

‘IRAQ

A Study in Political Development



H.M. KING GHAZI I

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*A Study in Political
Development*

by

PHILIP
WILLARD IRELAND

F R G S., M.A (Oxon), Ph D.



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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

IN preparing this study of the development of 'Iraq from being a remote and neglected portion of the Ottoman Empire in 1914 to her present position as a political unit possessing all the machinery of a modern state and standing on the aerial highway to the farther East, the author has had good reason to be grateful to a large number of persons who have permitted him to draw extensively on their time, knowledge and patience. He cannot hope to thank each by name. The complete list alone of those intimately connected with the creation of modern 'Iraq, both 'Iraqi and British, to whom the author is indebted would form a 'Who's Who of 'Iraq'. He must, however, acknowledge with particular gratitude the interest graciously shown by H.M. King Ghāzī I, who has given the author every possible encouragement; the valuable assistance of the former High Commissioners for 'Iraq, Sir Percy Cox, K.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., and Sir Francis Humphrys, G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., K.B.E., C.I.E., more recently H.B.M. Ambassador to 'Iraq, and the kindness of Sir Stephen Gaselee, K.C.M.G., Librarian of the Foreign Office, in facilitating the inspection of official papers.

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Auditor General; C. J. Edmonds, Esq., C.B.E., Adviser to the Ministry of Interior; E. G. Hogg, Esq., C.M.G., Adviser to the Ministry of Finance; and S. H. Longrigg, Esq., O.B.E., formerly Assistant Adviser to the Ministry of Finance.

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To his wife, Marjorie Webster Ireland, M.A., the author owes much more than these words can express, not merely for assistance with the tedious details of preparing the manuscript and the Index, but also for constant encouragement and unsparing criticism, without which the work would have never taken its present form.

PHILIP WILLARD IRELAND

SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION

IN transliterating Arabic words into English, the inevitable problem has arisen of adopting a system which would accurately represent the nearest English equivalent of each Arabic letter or diacritical mark and which would not, at the same time, confuse the reader with unfamiliar words and place-names or with a bewildering array of diacritical marks.

The writer, although not unmindful of the merits of other systems, as for instance that followed by Professor D. S. Margoliouth, of Oxford, has adopted the system employed by the Royal Geographical Society¹ although occasional lapses from it may be discovered. This system, although perhaps not so exact as others, has the advantage of employing single English letters, without distinguishing diacritical marks, for the Arabic letters of which the sounds seem to be duplications in most European ears. Thus Dāl (د) and Dād (ص) are here represented by the English letter D, Zāi (ز) and Zā (ظ) by Z, Tā (ت) and Tā (ط) by T, Sīn (س) and Sād (ص) by S, and Hā (ح) and Ha (ه) by H, except that the 'silent' final Hā is rendered as A or E.

'Ain (ع) is represented by '. Hamza Alif and Wasla Alif when transliterated are rendered as '. The two sequences Fat-ha Yā and Fat-ha Wāw are treated as AI and AU instead of AY and AW, respectively. This is perhaps open to objections since the two sequences are properly not diphthongs but combinations of a vowel and a consonant. The forms adopted by the R.G.S. II system have been retained, however, in the belief that AY and AW would result unnecessarily in un-

¹ Gleichen, Major-General Lord Edward, and Reynolds, J. H., *Alphabets of Foreign Languages transcribed into English according to the R.G.S. II System* (1921)

SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION

familiar spellings, as for example in Faisal, Husain, Saiyid, Beirut, etc.

Place-names follow the lists prepared by the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names¹ with a few exceptions, as Dair az-Zūr and Kūt al-‘Amāra. Long vowels have been indicated by “ except in the case of ‘Irāq and Baghdād. These names appear so frequently in the text that the distinguishing marks have been omitted on the grounds of convenience.

Arabic words in titles of books or reports and in citations have been given exactly as they appear, no attempt having been made to bring the Arabic words into conformity with the R.G.S. II System.

¹ *First List of Names in ‘Iraq (Mesopotamia)*, (1932), *First List of Names in Syria* (1927), Royal Geographical Society

إِلَى الْوَالِدِ الْحَبِيبِ الْمُسْتَوْجِبِ كُلِّ إِكْرَامٍ
تَقَارِعُهُ الْحُبَّةُ وَالشُّكْرُ وَالْإِحْتِرَامُ

*To the Hakim
in affection and gratitude*

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GREAT BRITAIN GOES TO WAR IN TURKISH ARABIA

LATE in the day of November 6th, 1914, a detachment of the 16th Infantry Brigade under the command of Brig.-General W. S. Delamain disembarked under the guns of H.M.S. *Odin* at Fao, the southernmost point of Turkish Arabia. The guns of the fort had been already silenced by the *Odin* and there was no further resistance. Within a few minutes the Union Jack replaced the Osmanli Crescent at the flagstaff.¹

Thus began the campaign which eventually was to wrest from the Ottoman Empire the whole of Turkish Arabia, as the Turkish wilayets or provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul were then known in British official circles,² and to lay the foundations of the Kingdom of 'Iraq.

In this engagement at Fao stands revealed, in brief, British policy in the Middle East: the control, direct or indirect, of the Persian Gulf and its natural extensions, the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, as the outposts of India, which, if jeopardized, must be safeguarded by force of arms when peaceful means had failed. When, therefore, from August, 1914, Turkey had given almost unmistakable indication that she would join the Central Powers against the Allies, the significance of her

¹ Brig.-General W. S. Delamain to Chief of General Staff, November 16th, 1914. See also, Moberley, Brig.-Gen. F. J. (*History of the Great War based on Official Documents*), *The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918* (London, 1923-27), Vol. 1, p. 107. Hereafter referred to as *O.H.* (Official History).

² In referring to the regions now known as 'Iraq, the attempt has been made in this work to employ the term current in official usage at the time. Thus Turkish Arabia is used for the pre-war period, Mesopotamia for the war-time and 'Iraq for the post-war period, although the latter term did not entirely displace that of Mesopotamia until 1920-21.

potential menace in Turkish Arabia could not be ignored. Her obvious military preparations: the general mobilization, the movement of an unprecedented number of troops to Basra and below, ostensibly directed against Kuwait and against Arab uprisings, the seizing of coal and supplies at Baghdad and Basra, the fortification of the Shatt al-‘Arab below Basra and Mohammerah could scarcely be dismissed as attempts, in time of universal war-fever, to set her house in order, as the Sublime Porte repeatedly assured Sir Louis Mallet, H.M. Ambassador in Constantinople.¹

The possibility of war in the Middle East with Turkey alone or allied with Germany had been anticipated by General Sir Douglas Haig, when Commander-in-Chief in India in 1911, in a memorandum in which he proposed the reorganization of the Indian Army to meet such a contingency. The occupation of Fao and Basra from India was no new project. It had been formally proposed by a special committee, composed of Admiral Sir E. Slade, Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies; Lieut.-General Sir Percy Lake, Chief of Staff, India; Lieut.-Colonel Sir H. McMahon, Foreign Secretary, India; and Sir Percy Cox, Political Resident, Persian Gulf, on January 15th, 1912, as a measure whereby the British position in Turkish Arabia might be established in the face of unfriendly Turkish officials. The Government of India had not then approved of the plan except as part of widespread hostilities. The project had been revived again in January, 1914, in connection with the defence of the Anglo-Persian oilfields, but the reply of the Government of India, to which the matter had been referred, was not received until July 30th, 1914.² In preparation for possible hostilities, the movements and particulars of Turkish troops in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys had been carefully recorded by H.M. consuls at Baghdad, Mōsul and Basra. Military

¹ See *Correspondence respecting events leading to the rupture of relations with Turkey, Accounts and Papers*, 1914-16. (Cd. 7628), LXXXIV, 179, especially Dispatches Nos. 3, 6, 14, 18, 64, 84, 87, 94, 118, 121 and 164.

² *O.H.*, Vol. 1, pp. 72 ff.

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handbooks on Turkish Arabia had been published¹; map and geographical surveys had been carried out over a considerable period.²

The hesitation in the autumn of 1914 attending the final decision to send an expeditionary force to the head of the Gulf in anticipation of the outbreak of war with Turkey must be attributed, not to any failure to recognize the importance of the threatened Imperial interests, but rather to a reluctance, in the face of the existing circumstances, to take the inevitable plunge. The Government of India, fearing that its internal strength had already been seriously weakened by the withdrawal of troops overseas, felt unwilling to spare further forces for the proposed expedition. It also feared the disastrous effects which the initiation of hostilities against Turkey and the 'Commander of the Faithful' might have on the Indian Muslims.³ To appear blameless in the eyes of Islam became of greater importance, for the moment, than the gaining of immediate military and political advantages at the head of the Persian Gulf.

H.M. Government, on their part, although fully appreciating the proposals of the India Office and the Admiralty, formulated after numerous conferences, hesitated to dissipate men and energy on so distant a venture while every effort was being made to stem the German advance in France and Flanders, and while there was even a remote possibility that Turkey might not declare war.

By the middle of September, however, it became apparent to the Foreign Office, to the Naval authorities of the Admiralty and to the Military and Political staffs of the India Office that precautionary action at the head of the Gulf could no longer be delayed. The belief that war was imminent, a matter even

¹ *Military Reports on Eastern Turkey in Asia* (Secret), War Office, in progress from 1904.

² Notably Lorimer's *Geographical and Statistical Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf*.

³ For a critical view of the attitude of the Government of India to the Mesopotamia Expedition, see Minority Report by Cmdr. Wedgwood, in *Report of the Commissioners . . . to inquire into the operations of War in Mesopotamia*, (Cd. 8610).

of a few days, and that immediate action should be taken, was expressed by General Barrow, Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for India, in an appreciation of the situation, dated September 26th, in which he declared that troops should be sent at once to the Shatt al-‘Arab and landed on Persian soil, ‘ostensibly to protect the oil installation, but in reality to notify the Turks we mean business and to the Arabs we are ready to support them.’¹

On the basis of this appreciation, Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, with the concurrence of Lord Kitchener, warned the Viceroy on the same day: ‘Situation as regards Turkey most menacing and it may be necessary to demonstrate at the head of the Gulf.’ He further indicated that a secret expedition to Abadan was probable. On October 2nd, with Cabinet approval, the diversion of an infantry brigade, two mountain batteries, a company of sappers, and necessary medical and transport units was ordered to Abadan. In secret instructions it was stated that the whole of the 6th Division would follow as quickly as possible in the event of hostilities with Turkey.² The destination was later changed to Bahrain, where the expedition was to await further orders, in deference to the continued protests of the Viceroy and of the Government of India.³

The necessity of safeguarding Persian oil supplies for British consumption has been the usual reason given for the consent of H.M. Government to the dispatch of the expeditionary force to Basra,⁴ but it was rather the reason which kept the expeditionary force in Turkish Arabia, than that which originally sent it there. Whatever part Persian oil eventually played in ‘floating the Allies to victory on a wave of oil’, to recall Lord Curzon’s famous remark,⁵ there appears to be little evidence to indicate that the necessity of its protection occupied so great a part in

¹ *O.H.*, Vol. 1, pp. 86 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 99.

³ Government of India to Secretary of State (hereafter S/S) for India, *O.H.*, Vol. 1, pp. 93 ff. Viceroy of India to S/S for India, *ibid.*, pp. 93 ff.

⁴ *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th Series, Vol. XL (1920), p. 887.

⁵ Speech made to the Inter-Allied Petroleum Council, November 21st, 1918.

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the final decision as has since been assigned to it. The immediate importance of the oil supplies was discounted by the Admiralty itself. Mr. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote, on September 1st, in a minute on a memorandum by Admiral Slade urging the dispatch of an expedition: 'There is little likelihood of troops being available for this purpose. Indian troops must be used at the decisive point. We shall have to buy our oil from elsewhere.'¹

The India Office itself did not take the view that oil was the chief objective to be gained in sending the expedition. General Barrow placed oil as the last of five objectives to be thus gained.² The Secretary of State for India, writing in a private letter to the Viceroy, after the expedition had been ordered to proceed, stated: 'Of the various objects to be attained by sending a force up the Gulf, I have always regarded the moral effect on the Arab chiefs as the primary and the protection of the oil stores as the secondary.'³ The Government of India also held that oil was not so valuable as to outweigh the consequences of an attack on Persia.⁴

The menace of Basra as a fortified enemy port from which enemy ships or even submarines, transported piecemeal over the disjointed sections of the Baghdad Railway, would strike at Imperial communications in the Indian Ocean, might have carried more weight in the decision to send the expedition had the Baghdad Railway been completed or had Turkey, with the aid of Germany, had the opportunity before the outbreak of war to establish an adequate naval base and force in the Persian Gulf. Information that the *Emden* might take refuge in the Gulf was discounted by the Admiralty. Any attack on India from Basra was, under the circumstances, regarded as unfeasible.

The paramount danger, in the opinion of H.M. Government,

¹ Cited *O.H.*, Vol. 1, p. 82.

² *Ibid.*, p. 88.

³ Letter (private), Lord Crewe to Viceroy, October 9th, 1914, quoted in evidence before the Mesopotamia Commission. Also in *O.H.*, Vol. 1, p. 95.

⁴ Telegram to S/S for India, October 7th, 1914, cited *O.H.*, Vol. 1, p. 94.

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from hostile powers in Turkish Arabia, athwart lines of communication to Persia, Afghanistan and beyond, and to eastern Arabia via Zubair and Kuwait, was not merely the military or naval action which the Central Powers might take there. It was rather the power of Turkey as the principal Islamic state, influenced and supported by German funds and by German officers who never wearied of proclaiming the pro-Islamic sympathies of the German Emperor, to unite the latent forces of religion, of political discontent and of unrest in the Near and Middle East against Great Britain, to undermine and probably destroy the position and the prestige which Great Britain had created and had maintained in the previous three hundred years.

In a memorandum of September 2nd, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Political Secretary to the Secretary of State for India, wrote:

The political effect in the Persian Gulf and in India of leaving the head of the Gulf derelict will be disastrous, and we cannot afford, politically, to acquiesce in such a thing for an indefinite period while the main issues are being settled elsewhere. From the military point of view a Turkish diversion in that region is doubtless negligible, though under German officers it may not be wholly ineffective: but it will be worked for all it is worth for the sake of the political effect which the Turks and Germans hope to produce through it on Moslem feelings on India. Moreover . . . we cannot begin by sacrificing the Shaikh of Kuwait.¹

General Barrow stated, in a minute on the above memorandum, that in the event of hostilities,

British interests at Baghdad and Basra will be swept out of existence. Our allies the Shaikhs of Mohammerah and Kuwait will be threatened and may consequently be attacked or seduced, in which case all our prestige and all our labours of years will vanish into air and our position in the Gulf itself will become precarious. Can we avert this?²

¹ *O.H.*, Vol. I, p. 80.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 80-1.

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Even more serious was the prospect of Turco-Arab co-operation, and of a *Jihād* or Holy War which might be directed against the Suez Canal and Egypt and which might spread by means of Turkish and German encouragement through Persia and Afghanistan to India where, combined with latent sedition and rebellion, it might spread like wildfire at a time when India would be least able to cope with it. The conviction that these threats were real and were most potent reasons why the expedition should be sent was recorded by General Barrow in his memorandum of September 26th:

Such a contingency (immediate war with Turkey) need not alarm us unless the Turks succeed in drawing the Arabs to their side. In that case they will proclaim a Jihad and endeavour to raise Afghanistan and the frontier tribes against us, which might be a serious danger to India and would most certainly add enormously to our difficulties and responsibilities. This shows how important it is to us to avert a Turco-Arab coalition. It is known that Turkey has been intriguing right and left to win over the Arabs, and it is even said that Ibn Saud, the leading Arab Chief, has been induced to join the Turks. If this is true we may expect serious trouble in Mesopotamia and in Egypt.¹

Although events after the outbreak of the war were to prove that the dangers as well as the possibilities of effective Muslim co-operation had been greatly overstressed in London, the fear of German and Turkish propaganda and subversive activities had not been without foundation. A German mission composed of thirty-two members was known to be on its way in September, 1914, to Afghanistan by way of Aleppo and Kerman.² Other missions, sent to stir up the Muslims in India, in the Yemen and in Egypt, had been reported.³ Attempts

¹ *O.H.*, Vol. 1, pp. 86 ff.

² *Acts. and Papers*, 1914-16 (Cd. 7628), LXXXIV, 179; Dispatch No. 100, Sir E. Grey to Sir Louis Mallet, September 29th, 1914.

³ *Ibid.*, Dispatch No. 44, Mr Cheetham to Sir E. Grey, August 28th, 1914; No. 59, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, September 5th, 1914; No. 127, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, October 14th, 1914; No. 150, Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey, October 19th, 1914.

were being made to alienate the loyalty of the Shaikh of Mohammerah¹ and to induce Ibn Sa‘ūd, Amīr of the Najd, to take up arms for Turkey.² In early October, Enver Pasha admitted that efforts were being made to enlist Bedouin sympathies for the Ottoman Empire.³ Confirmation of this and other efforts to stir up anti-British and anti-Russian feeling among the Arabs had also been reported from all sections of Turkey’s Arab dominions.⁴

A mission had been reported as destined for Persia,⁵ where the future revelation of the activities of Wassmus,⁶ Neidermayer, Zugmayer and others was to confirm the pre-war suspicion that every effort was being made not only to embarrass the British and Russians by sporadic hostilities, but also to force Persia, as the second Islamic state, into war against the Allies, and thus prove Germany’s contention that Islam itself was on the side of the Central Powers.⁷

A British expedition into Turkish Arabia would not only neutralize such threats against British prestige and position, but would also enable Great Britain to consolidate her position at the head of the Persian Gulf. It would enable her to convert her special privileges in Turkish Arabia, laboriously won from the Sublime Porte and as tenaciously held, into rights by conquest as had been proposed in 1912. It was an opportunity too tempting to be allowed to slip, as earlier and more subtle opportunities had been allowed to pass, of settling in her favour, once and for all, the international rivalries which had, more than

¹ Wilson, Sir A. T., *Loyalties, Mesopotamia*, 1914-1917, p. 7 (Hereafter *Mesopotamia*, 1914-17).

² *Accts. and Papers*, 1914-16 (Cd. 7628), LXXXIV, 179; Dispatch No. 100, Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet, September 29th, 1914.

³ *Ibid.*, Dispatch No. 107, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, October 6th, 1914.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 129, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, October 15th, 1914; No. 163, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, October 23rd, 1914; No. 173, Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey, October 28th, 1914.

⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 59, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, September 8th, 1914.



⁶ For activities of Wassmus, see Sykes, C., *Wassmus, ‘The German Lawrence’* (1936).

⁷ Sykes, Sir Percy, *History of Persia* (2 vols., 1930, 3rd ed.), Vol. II, pp. 442-50. For extracts from the Diary of Zugmayer, see *O.H.*, Vol. I, App. I, pp. 344-5.

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once, threatened the *status quo* in the Persian Gulf, and, in turn, the peace of Europe. Once established at Basra, Great Britain, in the event of a successful outcome of the general struggle, could look forward to the maintenance of her time-honoured policy of keeping guard over India through her supremacy in the Gulf and its extensions, to the possible utilization of these same regions as links in speedier communications with India and to the restoration of her ancient trade and commercial supremacy in the Middle East.

OUTLINE MAP OF PERSIAN GULF



THE GROWTH OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES VALLEYS

IT was trade which first brought the English to the Persian Gulf and into the Tigris and Euphrates valleys,¹ as it had first taken them to India, China and Japan. In 1616, the East India Company, hoping to find new markets for its woollen cloth, no longer a novelty in India, dispatched the *James* under the terms of the three *farmāns*² obtained by Richard Steele and John Crowther from Shah Abbas in September, 1615,³ to Jask, just outside the Clarence Straits. A few years later, 1619, the monopoly of the silk trade through the Persian Gulf was granted to the Company⁴ by Shah Abbas.

The Portuguese, for more than a century following a treaty with Shah Ismā'il in 1515, had dominated trade from Hormuz, but after the capture of the island in 1622 by a combined force of Englishmen and Persians,⁵ they speedily lost the ascendancy, not to the English, but to the Dutch. Not until 1766, when the Dutch factory on Kharag Island was destroyed by the Persians and the Dutch threats to sweep England from the seas had come to nothing, were the English merchants able to gain the mastery of trade in the Middle East, a supremacy which they have

¹ John Newbery, Ralph Fitch and John Elred of the Turkey and Levant Co., founded in 1581, had already passed from Aleppo to Baghdad and thence down the Persian Gulf to India. See: Purchas, *His Pilgrimes* (ed. 1625), lib. viii, p. 449. Hakluyt, Tome II, i, pp. 245-71; also Birdwood, Sir G., *Report on Miscellaneous Old Records at the India Office* (1890), p. 196.

² *Farmān*, following the Persian *فرمان*.

³ Purchas *His Pilgrimes*, lib. iv, cap. xiii, p. 524. For an account of the opening of trade with Persia by the Moscovy Co., see *Early Voyages in Russia and Persia* (Hakluyt Society), edited by Morgan, E. D., and Coote, C. H. (2 vols., 1886).

⁴ *State Papers* (East Indies), No. 753.

⁵ Low, C. R., *History of the Indian Navy* (1877), Vol. I, pp. 31-7. The terms of co-operation were never fully carried out by the Persians.

retained to the present time, in spite of acute rivalry from other Powers, notably Germany and Japan in the twentieth century.¹

From the first, the East India Company had been obliged to undertake more than purely commercial activities. The pioneering nature of their ventures and the distance from the home government made it essential that they, in common with other trading companies of that age, should maintain their own armies and navies, provide their own charts and conduct most of their own political negotiations, activities which, in the end, were to overshadow the commercial origins of the companies. From the beginning, ships of the Company, and later of its Bombay Marine, were stationed in the Gulf to protect trade and on political missions.

Piracy for a time threatened to be a more serious obstacle to English trade than the hostility of European rivals.² The freebooters, the most numerous and troublesome of whom were the Jawasim (properly *جواسيم*) tribes along the Gulf coast from Ras Musandum to Qatar peninsula, whose predatory habits had been stimulated by Wahhābī influence with its emphasis on the Muslim injunction of plunder and death to unbelievers, attacked not only merchant shipping but also Company cruisers. Aroused by the continued attacks, the Company dispatched a series of expeditions from Bombay in 1806, 1809,³ and 1819,⁴ which effectually broke the power of the Pirate Coast tribes,⁵ whose chiefs were forced to sign a General Treaty of Peace, January 8th, 1820.⁶

¹ British imports have declined, however, from 60 per cent of the total in the years immediately before 1914 to 32 per cent in 1934-5. Japanese imports rose from 1·83 per cent in 1930-1 to 20·04 per cent of the total in 1934-5: *Economic Conditions in 'Iraq*, 1933-35, Department of Overseas Trade, No. 627 (1936).

² Low, *op cit*, pp. 79 ff. Also Miles, S. B., *Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf* (1919), Vol. I, pp. 223, 266 ff.

³ Low, *op cit.*, Vol. I, p. 325.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

⁵ The section of coast inhabited by the Arab pirates was then so-called. After the treaty it became known as the Trucial Coast.

⁶ Aitchison, C. U., *Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries* (Delhi, 1933, 5th ed.), Vol. XI, Persian Gulf, No. XIX.

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From the Treaty of 1820, arising primarily from the necessity of safety for commerce, dated the beginnings of the political supremacy of Great Britain over the Arabs of the Gulf. It was eventually replaced in 1853 by a Treaty of Peace in perpetuity which stipulated that 'perfect maritime truce' now established 'for evermore' should be enforced by the British Government. All acts of aggression were to be referred to the British authorities in the Persian Gulf.¹

Traffic in slaves in the Gulf had been forbidden in Article 9 of the Treaty of 1820, but it had not been noticeably affected by the prohibition. Additional treaties and agreements attempted to deal with the traffic,² but only the presence of British men-of-war on patrol in the Gulf, with orders to seize all slaving ships, effectively suppressed it.

Experience gained from the early attempts to deal with the pirates, especially after the expeditions of 1809 and 1819, had shown the necessity for charts of the Persian Gulf. Preliminary surveys had been undertaken in 1772 of the coast, and in 1785 of the Shatt al-'Arab as far as Basra, but not until 1820 was the work resumed under Captain Philip Maughan and later under Captain Guy.³ The surveys continued for nine years, forming the basis of the present charts of the Gulf. Other surveys, principally in Turkish Arabia, were made throughout the century until the outbreak of the war in 1914.⁴

¹ Aitchison, *Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries* (Delhi, 1933, 5th ed.), Vol. xi, Persian Gulf, No. xxiv.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. xiii (Calcutta, 1933, 5th ed.). Persia, Nos xv, xvi, xix; *ibid.*, Vol. xi, Persian Gulf Nos. ix, xx, xxiii, xxviii, xxix.

³ Low, *op. cit.*, Vol. i, pp. 185 ff.

⁴ Chesney, in 1835-6, made surveys of the Tigris and Euphrates, a work carried on by Cmdr. Henry Blosse Lynch, from 1837 to 1840, when he surveyed the Tigris from Mōsul to Ctesiphon and sections of the Euphrates. Capt. J. C. Hawkins explored the Euphrates with great difficulty for some 500 miles above Basra in 1838. In 1840-2, the Tigris below Baghdad was surveyed by Lieutenant C. D. Campbell. Commander Felix Jones, 1843-54, explored the Persian hills from Baghdad to Mōsul, and made surveys from Musayib to Baghdad. In 1841-2, and again in 1856, Captain W. S. Selby made surveys from Babylon to Sāmawa and up the Kārūn river. See: Wilson, Sir A. T., *Persian Gulf* (1928), pp. 281 ff. Low, *op. cit.*, Vol. ii, pp. 31 ff., pp. 403 ff; also, Hoskins, H. L., *British Routes to India* (1928), pp. 180-2.

The keeping of the peace, the suppression of piracy, the charting of the rivers and seas, the restriction of slave-trading and the control of the traffic in arms have often been claimed, and rightly so, as due entirely to the efforts of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. To go farther, however, and ascribe these self-imposed tasks to motives of disinterestedness or pure philanthropy, or to describe them as forming ‘the most unselfish page in history’,¹ and to adduce therefrom, as has so often been done, the right of Great Britain to supremacy in the Persian Gulf and its extensions, the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, is to disregard the true nature of Great Britain’s activities in the Middle East.

Nations do not vie among themselves for control over lands and seas, primarily to give justice, to raise standards of living among the people, or to suppress disorder *per se*. If these blessings come, they come as secondary aspects or as by-products of men’s efforts to enlarge their economic resources or to safeguard that which they have already won. It is a commonplace that where trading ventures have gone forth to new lands in search of wealth, fresh markets, new or cheaper sources of raw materials or commodities, the extension of the political authority of the mother country has eventually followed in direct proportion to the economic value of the territory concerned or to the degree of resistance which is offered by its inhabitants. Only political authority, with force at its disposal, can guard from external attack that which has already been won or break the opposition of the native peoples and pave the way for further extension of territory. Only by the assumption of authority can a continuity of administration be provided, without which commerce cannot flourish. It only can maintain order, establish legal security, regulate tariffs and imposts, under which the economic development of the territory can proceed on the most favourable conditions to the nationals of the mother country.

¹ Lord Curzon, November 21st, 1903. See *Lord Curzon in India*, (1906), p. 502.

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If these benefits extend to the natives of the country it is because the latter cannot, in the very nature of the circumstances, help sharing them. If conscious efforts are made to extend improved conditions and to encourage the so-called arts of peace among the native population, it is because any increase of their well-being must lead to their increased productiveness and purchasing power and to less costly methods of control and of administration.

It cannot be denied that individual officials and even the mother country itself are often genuinely concerned for the well-being of the peoples they have taken in charge. The records of India, for instance, are crowded with the names of soldiers and administrators who have given full measure of devotion to the peoples under them. In a conflict of interests, and these must inevitably occur, it is only natural that those of the mother-country should come first, and that the good of the people themselves must, in reality, be subordinated to the expected material or political returns.

It is a further commonplace that once political authority has been established under such circumstances, it tends to forget the commercial origins which called it into being in the new territories. Its own maintenance becomes its chief objective. In extenuation of such diversion of aim, it might claim that only thus can it facilitate economic development, provide opportunities for the employment of its own nationals, and increase the prestige and power which are associated with the command of such territory.

The political authority is therefore constantly engaged in efforts to consolidate its control over the territory won, and to extend wherever possible, by conquest or peaceful penetration, its dominion. Its aim is not merely the increase of its own power and importance. It also seeks to bring the new territories to strategical frontiers or to develop them along strategical lines of communication so that they may act as buffers to the original spheres of interest, particularly if these original spheres, by

reason of their vastness and economic importance, have become vital to the continued well-being of the mother-country.

These observations seem to be borne out particularly by the history of the relation between the Persian Gulf and Turkish Arabia both to India and to the British Empire. In the promotion and protection of trade the East India Company was led, as has been related, into activities which, taking on the inevitable political aspect, were to overshadow its original aims.

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The increasing tendency, as the years passed, towards political sovereignty on a territorial or a quasi-territorial basis, while revealed early in the Company's attitude to India,¹ became fully apparent in the Gulf and in Turkish Arabia when, as one of the three Middle East corridors to India and as a flank to the other two routes, they were taken into the arena of European politics. The schemes of Napoleon to bring England to her knees by the invasion of India, to which the brilliancy of his military genius and his spectacular negotiations with Russia, Turkey and Persia lent more colour than substance, and the subsequent Russian expansion to the south aroused both official and public opinion to fear for the safety of India. From that time onward, Great Britain's interest in the Persian Gulf and in Turkish Arabia was, primarily, their importance as outposts of India, and as points from which Persia and the two other Middle East routes through Baluchistan and Afghanistan might be controlled, their passage by an unfriendly Power prohibited. The additional

¹ On December 12th, 1687, the Company wrote to the President of Fort St. George: 'That which we promise ourselves in a most especial manner from our new President and council is that these will establish such a politic of civil and military power and create and secure a large revenue to maintain both at that place as may be the foundation of a large, well grounded, sure English Dominion in India for all time to come' (*Diary of Sir William Hedges*, p. 117). See also, Resolution passed by the Court of Directors, 1689, Birdwood, op. cit., p. 230.

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importance of the Gulf, together with the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, as an alternative or quicker route to India was realized first when the potentiality of steam as applied to river craft and railways became evident, and later, when the development of the internal combustion engine opened the way for Empire air communications.

The extension and consolidation of British political organization were among the first steps towards the conversion of the Persian Gulf into an Indian Lake. A number of the points at which the East India Company had set up its representatives had already exercised considerable extra-commercial influence. Their political importance was recognized by the British Government in the establishment of consulates, as at Basra in 1764. At Bushire, the centre of Great Britain's interests in the Gulf, a representative of H.M. Government replaced an official of the East India Company as Resident. Harford Jones, Resident at Basra, was sent, in 1798, to Baghdad as permanent Resident, with a double object: to arrange with the semi-independent Pasha for the transmission of official dispatches across the wilayet, and to observe and counteract the work of French agents believed to be active in that region.¹ Baghdad soon became the chief centre of British influence in Turkish Arabia. By 1822, the entire establishment of the East India Company had acquired a political status. Factors and brokers became Political Residents and native Agents. The relations between the Gulf and England had passed from the ledgers of merchants to the dispatches of statesmen.²

The Napoleonic menace to India, more dreaded than real, passed,³ but the Russian pressure southward, begun in the later part of the eighteenth century, intensified. Russia's long

¹ *India Office Records*, Vol VI, Loose Papers, Packet 11, Bundle 1, Nos. 7, 8. Jones was created a baronet for his services.

² Curzon, G. N., *Persia and the Persian Question* (2 vols., 1892), Vol II, p. 553. Until the war the Residents at Bushire and Baghdad, and the Consuls at Meshd, Shiraz, Mohammerah and Basra were nominated and paid by the Government of India, but reported both to it and to the Foreign Office. *Ibid.*, p. 624.

³ *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, I, 151-70

strides over the Caucasus, to the sea of Aral, 1844-8, into the valley of the Sir Darya, 1849-64, to Khiva, 1873, and Khokand, 1876, and, after the fall of Geok Teppe, the Turcomans' most formidable fortress, into Merv, February, 1884, brought her territories, consolidated by railroads, almost to India's Central Asian frontiers.¹ Her unceasing assimilation of territory in northern Persia and her acquisition of markets and influence over even larger areas confirmed British merchants and statesmen in their fear that Russia intended the subjection of Persia not merely for the sake of commerce but also to guarantee access to India by the Persian Gulf or by Central Asia.

These fears were not allayed by Russian efforts to obtain a coaling station in the Gulf at the end of the nineteenth century, by the establishment of Russian consulates at Bushire, Basra and Baghdad where few, if any, Russian subjects lived,² and by the steady infiltration over the mountains of Kurdistan towards Baghdad. Not less disturbing were the activities of Russian financiers with political backing, in the *Banque d'Escompte et des Prêts de Perse*, in seeking concessions in Persia and in Turkey, such as Count Kapnist's project for a Mediterranean-Kuwait Railroad,³ or in blocking concessions to other powers, as by the Russo-Persian Railway Agreement of November 12th, 1890.⁴ All of these were regarded as manifestations of the Russian dream of a vast Oriental Empire including India and warm weather ports as revealed in the will of Peter the Great, which, even if spurious, 'enshrines with admirable fidelity the leading principles that have guided the Asiatic policy of his country ever since'.⁵

Persian attempts to counter-balance with conquests in the

¹ Sykes, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 354 ff.

² Wilson, Sir A. T., *Persian Gulf*, p. 259; Frazer, Lovat, *India under Curzon and After* (1911), p. 91.

³ *The Times*, December 17th, 1898.

⁴ Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. XIII, Persia, App. No. XXIII.

⁵ Curzon, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 601. For English version of the alleged will, see Sykes, *Persia*, Vol. I, p. 245.

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south-east what she had lost to Russia elsewhere,¹ brought her into collision with Great Britain, who by successful military and naval actions, launched from the Gulf in the war of 1856-7, demonstrated the possibility of controlling Persia from her flank.²

Consolidation of British Influence in the Persian Gulf

The advance of Russia, and at the end of the nineteenth century, the appearance of Germany, as a serious claimant for a place in Turkish Arabia and in the Persian Gulf, coincided with 'a deliberate but necessary consolidation of our (British) influence' in the 'quarters where trouble threatened or where rivalry was feared',³ that is, in the Gulf and in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys.

In the Persian Gulf, veiled protectorates were established over the Arab chiefs, who agreed by treaties to enter into no other treaties, except with Great Britain, to admit no agents of other Powers and to alienate no territory save by permission of the British Government.⁴ Shaikh Mubārak of Kuwait, who possessed the finest natural harbour in the Persian Gulf and who had repeatedly asked for British protection was brought into treaty relations, January 23rd, 1899, at the direction of Lord Curzon.⁵ His earlier requests had been refused as he was

¹ As by the Treaties of Turkomanchai, February 22nd, 1822: Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. XIII, Persia, App. No. VII; *Brit and For. St. Papers*, xv, 669.

² *Lieut.-Gen. Sir James Outram's Persian Campaign in 1857* (1860), Low, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 98; *Asiatic Jour.*, Vol. XXVI, N S., Pt. II; *Brit and For. St. Papers*, XLVII, 282 ff.; Douglas, Sir G., and Ramsey, Sir G., *Panmure Papers* (2 vols., 1908), Vol. II, p. 470.

³ *Accts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3882), cxxv, 457; *Extract from a Despatch from the Government of India to S/S for India in Council, dated September 21st, 1899, referring to British Policy in Persia*. Paras 42-89 of this dispatch are given more fully in *British Documents on Origin of the World War, 1898-1914*, Gooch and Temperley, eds., (13 vols., 1926—) (Hereafter *Brit Docs.*).

⁴ Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. XI. Persian Gulf, No. XII; Trucial Coast Agreement, March 6th, 1892: *ibid.*, Persian Gulf, No. XXX; Bahrain Agreement, March 13th, 1892, *ibid.*, Persian Gulf, No. XIII.

⁵ *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol VII (1911), p. 587. One of his first administrative acts had been to instruct Col. Meade, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to bring Shaikh Mubārak into treaty relations. For treaty, see Aitchison, op. cit., Persian Gulf, No. XXXVI.

under the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan¹ and he was, strictly speaking, a usurper. The prospect of Kuwait, however, as a Russian port or as the German terminus of the Baghdad railway overcame any scruples which may have been felt.

Khaza‘al, Shaikh of Mohammerah, owing allegiance to Persia and possessing immense power on both the Persian and Turkish sides of the lower Shatt al-‘Arab, over which he exercised *de facto* control, was also brought on Lord Curzon’s suggestion, into excellent understanding with the British Government.²

Throughout the later nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, it was Lord Curzon who, having taken India and the Middle East as his special interests, did more, both as a private citizen and as a public servant, than any other individual of his day³ to direct attention to the rivalries of the Powers in the Middle East, and to the necessity of British control in the Persian Gulf and its extensions, and of strengthening India’s defences against what he believed to be dangers of the greatest

¹ Lord Curzon, in 1892, had recognized that Kuwait owed allegiance to Turkey. He wrote: ‘Northward from Port Ujaïr, Ottoman dominion is established (on the Arab coast of the Gulf) without dispute as far as Fao’ Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 462. Kuwait was included in the territory thus described. Sir A. T. Wilson (*Persian Gulf*, p. 251) wrote, 1928, that until 1896, it was ‘regarded at home as under the exclusive influence of Turkey’. It would appear that while Ottoman sovereignty had never been contested until 1899, its claim had rested lightly on the Shaikh. In the agreement between Great Britain and Turkey, 1913, never ratified, Kuwait was recognized as an autonomous *qādhā* in which the British had a privileged position.

² Further agreements not to give pearl or sponge fishing concessions except by permission of the British Government, were signed by the Shaikh of Kuwait, July 29th, 1911, and later in the same year by the Shaikh of Bahrain and the shaikhs of the Trucial Coast, Atchison, op. cit., Vol. XI, *Persian Gulf*, No. xxxix. Agreements not to allow other post offices than those of India were signed by the Shaikh of Kuwait, February 28th, 1904, *ibid.*, No. xxxviii; by the Shaikh of Bahrain in 1911, not to grant oil concessions without permission of the British Government, by the Shaikh of Kuwait, October 27th, 1913, *ibid.*, No. xli; by the Shaikh of Bahrain, May 14th, 1914, *ibid.*, No. xvi; by the shaikhs of the Trucial Coast in February and May, 1922, *ibid.*, Nos. xxxiv, xxxv. The Shaikh of Qatar entered into an agreement on November 3rd, 1916, to observe all previous treaties with the shaikhs of the Persian Gulf, *ibid.*, No. xxxiii.

³ See tribute paid to him by Lovat Fraser, one time editor of the *Times of India*, in *Pro. C. Asian Soc.*, January 8th, 1908, pp. 7 ff., and in *India under Curzon and After*, p. 9.

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magnitude.¹ He was convinced that Russian threats to south Persia and to Turkish Arabia could not, commercially, politically or strategically be tolerated. 'Are we prepared,' he asked,

'to surrender control of the Persian Gulf and divide that of the Indian Ocean? Are we prepared to make the construction of the Euphrates Valley Railroad or some kindred scheme an impossibility for England and an ultimate certainty for Russia? Is Baghdad to become a new Russian capital in the south? Lastly, are we content to see a naval station within a few days' sail of Kurrachi and to contemplate a hostile squadron battering Bombay?'²

In his official role as Under-Secretary of State for India, 1891-2, and later as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs under Lord Salisbury, 1892-8, and more especially as Viceroy of India, 1899-1905, he put his convictions into practice. The Indian Frontiers were strengthened, the North-West Frontier Province was instituted and a frontier policy evolved.³ The question of the defence of India against European rivals was reviewed at his instance and set forth at length in the now famous dispatch of September 21st, 1899.⁴ The dispatch emphasized in detail that the *de facto* political situation reflected a more positive British predominance than the *de jure* position might indicate. The Viceroy in Council declared:

Upon the question of allowing any European Power, and more especially Russia, to overrun Central and Southern Persia and so to reach the Gulf or to acquire naval facilities

¹ Frazer, Lovat, *op. cit.*, p. 8. Also Leslie, Shane, *Studies in Sublime Failures* (1932), p. 204. Curzon, G. N., *Russia in Central Asia* (1899). Also *Quarterly Review*, January, 1887.

² Curzon, *op. cit.*, p. 378. Contrast his view of the Euphrates Valley Railroad here, with that expressed in *Persia and the Persian Question*, Vol. I, pp. 635 ff.

³ His views on frontier policy may be examined at length in his Budget speeches of March 27th, 1901, of March 26th, 1902, and March 30th, 1904; also in his speech at the Durbar at Peshawar, April 26th, 1902. Excerpts from all these may be found in *Lord Curzon in India*, pp. 415 ff., 418 ff., 428 ff., 422 ff., respectively.

⁴ *Accts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3882), CXXV, 457; with additional material in *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. IV, No. 319, pp. 356-63.

in the latter even without such territorial connections, we do not conceive that any doubt whatever can be entertained; and we imagine that it will be accepted as a cardinal axiom of British policy that no such development would be acquiesced in by H.M. Government.¹

To curb Russian rivalry, three possible policies were put forward. Of these the most favoured was that of partitioning Persia into spheres of influence along specific boundaries, as was eventually done by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. It was pointed out, however, at the time, that if the agreement were made as suggested, it

would not for one moment retard, but might on the contrary accelerate her (Russia) advance to the same objective through Mesopotamia by way of Baghdad. This is an issue which we should regard with scarcely inferior repugnance.²

Lord Curzon's vigorous policy was capped by protection of the Shaikh of Kuwait from Turkish attempts to reassert authority. Twice in 1901 a British cruiser was sent to his aid. The threats of Amīr Ibn Rashīd against Kuwait at Turkish instigation were countered in the same year by the dispatch of three British cruisers to the harbour and of British troops to Jahara, eighteen miles inland. The attempt of the nephews of Mubārak to unseat him was also checked by H.M.S. *Lapwing*.³

To renew Arab confidence, already somewhat shaken by German propaganda, Lord Curzon, accompanied by eight ships of war, paid the first viceregal visit in history to the Gulf, in November and December, 1903.⁴ Speaking to the assembled chiefs at Sharja, November 21st, he revealed his attitude to the

¹ *Accts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3882), cxxv, 464.

² *Ibid.*, p. 466.

³ *Times History of the War* (22 vols., 1914-22), Vol. III, ch. lii. Also Frazer, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁴ Curzon's meeting at Kuwait with 'the late Mr. Reynolds, Mr. d'Arcy's oil engineer, who was on his way to England, led to his (Mr. Reynolds) return to examine the Maidan-i-Naptura area and the discovery of the Anglo-Persian oilfields'. Dane, Sir Louis, *The Times*, April 6th, 1935.

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question of Great Britain's place in India, the Persian Gulf and in the Middle East, a point of view which was to come to the front again when he dominated the Middle East policy of H.M. Government after the Armistice of 1918. He said in part to the shaikhs:

The great Empire of India, which it is our duty to defend, lies almost at your gates. We saved you from extinction at the hands of your neighbours. We opened these seas to the ships of all nations and enabled their flags to fly in peace. We have not seized or held your territory. We have not destroyed your independence but have preserved it. We are not now going to throw away this century of costly and triumphant enterprise; we shall not wipe out the most unselfish page in history. The Peace of these waters must still be maintained; your independence will continue to be upheld; and the influence of the British Government must remain supreme.¹

Had any previous doubt existed as to British official policy for the Persian Gulf, none should have existed after the statement by Lord Lansdowne, Secretary of State for India, in the House of Lords, May 5th, 1903. He said in conclusion:

It seems to me that our policy (with regard to the Persian Gulf) should be directed in the first place to protect and promote British trade in those waters. In the next place I do not think . . . that . . . those efforts should be directed towards the exclusion of the legitimate trade of other powers. In the third place — I say it without hesitation — we should regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal.²

British Interests in Turkish Arabia

In the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain was less able to adopt the vigorous policy

¹ *Lord Curzon in India*, p. 502.

² *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 4th S., Vol. CXXI (1903), pp. 1347-8.

pursued in the Persian Gulf. For the most part¹ she continue to rely, for the maintenance of her interests, on her traditional prestige at the Sublime Porte and on the extension of her special position in Turkish Arabia, dating from the establishment of the first English factory at Basra in 1643, after the first venture of the East India Company there in 1635.²

Much of the British influence in the valleys had been the result of the political organization deliberately set up in recognition of their strategical importance. The Baghdad Residency supplanting that of Basra, in 1810, as the chief political centre of Great Britain in Turkish Arabia, acquired considerable political influence with local Turkish authorities, who had not been averse to making use of British assistance against Persian or Arab disturbers of the peace.³

The development of canal and river navigation between 1820 and 1840 gave the Mesopotamian valleys a new importance to

¹ Cf. proposals to occupy Basra in 1911, and in January, 1914, *O II*, Vol. 1, p. 73. Turkish authorities were aware of Great Britain's desire to increase her influence. Cf. Speech of a Member of the Committee of Union and Progress, Baghdad, April 18th, 1911 'Listen, dear compatriots — For a number of years England has been endeavouring to increase her political influence in the Persian Gulf. This influence is being felt in Basra . . . We must be ready to resist any political aggression on our territories. We must awaken our Government to take immediate steps to protect Basra.' Also speech of the *Wali* of Baghdad, August 30th, 1911, cited *infra*, p. 70, and *Al-Misbah* (Baghdad), March 14th, 1913, which warned readers that Great Britain intended to do in Turkish Iraq what she had done in India, that the Lynch Company, supported by England, were 'harbingers of a vast colony here', and advised readers 'to arm themselves to fight the pioneers of the colonizing army'.

² For an able résumé of the early development of British trading interests in Iraq, see Longrigg, S. H., *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*, 1925, pp. 107, 175, 188, 254-5 *passim*.

³ In 1763, the Pasha of Baghdad asked for help against the Ka'ab, who were attacking towns and shipping around Basra. Six ships were eventually sent from Bombay, in 1766. Later, in 1774, when ships had been furnished to the Pasha, he requested the British to use them as they thought fit for Turkish interests. In 1778, the British aided the Turks to regain Basra from the Persians, while in 1798, the Resident at Bushire was called in to adjust claims between the Sultan of Oman and the Pasha of Baghdad. When there was a possibility, between 1835 and 1839, that Muhammad 'Ali's Egyptian army might advance from the head of the Gulf and attack Baghdad, it is reported that the Turkish Government asked for British intervention. Hogarth, D. G., *Penetration of Arabia* (1904), pp. 84-7, 104, *passim*.

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the British Government and to the Indian Presidencies when, in the nineteenth century, they sought speedier communications between India and England.¹ The scheme to establish communications with India by means of a line of mail steamers running regularly on the Euphrates River, found its chief early protagonist in Captain F. R. Chesney, R.A., who, after preliminary surveys of both the Euphrates and the Egyptian routes,² undertook with Government assistance to make a thorough survey of the Euphrates route. Few of the results so confidently promised by Chesney were accomplished, although he did succeed under great difficulties in launching two small steamers at Miskine on the Euphrates, in reaching Basra and in obtaining much information.³ In the meantime, the Near and Middle East had become comparatively quiet under the terms of the Protocol of London, 1841, by which Russian, French and Egyptian ambitions were checked for the time being.⁴ The Mesopotamian route was neglected in favour of that lying across Egypt, already partially developed.⁵

The increase of Russian influence in Persia and in Turkey with its supposed menace to the security of India coincided with a wave of railway expansion in England and in Europe. British interest was renewed in the project, originally proposed in 1850,⁶ to build a British-owned Euphrates Valley Railway along the Mesopotamian route to India. Plans for the financing and construction of the railroad had made considerable pro-

¹ *Parl. Debates*, 3rd S., Vol. xxvi (1834), p. 142; *Parl. Papers*, 1831-2 (735-11), x. Pt. II, App. 25, 675 ff.; 1834 (478), xiv, 369 ff.; 1837 (540), xliii, 223; 1837-8 (356), xli, 365.

² *Parl. Papers*, 1834 (478), xiv, App. 16; *Reports on the Navigation of the Red Sea and the River Euphrates, submitted to Government by Capt. Chesney, F.R.S., of the Royal Artillery* Chesney had at first, because of marshes, difficulties of navigation and unfriendliness of the Arabs, taken an unfavourable view of the Euphrates route (*ibid.*, p. 51).

³ *Parl. Papers*, 1837 (540), xliii, 235 ff.; Chesney, F. R., *Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition* (1868), pp. 172 ff.; Poole, S. L., (ed.), *Life of General F. R. Chesney* (1885), pp. 293 ff.

⁴ *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, xxiv, 703 ff.

⁵ Hoskins, *op. cit.*, ch. ix, x, for growth of Egyptian route.

⁶ By R. M. Stephenson. See article in *Calcutta Review*, Vol. xxv, pp. 145 ff.

gress¹ and Lord Palmerston's promise of Government support for political reasons seems to have been obtained,² when suddenly, on August 14th, 1857, Lord Palmerston withdrew the support of the Government.³ The whole project fell through.

British public opinion had not been unanimously in favour of the Mesopotamian route to India. The objection was raised that the British fleet could not be used to protect the route. Its strategical value, either to convey troops to India or to counteract Russian influence, was not a subject of agreement even among military experts.⁴ It was contended, even as it was of the Suez Canal, that the construction of the new highway would facilitate aggression rather than discourage it.⁵ It would seem, moreover, that the British Government believed that if the railway ever became a necessity it could, because of its long-standing prestige and influence at the Sublime Porte, obtain permission at any time to proceed with the project — a doubtful supposition in view of the gradual change in its relations with Turkey — a change not yet generally realized in Great Britain.

Of even greater importance was Great Britain's belief that by

¹ *The Times*, January 10th, January 22nd, February 17th, June 23rd, 1857. Also *Parl. Debates*, 3rd S., Vol. CXLVII (1857), pp. 1226, 1652, 1658, 1662.

² The possibility of checking French influence, again in the ascendancy in Egypt and Syria, of providing a diversion to the projected Suez Canal and of forestalling Russian designs on the Persian Gulf were among some of the political arguments put forward for the railroad — Andrew, W. P., *A Letter to Viscount Palmerston on the Practical Advantages of the Euphrates Valley Railway and the Necessity of the Financial Support of H.M. Government* (1857); *The Times*, June 23rd, 1857.

³ *Parl. Debates*, 3rd S., Vol. CXLVII (1857), pp. 1676-7. Various reasons for Palmerston's *volte-face* have been given. Pressure may have been put on him by Napoleon III, then visiting in England. Palmerston may have deemed it wiser to give up the railway than accept the Suez Canal, in order to preserve the nominal alliance with France. It has also been suggested that the sacrifice of the railway was in exchange for French consent to use the overland (Egyptian) route for the dispatch of troops to India at a critical stage in the mutiny. See *The Times* for August 8th, 10th, 11th, 1857; May 4th, 1858; also *Quarterly Review*, CXX, pp. 354-397; *J. R.C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. XXI (1934), p. 376.

⁴ *Jour. E. India Ass'n.*, Vol. x, p. 250; Curzon, *Persia*, Vol. I, pp. 633-5.

⁵ Viscount Palmerston, *Parl. Debates*, 3rd S., Vol. CXLVI (1857), pp. 10, 1385-91.

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manipulating the political situation in Europe, she could safeguard the routes to India. She had not yet fully realized that political control, direct or indirect, would have to be assumed over territories through which lay actual and potential highways to her indispensable Eastern possessions.

Protection of the Indians engaged in trade at Basra and Baghdad and of the Indian Muslims on pilgrimage to the four Holy Cities of Turkish Arabia, concern for the sanitary conditions at Basra and the Holy Cities, the distribution of the Oudh bequest, the administration of the India Postal System, established in 1868 at Basra and Baghdad, the irrigation schemes projected by Sir William Willcocks in 1911,¹ and executed by British companies, and, above all, the encouragement and protection of commerce and river navigation continued to be the methods by which British influence and position were maintained and extended. British prestige centred largely about the Residency at Baghdad with its guard of Indian troops,² and the armed sloop attached to it, yet so strong was it among the tribes that on a number of occasions British representatives were approached by Arabs who desired Great Britain to establish a protectorate over them.³

Great Britain's early interest in communications with India, however, had not been without some valuable results. The expeditions sent out from 1834 onwards and the presence of armed steamers on the Tigris⁴ paved the way for the initiation of a

¹ Willcocks, Sir William, *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia* (1917, Revised Ed.).

² 'Our maintenance of troops as far north as Baghdad . . . could not have been actuated by hope of commercial gain. It must have been due to our strategic position in those regions.' Lord Lamington, former Governor of Bombay, 1903-7, *Pro C. Asian Soc.*, January, 1908, p. 17.

³ In 1899, 1902, 1912; *Official Reports on Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, September, 1911; October, 1911; February, 1912.

⁴ In 1840 and 1841, four armed steamers of the East India Company, the *Assyria*, *Nitocris*, *Nimrod*, and *Euphrates*, designed to establish further British influence, made periodic trips from Basra to Baghdad with goods, mail and passengers. Surveys were also made on both the Tigris and Euphrates (*supra*, p. 33). All but the *Nitocris* were withdrawn in 1842. *Parl. Papers*, 1840 (323), Pt. II, 299-300.

British mercantile line on the Tigris¹ and for a further expansion of British commerce which, advancing far beyond the days when Basra had first been a centre for part of the Gulf trade, contributed not a little to the predominant position and influence which Great Britain exercised in Turkish Arabia. In 1911 and 1912, imports through Basra and Baghdad averaged for each of the two years, £3,100,000, of which the great proportion were British and Indian goods destined for re-export to Persia by way of Kermanshah. Exports by sea for the same years averaged £3,247,500.²

The transportation of practically all of these commodities was in British or Anglo-Indian bottoms, while the handling of the largest proportion of the entire river transport had come into the hands of the firm of Lynch Brothers, who from 1860 had assumed the local management of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company. It had enjoyed a virtual monopoly until the advent of Midhat Pasha's river service. In spite of constant interference from the Turkish authorities,³ the company carried on a comparatively efficient service, although at high rates. It also maintained, with a Government subsidy, a line of steamers on the Kārūn River, after it had been opened by the Shah of Persia in 1888.

So strategically placed were the river valleys, so firmly was external trade regarded as a British monopoly, so paramount was British influence that British statesmen had come to regard

¹ This mercantile service was maintained from 1836 on the Tigris, ostensibly under the *firmān* (following the Arabic *فَرْمَان*) originally granted in 1834 to the British Government for the operation of two steamers for commercial purposes on the Euphrates in connection with the Euphrates Expedition of that year. (Herslet, *Commercial Treaties* (1820-1925), Vol. XIII, pp. 838-9). Just how this *firmān* could be applied to the Tigris is not easily understood. Neither the subsequent one of 1842 (*ibid.*, p. 839) nor the Vizierial Letter of 1861 (*ibid.*, p. 845) defined clearly the rights and privileges which the company exercised and claimed.

² *Report on the Conditions of Trade in Mesopotamia* (Baghdad, 1920), p. 13.

³ Other than purely political reports, the difficulties of the company with Turkish officials occupied more dispatches from the Resident at Baghdad to the Foreign Office than any other subject.

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them as commercial and political as well as geographical extensions of the Persian Gulf, in whose politics, as Lord Curzon declared in the House of Lords, were 'involved the security, integrity and safety of India itself'.¹ Lord Curzon had stated in 1892, alluding to the commercial importance of Baghdad, 'Baghdad, in fine, falls under the category of the Gulf Ports, and must be included in the zone of indisputable British supremacy'.² He amplified this statement in the House of Lords, in 1911, saying:

It would be a mistake to suppose that our political interests are confined to the Gulf. They are not confined to the Gulf; they are not confined to the region between Basra and Baghdad; they extend right away up to Baghdad.³

Any change in the *status quo* in Turkish Arabia became, therefore, as objectionable as any alteration in that of the Persian Gulf itself. The interest of H.M. Government in the early trans-Mesopotamian schemes of communication had been stimulated by the realization of this fact. Lord Salisbury, in 1878, had made the attitude of H.M. Government quite clear upon the subject, when he said: 'Whatever happens, whatever Ministry may be in power, the people of this country will never allow Russian influence to be supreme in the valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris.'⁴ This attitude was again reflected in the dispatch of September 21st, 1899, from the Viceroy of India in Council,⁵ when it was declared that Russian movement towards Baghdad would be as distasteful as Russian penetration into South Persia.

Germany's 'Drang Nach Osten'

If Russia was Great Britain's chief rival in Asia during the nineteenth century, Germany became her rival of the twentieth

¹ *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. VII (1911), p. 587.

² Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, Vol. II, p. 578.

³ *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. VII (1911), p. 586.

⁴ Cited Hoskins, *op. cit.*, p. 446.

⁵ *Supra*, pp. 41-2.

century. The entry of Germany into Turkey and the Persian Gulf, although ostensibly based on commercial ventures¹ and on concessions from the Porte to build a railroad through Anatolia to the Persian Gulf,² came to be regarded as a greater threat than Russia to the *status quo* in those areas which Great Britain had come to look upon as her own special spheres. Lord Lansdowne's official statement of policy was directed as much at Germany as at Russia, although Germany chose to regard it as applicable only to Russia.

Germany's early interest in Turkey had not been regarded with alarm. The decision of ‘Abdul Hamid, in 1899, to grant the concession for a railroad to the Persian Gulf had been welcomed in England as a check to both Russian and French

¹ Details cannot be given here of the activities of the firm of Wonckhaus in the Persian Gulf, of the negotiations for the railroad concessions, of the political significance attached to the railway project both in Germany and elsewhere, and of the increase of German prestige and influence in Turkey generally. Of the mass of literature existing on this whole subject, the following may be consulted: *The Times History of the World War*, Vol. III, ch. III; *Report on the Condition and Prospects of British Trade in Mesopotamia*, Lloyd, George, 1908 (confidential). Rohrbach, P., *Die Bagdadbahn* (Berlin, 1903); Helfferich, K., *Die deutsche Turkenpolitik* (Berlin, 1921); Schaefer, C. A., *Die Entwicklung der Bagdadbahnpolitik* (Weimar, 1916); Müller, K. H., *Die Bedeutung der Bagdadbahn* (Hamburg, 1916); Cheradame, André, *La Question d'Orient: la Macédoine, le chemin de fer de Bagdad* (Paris, 1903); also, *The Baghdad Railway*, Pro. C. Asian Soc., 1911; Lewin, Evans, *The German Road to the East* (New York, 1917); Earle, Edward M., *Turkey, The Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway* (New York, 1923). See also Lynch, H. F. B., ‘The Bagdad Railway’, *Fortnightly Review*, March, 1911; *Quarterly Review*, October, 1917, pp. 491-528 (by Sir Alwyn Parker, Foreign Office).

² For texts of the concessions: *Actes de la concession du chemin de fer Eski Shehr-Koma* (Constantinople, 1893); also, *Report of the Anatolian Railway Company* (1896), pp. 4, 9, preliminary concession, 1899; Young, G., *Corps de droit Ottoman*, Vol. III, pp. 342-51; cf. *Report of the Anatolian Railway Company*, 1902, p. 8; provisional convention, 1902; Lecoq, R., *Un chemin de fer en Asie Mineure* (Paris, 1907), appendix; definitive convention, March 5th, 1903: *Parl. Papers*, 1911 (Cd 5635), CIII, I. This also contains the additional convention of 1908, as well as the Statutes of the Imperial Bagdad Railroad Company, Specifications, the Loan Contract, First Series, 1903; Loan Contract, Second and Third Series, 1908; third and fourth additional conventions, March 21st, 1911: *troisième convention additionnelle et quatrième convention additionnelle à la convention du 5 Mars*, 1903, *relative au chemin de fer de Bagdad* (Constantinople, 1911).

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ambitions.¹ The phenomenal expansion of Germany's industries and of her overseas commerce, the penetration of markets hitherto regarded as Britain's own, the sudden growth of Germany's mercantile marine, her Navy bills of 1899 and 1900, the colonial demands and aspirations of German diplomatists, the noisy anti-British demonstrations at the time of the Boer War, however, led the English public, stimulated by the Press, to believe that not only Great Britain's markets but also her political prestige in the East and in Africa were being seriously challenged.

The possibility of curbing German political expansion in Turkish Arabia by means of British participation in the Baghdad Railway had, at first, seemed likely, but the suggestion of the Prime Minister, Mr. Arthur Balfour, April 7th and 8th, 1903,² that H.M. Government should approve of the investment of British capital in the railway at the invitation of the German financiers,³ providing such participation were on the basis of equality with any other Power, raised a storm of disapproval in the House and in the press.⁴ Protests of the shipping companies serving India, of the owners of the Tigris and Euphrates Steam Navigation Company, and of the British-owned Railways in Asia Minor may have also added to the

¹ Lord Salisbury is reported to have said in 1900: 'We are in no way unfavourably impressed by the grant of the concessions in question. On the contrary we welcome them for in this way Germany comes into line with our interests in the Persian Gulf' *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, 1871-1914 (hereafter *G.P.*), (Berlin, 1922-7), Vol. xvii, No. 5212, p. 373. Also Lord Lansdowne to F. Lascelles, March 18th, 1902, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. II, No. 204, pp. 177-8; *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. CI (1902), pp. 129, 597, 628, 669; Vol. CXXII (1903), p. 1371.

² *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. CXX (1903), pp. 1207-8, 1358-78.

³ von Gwinner, A., 'The Baghdad Railway and the Question of British Co-operation', *Nineteenth Century*, June, 1909.

⁴ *The Times*, April 9th, 14th, 18th, 19th, 21st, 22nd, 24th; *Daily Mail*, April 9th, 18th, 22nd; *The Daily Telegraph*, April 8th, 9th, *Pall Mall Gazette*, April 9th, 11th, 22nd, 24th; *Spectator*, April 4th, 11th, 18th, 25th; *Manchester Guardian*, April 15th, 1903. Yate, Col. A. C., *Pro. C. Asian Soc.*, May 22nd, 1911, p. 19; Johnson, Sir H. H., *Common Sense in Foreign Policy* (London, 1913), pp. v-vii. Cf., also, Lord Curzon, *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. VII (1911), pp. 583-7, 589.

opposition¹ which, without doubt, extended to his own cabinet. Mr. Balfour was forced to declare to the House of Commons, April 23rd, 1903, that H.M. Government would give no support to British financial participation in the project.²

What the British Government had failed to secure by financial participation, it attempted to secure through diplomatic negotiations. The *rapprochement* between England and France already in the air soon became a reality.³ The three agreements signed on April 8th, 1904,⁴ settled the outstanding points of friction, initiated the *Entente Cordiale* and paved the way for the defensive alliance between the two countries.⁵

The period of ‘splendid isolation’ for Great Britain had come to an end. Instead there was inaugurated an era of diplomacy among the Powers which aimed, on the one hand, at securing on the basis of compensations⁶ a recognition of spheres of interest in Asia and in Africa, thus avoiding points of conflict, and, on the other hand, at providing for collective security in the event that rival ambitions, either commercial or territorial, could not be reconciled.

Tentative negotiations towards an Anglo-Russian *rapproche-*

¹ *The Times*, April 18th, 19th, 24th, 1903.

² *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. CXXI (1903), pp. 271-2. Lord Lansdowne seems to have believed that ‘the scuttling of British financiers’ at the newspaper opposition made it impossible for the Government to give assurances of its support. *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. II, Minute on No. 224, p. 196. Cf., Earle, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

³ For early indications of the *rapprochement*, see *Documents Diplomatiques Français* (hereafter *Docs. Fr.*) (Paris, 1922-9), 2nd Series, Vol. II, No. 524 (December 12th, 1902), p. 653; Vol. III, No. 138 (March 14th, 1903), p. 186; Vol. III, No. 192 (April 23rd, 1903), p. 258. Also, Tardieu, A., *La France et les Alliances* (Paris, 1908), pp. 51-72.

⁴ *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. II, Nos. 356-416, pp. 292-373; *Docs. Fr.*, 2nd Series, Vol. III, Nos. 362, 363, 381, 384, 387, 392, 419; Vol. IV, Secs. II, IIIA, VI, VII. Texts of the three agreements: *Accts. and Papers*, 1904 (Cd. 1952), CX, 323-4, 340-1, 1905 (Cd. 2383), CIII, 241; 1905 (Cmd. 2384), CIII, 265; 1905 (Cmd. 2385), CIII, 285. Secret articles of Egyptian Declaration; *ibid.*, 1911 (Cd. 5969), CIII, 353 ff. Also in *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. II, pp. 374-98, with earlier drafts in parallel columns.

⁵ On discussions from 1906, on the Anglo-French defensive alliance, see *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. III, Nos. 210-21, pp. 170-203.

⁶ A ‘give and take arrangement’, as Lord Lansdowne expressed it, July 2nd, 1903, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. II, No. 356, p. 293.

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ment had been interrupted by the Russo-Japanese war.¹ Russia's defeat and her domestic difficulties in 1905 made her more amenable to settlement of her Middle East differences with Great Britain on August 31st, 1907, when an Anglo-Russian Convention was signed.² By it Persia, without her consent, was partitioned into spheres of influence, as foreshadowed by the suggestion of the Government of India in 1899.³ No reference was made, however, to the Persian Gulf or to Turkish Arabia, although Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had pressed urgently for the inclusion of a clause recognizing the *status quo* in the Persian Gulf.⁴ To remedy the omission, Sir Edward, in a dispatch to Sir Arthur Nicolson, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, August 27th, 1907, noted, on behalf of H.M. Government, that the Russian Government had explicitly stated that they did not deny the special interest of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. He added: 'H.M. Government think it advisable to draw attention to previous declarations of British policy and to affirm generally previous statements as to British interests in the Persian Gulf and the importance of maintaining them.'⁵

The Convention was not so much an attempt at territorial expansion as an attempt to recognize the *status quo*, to check

¹ Lansdowne to P. Cambon, October 26th, 1903; *ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 250, pp. 217-18. Also *ibid.*, Vol. IV, Nos. 181-8, pp. 183-94, especially, Lansdowne to Spring-Rice, November 17th, 1903, No. 181a, p. 183.

² *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. IV, No. 339, p. 388; Nos. 341-517, pp. 389-576; *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. CLVII (1906), p. 1416, Sir E. Grey's statement, May 24th, 1906. For part played by Baghdad Railway, Driault, E., *La Question d'Orient depuis ses Origines* (Paris, 1921), pp. 273 ff. For text: Treaty Series, No. 34 (1907), in *Acts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3753), cxxv, 489; also, *ibid.*, 1908 (Cd. 3750), cxxv, 477; *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, C, 276-7.

³ *Acts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3882), cxxv, 465. But cf.: Hardinge to Grey, December 23rd, 1905, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. IV, No. 322, 276-7.

⁴ *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. IV, No. 417, p. 465; No. 421, p. 470; No. 425, p. 473; Minutes on No. 428, pp. 476-7; Enclosure to No. 429, pp. 480-1; No. 430, pp. 481-2; No. 434, p. 484.

⁵ *Acts. and Papers*, 1908 (Cd. 3750), cxxv, 477, Dispatch No. 1, Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson, August 27th, 1907. For previous declarations of policy, see Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty* (4 vols., 1875-91), Vol. IV, pp. 2615-17, 2624-7; Lord Lansdowne, *Parl. Debates*, 4th S., Vol. CXXI (1903), pp. 1347-8; Lord Salisbury, July, 1878; Hoskins, *op. cit.*, p. 446.

further Russian advances and to free England to deal with Germany's ‘Drang nach Osten’. It was received in England, however, with great disapproval. Of those opposed to the Convention, some alleged that it needlessly sacrificed British interests. Others voiced their misgivings lest Persian opinion, hitherto friendly to Great Britain, should be alienated. These apprehensions were not unjustified, the ill-feeling which the partition aroused in Persia being exploited to the fullest extent by Germany during the Great War. Nevertheless, the Convention served its purpose, particularly in relieving pressure on India and the Persian Gulf at a time when it was most needed.¹

Early attempts at an Anglo-German understanding had failed.² Following, however, the Anglo-Russian Convention, Great Britain turned to negotiations with Germany and with Turkey on the question of the Baghdad Railroad which had continued to grow in international importance. To Turkey, consent to the increase in customs was held out in return for concessions which would both safeguard and consolidate England's acquired position in Turkish Arabia. To Germany, Great Britain was willing to make concessions in order to secure her original demands as stated by Lord Haldane to Emperor William II at Windsor in November, 1907:³ the right to construct and control the section of the Baghdad Railway

¹ Sir E. Grey to Committee of Imperial Defence, May 26th, 1911, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. vi, App 5, pp. 788-9. Also, MacCaulay, Capt. D I, *Pro C. Asian Soc.*, October 10th, 1909. The convention was probably not sincerely observed by either Russia or England. See, *Parl Debates*, H of L, 5th S., Vol. vii (1911), p. 605; Vol. 10, pp. 678, 694, 697; Cox to Grey, September 28th, 1913; Minute by H. G. Chick, Commercial Adviser to the Persian Gulf Residency; Government of India to Marquess of Crewe (Confidential), January 22nd, 1914, cited in *Behind the Veil in Persia* (Amsterdam, 1917), pp. 148-57.

² For these early negotiations, see. *Brit Docs*, Vol. I, No 122 (August 21st, 1898), pp. 100-1; Vol. II, No 77 (March 18th, 1901), pp. 60-1 and documents ff.; Vol. III, No. 1 (May 18th, 1904), p. 1; *G.P.*, Vol. xiv, ch. xci; Vol xvii, ch. cix. For an official review of Anglo-German relations, see *Brit. Docs*, Vol. III, App. A, pp. 397 ff.

³ Haldane, Viscount R. B., *Before the War* (1920), p. 48; *Autobiography* (1929), p. 220; also, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. vi, Nos. 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, pp. 91-9. From the German side: *G.P.*, Vol. xxiv, pp. 17-22; Baron von Schoen, *Memoirs of an Ambassador* (1922), pp. 59-63.

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from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf, thereby securing 'the gate to India'.¹ In 1909 she was prepared to grant Germany a free hand in Turkey north of Baghdad in return for the recognition of similar privileges for Great Britain in southern Mesopotamia.²

A settlement along these lines was not out of keeping with the attitude of the Powers, including Austria and Italy, during the period 1907 to 1914,³ in which there 'was an approach to a general agreement among the European nations with reference to their interests',⁴ i.e. the creation of special economic and political spheres of influence. Russia and England had already partitioned Persia in 1907. By the Potsdam Agreement, August 19th, 1911, Germany and Russia recognized each other's special interests in Asia Minor and in Persia.⁵ France and Germany brought their commercial interests in the Near and

¹ This arrangement, proposed to Dr. A. von Gwinner, December 13th, 1903, was accepted by him as far as the financial interests were concerned. Nothing came of it, however. *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. II, No. 224, p. 195. It was put forward officially as the basis of British policy, April 25th, 1907, Grey to Bertie, *ibid.*, Vol. VI, No. 249, p. 355. Also, Grey to Cambon and to Benckdorf, June 4th, 1907; *ibid.*, No. 250, p. 355. For the renewal of the proposals: Grey to Goschen, October 28th, 1909, *ibid.*, No. 277, p. 379, Marling to Grey, *ibid.*, No. 282, pp. 384-5; and Memo. by Sir H. Babington Smith, *ibid.*, App. 7, pp. 793-4 Enclosure to No. 309, p. 410.

² *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. VI, No. 277, p. 379, No. 287, p. 388. Also, the confidential letter from the Russian Ambassador, Constantinople, to Iswolsky, November 25th, 1909, de Siebert, B., *Entente Diplomacy and the World War, 1909-1914* (New York, 1922), No. 576, p. 510 'The projected treaty is equivalent to partition of Turkey into a British and a German sphere of interest: England granting Germany freedom of action in Turkey, in Europe and Asia Minor, and claiming such for herself only in the Turkish territories in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf. The projected treaty with Germany completes England's sovereignty in the Persian Gulf.' Also, Russian Ambassador, London, to Iswolsky, *ibid.*, No. 570, p. 507.

³ For an able account of these pre-war aspirations: Howard, H. N., *Partition of Turkey* (Norman, 1931), pp. 50-60.

⁴ *Official Report on Events in Turkish Iraq*, July, 1913.

⁵ Text. *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, March, 1924, p. 63. The Potsdam Agreement undoubtedly had its origin in fear of an Anglo-German understanding. In such an event, as the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople wrote to Iswolsky, November 25th, 1909: 'France and Russia would stand alone, which has to be prevented . . . Hence there remains only direct though parallel negotiations between . . . Germany and Russia and Germany and France.' de Siebert, *op. cit.*, No. 576, p. 510. Also, *ibid.*, No. 582, p. 515; No. 619, p. 543. For negotiations, see G.P., Vol. XXVII, Nos. 10218-25, pp. 950-62; *Un Livre Noir* (R. Marchand, ed., 3 vols., Paris, 1922-27), Vol. II, pp. 501-76.

Middle East into agreement between 1910 and 1914.¹ From Great Britain, France had secured in 1912 a pledge of disinterestedness in Syria.²

Negotiations with Turkey had been opened in 1909 but not until 1913 was an agreement possible, Great Britain having been forced to give way on many of her original proposals.³ By Agreements signed July 29th, 1913, Great Britain secured the recognition of her special position in the Persian Gulf and of the validity of her existing treaties with Kuwait and Bahrain. The terminus of the Baghdad Railway was to be at Basra, beyond which the railway was not to extend without the consent of Great Britain. Two British subjects were to be appointed to the Board of the railway. Equal charges, dues and treatment on the railway were guaranteed to all nations. The development and future of the port of Basra were to be partially entrusted to British hands. Exclusive rights of navigation were secured for a new company, eventually formed by Lord Inchcape and the existing Lynch Line, whose privileges were extended.⁴ Turkey recognized the right of Great Britain to buoy, light and police the Shatt al-‘Arab and the Persian Gulf.⁵

During this period of negotiations, both the Foreign Office⁶ and British representatives in Turkish Arabia were concerned

¹ The Franco-German Agreement was signed February 15th, 1914. See Earle, *op. cit.*, p. 248, also *Docs. Fr.*, 3rd Series, Vol. III, No. 239, p. 317.

² M. Pichon at Secret Meeting of the Four Powers, Paris, March 20th, 1919: Baker, R. S., *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (3 vols., 1922-3), Vol. III, p. 3.

³ A long series of drafts and counter-drafts had been made as on March 1st, 1911, April 15, 1912, etc. Various sections of the Agreements had been initialed on May 6th and June 11th, 1913.

⁴ Hakkı Pasha and Lord Inchcape signed a concession, December 12th, 1913. Lord Inchcape and the Lynch Line came to an agreement, March 27th, 1914.

⁵ Great Britain, however, made its adherence to the Agreements and consent to the increase in Custom dues, sought by Turkey, contingent on the removal of the Ottoman veto on Egyptian borrowing powers, on further railway concessions and on recognition of the D’Arcy Concession to Turkish oil fields. *Quarterly Review*, October, 1917, pp. 517-21; *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. LIII (1913), pp. 392-5; de Siebert, *op. cit.*, ch. xx; *The Times*, May 17th and 31st, 1913.

⁶ Minute by Sir E. Grey, March 12, 1910, *Brit. Docs.*, Vol. VI, No. 325, p. 433.

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with increasing Great Britain's influence and prestige, not only to counteract the importance of the Baghdad Railway, but also to provide a greater claim to Mesopotamia as her sphere of influence in the event of the break-up of Turkey. The Resident of Baghdad had telegraphed, June 23rd, 1913, to the Government of India and to H.M. Ambassador at Constantinople:

In view of the possible break-up of Turkey and in the meantime the development of preparatory foreign spheres of interest, it seems incumbent on the British Government to preserve every kind of priority which they already possessed in Mesopotamia, their natural sphere in the Ottoman dominions. Hence any abolition of British Post Offices in Turkey should not extend to those at Baghdad and Basra. The Residency guard and the R.I.M.S. *Comet* are appurtenances to be jealously guarded, for the present.¹

A month later, the Acting Resident in Baghdad presented a full plan for extending Great Britain's position.² He advocated an extension of the irrigation system under British auspices, as one of the most important means to that end, saying: 'To gain control of this system and create an *imperium imperio* is important. Control of water will give control of revenue assessment, perhaps control of collection.' As to railways, they would be auxiliary to irrigation and to the agriculture which it would encourage,³ while steam navigation, he believed, would have to give way both to irrigation and to the railways. The importance of oil, in his opinion, had not been proven.⁴

Germany was not unwilling that Great Britain should possess

¹ Cited: *Reports on Events in Turkish Iraq*, June, 1913

² He had already urged that increased efforts should be made to add Mōsul, not then belonging to any sphere of influence, to Great Britain's sphere. He had suggested that the Church Missionary Society might be aided financially and that Sir Edward Grey should approach the Jewish Colonization Society to subvent schools where English would be taught. Nestorians should also be encouraged. *Ibid.*, February, 1913.

³ 'Give the Tigris and Euphrates escapes into the deserts, and Babylon will again rival Egypt and the railways will be one of the best paying concerns in the world.' Willcocks, Sir W., *Near East*, June 6th, 1913.

⁴ *Reports on Events in Turkish Iraq*, July, 1913.

these special interests in Turkish Arabia, although she was no willing to recognize the full British claims. The process of reconciling the differences between the two Powers was restricted by the necessity of bringing Germany and Turkey into agreement, of considering the wishes of France, Italy and Russia, and of finding compensations for them in order to avoid that obsession of the early twentieth century: a general European war. Not until June 15th, 1914, was a treaty initialled, subject to ratification, following the conclusion of separate Turco-German negotiations.

By the terms of the agreement,¹ Germany abandoned all hope of a port in her own name on the Persian Gulf. She secured, however, cessation of obstruction to the Baghdad Railway, the recognition of her own special spheres in Anatolia, North Syria and northern Mesopotamia, in exchange for recognition of Great Britain's dominant position in southern Mesopotamia and in the Persian Gulf. The terminus of the Baghdad Railway was to be at Basra, any further construction to be made only after a complete agreement had been previously reached by the Ottoman, German and British Governments. Both Powers were to observe strictly the terms of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of July 29th, 1913, together with the agreement between Lord Inchcape and the Baghdad Railway Company regarding important navigation rights, port and terminal facilities on the Tigris and Euphrates and the agreement between the Smyrna-Aidin Railway and the Baghdad Railway regarding important extensions to the former line. As an essential preliminary to the negotiations regarding the transfer of the Turkish oilfields to a British controlled company, the German Government was forced, in March, 1914, to recognize southern Mesopotamia as well as central and southern Persia as the exclusive fields of operation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and, in addition, to agree to the construction of a railway from Kūt al-‘Amāra to Mandali in order to facilitate the shipment of

¹ *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1923, pp. 29 ff.

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petroleum. Both Germany and Great Britain undertook to observe their respective interests in the irrigation of the Cilician plain and lower Mesopotamian valley.

Thus, on the eve of the World War, Great Britain's long tenure as the dominant European Power in Turkish Arabia and the Persian Gulf was about to enter a new phase. Three centuries of British efforts to extend and to protect trade had culminated, through the new concessions contained in the negotiated Agreements, in fresh opportunities for British capital, talent and products in the development of irrigation, of navigation, of the ports of Basra and Baghdad and in the anticipated increase in prosperity of Turkish Arabia. A share of the potential riches of the petroleum fields of Kirkūk had also been won for British exploitation.

Even more important, the long series of British activities in the Persian Gulf and in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys: the suppression of pirates, the establishment of suzerainty over Arab chiefs of the Gulf, the surveys and investigations for river and railway communication projects, and the initiation of diplomatic and military measures, all of which had been successfully directed towards protecting trade and forestalling other powers from reaching the Gulf and thus menacing India, had broken the force of the latest and most dangerous of the attempts to disturb the *status quo* in Persian Gulf regions. Great Britain's claim to special consideration and position in south-west Asia had achieved recognition both by the Powers and by Turkey itself. She had, in effect, with their consent, completed the peaceful annexation of the Persian Gulf as an Indian Lake and the establishment of her special position in the Mesopotamian wilayets of the Ottoman Empire.

The agreements, however, had not been all pure gain for Great Britain. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway was to have its outlet to the Gulf. Germany, although greatly restricted, was to be admitted into the hitherto jealously guarded Garden of Eden. Nor was there any guarantee as to how long the new

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relations could be expected to last. In the face of previous successes in hitherto British markets already won by German commercial rivals and of the bellicose attitude and unfriendly actions of Germans, within the few months following the initialling of the Anglo-German Agreement, it is not too much to conjecture that the agreement might have been, in reality, only an uneasy truce.

It may be reasonably doubted whether these breaches in Great Britain's traditional policy would ever have taken place, whether the negotiations themselves would ever have been necessary, or whether Great Britain would have been forced to suffer nearly 100,000 casualties¹ or to sacrifice £200,000,000² in a war in Turkish Arabia had she taken the early opportunities repeatedly offered her of building the trans-Mesopotamian railroad. Had she built the railroad, the wilayets of Baghdad and Basra would probably have taken on the status of Egypt before the war, owing nominal allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan but under the protection of Great Britain. Had there not been the opportunity for economic and political expansion in Turkish Arabia to draw Germany onwards, the latter might never have sought and acquired her predominating influence at the Sublime Porte, without which Turkey would have never entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. Without the stimulus of Allied war-time promises of independence, Arab nationalism would not have risen in such power for at least another decade, the Sharifians would not have gained their chance at leadership, and the creation of the kingdom of 'Iraq might have been delayed to the dim future.

Whatever the new relations between Turkey, Germany and Great Britain in Turkish Arabia and the Persian Gulf might have been as the result of their agreements, it was clear, immediately on the outbreak of war in Europe that the whole

¹ Casualties from all sources in the Mesopotamia Campaign were 92,501, according to *O.H.*, Vol. IV, p. 331; 98,258, according to Robertson, Sir William, *Soldiers and Statesmen* (2 vols., 1926), Vol. II, p. 82.

² *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CLI (1922), p. 1546.

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situation had been thrown once again into the melting pot. All for which Great Britain had striven, consciously or unconsciously, for nearly three hundred years was now in danger of being swept away. The whole history of the part played by Great Britain in the Middle East made it inevitable, once resort to arms had begun, that she should make some effort, not only to maintain that which she had won but also to secure, once and for all, by the establishment of political control, the Mesopotamian portion of the land route to India.

BASRA AND SURROUNDING COUNTRY.

Scale of Miles

50 50



THE CONQUEST OF SOUTHERN
MESOPOTAMIA

IN the four years, 1914 to 1918, British arms completed what three centuries of British commerce and diplomacy had begun. The military operations which resulted in the occupation of Basra, then of Baghdad in 1917, and finally of the whole of Turkish Arabia as far north as Mōsul, have been ably recounted elsewhere.¹ It is germane here only to indicate how the motives which lay behind the forward movements and the administration of the occupied territories arose partly from immediate circumstances and partly from the long established Middle East policy of Great Britain.

Consideration of Baghdad as an objective of the Expeditionary Force had come before its military and political officials early in the campaign. On November 23rd, the day after the occupation of Basra, Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer to the Force, telegraphed privately to the Viceroy that the General Officer Commanding had been considering the question of the advance to Baghdad and that he (Cox) did not see how 'we can well avoid taking over Baghdad'.² Officials on the spot, in India and at Whitehall as well as representatives of commercial interests in the country continued to give expression to similar views,³ but neither H.M. Government nor the Government of

¹ *History of the Great War based on Official Documents*: (a) Moberly, Brig.-Gen., F. J., op. cit. (O.H.); (b) Corbett, Sir Julian, *Naval Operations*, Vol. II (1922); VI (1923); (c) Macpherson, *Medical Services, General History*, Vol. IV (1924) *Survey of India, Records of the*, Vol. XX. *The War Record* (1920). Candler, Edmund, *The Long Road to Baghdad* (2 vols., 1919). Personal accounts by Sir Arnold Wilson, Lieut.-Col. J. E. Tennant, C. V. Townshend and others.

² O.H., Vol. I, p. 134. His telegram 'was specifically prompted by urgent representations from the Heads of the British Mercantile community'. Sir Percy Cox to the writer, July 16th, 1936

³ *Meso. Comm. Report*, Cd. 8610, p. 97; Bolitho, H., *Lord Inchcape* (1936), pp. 122-4.

India were ready, at the time, to support such a far-reaching objective.¹ Indeed the attitude of the latter towards the expedition until the middle of 1915 had been that of niggardly, even unwilling compliance with the policy laid down by H.M. Government.²

The sudden reversal of this attitude by the Government of India came after the appointment of General Sir John Nixon to the command in Mesopotamia, April 9th, 1915, when it assumed, with his support, the initiative for the advance to Baghdad.³ Occurring almost at the same moment that the India Office, with a new concern for oil supplies, opposed any extension of objective beyond the hinterland of Basra, a deliberate and concerted policy was rendered impossible. The criticism of the Mesopotamia Commission of 1917: ‘The scope of the objective of the expedition was never sufficiently defined in advance, so as to make each successive move part of a well-thought-out and matured plan,’⁴ was never more pertinent than in the days before the first march on Baghdad.

The degree to which the reversal of the attitude of the Government of India and the sanction of H.M. Government to the advance on Baghdad were influenced by the realization that India’s permanent interests would be best served by the inclusion of Baghdad under the direct control of India cannot be fully known until the evidence in state archives is available. In the late autumn of 1915 the Government of India stated clearly that it expected to annex at least Baghdad and Basra⁵ but it would seem that considerations of the moment played as large a part in the authorization of the advance as did deliberate consideration of past and future policy.

Early successes around Basra had elated the military command in India, increasing their desire for further victories in

¹ *Meso. Comm. Report*, Cd. 8610, p. 20; Asquith, H. A., *Memories and Reflections* (2 vols., 1928), Vol. II, p. 69; Bolitho, op. cit., p. 123.

² Cd. 8610, pp. 97, 105, 106, 123-31.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 111; *O.H.*, Vol. III, preface.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 97, 125.

⁵ *Infra*, p. 96.

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order to demonstrate their importance, unduly cast in the shade in their own opinion, by the larger and more striking operations in Europe.¹ The advance to Baghdad would not only give these opportunities but would, as the Viceroy pointed out to the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Austen Chamberlain,

create an immense impression in the Middle East, especially in Persia, Afghanistan, and on our frontier, and would counteract the unfortunate impression in the Middle East created by want of success in the Dardanelles. It would also isolate German parties in Persia,² probably produce a pacifying effect in that country, and frustrate the German plan of raising Afghanistan and the tribes, while the impression throughout Arabia would be striking. In India, the effect would be undoubtedly good.³

The Chief of General Staff, India, on October 5th, emphasized in addition, that the possession of Baghdad would

deprive the Turks of a well-equipped place of concentration; place us in a good position to defeat them in detail as they moved down the rivers from Asia Minor or Syria; deprive the Turks of steamers, material and resources, and increase our prestige.⁴

In the arguments put forward by the Government of India, H.M. Government fully concurred.⁵ Indeed so convinced was the War Cabinet by 'Nixon's attitude and by opportunities within our grasp for a great success such as we have not yet achieved in any quarter, and the political (and even military) advantages which would follow from it throughout the East',

¹ Cd. 8610, p. 131.

² For German activities in Persia, Afghanistan and India in August and September, 1915, see *O.H.*, Vol. I, pp. 309 ff.

³ Telegram (Private) Lord Hardinge to Chamberlain, October 6th, 1915, cited *O.H.*, Vol. II, p. 11; also, Letter, Viceroy to Chamberlain, October 15th, 1915, cited *ibid.*, p. 21.

⁴ Appreciation, Sir Percy Lake, October 5th, 1915, cited *ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

⁵ Letter (Private), Chamberlain to Hardinge, October 7th, cited *ibid.*, p. 8; Telegram S/S for India to Viceroy, October 6th, cited *ibid.*, p. 11; Interdepartmental Comm. Report, October 16, cited *ibid.*, p. 17.

not easily overrated,¹ that it authorized General Nixon to ‘march on Baghdad if he is satisfied that the force he has available is sufficient for operations’ and promised reinforcements from France.²

The disasters which followed, ending in the surrender, April 29th, of 13,309 British officers and other ranks at Kūt al-‘Amāra, after a siege of five months, now form part of history. The Commission appointed by Parliament in 1916 to make inquiry into the conduct of the operations in Mesopotamia,³ placed ‘the weightiest share of responsibility for the first attempt on Baghdad’ on Sir John Nixon, whose ‘confident optimism was the main cause of the decision to advance’.⁴ It must not be overlooked, however, that both he and those who advocated the advance at the time were not unnaturally influenced by immediate ends which outweighed military conditions, to meet which little or no adequate preparation had been made.

In the period after the unsuccessful attempts to relieve Kūt, and its surrender, when the Force lay inert, concerned mainly with renewing its strength and reorganizing its vital services,⁵ the ultimate desirability of extending British influence to Baghdad was not entirely forgotten. Not until February 3rd, 1917, however, when the Russians were expected to converge on Mōsul and perhaps Baghdad, did Sir William Robertson ask General Maude for his views regarding another advance towards Baghdad, it being considered desirable for political reasons that British forces should occupy the city before the Russians.⁶

¹ Telegram, S/S for India to Viceroy, October 6th, cited *ibid.*, p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, October 23rd, cited *ibid.*, p. 28.

³ *Meso Comm. Report*, Cd. 8610.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 111. General Nixon had repeatedly shown his confidence that he had enough troops to capture the city; Telegrams, Nixon to Government of India and India Office, October 6th, 1915, cited *O.H.*, Vol. II, p. 12; Nixon to Chamberlain, October 8th, 1915, cited *ibid.*, p. 15; Viceroy to Chamberlain, October 6th, 1915, cited *ibid.*, p. 11. Telegram (Private), Chamberlain to Hardinge, October 5th, 1915, cited *ibid.*, p. 9.

⁵ *O.H.*, Vol. III, pp. 7, 20-3, 30-6, 62-70.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 125, 126 and 204 ff

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The inquiry, followed by definite instructions on February 28th, 1917, to capture Baghdad¹ were not influenced merely by the traditional opposition to the installation of Russia in Turkish Arabia. Circumstances arising from more deeply rooted aspirations, together with the same general considerations which had prompted the advance of 1915, were also at work.²

The pre-war aspirations of the powers for economic and political expansion in Asia had taken on a concrete form as important war objectives of the Allies on the basis of the so-called Secret Agreements. These, as far as they affected the Ottoman Empire, were as follows: (1) Constantinople Agreement, March 18th, 1915, by Russia, France and Great Britain concerning Constantinople, the Straits and Persia;³ (2) Pact of London, April 26th, 1915, between Great Britain, Russia and Italy regarding compensation to Italy for joining the Allies against Germany;⁴ (3) Husain-McMahon Correspondence, August, 1914, to January, 1916, concerning Arab independence in return for Arab co-operation against the Turks;⁵ (4) Agreements of the spring of 1916, between Great Britain, France and

¹ *O.H.*, Vol. III, p. 205.

² The Government of India again pressed for the capture of Baghdad on the grounds that it would relieve the increasing tension on the North West Frontier, *O.H.*, Vol. III, p. 207.

³ Text, de Martens, C., *Recueil des Traites*, 3rd Series (Leipzig, 1922), Vol. x, p. 347. Also, Temperley, H. W. V., *History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (hereafter *H.P.C.P.*) (6 vols., 1920-4), Vol. vi, pp. 2-10; *Manchester Guardian*, February 22nd, 1918.

⁴ *Accs. and Papers*, Misc Papers, 1920, No. 7 (Cmd. 671), LI, 261. Text: de Martens, op. cit., Vol. x, p. 329; *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. v, pp. 384 ff.; also, Vol. vi, pp. 10-13.

⁵ The complete text of the correspondence has never been officially revealed, but summaries of substantial portions have been published: MacMunn, Sir G., and Falls, C., *Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine* (Official History of the World War, hereafter cited as *O.H., E. and Pal.*) (2 vols., 1928-30), Vol. 1, pp. 213 ff.; *Le Temps* (Paris), September 19th, 1919; Cocks, Seymour, *The Secret Treaties* (1918); *Note on the Arab Question*, submitted by Amir Faisal to H.M. Government and cited *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. CXXXVI (1929), pp. 735-6; *Al-Manâr* (Arabic journal, Cairo), January 5th, 1924. The summaries given here have been taken from the original Arabic text of the letters.

Russia — (a) Sykes-Picot Agreement, May 16th, 1916, between Great Britain and France, concerning the division of Syria and Mesopotamia between themselves and the Arabs;¹ (b) Russia's assent to an agreement which assigned her northern Kurdistan and portions of Eastern Anatolia;² (5) The Agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne, April 17th, 1917, between Great Britain, France and Italy, concerning Italy's share of Asia Minor.³

The Ottoman Empire, from which Germany was to be excluded, was, by the Agreements, divided among the Allies in accordance with their long-standing ambitions. In addition, large sections of the Empire were assigned to potential allies to draw them into the war against the Central Powers. Thus, Italy demanded and received recognition, by the Pact of London, April 26th, 1915, of her claims to an 'equitable' section of Asia Minor. In return for his revolt against the Turks, Husain, Sharif of Mecca, received promises through the so-called Husain-McMahon Correspondence of British aid for the establishment of Arab independence in a large portion of the Arabic-speaking provinces of Turkey.⁴

In the Correspondence, however, Sir Henry McMahon made reservations safeguarding the interests of Great Britain

¹ Text: de Martens, op. cit., Vol. x, p. 350; *L'Asie Française*, xvii (August-November, 1919), pp. 243 ff.; Samné, G., *La Syrie* (Paris, 1920), p. 638 ff.; Loder, J. de V., *The Truth about Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria* (1923), pp. 161-4. The Foreign Office 'version' in Leslie, Shane, *Mark Sykes; His Life and Letters* (1923), pp. 250-8, is nothing more than an explanation of the circumstances under which the Agreement was made.

² See Memorandum of March 6th, 1917 (first printed in *Izvesta*, November 12th, 1917); *Manchester Guardian*, January 19th, 1918, de Martens, op. cit., Vol. x, p. 353; *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. vi, p. 16. For negotiations in which Russia participated, see documents in *Die Europäischen Mächte und die Türkei Während des Weltkrieges: Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei* (Adamoff, E., ed., Dresden, 1932) (hereafter *Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei*), especially Nos. 56, 60, 74-8, 99, 103, 104.

³ Reputed text: *Manchester Guardian*, January 9th, 1920; *Current History* (New York), Vol. xi (March, 1920), pp. 499 ff.; see also *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. vi, pp. 18 ff.

⁴ Letters, Sir H. McMahon, Cairo, to Husain, Sharif of Mecca, October 24th, December 14th, 1915, also, August 30th, 1915. See also, Young, Major Sir H. W., *The Independent Arab* (1933), pp. 276-7.

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and those of her ally, France.¹ Previous agreements which Great Britain had with the Arab chiefs were to be unaltered.² Basra was to be placed under British control³ while Baghdad, concerning which it was declared that a stable government was demanded by the very special British interests in the region,⁴ was to be the subject of future negotiations.⁵ It was also stipulated that the prospective Arab state should receive only British aid and assistance, and should employ, exclusively, British advisers.⁶ The Sharif had, at first, protested at the conditions concerning 'Iraq, which, he declared, by history and religion, formed an integral part of Arab territory.⁷ It was agreed, however, to leave the final decision to the future, the British to pay an indemnity for any part of 'Iraq which they occupied, even temporarily.⁸

The Sykes-Picot Agreement⁹ was to regulate future Anglo-French territorial relations in the eastern Mediterranean and to govern future British policy in points of conflict arising from the interpretation of the Husain-McMahon Correspondence and the Agreement. It confirmed the arrangements made by the Anglo-Arab correspondence by assigning Basra and

¹ Letters, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th, December 14th, 1915; also, January 25th, 1916. The reservation of territory along the eastern Mediterranean in the interests of France were not recognized by the Sharif, who agreed, however, to postpone the decision until the end of the war. Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, January 1st, 1915. The claim of an existing secret treaty giving all of Arab-Asia to Sharif Husain has never been proven. *Infra*, p. 177.

² Letters, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th, Section I, Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, November 5th, 1915.

³ Letter, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th, 1915.

⁴ Letter, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, December 14th, 1915.

⁵ Letter, Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, November 5th, 1915; Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, January 25th, 1916.

⁶ Letter, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th, 1915.

⁷ Letter, Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, November 5th, 1915.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, January 25th, 1916.

⁹ The frequent assertion that T. E. Lawrence, 'had much to do with the Sykes-Picot Agreement' (Main, *'Iraq*, p. 58) is scarcely accurate. The first intimation received by Sir Henry McMahon, or anyone else in Cairo, of the agreement seems to have been when Sir Mark Sykes, 'in conversation, producing a map, remarked, "What do you think of my treaty?"', Hart, H. B. Liddell, T. E. Lawrence (1934), p. 70. See also Leslie, *op. cit.*, pp. 244, 245, 249, 287, 288.

Baghdad to British control, and by designating a strip of territory lying between Baghdad and the zone of territory around Mōsul, assigned to French influence, as a zone to be given to the Arabs, subject to British influence.

The necessity of capturing Baghdad as a preliminary to the application of these secret agreements thus became one of the primary political arguments in favour of the renewed advance towards Baghdad. Its capture would also restore British prestige, seriously shaken by the surrender of Kūt and by the attempt, suggested by General Townshend himself, April 23rd,¹ and sanctioned by the War Cabinet,² to purchase the freedom of the besieged army for a sum of £2,000,000. The capture would, in addition, encourage the Allied Powers and dishearten the Central Powers.³

The occupation of Baghdad would present a better opportunity to organize Arab co-operation, a step which H.M. Government had repeatedly stressed from the inception of the campaign and to facilitate which the War Cabinet was to sanction the Proclamation of March 19th, 1917, issued under the name of General Maude, following the capture of Baghdad, March 11th, 1917.⁴

Among the reasons originally urged for the dispatch of the Expedition, it will be remembered, was the hope that it would secure the assistance of the Arabs against the Turks and prevent them from joining in a *Jihād*.⁵ With these ends in view, proclamations had been addressed to the Shaikhs of the Gulf and to the Arabs of Turkish Arabia by H.M. Political

¹ *O.H.*, Vol II, p. 450.

² *Ibid.*, p. 452.

³ The tremendous store set by Germany and Turkey on Baghdad and the plans which they elaborated for its recapture have been well described by Djemal (Jamal) Pasha in *Memories of a Turkish Statesman* (n.d.). During the war, he, himself, regarded Palestine and Syria as more important centres, although he had once, when Pasha of Baghdad, described ‘Iraq as ‘an iron gate against the great power to the south, that is, India’. Speech on the Inauguration of Jamal Bey as Pasha of Baghdad, August 30, 1911.

⁴ For text see Appendix I.

⁵ *Supra*, pp. 27-8.

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Officers, both before and after the occupation of Basra.¹ It was emphasized that 'this War has nothing to do with religion'.² The Shaikhs were urged not to 'allow the foolish people to be led away by foolish talk of "Jihad"'.³ The Arabs were assured that the British Government bore 'no enmity or ill-will against the populace';⁴ that it had 'no desire to treat them as enemies so long as they themselves remain friendly and neutral and refrain from taking up arms against her (British) troops'.⁵ On the contrary, the British Government hoped 'to prove good friends and protectors'. The inhabitants were assured that, under the British flag, they would 'enjoy the benefits of liberty and justice both in regard to your religious and your secular affairs'.⁶ They were warned, however, that while it was 'the wish of the British Government to free the Arabs from the oppression of the Turks and bring them advancement and increase of prosperity and trade', yet, 'in the case of those departing from the the path of friendship and neutrality and taking up arms in co-operation with the enemy, their properties lying within the sphere of British control will be considered sequestered to the British Government'.⁷ This warning had already been conveyed to them in an emphatic notice on the outbreak of war and dated November 5th, 1914.⁷

Neither the assurances nor the warnings conveyed in these proclamations nor the personal efforts of Sir Percy Cox and his assistant Political Officers were sufficient to win over the Arabs

¹ *Compilation of Proclamations, Notices, etc. . . . Relating to . . . Mesopotamia, October 31st, 1914 to August 31st, 1919* (Baghdad, 1919) (hereafter, *Proclamations, 1914-19*). Notices and Proclamations, Nos. 1-5, 7, 8. An interesting parallel to the Proclamations of 1914 may be seen in the instructions to Captain Seton, Political Officer to the expeditions against pirates of the Persian Gulf, 1809. See Low, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 325.

² *Proclamations, 1914-19*, Notice No. 1, October 31st, 1914; Proclamation No. 2, November 1st, 1914; Proclamation No. 3, November 1st, 1914.

³ *Ibid.*, Proclamation No. 5, November 22nd, 1914.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Notice No. 7, February 14th, 1915; cf. also, Notice No. 4, November 5th, 1914.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Proclamation No. 5, November 22nd, 1914.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Notice No. 7, February 14th, 1914.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Notice No. 4, November 5th, 1914.

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as a whole to the British side. The problem of gaining Arab co-operation in accepting responsible posts in the Administration or in fighting the Turks hung largely on the ability of Great Britain to give the Arabs tangible evidence that the Turks would never return to the country. Confiscation of property would be the least of the reprisals which the Turks would inflict if they ever returned, as the Arabs well knew; a knowledge confirmed by Turkish treatment of the Arabs of Kūt al-‘Amāra after its surrender.

Such assurance could not be given, however, not only for fear of giving umbrage to the allies of Great Britain, but also because the question of the advance on Baghdad was still in the air, and the future status of the country was still in doubt in official quarters.¹ Not even those familiar with the intimate relationship which Turkish Arabia bore to India or responsible for the administrative policy of the country could make reassuring public announcements, although they confidently expected Mesopotamia to be ‘an Indian appendage’ as Sir Valentine Chirol wrote in 1915, while accompanying the Viceroy of India on an official visit to Basra.² The Viceroy himself on the occasion of the visit had made a speech, interpreted by many as foreshadowing annexation to India.³

Private assurances as given by Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer, on behalf of H.M. Government to various individuals, such as the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Shaikh of Mohammerah, had limited credence. To the former, in a letter dated November 3rd, 1914, three days before the landing at Fao, Sir Percy Cox had declared that if the British succeeded at Basra, ‘we will not return Basra to the Turkish Government and will not surrender it back to them at all’.⁴

¹ Asquith, Herbert, wrote in his diary, March 25th, 1915. ‘Grey and I . . . both think that in the real interests of our own future the best thing would be if at the end of the War we could say that we had taken and gained nothing . . . Mesopotamia for instance.’ Asquith, H. A., op. cit., Vol. II, p. 69.

² *Behind the Veil*, pp 91-2 (facsimile, p. 119).

³ *Proclamations*, 1914-19. Speech No. 6, February 6th, 1915, p. 3.

⁴ Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. XI, Persian Gulf No. xlii.

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Lacking definite and public assurances, the great majority of the Arabs, both townsmen and tribesmen, while feathering their nests at every opportunity, refused to commit themselves. They preferred to let time and circumstances decide the question on whom their permanent allegiance should be bestowed.

INITIATION OF BRITISH
ADMINISTRATION

WHILE the extension of the campaign to Baghdad and the future of the country were being discussed in official circles, the practical problem of the administration of the occupied areas was forced upon those in command of the Expeditionary Force. Even had there been no obligation under international usage, as the Hague Conventions of 1890 and of 1907,¹ the needs of the Force and the necessity of replacing the vacuum left by the departure of the Turks rendered the initiation of some form of administration imperative.

The local requirements of the troops were wide and varied. Such needs as were not met by direct intervention of the military authorities necessitated an intricate mass of detailed orders, proclamations and notices issued under the authority of the General Officer Commanding and enforced for the most part by military police and military courts. These regulations supervised the direct relations between the inhabitants and the army, ranging from the control of rents² and foodstuffs,³ the restriction of movement of persons and of rivercraft,⁴ to orders that carriage drivers and boatmen 'shall in all cases give preference to British Officers, European ladies and Government

¹ Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annexed to Hague Convention, July 29th, 1899, affirmed in a similar Convention of the Hague, October 18th, 1907. Texts: *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, Vol. xci (1898-9), 988; Vol. c (1906-7), 338.

² *Compilation of Proclamations and Notifications Affecting Civil Inhabitants of Mesopotamia in Basrah* (Baghdad, 1919), Notification No. 2 (hereafter *Procs. Basrah*).

³ *Ibid.*, Notif. No. 5; *Proclamations and Notifications*, 'Amarah (Baghdad, 1919), No. 1, Sec. 14 (hereafter *Procs. 'Amarah*).

⁴ *Procs. Basrah*, Notif. No. 6, Regulation Nos. 12, 13; *Procs. 'Amarah*, P10c. No. 1, Secs. 2, 3, and 9.



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servants'.¹ Regulations governed indirect relations, from the control of the carrying of arms among the inhabitants,² the sale of liquors and drugs³ to minute sanitary regulations prescribing floor space per animal in stables or rewards for bringing in dogs for destruction.⁴

In all these relations between the civil population and the military authorities, the fact was never lost sight of that it was a military occupation and that a war had to be won. From the first to the last, the needs of the inhabitants were subordinated to those of the occupying Forces. Food, in certain cases, was admitted to market for sale only when the requirements of the military authorities had been met.⁵ Access to piped water was forbidden.⁶ Families were evicted from their houses and land requisitioned, sometimes without payment of rent.⁷ Restrictions on persons and goods were carried to unnecessary lengths, even after the danger from spies had vanished.⁸ Labourers in ever-increasing quantities were taken from their fields and villages and from their families and forced to work on military works, such forced labour becoming, as in Egypt, one of the outstanding grievances of the inhabitants against the British authorities.⁹

Delicate handling by the Political Officers was necessary in order to enforce the orders and regulations, harsh and exacting as many of them were, and at the same time to keep the

¹ *Procs. Basrah*, Reg. No. 12, Sec. 11.

² *Ibid.*, Reg. No. 12; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, Reg. No. 12, Sec. 9; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 7; Notice No. 5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Notice No. 1, No. 10; *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 14.

⁵ *Procs. 'Amarah*, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 14.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Notice No. 3.

⁷ No rent was paid from the time of the Occupation on the four or five miles of river frontage occupied by the British at 'Amāra. *Monthly Reports, Political Officers*, December, 1918, 'Amāra, p. 2.

⁸ Wilson, Sir A. T., op. cit., pp. 144, 242, *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia* (1920), Cmd. No. 1061, p. 24 (hereafter *Review C. Admn.*, 1914-1920).

⁹ Telegram No. 7520, Civil Commissioner to S/S for India, July 13th, 1919. The telegram indicates that by that date both the Civil Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding were 'fully alive to the importance of abolishing forced labour at the earliest possible moment'.

populace friendly, an avowed aim of the Expedition which from its inception placed the British officials in a peculiar position.

The entire situation was a contradiction in terms. The Expeditionary Force was invading enemy territory with the population of which the British Government was not at war, according to the proclamations issued after Fao.¹ Indeed, the British Government had declared that it had come to co-operate with the Arabs for their liberation from Turkish oppressors.² In spite of these declarations, however, the restrictions placed on the inhabitants differed little, if any, from the treatment accorded to an enemy population. The situation was no doubt complicated by the refusal of many of the Arabs to be considered friendly and by the necessity of combating by rigorous measures the low standards of sanitation, housing and morality prevailing in Mesopotamia.

The fact that the military regime was accepted as long as it was without protest may be attributed to a variety of factors. Prompt payment for all supplies, cash rent for billets and land, although not invariably nor always in strict proportion to prevailing rates, non-interference with such religious or local customs as did not hamper military or administrative policy, and the marked increase in general economic prosperity did much to mitigate its rigours. While the attitude of the army as a whole was distinctly hostile to the native population, not without good reason, yet there was a genuine and general desire on the part of all responsible officers to be just and fair in all their dealings with the native population. The untiring efforts of Sir Percy Cox and his assistants in establishing personal relations at the same time that subsidies and remissions of taxations were distributed among the shaikhs and local dignitaries, won many of the notables to benevolent neutrality.

¹ *Proclamations*, 1914-19, Notice No. 4, November 5th, 1914; Proc. No. 5, November 22nd, 1914; also *supra*, pp. 71-2.

² *Ibid.*, Notice No. 7, February 14th, 1915.

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The high integrity and efficiency of the new administration, once it had got into its stride, as contrasted with the former Turkish administration, did even more to create a general feeling of confidence and belief that the coming of Great Britain was for good rather than for evil.

Why the Turks Failed to Give Good Government to 'Iraq

It has been the habit among many writers on pre-war and war-time 'Iraq to disparage its administration by the Turks. Much of this attitude may be due to the not unnatural desire to paint the Turkish picture black in order that the scene, after Great Britain had reconstituted the administration, might appear brighter in contrast. Undoubtedly these views are somewhat exaggerated, yet there can be no question that the Turkish system, both in conception and in application, was lamentably deficient.

The principal reason for the failure of the Ottomans to give good government in 'Iraq or elsewhere in their dominions, lay in their fundamental political concepts. From the foundation of the Empire, Ottoman subjects, their lives and property were regarded as existing only for the benefit and glory of the rulers. Thus, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, from the Sultan downwards, every member of the official hierarchy looked on each person lower than himself in the scale as providing the wherewithal for his own profit and advancement until the accumulated burden finally rested on the great mass of peasantry and common people who, having no means of resistance, might be maltreated and starved with impunity. A wider concept of government as well as other reforms seemed imminent after the Revolution of 1908, but the Young Turk movement produced little but confusion and disappointed hopes.

The Ottomans, moreover, in all their political activities could not forget that they had come to power by conquest, a

fact which bore particularly upon the non-Ottoman sections, such as ‘Iraq and Syria and upon the non-Muslim peoples of the Empire. They looked with ingrained aversion on all occupations except those of soldiering and governing. The potential wealth of the Empire was thus left undeveloped, additional sources of revenue were untouched, and, in the face of extravagant and ill-advised expenditure, the country was forced to seek for financial relief from abroad.

Another reason for the failure of the Turks to give good government lay in the hiatus between statute book and practice, between a principle and its application. Every reforming movement had seen new laws and regulations, often copied bodily from European models, added to the statute books.¹ Rarely, however, was the will or the ability present to enforce the measures. Every innovation had to face opposition not only from a poorly paid, badly educated, often indolent officialdom, but also from traditional usage, from religious custom and prejudice and, not infrequently, from vested interests of the European Powers.

Although the civil bureaucracy might blindly struggle to apply the regulations as imposed by the central authorities, the impartial application of such measures varied in direct proportion to the energy and honesty of the pashas of the wilayets, on the one hand, and, on the other, to the distance of the wilayets from the central supervising authority at Constantinople.

In all these respects, Turkish Arabia suffered badly. Its remoteness from Constantinople, its lack of amenities, and its

¹ A general résumé of Turkish laws, regulations, etc., may be found in Young, George, *Corps de droit ottoman, Recueil des codes, lois règlements, ordonnances, et actes les plus importants du droit intérieur, et d'études sur le droit coutumier de l'Empire Ottoman*, (7 vols, Oxford, 1905-6). Also Biliotti, A., and Sedad, Ahmed, *Législation Ottomane depuis le rétablissement de la constitution*, 24 Djemazi ul-ahir, 1326 (10 juillet, 1908, 1^{er} Novembre, 1909). *Recueil des lois, décrets, règlements, conventions, actes internationaux, etc., de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1912). English translations of various Turkish laws made by the Judicial Department during the British occupation are listed in the bibliography under *Official Publications, 'Iraq Government, Judicial*.

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unfavourable climate made officials reluctant to take office there. The wilayets were staffed, for the most part, by incompetent officials or by those in political exile from Constantinople. Proper supervision was almost impossible.

Salaries of most of the government officials from *Walīs* to gendarmes were small and irregularly paid. Opportunities for peculation and corruption seem to have been rarely overlooked.¹ Substantial sums, exceeding the annual salaries were often paid for offices, from which holders rarely retired without having privately reimbursed themselves. Judges' salaries in the Baghdad wilayet ranged from £T.7½ to £T.35 per month,² but occupants of these positions had been frequently known to advance from extreme poverty to wealth within the space of a few years.

Whatever its faults, and they were many, the Turkish regime had been the only Government known to Turkish Arabia. Its vagaries had become familiar. Its defects and shortcomings the populace both knew and made use of for their own ends. Its disappearance with the complete withdrawal of the Turks as far north as Kūt al-'Amāra by September, 1915, the flight of all but minor Arab officials, the destruction or removal of records both by fleeing Turks and by interested inhabitants and the looting and pillaging of government buildings and equipment,³ made it imperative that an administration should be re-established. As soon as the first confusion had settled into routine and the population of the occupied territories had

¹ *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 7, cites 'an authentic story of a Turkish *Mutasarrif* in Syria, popular with his superiors if not with the people he governed, who boasted that his budget showed no expenditure at all. It consisted entirely of receipts. All the officials, from the *Mutasarrif* himself downwards, drew no pay, but lived on questionable perquisites, while repairs, maintenance, public works, etc., were simply neglected'.

² *Report on the Admin. of Civil Justice, from the Occupation of Baghdad to 31st December, 1917*, in *Admin. Report of the Baghdad Wilayet, 1917* (Calcutta, 1918), p. 182 (hereafter *Admin. Report, Baghdad, 1917*).

³ Within forty-eight hours of the departure of the Turks, not a single government building outside Basra possessed doors or windows. Wilson, Sir A. T., *op. cit.*, p. 13.

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become somewhat accustomed to British troops and their unfamiliar demands and regulations, the setting-up of the Civil Administration was taken in hand.

For the purposes of Civil Administration¹ and control of the tribes, the General Officer Commanding had attached to his staff a Chief Political Officer (Sir Percy Cox) who appointed officers, wherever they could be diverted from their military units, as Assistant Political Officers to take charge of the occupied territories, divided for political purposes along Indian lines. At the time Kūt al-‘Amāra was taken, they had been established at Basra, Qurna, Nāsiriya, Sūq ash-Shuyūkh, ‘Amāra, Qal ‘at Sālih, and ‘Alī Gharbī. To the Chief Political Officer, they were responsible for the maintenance of law and order, the settlement of disputes both of townsmen and tribesmen, the administration and collection of revenue and the creation of friendly relations with the tribes. To the military authorities, they were responsible for the collection of labour and local supplies, for estimates for compensation of damages caused by military operations and for the local protection of lines of communication.² In the towns Military Governors were appointed, with full control under the senior Military Officer.

From the outset, the primary question had to be decided whether the existing Turkish system, either as a whole or in part, should be adopted and utilized, or whether new systems based on Indian methods should be set up. Although the Hague Conventions of 1899 and of 1907, of which Great Britain was a signatory, stated that the occupant of a country ‘. . . shall take all the measure in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible public order and safety while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country’,³ the

¹ The administration until November, 1920, was actually Military Government, whether called Civil or Military Administration. It was imposed by the military authorities under the necessities of war. The laws of war alone determined the legality of its acts.

² *Admin. Report, Basra Sanjak, 1916-1917* (Calcutta, 1917), pp. 1-2.

³ Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Sec. III, Art. 43: *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, Vol. xcl (1898-9), 999; Vol. c (1906-7), 350.

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choice between the two alternatives was not difficult. Both the magnitude of the task and the military situation demanded immediate returns and a maximum of efficiency with a minimum of effort from those delegated to the initiation of the civil aspect of administration. None of the responsible officials of the Turkish regime remained. Few of the British officers of the Army of Occupation possessed any specialized knowledge of the previous administration. Such little administrative experience as existed had been gained in Indian systems which, from the British point of view, were vastly preferable to the inefficient and clumsy Turkish methods. In addition, the confident expectation within inner circles that the Government of India would assume the future permanent control of Basra and its hinterland at least, stimulated the adoption of the Indian administrative methods and practices which would aid in the assimilation of the occupied territories.

Within a week of the occupation of Basra, a Civil Police service modelled on Indian lines replaced the Military Police, under the supervision of Mr. E. G. Gregson of the Indian Police Service, who had had wide experience on the North West Frontier and in the Persian Gulf. Employment of the ex-Turkish police, even had they been available, was not desirable. Constables were therefore imported from India and Aden. A similar force was organized at 'Amāra, and a little later at Nāsiriya and at Sūq ash-Shuyūkh, but not with great success.¹ Local police, or *Shabana*, for use in the outlying villages and districts, were recruited from the Arabs themselves.

Foundations were thus laid on which later officials from India, including Colonel H. C. Prescott, I.A., Late Inspector-General of 'Iraq Police, were to construct the present 'Iraq Police system, in which the *Shabana* provided the nucleus of the native element.

¹ *Administration Report, Suq ash-Shuyūkh*, in *Reports of Political Officers in Occupied Territories of 'Iraq, 1916-1917* (March 31). Submitted by Sir P. Cox under No. 8850, Baghdad, November 18th, 1917 (hereafter *P.O. Reports, 1916-17*).

The introduction of Indian currency followed naturally on the coming of the Expeditionary Force, whose needs were paid for in rupees. A proclamation forbade the use of depreciated Turkish paper money¹, and the inadequate supply of small Turkish coins was driven from the bazaars. Turkish gold *liras*, however, continued to circulate, but their import and export were regulated.

Establishment of a Judicial System

For the administration of civil and criminal justice, a special code, known as the ‘Iraq Occupied Territories Code,’² was created largely from laws in force in India.³ The Code, promulgated August 1st, 1915, from which time the legal system of the Occupied Territories may be said to date,⁴ established courts for the enforcement of civil rights by legal action, hitherto in abeyance, and criminal courts to supplement the military courts. These courts, functioning under the authority of the General Officer Commanding, were supervised by Lieut.-Colonel S. G. Knox, Senior Judicial Officer, and by Captain C. F. Mackenzie, Junior Judicial Officer, both of whom were members of the Indian Political Department.

Among the reasons put forward for the substitution of the Anglo-Indian Judicial system for that of the Turkish system, were the impossibility of reproducing within a limited time the hierarchy of courts culminating in the Court of Cassation at Constantinople, the inability to find judges and officials familiar with the Turkish system, as well as other reasons already given

¹ *Proclamations, notices, etc., relating to the Civil Admin. . . . issued between December 22, 1916, and July 1st, 1918* (Baghdad, 1918), Proc. No. 1, December 22nd, 1916.

² *‘Iraq Occupied Territories Code, 1915* (Bombay, 1915). Also six supplements to December 31st, 1918 (hereafter ‘*I.O.T. Code*’).

³ A preliminary schedule of thirty-four Indian Acts to be applied in the Occupied Territories was annexed to the Code.

⁴ Arrangements to reconstitute the courts had begun shortly after the appointment of the Senior Judicial Officer, April 7, 1915.

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above. It was also held that the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890¹ could not be applied and that any laws made or administered must take the form of orders issued by the Army Commander who could, by notification, depute his powers to Civil Judicial Officers and regularize the exercise of the orders so made in the form of a code² such as the one actually promulgated.

Under the Code, the Senior Judicial Officer exercised the civil and criminal powers normally assigned in India to the District and the Sessions Judge, respectively. The Junior Judicial Officer possessed the powers of an Assistant Judge and a District Magistrate. In addition, the Junior and the Assistant Judicial Officers were invested, as in India, with powers of Small Cause Court Judges.³

Powers were given under the Code to enforce any Indian Law, which might be amended to meet local conditions,⁴ a provision which was freely used,⁵ as was also the power to make rules of procedure for the better execution of any matter arising in the course of any civil or criminal case.⁶

Although provision was made for the application, subject to stated exceptions,⁷ of Turkish Civil Law,⁸ the exceptions included in practice the bulk of suits coming before the courts.⁹ Thus, for all intents and purposes, Turkish Civil Law disappeared. Turkish Criminal Law, the Law of evidence and the Laws of Civil Procedure were expressly excluded from operation.¹⁰

The 'Iraq Code in its provisions and in the manner of its application seems to have made little distinction between India and 'Iraq. Indeed, Section 8 explicitly stated 'the Code of Criminal Procedure and other enactments for administration

¹ 53-54 Victoria cap. 37.

² *Administration Report, Judicial Department*, 1915 (Calcutta, 1916), p. 1 (hereafter *Judicial Report*, 1915).

³ Order by the General Officer Commanding, August 1st, 1915, in *I.O.T. Code*, p. 25.

⁴ *I.O.T. Code*, Sections 6 and 55.

⁵ *Judicial Report*, 1915, p. 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Sections 49, 50.

⁹ *Judicial Report*, 1915, p. 1.

⁸ *I.O.T. Code*, Section 51.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Sections 6, 32, 50.

¹⁰ *I.O.T. Code*, Section 48.

of criminal justice in British India shall have effect as if the Occupied Territories were a district in the Presidency of Bombay'. This section, taken with the Code as a whole, tends to confirm the impression that valid as were some of the reasons advanced at the time for the introduction of the new legal system, the most cogent reason was the underlying desire to pave the way for the painless absorption of lower Mesopotamia to India.

The belief, apparently held at this time, that the Indian system introduced by the Code was no more foreign to Turkish Arabia than the Turkish system which it replaced,¹ and that therefore the change was acceptable, seems scarcely in accordance with the facts. As Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, head of the Judicial system in Mesopotamia, 1917-21, has pointed out:

The present organization of these Courts and the Codes (of the Turks) have been in force for more than a generation, and indeed some of the Codes date back to a much earlier date. The people are accustomed to them, and are accustomed to regulate their transactions by them. This is especially true of the Baghdad mercantile community . . . Lawyers and Government officials have been trained in the procedure of the Courts and use of the Codes.²

The same statement could hardly be made concerning the Indian Laws, none of which were available either in Arabic or in Turkish when introduced. Even the Code was not translated into Arabic for some time following its introduction. Only four of the several score of Indian Laws had been translated into Arabic at the end of 1917, a fact which called forth a protest from the retiring Senior Judicial Officer, Lieut.-Colonel S. G. Knox.³ With the introduction of the Code, Arabic became the official language in the Courts, a measure popular to the people. Its use, however, was not entirely new. A circular from

¹ Wilson, Sir A. T., op. cit., p. 68.

² *Report on the Admin. of Justice, Baghdad, 1917*, in *Admin. Report, Baghdad, 1917*, p. 184.

³ *Review of the Reports of the Administration of Basrah Wilayet from April to December, 1917* (Calcutta, 1918), (hereafter *Admin. Rep., Basrah, 1917*): *Report on the Admin. of Justice, 1917*, p. 108.

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the Turkish Ministry of Interior in April, 1913, had directed that the use of Arabic should be allowed in the Courts of Justice and in public offices. In spite of the failure to carry out this concession literally, the use of Turkish was more of an affront to Arab sentiment than a handicap to litigation. Turkish was, and in many centres still is, the polite language, much as French was at the Courts of Prussia and Russia in the eighteenth century.

Although criminal cases could be tried in these newly established civil courts, the bulk of such cases was not sent to them. Serious cases, mainly robbery under arms, continued to be tried by military courts, under a highly summary procedure.¹ In Basra, 'Ashar, 'Amāra and Nāsiriya, the Military or Deputy Military Governors decided disputes of all kinds, while in the districts the same powers were exercised by Political Officers. Until after the fall of Baghdad no civil courts existed outside of Basra town.

Justice in Tribal Areas

It was soon evident that the 'Iraq Code could not be applied in its entirety to the tribal areas, comprising practically all of the Occupied Territories outside the towns. It was also clear that special powers were needed by the Political Officers to dispose of civil and criminal cases in their districts. To meet the situation, the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation was drawn up by Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs,² on the lines of the Indian

¹ *Admin. Rep., Basrah, 1917: Rep. Military Governor of Basrah, 1917, p. 199.*

² Henry Robert Conway Dobbs, G.B.E., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E. (1871-1934), may be rightfully called one of the makers of modern 'Iraq. He saw wide and distinguished service in India, Persia and Afghanistan. As Revenue and Judicial Commissioner to Baluchistan, 1909, 1911 and 1917, he came into direct contact with the 'Sandeman System'. He was under orders as Resident to Turkish Arabia when war broke out in 1914, but it was as Revenue Commissioner that he supervised the organization of administration, 1915-16, while Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer, enlarged political relations with the Arabs. Versatile in talents, but essentially an administrator, he brought to the difficult period, 1923-9, when he served as High Commissioner to 'Iraq, a great capacity for realistic thinking, a highly developed sense of duty, and a deep loyalty to the Empire which dominated all his relations with the Arabs.

Frontier Crimes Regulation and was promulgated in February, 1916. It gave authority to the Political Officers to invoke a tribal *majlis* or other arbitrating body to deal, in accordance with tribal custom, with all cases in which any of the parties concerned was a tribesman.¹

In all arbitration procedure, the Political Officer had the final word, although the Chief Political Officer might review the case. The Political Officer had to confirm the findings of the *majlis*, and he might set aside or add to the sentences imposed.² He was also invested with magisterial power to try cases which did not lend themselves to the application of tribal arbitration.³

The Regulation in its application proved congenial to the tribes, for it enabled them to settle disputes in ways long familiar to themselves. It also aided in tribal settlement and pacification by giving effect to tribal opinion obtained by arbitration, and it raised the importance of the shaikhs by giving them a recognized place in the political and legal system. The Political Officers, on their side, found that considerable work was taken off their shoulders.⁴

Over one point of tribal justice the views of the tribesmen and of the Political Officers often clashed. In cases of murder arising out of a blood feud, the tribesmen were accustomed to regard *fasl*⁵ or payments of money and usually, of women, as sufficient to settle the score and to end the feud. Imprisonment or capital punishment was thus considered not only harsh but unnecessary. In many cases where a woman violated or had been even accused of violating the desert code of morality, the death of the offender was demanded by the code in the name

¹ *Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation*, G.O.C. Proclamation No 2 of 1916, ch. iii, Sec. 7.

² *Ibid.*, Sections 10, 11, 13.

³ *Ibid.*, ch. iv and v.

⁴ *Reports of Admin for 1918 of Divisions and Districts of the Occupied Territories of Mesopotamia* (Calcutta, n.d.). Qurna Report, p. 306 (hereafter *Admin. Report*, 1918).

⁵ For valuable first-hand observations on *fasl*: *Monthly Reports of Political Officers of the Occupied Territories*, November, 1919 (hereafter *Monthly Rep'ts*): Nāsiriya, pp. 94-5.

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of honour (*namūs*).¹ Capital punishment for such murders, which were frequent and usually premeditated and brutal, cut across tribal justice. The Political Officers, on their side, found such customs abhorrent and contrary to their ideas of justice.² Their natural tendency was to override the decisions of the tribal *majlis* and to impose imprisonment or death penalties. The problem was partially solved by the gradual recognition of the tribal point of view by the British authorities, but the modification of tribal custom has taken longer. At the present, it still constitutes one of the major problems in the administration of the tribal areas of 'Iraq.

The Revenue Department

No single task of greater magnitude faced the British administrators of the Occupied Territories than that of organizing the Revenue Department. The collection and administration of revenue in accordance with the Turkish system but freed from abuse and corruption were not the only problems. Associated problems of land tenure, of revenue assessment, of *Auqāf* administration, in all their strangeness and complexity, had to be studied and solved. Responsibility for other activities, such as Excise and Customs, control of Hostile Trading Concerns, of the Public Debt, and of Education had to be assumed. To render the task more difficult, papers and records where they had not been destroyed, were out of date and, with the exception of land-registration, in confusion, requiring weeks of careful sorting.³ Responsible officials had fled, and although

¹ See Thomas, Bertram, *Alarms and Excursions in Arabia*, 1931, pp. 86-7.

² *Admn. Report*, 1918: Hilla Division, pp. 126, 133; *Monthly Rep'ts*, December, 1919. Qurna Division, p. 59; *Ibid.*, August, 1919: Qurna Division, p. 74.

³ Cf. the excellent unsigned article (by C. C. Garbett, I.C.S.): *Turkish Rule and British Administration in Mesopotamia* in *Quarterly Review*, Vol. CCXXX, pp. 403 ff. The claim made there (p. 411), however, that demand-statements for the annual tax on date trees as prepared by the Turks, were found intact and collection of this as well as other revenue were begun within a few days of the occupation of Basra, is not borne out by the records of the period, as *Revenue Admn. Report*, January-March, 1915 (confidential), nor by personal testimony of the officials on the spot at the time.

important aid was rendered by residents of Basra and ‘Amāra and later by the discovery of old registers, the essential information concerning the complicated and often inconsistent system had to be gleaned by investigation and experience.

British Military authorities had at first no time to deal with Revenue or Fiscal matters except Customs. With the arrival, however, of Mr. Dobbs in January, 1915, as Revenue Commissioner, the work was taken in hand. The taxes demanded by the Turks had to be ascertained, the proportion paid before the arrival of the Expeditionary Force had to be discovered, and a collecting agency improvised.¹ Methods of assessment had to be learned. In the first months, the process of learning was by trial and error, tempered by the desire to win the confidence and goodwill of the Arabs and to impress them with the difference between the Turkish and the British methods of government. In some sections, as around ‘Amāra, the revenue was farmed out to great landowners on terms which kept them loyal to the British. In other sections it was remitted in part,² and in still others, entirely, as at Qurna in 1915.³ In some districts the tax on date trees alone was collected, and this in small proportion to former Turkish demands.⁴ In other districts where the landowners were obviously paying on too few trees, the number was raised, with the alternative that owners might demand a recount. No such demands occurred. Considering the difficulties, it is not surprising that only Rs. 20,000 (approximately £1400) in land revenue was collected in the five months of the first fiscal year (ending March 31st, 1915) following the British occupation.⁵

Full development of the Revenue Department was to come after Baghdad wilayet had been taken over.⁶ Nevertheless,

¹ *Revenue Administration Report*, 1915, p. 1.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *P.O. Reports, 1916-1917: Hammar Lake Area, 1916-1917*, p. 57.

⁵ *Revenue Admin. Report*, 1915.

⁶ The Turkish system and the British methods in the various aspects of the Revenue Department will be described in greater detail in a later section dealing with the development of the Administration from 1917 onwards. *Infra*, pp. 112 ff.

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by October, 1916, when Mr. Dobbs was invalided to India, a working administrative machinery had been set up, not only for revenue but also for other branches of administration which had been taken under the wing of the Revenue Department. A certain amount of confidence in the British regime had been gained. Data and information on revenue, land tenure and other subjects had been embodied for future guidance in a series of notes which for clarity of judgment and succinctness have probably never been surpassed in the history of 'Iraq Administration.

Administration of Tribal Areas

To the establishment of a government for the tribal areas, both Sir Percy Cox and Mr. Dobbs gave particular attention. The greatest need of the moment was for peace and order in tribal areas and for the restriction of all assistance to the Turks from the Arabs, in order that the Expeditionary Force might devote itself to its main objective of defeating the Turks.

Both Sir Percy Cox and Mr. Dobbs believed that these conditions might be attained by making use of the natural leaders of the tribes: the shaikhs. The alternative of direct government, either by a British or Arab staff, was calculated to be contrary to immediate ends if not impossible, due to the lack of a suitable staff and to the semi-barbaric character of the tribes. Their efforts were, therefore, directed towards building up forms of administration and of justice which, while conforming as far as possible to Western standards, were based on tribal organization, on recognition of tribal habits and customs and on support of the shaikhs as instruments of government.

The policy adopted was, in reality, an adaptation of the system so successfully developed and applied in Baluchistan by Sir Robert Sandeman, of whom it has been said: 'Every great

colonial administrator has, wittingly or unwittingly, taken him as their example or followed in his footsteps.’¹

When Sir Robert Sandeman first began to develop his system in Baluchistan, about 1875, he had found ‘the tribal organization in a state of rapid decay and the power and influence of the tribal leaders much diminished’.² In ‘Iraq, at the outbreak of the war, the tribes, especially those on the lower Euphrates, were in much the same state as a result of Ottoman attempts alternately to crush or settle them and to break or conciliate their leaders. The Turkish Government had at all times regarded the tribal Arabs as savages who, from sheer maliciousness, opposed the Government while in reality they were primitive communities still leading an existence so untouched by the benefits of civilized government that they could comprehend no other form of life than that postulated by their own codes and customs. The Government policy until the appointment of Midhat Pasha as *Wali* of Baghdad in 1869 aimed at the forcible conversion of the tribesmen from outlaws to obedient citizens without providing the means to live as such, or without arousing even a spark of the respect by which tribal obedience might be secured.

Midhat Pasha³ approached the tribal problem from the standpoint of the land. His method was to sell *mīrī* or state lands for small periodical payments, giving *mīrī tāpū sanads* (state-land title-deeds) which, while not conferring actual ownership, gave security of tenure. These *tāpū sanads* were to be open to holders of doubtful titles, to villagers who cleaned a canal or planted a garden and to all shaikhs of tribes for their

¹ Bruce, Col. C. E., *J.R.C. Asian Soc.*, January, 1932, p. 60. For details of Sir Robert Sandeman and his system, see the article cited; Thornton, T. H., *Sir R. Sandeman; his Life* (1895); Hittu Ram, *Sandeman in Baluchistan* (Calcutta, 1916); *The Times*, February 26th, 1935; and *J.R.C. Asian Soc.*, April, 1935.

² *J.R.C. Asian Soc.*, January, 1932, p. 51.

³ For the career of this noted Turkish official, whose reforming influence extended throughout the Ottoman Empire, and to whom the Turkish Constitution of 1878 owed much, see the interesting but uncritical *Life of Midhat Pasha* (1903), by his son, ‘Ali Haydar Midhat.

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tribal area. He intended thereby to reclaim wide tracts for the plough, to increase revenue and to subdue tribal 'Iraq by giving the tribesmen new interests and relations in agricultural life. The shaikhs, to whom the grants were to be made, would be won to the government in self-interest, and would therefore lose their terror as rallying-points of anti-government forces. As chiefs of agricultural communities, they would be accessible because rooted to the land, taxable because crops could not be hidden, vulnerable because of government control of water, and dependent on the government as guarantor of their acquired rights to collect the landlord's share of crops.

This agrarian policy, although the only one which could permanently solve the tribal problem, never achieved more than partial success, either during Midhat Pasha's regime, 1869-72, or during those of his successors previous to 1908, who, while nominally committed to land settlement, followed their own devices in dealing with the tribes.¹ The machinery for registering the land was inadequate and tended to become corrupt. The majority of the tribal leaders feared the new policy and shunned the new status as a machination of government to rob them of freedom and to impose conscription. Urban speculators, friendly with *tāpū* officers, forestalled other would-be tribal purchasers.²

The attempt to settle the tribes had one definite result. It split the shaikhs as in the case of the Sa'dūns of the Muntafiq into groups, one hostile to the innovations, the other, willing tools of the Government, bought by gifts of land. Between the two groups the Government vacillated. It was easier at times to acquiesce in the domination of the countryside by powerful, reactionary shaikhs and in the consequent nullification of their

¹ After the revolution of 1908, the Young Turks reaffirmed the policy of settling such tribes as were still nomad, such as the *firmān* appointing Jamal Bey (better known as Djemal Pasha) as *Walī* of Baghdad, August, 1911: 'The *Walī* is to formulate a scheme with the least possible delay for the settlement of the nomad tribes on the land.'

² *Revenue Circulars*, Nos. 1-22 (Baghdad, 1920), No. 15, p. 25.

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land policy rather than to maintain its own partisans. Whatever plan for winning over the shaikhs had existed, it was soon abandoned by the Young Turks who, desiring to stamp out all other power than their own, sought to establish direct relations between the Government and tribesmen. Great shaikhs were struck down wherever possible, as was Sa’dūn Pasha in June, 1911, when he was treacherously captured and imprisoned in Aleppo where he died suddenly. The authorities went deliberately ‘out of their way to break the power of the individual shaikhs by multiplying their number everywhere to a bewildering degree. Anarchy reigned and nothing could be done to prevent it, owing to the lack of a strong hand in each tribe’.¹

The struggle between the Government and the tribes in the lower Euphrates valley had been further complicated by the disruption of the prevailing feudal system, through the unskilful application to the Muntafiq country of Midhat Pasha’s otherwise sound policy of land-settlement.² The whole of the arable land, although occupied and cultivated for many years by the tribes and therefore claimed as their own by prescriptive right, was parcelled out between the Turkish crown and the Sa’dūns, *tāpū* title deeds being issued to the new landlords.³ The degradation in status of the tribesmen to tenants, much as the Irish cultivators had been reduced on their own tribal lands by the English adventurers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, together with the necessity of paying both rent to the newly created Sa’dūn landlords — who formerly had exercised only a form of lordship over the Muntafiq and had held none of the land as private property⁴ — and revenue to the Government in the form of shares of their crops, stirred tribal feeling to revolt

¹ *Admin. Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh, in P.O. Reports, 1916-1917.*

² Nāsir Pasha, the great Sa’dūn and founder of Nāsiriya is credited with introducing the *tāpū* system into the Muntafiq, whereby the Sa’dūns became great landlords. Note on the Sa’dun Problem (confidential) by the Revenue Commissioner, 1916; *Admin. Report of the Muntafiq Division, 1919* (Baghdad, 1920), pp. 1-2.

³ Note on the Sa’dun Problem; *Admin. Report, Muntafiq, 1919*, p. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, also *Revenue Rep.*, 1919, p. 24.

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in which they were joined by the party of landless Sa'dūn hostile to the Government.¹ An era of bitter strife ensued between tribesmen and landlords, many of whom lived in the towns, occasionally by choice but more often by necessity, and between tribesmen and the Government. In some areas, accessible to gunboats and troops, the tribesmen had begun to pay these dues regularly² until the weakening of the Government hold, due to the Revolution of 1908 and later to the Italian and Balkan wars. The tribes soon relapsed into their former state of truculence, expelling their landlords and paying scant attention to the Government.³ In other districts revenue had not been paid by the tribes for years, as in the Hammār Lake area,⁴ and in the Sūq ash-Shuyūkh region which had been free of any government control for fifteen years or more.⁵ In still others the Turkish writ did not run outside the towns.⁶

Thus, by the time that British Administrators appeared in the tribal areas, the only attempt to settle the tribes had failed for want of will and of means to execute it. Disputes over land and water had embittered relations between tribesmen and landlords on the one hand, and between tribesmen and the Government on the other. The authority of the shaikhs, where it had not been entirely destroyed by the Government, was antagonistic to it. Government had for the most part broken down. 'Iraq, in the words of one competent observer, which though written with reference to the situation in 1900, may be applied with equal force to that in 1914, was

¹ *Revenue Circular No. 15*, p. 25; *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1919, p. 2

² *Review of Civil Admin. of the Occupied Territories of al-'Iraq*, 1914-1918 (Baghdad, 1918), p. 44 (hereafter *Review C. Admin. O.T.*, 1914-1918).

³ The disturbances eventually led the Turkish Government in 1911, to appoint a Commission of Inquiry, which 'attributed the Muntafiq troubles to the fact that the arable lands of the tribes are in the hands of a few powerful shaikhs who oppress their fellow tribesmen and keep them at variance ... The proper remedy is a thorough partition of the lands'. Cited: Note on Sa'dun Problem.

⁴ *P.O. Reports, 1916-1917; Admin. Report Hammar Lake Area*, p. 56

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Admin. Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh*, p. 39.

⁶ *Arab of Mesopotamia* (Basra, 1917). Hereafter this semi-official publication by Miss G. L. Bell: Bell, *Arab of Meso.*

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a country of tribesmen fast losing the old loyalties, less and less able to revert to the old livelihood, attracting local rather than tribal relations, more dependent on order and control . . . yet still tribal in material equipment, in speech, in ignorance, still easily inflamed to ruin their own interests, still resentful of government and all its works.¹

The full application of the policy of rebuilding the tribal organization under competent shaikhs, advised, controlled and supervised by British Political Officers, which was the essence of Sandeman's policy, had to wait until the force of Turkish arms had been broken.² In the meantime, however, every means of strengthening the power of the shaikhs was undertaken, on the basis that 'both the attitude and action of a tribe depend almost entirely on its most influential chiefs'.³

A single leading shaikh was recognized in every tribe, as in the Sūq ash-Shuyūkh district where H. R. P. Dickson, Assistant Political Officer, reported that he had 'managed during 1916-17, more or less to get the power into the hands of one shaikh in the case of each of the 22 Suq tribes'.⁴

Each shaikh so selected was made responsible for peace and order in his tribe, for the apprehension of wrongdoers, for the protection of lines of communication and of British Government property, for the cutting off of supplies and aid to the Turks and for the collection of such revenue as was levied. In return, he was given the support of British officials, prestige and, if necessary, arms. Possession of his lands was confirmed, and his tribal boundaries were defined as closely as possible. His natural importance in the tribal *majlis* was enhanced by

¹ Longrigg, S. H., *Four Centuries of Modern 'Iraq*, p. 309.

² For instance, Nāsiriya was occupied July, 1915, but not until 1918 was administrative progress possible among the tribes, because of their anti-British feeling. *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1919, p. 2; *Revenue Report*, 1919, p. 24.

³ *Provisional Note on the Tribes within and fringing Mesopotamian Boundaries, North of Latitude 33° 20' (Baghdad)*. For official use only, General Staff, M.E.F. (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1 (hereafter *Note on Tribes for General Staff*). Although written in 1920 of tribes of Baghdad wilayet, it is generally applicable to practically all tribes from 1914.

⁴ *P.O. Reports, 1916-1917: Admin. Rep., Suq esh-Shuyūkh*, p. 43.

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the measures of the Tribal Disputes Regulations. Added to these was the policy of 'large doles, subsidies and no taxation',¹ which one Political Officer, at Nāsiriya, held to be 'chiefly responsible for the remarkable state of law and order which now exists', since 'the shaikh . . . will obey any order than risk losing it (his subsidy)'.²

As advantageous for immediate military ends as was the policy of restoring the cohesion of the tribes and the patriarchal rule of their shaikhs and as well suited as it was to many aspects of tribal life, it was nevertheless fraught with difficulties for the future.

The tribal organization had so far deteriorated, especially among the rice-growing and date-producing tribes, that it could only be restored by supporting the shaikhs with force, and, as Sir Henry Dobbs said in 1916: 'Once a shaikh has to rely on Government for support, he has lost the sympathy of his tribesmen.'³ Endowed with power as they were and motivated by self-interest no less than the meanest tribesmen, the shaikhs found it difficult to restrain themselves from even petty tyrannies, which, by 1920 had assumed such proportions in tribal eyes as to form a cause of the insurrection of that year.

From the standpoint of government, the efforts to restore tribal organization meant the reimposition of feudalism, contrary to the principle of the evolution of political institutions. Purely bureaucratic government, with its lack of flexibility and sympathetic contacts, was manifestly unsuited to tribes at the time, a fact which Mr. Dobbs realized and made every effort to combat. Nevertheless, the introduction of the Sandeman system, depending for its successful operation on maintenance of the tribal *status quo*, gave little opportunity for the operation of civilizing processes, for the growth of less primitive social codes and of more progressive forms of government. The system in 'Iraq tended to become a method of control rather than a system of government in its broadest sense.

¹ *Admn. Report, Muntafiq*, 1921 (confidential, Baghdad, 1922), p. 18.

² *Reports Admn.*, 1918. *Nasiriyah Division*, p. 351.

³ Cited, *Admn. Report, Suq al-Shuyukh District*, in *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1921, p. 56.

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CAPTURE OF BAGHDAD

ONCE Baghdad was in British hands and its future had been considered by a Committee of the War Cabinet, it was apparent that H.M. Government intended to follow a line of policy differing in many respects from that hitherto expected for the political control and administration of Basra, Baghdad and Arabia. The Government of India had declared in late 1915 that 'the minimum of annexation contemplated by us has always been the wilayets of Basra and Baghdad',¹ and it was still generally believed that the whole of the Occupied Territories if not actually annexed would be controlled from India. The views of H.M. Government, however, on this as well as other points were clearly stated in the summary of conclusions of the War Cabinet as telegraphed to Baghdad on March 29th, 1917:

- (1) Occupied territories to be administered by His Majesty's Government, not by Government of India.
- (2) Basrah with Nasiriyah, Shatt-el-Hai, Kut, Bedrai as its western and northern limits to remain permanently under British Administration.
- (3) Baghdad to be an Arab State with local ruler or government under British protectorate in everything but name. It will accordingly have no relations with Foreign Powers and Consuls will be accredited to His Majesty's Government.
- (4) Baghdad to be administered behind the Arab façades as far as possible as an Arab province by indigenous agency and in accordance with existing laws and institutions. In particular (a) Iraq Code not to be used but local judicial system maintained as regards both law and personnel; only with substitution of Arab for

¹ Dispatch cited by Philby, H. St. J. B., *Arabia* (1928), p. 245.

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Turk. (b) Similarly with executive and administrative machinery. Tribal system of Government, provincial and local councils, etc., to be resuscitated and maintained. (c) No disturbance of present land revenue system. (d) Employment of Indians in all branches of Administration to be strictly discountenanced as being inconsistent with above principles. No Asiatics from outside to be employed unless of Persian or Arab descent or domicile. The same to apply to Basra wilayet as far as possible. (5) In the event of Basrah not being annexed, head of whole of Mesopotamian administration to be High Commissioner residing at Baghdad, Basrah being placed under the Governor subordinate to him. In the event of Basrah being annexed, head of administration to be styled Governor of Basrah and High Commissioner for Mesopotamia with titular headquarters at Basrah but residing generally at Baghdad. Deputy Governor and Deputy High Commissioner at Basrah and Baghdad, respectively, to act for him in his absence. (6) Amalgamation of British Civil Service, with that of Soudan, and possibly also of Levant, recruitment being carried on by same method and personnel interchangeable. British Officers of Indian Services, if required at first, to be lent temporarily under Foreign Service rules. Those now serving there to be permitted to volunteer for permanent transfer. (7) Shiah Holy Places to form separate enclave not under direct British control, care being taken not to include any important irrigated or irrigable areas in it. (8) Control of irrigation, navigation and conservancy of rivers in both vilayets to be under single British administration. (9) Koweit and whole of Arab littoral of Persian Gulf including Oman to be controlled by Basrah. (10) Aden, Hadramaut to be taken over by Foreign Office. (11) South Persia, including Arabistan and Fars to be sphere of influence of Government of India. (12) It is regarded as of utmost importance that administrative arrangements introduced into Baghdad Wilayet should strictly conform to above principles from the very outset.¹

¹ Telegram, S/S for India to Foreign Secretary, Simla, March 29th, 1917.

It was also apparent that the application of this policy as well as the continuation of the offensive against the Turks and the active extension of British political influence throughout the wilayet, which H.M. Government put forward as essential for success of the policy, did not meet the whole-hearted approval of the Commander-in-Chief in India, of the Imperial General Staff or of General Maude. The General Staff in particular wished to assume ‘an active defensive’ in order that men, equipment and shipping might be released for the needs of the Western Front.¹ With the political aspects of the policy, General Maude found it difficult to be in full accord. As a soldier he considered the destruction of Turkish arms to be his first duty, from which his energies should not be diverted, particularly since he believed that an early advance would have a substantial moral effect in Mesopotamia and in adjacent countries.² Moreover, an attempt by the Turks to retake Baghdad seemed almost certain.³ He was reluctant therefore to assume new responsibilities.

In addition he could not regard as desirable the encouragement of the Arab Movement in Mesopotamia as now urged by the Foreign Office which held that it was unsound not to take advantage of the opportunity to exploit Great Britain’s Arab policy⁴ and to foster a Movement which had proved to be of

¹ *O.H.*, Vol. iv, pp. 19 ff.

² Telegram, General Officer Commanding, Baghdad, to Commander-in-Chief, India, July, 1917, cited, *O.H.*, Vol. iv, p. 27.

³ See *O.H.*, Vol. iv, pp. 5, 7, 12, 38-41. For Enver Pasha’s abortive *Yilderim* or ‘Lightning’ expedition to retake Baghdad: *O.H.*, Vol. iv, pp. 8-9, 13 ff., also Husain Husni Amin Bey, *Yilderim*, published by the Turkish General Staff, translated by Captain C. O. de R. Channer, I.A.; also Liman von Sanders, Gen. O. V. C., *Fünf Jahre Türkei* (Berlin, 1922), pp. 219-33.

⁴ This policy, in a formula proposed by Sir Mark Sykes, was: ‘Towards all Arabs . . . whether independent allies as Ibn Sa’ud or the Sherif, inhabitants of protectorates, spheres of influence, vassal states, we should show ourselves as pro-Arabs, and that wherever we are on Arab soil we are going to back the Arab language and Arab race, and that we shall support or protect Arabs against external oppression by force as much as we are able and from alien exploitation.’ Cited Hart, H. B. Liddell, *op. cit.*, p. 105 n.

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distinct military advantage in the past.¹ By thus making use of the Movement, H.M. Government hoped to hasten the defeat of the Turks and to acquire additional compensatory advantages in Mesopotamia, as well as in Palestine, to offset the possible stalemate in Europe. They were also anxious to achieve along the lines of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the correspondence between the Sharif of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon,² an unchallengable position in the Middle East.³

General Maude had protested against the proclamation issued in accordance with this policy, but under his name, after the fall of Baghdad as being unnecessary and ill-timed. He had held that the proclamation as well as the policy would create confusion in the minds of the Arabs as to the future intentions of Great Britain, and would unduly arouse their hopes and ambitions at a time when the authority of the British Army must remain supreme and unquestioned in the Occupied Territories.

General Maude was also doubtful as to the military benefits to be derived from the application of the proposals of H.M. Government towards the Arabs,⁴ although the Chief Political Officer, Sir Percy Cox, thought that Arab assistance in definite instances, as by the 'Amārāt section of the 'Anaiza tribe, numbering about 5000 rifles under Fahād Beg ibn Hadhdhal,⁵

¹ Summary of telegram, Chief of Imperial General Staff to General Officer Commanding, Baghdad, May 16th, 1917. The reference to military advantages of the Movement is hardly a reference to Egypt, as suggested in *O.H.*, Vol. iv, p. 6, but more probably to operations in the Hijāz.

² Notably. Letters, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th; December 14th, 1915; January 25th, 1916. Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, November 5th, 1915; January 1st, 1916.

³ *O.H.*, Vol. iv, p. 42, 'In Mesopotamia one of our main guiding factors was our anxiety for the safety of India'.

⁴ Telegram, General Officer Commanding, Baghdad, to Chief of Imperial General Staff, June 1st, 1917, cited, *O.H.*, Vol. iv, p. 9.

⁵ The 'Amārāt section ranged over the eastern half of the Syrian desert, from Karbalā as far north as Dair az-Zūr, and also shared with the Dulaim pastures between the Euphrates and the wells of Muhawir and al-Mat. *Arab Tribes of Baghdad Wilayet*, July, 1918 (Baghdad, 1918); *A Handbook of Mesopotamia* (prepared on behalf of the Admiralty and the War Office, by Naval Staff, Intelligence Department, 1918, 2nd ed., 5 vols.), Vol. 1, p. 103 (hereafter *Handbook of Meso.*); *Note on Nomadic Arab Tribes* (Baghdad, 1919).

might achieve a wide and important effect apart from its precise military value.¹

On these points, General Maude was in full agreement with the views of the Government of India and with those of most of his fellow officers in Mesopotamia.²

Although one of the objectives of the expedition had been to win over the Arabs from their fellow-Muslims the Turks, the Government of India had made little effort other than with Ibn Sa‘ūd, to induce the Arabs to take up arms against the Turks. Talib Pasha, the ambitious leader of Arab Nationalism, was not permitted to return to ‘Iraq.³ Favourably disposed shaikhs were given little active work except that of keeping supplies from the Turks, duties which made little appeal either to their pockets or to their dignity. In late 1915 and early 1916, Karbalā and Najaf had risen against the Turks, the Arab forces with Khalil Pasha were openly rebellious and the tribes were ripe for a rising.⁴ These opportunities had been allowed to pass, although Arab attacks on Turkish communications might have enabled the British forces to have dislodged the Turks before Kūt.

Even the Arab rising in the Hijāz had been deprecated. It had been, in the Viceroy’s words, ‘a displeasing surprise’ and ‘its collapse would be far less prejudicial to us in India and also in Afghanistan than would military intervention in support of the revolt’.⁵ They feared that it would be regarded by ‘very many Mohammedans in and on the borders of India as having been inspired by us and consequently as a Christian interference with religion’.⁶

The attitude of the Government of India may have been

¹ Telegram, General Officer Commanding, Baghdad, to Chief of Imperial General Staff, June 24th, 1917. Summarized in *O.H.*, Vol. IV, p. 20.

² *O.H.*, Vol. IV, p. 10.

³ See also *infra*, pp. 231 ff., 239, 272, 305, 320 ff.

⁴ Lawrence, T. E., *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (1935), p. 60.

⁵ Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

⁶ *O.H.*, Vol. III, pp. 26-7. But cf. Sir Michael O’Dwyer, *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. X (1923), p. 63.

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partially due to fear of the effect of an Arab revolt on Indian Muslims still loyal to the religious authority of the Ottoman *Khalīfa*. It seems more probable that it was due to the inherent disbelief of Anglo-Indian officials in native ability, to the desire to avoid using allies who might complicate the eventual settlement of the political status of Mesopotamia and to the antagonism to an Arab policy which did not originate in India.

For generations past the Government of India had assumed sole charge of Great Britain's relations with the Arabs. On March 31st, however, the High Commissioner for Egypt assumed charge of all Arab affairs, save those of the south and east coasts of Arabia.¹ In this action, in Foreign Office support of the Sharīf of Mecca rather than Ibn Sa'ūd, the protégé of the Government of India, and in the incitement of Arabs against their spiritual and temporal overlords — a dangerous precedent, according to Indian authorities — lay the fundamental differences of opinion which gave rise to the two so-called 'schools' of thought on Arab politics. The Anglo-Indian or Eastern Arabia or Sa'ūdī school viewed Arab politics from the standpoint of the immediate needs of India. It regarded the Wahhābī Amīr of the Najd as the proper Arab leader, and it aimed at the penetration of Arabia from the Persian Gulf and Aden, at the indirect control of Arabs in their own spheres and at the absorption, by the Government of India, of Turkish Arabia, that it might, as a western Burma, protect and extend Imperial interests.

The Anglo-Egyptian or Western Arabia or Hāshimī school, no less concerned for the welfare of India, adopted the line of action which, if successful, would place friendly Arabs in Damascus, barring a possible French expansion towards India, and in Western Arabia and in Turkish Arabia, facilitating the protection of both the Suez Canal and the land routes to India. Having selected the Sharīf of Mecca and his family as the fittest tools available, it aimed at Arab independence in strictly Arab lands and at only sufficient influence over the other Arab-

¹ *O.H., E. and Pal.*, Vol. I, p. 216.

speaking portions of the Ottoman Empire as might guarantee their friendly relations with Great Britain.¹

In Mesopotamia, the views of the Anglo-Indian school naturally prevailed. Moreover, the military authorities, trained in the conduct of war only by orthodox methods, had little desire for irregular allies, who, in their opinion, had proven both unreliable and unsuitable for conditions of modern warfare. Their own experiences were taken as justification for these views. The tribes in Mesopotamia had shifted from side to side, according to whichever at the moment seemed to be winning.² They turned at the first opportunity, against ally or enemy, forgetting all obligations, in order that they might plunder and loot: their ‘clearest and strongest positive influence’.³ The Turks had relinquished hope of using them after the battle of Shu’aiba, where the 10,000 tribal allies had not fired a single shot. Even Ibn Sa’ūd, from whom the Government of India had expected much, had failed to render effective aid against the Turks, although, when his enemies had been removed or weakened, he became the paramount figure of Arabia. He had entered into treaty relations with Great Britain, December 26th, 1915, after negotiations extending over fourteen months. He was also in receipt of a subsidy which, in proportion to his effective participation against the common enemy, the Turks, was far greater than that paid to Sharif Husain,⁴ although he constantly com-

¹ See Hogarth, D. G., *Quarterly Review*, Vol. CCXXXIV (1920), pp. 411 ff.

² ‘This is not treachery but the natural outcome of weakness and the struggle to exist.’ Extract from *Note on Tribes for General Staff*, p. 2. *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1921, p. 56, cites the example of ‘the carefully attested warrior, who, in an authentic tribal battle, changed sides on no less than five occasions eventually to be with the victors’.

³ *Note on Tribes for General Staff*, p. 2. Arab uncertainty and their proneness to consider loot as the chief aim of their existence more than once threatened to suspend the operations on the other side of the desert; Lawrence, op. cit., pp. 128-9, 348, 368 ff. 470, 523, passim; Hart, op. cit., pp. 296-7.

⁴ It has been estimated that the operations of the Hijāz Force accounted for 65,000 Turkish troops, at the cost of £100 per man. Ibn Sa’ūd, in receipt of £60,000 annually from the British Treasury alone, as well as of other sums from the Government of India, occupied the attention of not a single Turkish soldier. Nor did his pro-Turk rival, Ibn Rashīd, have anything ‘to fear from Ibn Sa’ud’. (*Cmd.* 1061, p. 25. See also *O.H., E. and Pal.*, Vol. II, p. 398.) It has

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plained of its smallness.¹ His failure to render aid in 1915 may have been one reason why the British authorities at Cairo turned to negotiations with the Sharif of Mecca.

The military authorities could see little practical value in the Arabs as fighting forces unless they were carefully organized under officers with suitable knowledge and with military experience. They could be employed then only as part of a general campaign under a single direction. Otherwise, while they could harry and demoralize a retreating enemy, they would be entirely ineffective, although tiresome, against unbroken troops.²

With such views prevailing in India and in Mesopotamia, it is not surprising that T. E. Lawrence, on his visit to 'Iraq in 1916, with a three-fold mission, one of which was to foster, if possible, an Arab rising similar to that brewing in western Arabia, should be treated with scorn,³ that subsequent events in Hijāz should be belittled⁴ and that the policy of organizing Arab assistance should be rejected.

The historical fact remains that while many of the same obstacles to tribal co-operation existed in western Arabia, the effort was made there, with important results in the successful defeat of the common enemy, the Turk and his allies. The peculiar genius of T. E. Lawrence; the inspiring leadership and

¹ Memorandum No. 24, August 9th, 1917, from 'Iraq Section, Arab Bureau to Arab Bureau, Cairo. For Ibn Sa'ūd's own valuation of his services to Great Britain, see 'Amin Rihani, *Ibn Sa'ūd of Arabia, his people and his land* (1928), p. 61.

² Summary of telegram, General Officer Commanding, Baghdad, to Chief of Imperial General Staff, June 1st, 1917, *O.H.*, Vol. IV, p. 10. Cf. the views of T. E. Lawrence, *op. cit.*, pp. 104, 339-40. For the opinion of a Turkish Army commander on the military value of Arabs, see Djemal Pasha, *op. cit.*, p. 153. For that of the head of the German Military Mission to Turkey, see Liman von Sanders, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

³ Lawrence, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60; Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

⁴ 'Nothing that had been achieved in the direction of Arab co-operation on the Palestine front, up to this date (1917), gave those on the spot (Mesopotamia) any reason to advocate any change in policy.' Wilson, Sir A. T., *Mesopotamia*, 1917-20, p. 4.

been estimated that in the British Army's operations against the Turks, each Turkish casualty or prisoner cost from £1500 to £2000 per head. See Toynbee, A. J., *The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement* (1927), p. 283; *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. XLIX (1922), pp. 241-3; *ibid.*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CVIX (1922), p. 490.

fervent belief in Arab Nationalism of the Amir Faisal ibn Husain; the military experience of Ja‘far Pasha al-‘Askari¹; the patient direction of Lieut.-Colonel P. C. Joyce and the organizing ability of Colonel A. G. Dawnay and of Major Hubert Young contributed not a little to the success of the Arab movement in the West. So also did the support of those officials in Whitehall and in Egypt, including Sir Gilbert Clayton, Commander D. G. Hogarth, Sir Reginald Wingate, Colonel Kinahan Cornwallis, who, while aware of the limitations of Arab character and temperament, believed in the military as well as the political value of Arab co-operation against the Turks.² This belief was not wholly unjustified; the Arabs did not rise in force against the Allied Powers, as had been predicted. The Sharifian activities in western Arabia from 1916 onwards against isolated Turkish posts and communications taxed the strength of the Turks and contributed almost as much to the defeat of the Central Powers as did the role which they played in the main operations in Palestine and Syria under the command of General Allenby.³

The failure to make the same effort in ‘Iraq was not due to any lack of men of undoubted ability to lead and to work with the Arabs, although none would have claimed the special gifts of the late T. E. Lawrence. Outstanding men were Major H. R. P. Dickson⁴ who, combining generous sympathy with unwearying patience, possessed an unrivalled psychological understanding of the tribal Arab; Lieut.-Colonel G. E. Leachman who, by his indomitable spirit, controlled vast areas of

¹ Killed in the *coup d’état* in ‘Iraq, October 29th, 1936. For an estimate of the services of this ‘Iraqi patriot, soldier and statesman and the esteem with which he was held, see *The Times*, November 2nd, 1936; *J. R. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. xxiv (1937) pp. 194-6.

² Hogarth, Cmdr, D. G., *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. x (1923), p. 63.

³ Allenby, Field-Marshal Lord, *J. R. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. xxii (1935), p. 333; and *The Times*, May 20th, 1935; *O H., E. and Pal.*, Vol. i, pp. v, 221, 372; Vol. ii, pp. 401-3, 408-9; Lloyd, Lord, *The Daily Telegraph*, May 20th, 1935; Lloyd George, D., *The Times*, May 20th, 1930; Hart, op. cit., pp. 374-6, 437 ff., and *The Times*, May 20th, 1935; Liman von Sanders, op. cit., pp. 185-7, 260-1, 290-1, 345, Djemal Pasha, op. cit., pp. 168, 170, 191, 233.

⁴ Now Lieut.-Col. Dickson, Political Officer, Kuwait.

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tribal country almost single-handed under most trying conditions;¹ Major H. W. Young, who later served under Lawrence in western Arabia;² Bertram Thomas, later to distinguish himself as an explorer;³ H. St. John B. Philby, whose knowledge of Arabia and of Arabs is now probably unequalled;⁴ and later, Major A. H. Ditchburn, much of whose work in the Muntafiq has endured to this day.⁵

The energies and talents of these men, as well as of others, instead of being utilized in organizing Arab co-operation as a means of winning the war as in western Arabia, were diverted to checking tribal quarrels, to preventing food and supplies reaching the Turks, to collecting revenue and laying the foundations of administration. Such activities, although no mean accomplishments in themselves and no small contributions to the eventual establishment of the Kingdom of 'Iraq, were in no way fully indicative of the capacity of the British officers nor of what might have been accomplished had the authorities ordered otherwise.

For whatever reasons deemed sufficient at the time, the failure of the military authorities to make full military use of the

¹ For excellent summaries of his character and career, see Hogarth, *Geog Jour.*, Vol. LVI (1920), pp. 325-6; also *Near East*, August 26th, 1920, and *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. VIII (1921), pp. 70 ff. A highly coloured picture of Col. Leachman's career has been given by G. N. N. Bray, in *Shifting Sands* (1934), a book that is both inaccurate and unhistorical. His thesis, maintained also in his more recent biography of Leachman (1936), and by Main, E., *op cit.*, that Leachman actually contributed more to the success of Great Britain's Arab policy than any other individual is hardly tenable. Although a man of great gifts and a superb keeper of tribal peace, his work was less creative in character and less permanent in value than that accomplished in western Arabia. The thesis also confuses the Arab policy of H.M. Government and that pursued by the Anglo-Indian authorities in 'Iraq.

² Now Governor of Northern Rhodesia. He played a prominent part in the creation of the Kingdom of 'Iraq, and was Great Britain's first Minister to 'Iraq after the cessation of the Mandate. See his *Independent Arab*.

³ See his *Arabia Felix: Across the Empty Quarter of Arabia* (1932). Also, *Alarms and Excursions in Arabia* for a vivid and well-balanced account of his experiences in Mesopotamia and Muscat.

⁴ See his *Heart of Arabia* (1922); *Arabia of the Wahhabis* (1928) and *The Empty Quarter* (1933).

⁵ Administrative Inspector, 'Iraq, from 1922 until his recent appointment as Land Settlement Officer, 'Iraq.

Arabs of Mesopotamia, notwithstanding the efforts of Sir Percy Cox and his associates to win Arab support in other directions¹ had far-reaching effects, not only during the period of hostilities but also long after the end of the war.

The British authorities in Mesopotamia lost thereby the war-time services of capable Arab leaders. Arabs of ‘Iraq by the score, once in Turkish service, were gathered from the internment camps in India and Egypt, to serve as leaders and officers, not in the land of their birth, but in the Hijāz. In contact there with the sources of the Arab Movement, they were to imbibe and to pass on to ‘Iraq, in the days after the Armistice, an intensity of Arab Nationalism hitherto unknown in ‘Iraq. On the western side of Arabia, they had come into contact with English officers who, no less sincere in their allegiance to British interests than those on the eastern side of Arabia, were nevertheless sympathetic to this awakening Arab Nationalism. It is not surprising, therefore, that these ‘Iraqīs felt the difference between the official mind in Mesopotamia and that on the Mediterranean side of the desert, nor that, appreciating the difference, they were all the more impatient with the attitude of the Civil Administration which prevailed at Baghdad after Sir Percy Cox had been sent to Teheran in early 1918. Such impatience was none the less because they had little or no experience or knowledge of the difficulties of the military or administrative problems of Turkish Arabia, of which the British had gained an intimate, first-hand knowledge.

The military authorities in Mesopotamia also lost the opportunity to learn what British officers in western Arabia had already learned: that the Arabs might be more than treacherous, self-seeking, half-civilized peoples. The end of the war,

¹ To the untimely death of Capt W. H. I. Shakespear near Artawī, in January, 1915, has been ascribed the failure of Ibn Sa‘ūd to take an active part in the war and the failure to develop in Mesopotamia an Arab Movement comparable to that in the Hijāz. See Philby, *The Heart of Arabia*, Vol. 1, p. 21; Wilson, Sir A. T., *Mesopotamia, 1914-1917*, p. 161; also, Coke, Richard, *The Arab's Place in the Sun*, p. 221.

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consequently, found few British officials in authority in 'Iraq who had any sympathy for Arab Nationalism or who had more than hearsay knowledge either of its strength or of the extent of the Movement on the other side of the desert. To the majority of the British officials in Mesopotamia, engrossed in creating an Anglo-Indian regime for the country and belonging, for the most part, to the 'Indian School' of Arab politics and, therefore, antagonistic to everything savouring of the rival 'Sharifian School', Arab Nationalism was something to be controlled at all costs and destroyed wherever possible.

Notwithstanding the reluctance of the military authorities to accept political responsibilities, the creation and maintenance of British influence in the Baghdad wilayet became the chief mission of the expedition, according to instructions issued by the Imperial General Staff,¹ following considerable interchange of views among the authorities concerned. General Maude's force, after Baghdad wilayet had been cleared of Turks, was to assume the defensive, but it was to be ready to seize the earliest opportunity to resume the offensive. Tribal co-operation against the Turks was to be encouraged as far as possible, but administrative expansion was to be limited to bare essentials. These activities were to be placed under the guidance of Sir

¹ Cf. Orders issued to Sir William R. Marshall on his assumption of the command of British Forces in Mesopotamia. (Telegram, Chief of Imperial General Staff to General Officer Commanding, Baghdad, November 22nd, 1917), of which the pertinent sections are given here:

On your assumption of the command in Mesopotamia I think it advisable to recapitulate the instructions issued to your predecessor.

1. The prime mission of your force is the establishment and maintenance of British influence in the Baghdad Wilayet. Your mission is, therefore, primarily defensive, but, while making every possible preparation to meet attack, you should take advantage of your central position and of the superiority of your communications over those of the enemy to make your defence as active as possible and to strike at the enemy whenever he gives you an opportunity of doing so with success.

4. It is important to enlist the co-operation of the Arab tribes in your theatre, and induce them to harass the enemy's communications and refuse him supplies. For this an active propaganda, which should make the most of our recent successes in Palestine and Mesopotamia, should be undertaken. As to this you will consult and be guided by Sir Percy Cox.

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Percy Cox as Civil Commissioner, subject to the supervision of the General Officer Commanding, but with the right to correspond directly with the India Office. Sir Percy in his new role, replacing that of Chief Political Officer, was given responsibility of greater scope than hitherto permitted by General Maude, who had been loath to develop the civil machine.

The general principles by which H.M. Government wished Baghdad to be administered had been laid down in section 4 of the telegram of March 29th. They were again summarized in a telegram to Sir Percy Cox in August, 1917:

The Civil Administration must be carried on under such military supervision as the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief considers essential, with due regard to local conditions and prejudices, if only to prevent disorder which might necessitate the detachment of troops urgently required elsewhere. . . . For the present only such minimum of administrative efficiency should be aimed at as is necessary for the maintenance of order and to meet the requirements of the force; the amendment of laws and the introduction of reforms should be kept within the narrowest possible limits. His Majesty's Government do not wish large or controversial administrative questions raised or referred to them until the danger of Turkish attack is passed. . . .¹

The desirability of exploiting local resources for the prosecution of the war in accordance with these instructions and the necessity of at least partially satisfying the legitimate claims of the civil population for restoration of government in compliance with international law, were duly recognized by the political authorities on the spot. Other aspects of the instructions they held, however, to be not only impractical and out of touch with existing local conditions but also contrary to Great Britain's true interests in the Middle East. If British control were to be established in accordance with the avowed intentions of H.M. Government, it was essential in their opinion that there should

¹ Cited *Admn. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 1.

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be provided from the outset an administration which from its extent and solidity of foundation would 'meet future as well as present requirements' and would furnish a firm basis for such control.¹ As Sir Arnold Wilson wrote later: 'Neither Sir Percy Cox nor, at a later stage, I myself, could subscribe to the view that we should aim only at "the minimum administrative efficiency necessary to preserve order"'. Much more was at stake than the preservation of order.'²

The proposed administrative and political differentiation between the wilayets of Baghdad and Basra, therefore, together with the erection of an Arab façade by the admission and encouragement of Arab participation in the administration of Baghdad Wilayet met with little favour in Mesopotamia. It was felt that it would hamper administrative efficiency, the *beau-idéal* of Anglo-Indian administrators and that it might lead to undesirable opposition from Arab opinion. Even more important were the obstacles it would place in the application of uniform British control in conformity with the Sykes-Picot Agreement rather than with the tenor of the promises made to the Arabs through the Sharīf of Mecca. The Civil Commissioner from the first had advocated that Baghdad should be added to Basra³ which, as he had reason to know, it had been the original intention of the Government of India to administer directly. He now viewed the policy of H.M. Government with misgivings, mainly on the grounds of expediency and of the inability to find suitable 'Iraqīs willing to take part in the administration.

It was under the regime of the Acting Civil Commissioner, following the departure of Sir Percy Cox for Persia, March, 1918, that the gulf widened between the original instructions of H.M. Government and local administrative opinion. He held that the policy of H.M. Government was based on a

¹ See *Admin. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 1.

² Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 264-5. But cf. *Admin. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 1.

³ *Supra*, p. 63.

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series of misconceptions, fostered and disseminated by irresponsible enthusiasts at the Foreign Office and in Egypt, concerning not only the ability of the Arabs to govern themselves, their desire for self-government and their willingness to serve in the administration of Mesopotamia, but also the best interests of Great Britain in the Near and Middle East. The account of the efforts to combat these misconceptions and to impose an administration which he believed best suited to the country belongs to succeeding pages.

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IN BAGHDAD WILAYET

IN view of the divergence of opinion, both between London and Baghdad, and, to a lesser extent, between the local military authorities and Sir Percy Cox, both as regards the policy and the character of the administration to be set up in Baghdad, it is not surprising that those in charge of the Civil Administration in 'Iraq did not strictly adhere to the instructions laid down for their guidance; that the administration should have taken on aspects beyond the limits prescribed by H.M. Government; and that the immediate differentiation between the administration of Basra and Baghdad should be confined to a separation of administrative organization rather than to any appreciable alteration of spirit or character of the administration except in the Judicial System.¹

Administrative Organization

Under the organization adopted after the fall of Baghdad a Deputy Chief Political Officer remained in charge at Basra while Sir Percy Cox took up his headquarters at Baghdad. Later, when Sir Percy became Civil Commissioner, September 1st, 1917, both wilayets were separated into divisions. Basra Wilayet, with the addition of Kūt, remained the same as in Turkish days. Its five divisions were: Basra, Qurna, Nāsiriya, 'Amāra and Kūt. Baghdad was divided into eight divisions: Baghdad, Sāmarrā, Ba'qūbā, Khānaqīn, Ramādī, Shāmiya, and Samāwa. To each of these a Political Officer was posted, as well as to 'Aziziya and to Karbalā. Under each Political

¹ *Infra*, pp. 128 ff.

Officer, Assistant Political Officers administered subdivisions or districts. A Deputy Civil Commissioner assumed control of the Basra divisions until September, 1918, when the two wilayets, largely for political reasons, were merged and the administration directed from Baghdad.

Political Control and Revenue Administration

As at Basra, military exigencies largely controlled the situation. General Maude's own attitude to the Civil Administration had been in accordance with his views as to the necessity of establishing the unquestioned authority of the military authorities rather than with the spirit of the proclamation issued in his name after the fall of Baghdad. The appointment, often without reference to the Chief Political Officer, of military officials, many of whom knew nothing of Arab conditions or of Arabic, to civil administrative positions, gave no suggestion that he took seriously the statement 'I am commanded to invite you, through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives, to participate in the management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the Political Representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British Army'.¹ The Government by proclamation, with its harassing and sometimes unnecessary regulations, gave as little hint to the people of Baghdad as earlier regulations had given to the people of Basra, that the armies had 'not come into your Cities and Lands as Conquerors or enemies but as Liberators'.²

Nevertheless, Sir Percy Cox, concerned with the future as well as the present, deemed it essential to extend political control throughout the wilayet, as much as permitted by the military authorities and by General Maude's centralization of authority into his own hands. Such control could be best attained, as had been discovered in Basra Wilayet, by extending

¹ *Proclamations, 1914-19*, Proc. No. 9, p. 5. Text: App. I.

² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

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the administration and collection of revenue, which, in the eyes of the tribes, was regarded as a sign of government authority, similarly as revenue payment was considered an outward sign of their submission. Much of the confidence engendered by the Political Officers in Basra Wilayet had been the result of their revenue activities,¹ which included far more than the collection of taxes following the enforced assumption by the Revenue Board of a far wider range of responsibilities than merely financial duties. In addition, the extension of land-revenue collections in kind from the fertile areas of the middle Euphrates would produce local foodstuffs for the army and thereby release much precious tonnage. Hence, after the fall of Baghdad, Sir Percy Cox's chief efforts were directed, not only to the establishment of friendly relations with leading dignitaries, but also, through the First Revenue Officer, to the collection of information as to the customary rates of demand; the sorting of a mass of papers; the foundation of a Revenue system capable of extension; the inceptions of departments such as *Auqāf*, Education, etc., and the actual collection of revenue in Baghdad and surrounding districts.² The complexities and inconsistencies of the Turkish Revenue system, to which reference has already been made, proved, as in Basra Wilayet, one of the greatest obstacles in the way of a rapid establishment in Baghdad Wilayet of a system based on its principles.

The Turkish Revenue System

Under the Turks, general revenues in each wilayet had been collected under the authority of the *Daftardar* (Provincial Director of Finance), either directly or through departments. Among the taxes collected directly were land revenue in its various aspects, *koda* (animal head-tax), *tamattū* (income or

¹ 'I have been long convinced that Revenue work is the most important part of their duties' Deputy Civil Commissioner in *Admin. Report, Basrah*, 1917, p. 8.

² *Administration Report, Revenue Board, Baghdad, March 22 to December 31, 1917* (Baghdad, 1918), p. 1 (hereafter *Revenue Report*, 1917).

professional tax), conscription exemption-tax and several minor taxes. Tax-collecting Departments controlled by the *Daftardar* included the *Dairāt al Liman* (Marine Department) and the *Nufūs* or Statistical Department. Twelve other heads of revenue, together with one-quarter of three per cent of the customs receipts which had been assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, by the decree of Muharram, December 20th, 1881, following the default of the Ottoman Government on its European-held debts, were collected by a special Civil Service.¹

A few other revenues, provincial in character,² were accredited to the *Muhāsiba al Khususīya* (Special Accounts Department) created by the Young Turks as a sop to the outcry that the Central Government drained the Arab provinces of all funds. Customs were also in charge of a special staff.

In any account of land revenue, the most important of the general revenues, it must be clearly recognized that the Ottoman Government made a distinction between its right over land as Sovereign and its right as actual possessor or owner of the soil as well as between the dues exacted in accordance with each right.

In ‘Iraq, the Ottoman Government, by right of conquest, deemed itself in theory both Sovereign and sole owner of all land save in so far as it had divested itself of its rights of ownership by a specific act of alienation to individual owners. Lands so alienated absolutely, under the Land Code or *Qanūn Arādhī* of 7 Ramadhan, 1274 (1858)³ were known as *Sirf Mulk*.⁴ Those

¹ For the decree, and full list of the assigned revenues, Young, Sir George, *Droit Ottoman*, Vol. v, pp. 69 ff.

² The ‘public works’ and ‘education’ cesses on land revenue; 5 per cent cess on *koda*; 10 per cent cess on income tax, half the proceeds of the slaughterhouse fees; rents and profits of education trust property.

³ Text: Ongley, F., *Ottoman Land Code* (1892), Bk. I, pp. 1 ff, Young, Sir G., op. cit., Vol. vi, pp. 45 ff; Fisher, Stanley, *Ottoman Land Laws* (1919). Under the Code five legal categories of land were recognized:

1. *Arādhī Mumlūka*, land held in undiluted ownership.

2. *Arādhī Amīriya*, state land, the usufructuary possession of which is granted on a registered tenure.

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alienated conditionally by *tāpū sanads* were known as *Arādhī Amīriya* under the Code but were more commonly called *tāpū* lands in 'Iraq. Such alienated lands formed but a small proportion of the arable of 'Iraq. Most of it, although great sections had been in the actual possession and cultivation of the tribes for years, had never been granted on *sanads*, and was, therefore, *Arādhī Amīriya* or *mīrī* land in 'Iraq.¹ Other large sections had found their way to the personal possession of the Sultan or Ottoman royal family, and thence to *Arādhī Mudawwara*.²

In the case of the unalienated state lands, the Government was entitled to exact from the user both rent as landlord or owner, and revenue as accruing to it as Sovereign. The distinctions between these exactions had tended to become obscure since the two were usually paid as a single contribution.

In the case of *mulk* or *tāpū* land, the Government demanded revenue only since it possessed merely dominion. The possessors of the titles to such lands had the right to demand the landlord's share, normally the same as the revenue share, which was, on the principle of the 'Ashar, the tenth part of the fruits of the earth. On lands watered by flow irrigation, an additional tenth part of the crops was demanded as representing the fruits of the water.

Numerous graduations and variation of these shares had

¹ "The tenure of some four-fifths of the cultivated land in the country was not governed by law, was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Courts, and was not regulated in any methodical way at all" Dowson, Sir E. M., *An Enquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions* (Letchworth, 1932), p. 5.

² *Arādhī Sannīya* or Crown Lands until 1909, when the Young Turks transferred them to general revenues

3. *Arādhī Muqufa*, land dedicated to pious purposes

4. *Arādhī Matrūka*, land especially reserved for some public purpose.

5. *Arādhī Mawat*, waste land.

These classifications had never been applied as a whole to 'Iraq. Terms were also misapplied. Thus *Arādhī Amīriya* is known as *tāpū* land in 'Iraq, while land held in legal possession of the state is called *mīrī*. Category 4 seems not to have been generally recognized in 'Iraq.

⁴ See Howell, Sir E., *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. ix (1922), pp. 20 ff. for an authoritative article: *The Qanun al-Aradhi*.

grown up, however, in recognition of the general principle that land taxation and rent were proportional to profits made on the land, which varied yearly on account of faulty water control, weather vagaries, floods, pests, dust storms, and lack of security from marauding neighbours or nomadic tribes. Annual assessments were also made on most crops in accordance with the same principle. Such assessments were usually made by sight estimation of grain shortly before it was reaped, or on the threshing floor, or by a combination of these methods.¹ The measurement of small sample areas was another method commonly used in numerous sections of the Hilla and Shāmiya divisions.² Occasionally fixed assessment existed, as on the number of pumping engines or lift machines on an estate,³ or where taxes were farmed for a period of years at a fixed sum.⁴

The Turkish theory of variation in rates of demand⁵ and in assessment⁶ which took into account local conditions was, on the whole, well suited to a land of violent contrasts such as ‘Iraq. Behind the variations also existed a substratum of custom and of habit so firmly entrenched in the life of the country that Turkish legislation often did no more than formalize or commit to paper the habit of ages, as for instance Midhat Pasha’s *firmān* on ‘*Uqr*.’ Even the Civil Administration and, later, the ‘Iraq Government, although condemning the lack of uniformity of the Turks and aiming at fixed assessments, had to recognize the validity of the variations with constantly recurring rebates and

¹ Outlines of Turkish Assessment methods in *Revenue Report*, 1917, p. 18, *Admin. Report of Revenue Department, Baghdad*, 1918 (hereafter *Revenue Report*, 1918), (Baghdad, 1919), pp. 6-7, *ibid.*, 1919, p. 6.

² *Revenue Report*, 1917, p. 18.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 15; *ibid.*, 1918, p. 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1917, p. 18.

⁵ A comprehensive list of Turkish demands, together with those adopted by the Civil Administration (never higher, often lower) in: *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 8; *ibid.*, 1919, App. B., pp. 45-7; *Revenue Circular*, No. 7, 26 February, 1919; also *Report on Mesopotamian Spring Harvest* (Baghdad, 1919), p. 6.

⁶ For instance, land irrigated by lift on the right bank of the Tigris, above Kādhimān, paid fixed assessments in cash. Land opposite on the left bank paid fluctuating demands, *Revenue Report*, 1917, p. 15.

⁷ Cited *Revenue Report*, 1917, pp. 11 ff.

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remissions of taxes to meet difficulties caused by abnormal weather, flood or agricultural conditions. The system in application was not without its abuses. Once a variation had been made, either in increase or in reduction of demand, valid enough at the time it was made, it was often assumed to be permanent after the original circumstances had passed into oblivion. Thus inconsistencies had grown up side by side with elasticity.

The right to collect the assessment was frequently put up to auction or sold by negotiation. In Basra Wilayet, the practice was also followed of making each shaikh responsible for the revenue of his tribe. In Baghdad Wilayet, however, the practice had been to make the *sarkars* (invariably pronounced *sarkals*) or sub-lessees directly responsible for cultivation, and also responsible for revenue payments.

The system of annual estimates no less than the method of collection had afforded opportunities for bribery and corruption. The assessors, without adequate supervision, varied the assessments according to the inducement offered them; auctioneers who sold the right of collection could be bought or intimidated into selling to particular bidders. Shaikhs had to be placated to permit collection, while official machinery had to be oiled in case it was necessary to employ gendarmes to overcome opposition by the tax-payers.

British Revenue Administration

From the occupation of Basra Wilayet onwards, British officials had deemed the opportunities for corruption, the lack of encouragement of agricultural development by means of fixed assessments and, above all, the inconsistencies of the system as sufficient reasons for frowning upon the system, particularly the fluctuations in assessments and the variations in demand. 'The ultimate aim', the Revenue Secretary wrote in 1918, 'of our revenue policy is to make a fixed assessment at equable

rates and payable in cash, instead of the present arrangement.’¹

Fixed assessments, however, were found to be impossible for the time, as was the immediate creation of a revenue system which, while based on the familiar fiscal system in accordance with the instructions of H.M. Government, would embrace the improvement of the revenue staff, the settlement of ‘Iraq’s fundamental agricultural problem, that is, the definition of the rights of labourer, tenants, landowner and state over the land, and the resuscitation of agricultural prosperity in a manner that should be politically sound. Nevertheless, steps were taken in that direction. Consolidation of position occupied most of 1917. By the end of 1918 it was claimed by the Revenue Department that, although Turkish methods were still employed, the results were better than under the Turks, even after years of effort on their part.² In fact, in that year the British authorities issued demands for and collected more land revenues than had the Turks in any pre-war year. The latter in 1911-12 collected approximately Rs.96,97,000 or about £690,000 in tithes, *koda* and minor land taxes.³ In 1918, similar categories of taxation produced Rs.157,47,430 or £1,124,817,⁴ or one and two-thirds times the receipts of 1911. Even greater progress was made in 1919, the civil authorities collecting Rs.182,23,497 or £1,301,784,⁵ or nearly double the 1911 receipts.⁶

¹ Revenue Circular No. 7, February 26th, 1919. Cf. *Revenue Report*, 1917, pp. 5 and 42.

² *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 6.

³ *Bulletin Annuel de Statistique*, 1327 (1911), Imperial Ottoman Ministry of Finance (Constantinople). Turkish piastres converted throughout at 7·5 per rupee and 110 per pound sterling.

⁴ Exclusive of revenue grains supplied to the Army, valued at 60 lacs:—*Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 118. Rupees converted throughout to sterling at fourteen to the pound.

⁵ *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. ii.

⁶ Notwithstanding the statement ‘the land-revenue receipts for 1919-20 were substantially lower than in Turkish times’, Wilson, op. cit., p. 264. Cf. statement in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 88, an official report prepared under the Acting Civil Commissioner’s supervision: ‘The country has paid more in taxation than it used to pay.’ Also Telegram No. 8784, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to India Office, July 21st, 1920. For further comparison of revenue receipts see *infra*, p. 145.

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Koda, the Turkish head-tax on camels, buffaloes, sheep and goats from time immemorial, had been, at the time of the occupation of Basra, converted to a slaughter-house tax in order to lower the price of meat for the army. In other regions, as in lower 'Iraq, where the Turks had given up the attempt to collect the tax, the British made no effort to revive it until 1919.¹ Elsewhere, the tax was collected by a variety of methods at the rate of a rupee per camel or buffalo, and eight annas per sheep or goat. The most common method in the tribal areas was to assess the tribe and, in accordance with the policy of using the shaikhs to govern, lay the collection on the shaikhs and *sarkals*, giving them a percentage for their efforts. It was hoped to extend this method throughout the country.²

Other former Turkish sources of revenue, such as the military tax, fell into abeyance. Others, such as the income tax, *tamattü*, were abandoned.³

In Baghdad Wilayet, the Revenue Department included, as it had in Basra, a number of duties other than purely revenue work. It dealt with Customs, Public Debt, *Waqf* Administration, Land Regulation, Education and, under military supervision, with Irrigation and Agriculture. During 1918, however, as the staff increased and organization extended, each department tended to become a separate unit. Nevertheless, the Revenue Department continued to expand, dealing with seventeen varied aspects of administration in September, 1919.⁴ By April, 1920, its activities had extended to some twenty-two branches of the Administration.⁵

¹ *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³ Dobbs, H. R. C., *Collection of Notes on Revenue Matters*, 1915-1916 (confidential).

⁴ *Note on the Organisation of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, September 1st, 1919* (Baghdad, 1919).

⁵ *Ibid.*, April 1st, 1920 (Baghdad, 1920).

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Irrigation and Agriculture

In a country so predominantly agricultural as ‘Iraq, where rainfall, generally speaking, is too slight for its needs, the provision of irrigation from the rivers, the traditional source of the country’s prosperity, remains one of the major problems. The problem of irrigation, however, is more than one of mere extraction of water from the rivers. It is also the maintenance of the natural drainage of the country, its protection from floods and the preservation of navigable waterways.¹

After the Mongol invasions in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the early irrigation systems, the remains of which can still be seen, collapsed. No government which assumed power was able to maintain canals or regulate the flow of water. Each man did what was good in his own eyes. Many canals silted up. Other canals, cut in the banks by the cultivators, without adequate knowledge or without regard for the future, came to carry more water than the parent river. In many cases, the abstracted water because of improper drainage ruined the land through salination or else filled vast marshes. The rivers, unable to scour their beds in the lower reaches, increased the dangers from floods and hampered navigation.²

Not until comparatively modern times were efforts made by the Turks to prevent flooding and to secure the services of engineers to study and to undertake irrigation works. The most prominent of the foreign engineers was Sir William Willcocks who, from his appointment in 1908, studied and proposed schemes for the irrigation and drainage of the country.³

¹ *Note on Irrigation in Mesopotamia, December, 1919* (Baghdad, 1920), p. 9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7; *Brief Note on Irrigation Work in Mesopotamia and the operations of the Irrigation Directorate, M. E. F., up to November, 1918* (Baghdad, 1919), p. 1.

³ His programme, in brief, was: the construction of two barrages on the Euphrates at Hindiya and at Fallūja, and two on the Tigris at Kūt and Balad; the construction of a proper canal system from these barrages; the utilization of the Habbāniya-‘Abū Dībīs depression as an escape for the flood waters of the Tigris; the regulation of the swamps above Basra; the rehabilitation of the Nahrwan Canal from the Diyālā; and the provision of drainage, escapes and afforestation in connection with the entire programme. Willcocks, Sir W., *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia* (1917, 2nd ed.), pp. 15 ff.

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The Turks, however, lacking both money and initiative for his whole programme,¹ undertook, with encouragement from Great Britain and from Germany, the construction of the Hindīya barrage and the Habbāniya escape of which only the former was completed in 1914.

At the beginning of the Occupation, the interest of the military authorities in irrigation and in agriculture had been confined to restricting the former where it hindered navigation, and encouraging the latter to meet the needs of the troops, although a certain amount of flood prevention work was undertaken from late 1915 onwards. Urgent repairs of the Hindīya barrage and the completion of its canal were also carried out by military engineers in June, 1917, but not until a shortage of local food supplies for the army and later for the civil population was threatened,² was the extension of agriculture by means of irrigation taken seriously in hand through the Agricultural Development Scheme, put forward by Mr. C. C. Garbett, First Revenue Officer, July, 1917.³ 'The plan was to complete canals left half finished by the Turks, dig new ones, improve old ones, to import and advance to the cultivators plough-cattle and seeds'.⁴

The Scheme was only partially successful, the new acreage brought under cultivation, 319,152 acres, being only a little more than half of the original estimate of 606,000 acres.⁵ It had been calculated that 280,000 tons of grain would be produced.⁶ Actually between 50,000 and 60,000 tons for the

¹ Sir William Willcock's estimate for his programme was £T29,105,020 or about £26,537,000. He anticipated the return would be about nine per cent. *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia* (1917, 2nd ed.), p. 52

² *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 2; Hewitt, Sir J. P., *Report for the Army Council on Mesopotamia* (1919), pp. 4, 6, 9.

³ See minutes of Conference, August 10th, 1917, which formally proposed Scheme. Hewitt, op. cit. App 5, p. 44. The War Office approved of the Scheme on September 16th, 1917; *ibid.*, p. 5. See also *Revenue Report*, 1917, p. 28.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁵ *Brief Note on Irrigation Works in Mesopotamia to November, 1918*, pp. 3-4, 7.

⁶ *Final Report of the Agricultural Development Scheme* (Baghdad, 1920), p. 3.

army,¹ besides supplies for the civil population were obtained. More valuable than the actual amount of the supplies and the consequent reduction of prices and economy of shipping were the political effects of averting a threatened famine, of the show of encouragement to agriculture and the hold acquired over the shaikhs and the tribes of the regions opened up by the Scheme.²

The Irrigation Department was taken over by the Civil Administration, April 1st, 1919.³ The Acting High Commissioner, envisaging, no doubt, a long period of British control, advocated immediate caution and retrenchment. He recommended concentration of ‘attention on securing and improving already existing systems where necessary’ on the grounds that ‘shortage of labour alike for construction and cultivation and financial stringency makes it impractical and inexpedient to open up considerable fresh areas for cultivation’.⁴ The arguments of the Acting Civil Commissioner as well as the ‘small and unambitious programme of minor works’⁵ evolved under his direction and centring about the gradual establishment of the natural regime of the rivers,⁶ were, no doubt, believed to be in accordance with the needs of the moment. Colonel R. G. Garrow, Officiating Director of Irrigation, had estimated that the existing population could cultivate approximately 1,500,000 acres of which approximately 1,320,000 acres were to be in cultivation by the end of 1919.⁷

Nevertheless, the policy as enunciated and the programme as

¹ Hewitt, op. cit., p. 13, gives 56,472 tons. See also *Review C. Admn.*, 1914-1920, p. 80; *Revenue Report*, 1918, pp. 2-3.

² *Final Report*, p. 1; *Revenue Report*, 1918, p. 2; Hewitt, op. cit., p. 9.

³ *Irrigation Directorate, M. E. F., Admin. Report for period 1st April to 31st December, 1919* (Baghdad, 1920), p. 4.

⁴ Memorandum, A.C.C. to D.Q.M.G., Baghdad, December 27th, 1918. Also *Draft Report Covering the Last Ten Years of the Work of the Irrigation Department, ‘Iraq, dated Baghdad, 14 May, 1931*, para. 3 (hereafter, *Draft Report*, 1920-30).

⁵ *Irrigation Directorate, Admin. Report*, 1919, p. 2.

⁶ Memorandum, Col. R. G. Garrow to D.Q.M.G., Baghdad, in *Correspondence Regarding Post-War Irrigation Policy in Mesopotamia*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1919), p. 9. Also, *Handbook of Mesopotamia*, p. 171.

⁷ *Correspondence*, p. 2.

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evolved for one of the most essential departments of government for the country was unfortunate. They set up standards for works and expenditure which were to extend over into the Anglo-Arab regime.¹ They gave little or no encouragement to the department as constituted under that regime and tended to create a *non-possumus* attitude which was to add to the inherent difficulties of development of the country along progressive lines.

Out of the military Agricultural Development Scheme and the Directorate of Agriculture established in connection with it,² also grew the Agricultural Department of the Civil Administration which took over from the Deputy Quarter-Master General on March 1st, 1919.³ Until late 1920, the functions of the Department were threefold: the improvement of Agriculture by scientific research, demonstration and education; the supplying of seeds and advice to military units in connection with vegetables and fodder production; and the administration of the Military Farms Department⁴ attached to the Expeditionary Force.⁵

The prospect of developing Mesopotamia as a cotton-growing country had from the first attracted the attention of India, which apparently had hopes that Mesopotamia might provide a possible outlet for her surplus population,⁶ and of the British Cotton Growers Association, which anticipated that it would become an additional source of supply of Empire cotton. A cotton expert, Captain Roger Thomas, was engaged;⁷ a cotton

¹ The actual expenditure of the Department in 1919-20 was 8'4 per cent of the total, while in succeeding years the proportions to total expenditure were: 1921, 6'2 per cent; 1922, 7'1 per cent; 1923, 7'65 per cent; 1924, 6'26 per cent; 1925, 3'78 per cent; 1926, 5'35 per cent; 1927, 5'49 per cent; 1928, 5'27 per cent; 1929, 6'97 per cent; 1930, 4'07 per cent; 1931, 3'25 per cent.

² General Routine Order No. 820, July 30th, 1918.

³ *Admin. Report Agricultural Directorate*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1.

⁴ *Report Local Resources Depart.*, 1918, pp. 7, 9, 11.

⁵ *Note on Organization of Civil Admin.*, 1 September, 1919, p. 2.

⁶ Andrews, C. F., *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1930, p. 441; *infra*, p. 149.

⁷ At the suggestion of the Trade Commissioners, Messrs. R. E. Holland and J. H. White, in their report, June 16th, 1917, *The Prospects of British Trade in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf* (Delhi, 1917), (confidential) They pointed out that in view of the prospective importance of Mesopotamia as a cotton growing area, an expert should be appointed to conduct tests with Egyptian, American and Indian seed

farm at Karrāda, near Baghdad, and other experimental plots established in the country. Captain Thomas made comprehensive experiments,¹ both in the growing of cotton and in the marketing of the product, which seemed to hold out bright prospects for the future of Mesopotamia as a cotton-growing country.²

The activities of the Department centred about this and other experimental work,³ but attempts were also made to encourage better agricultural methods, both by the dissemination of information and by the demonstration of modern machinery.⁴ The handicaps, however, of the long years of ignorance and of dependence on traditional methods, the consequent apathy of the actual cultivators, the lack of education, the weather vagaries, the uncertainty of water supplies and the uncontrolled pests as well as the scarcity of funds available hampered the Department on every side. Under such conditions, the pioneering activities of the Department, often discouraging in the lack of apparent results, laid the foundations of service which might have played a greater part in regenerating the country had its early efforts been maintained during the succeeding years.

Education

Under the Turkish Government, an excellent system of education, according to its own reports, existed for ‘Iraq, with a

¹ Thomas, R., *Possibilities of Mesopotamia as a Cotton Growing Country*, Note I, June 15, 1918 (Baghdad, 1918); Note II, January 15, 1919 (Baghdad, 1919); Note III, November 5, 1919 (Baghdad, 1919); *Report on Cotton Experimentation Work in Mesopotamia*, 1918 (Baghdad, 1919); *Ibid.*, 1918-19, (Baghdad, 1920); *Report of Deputation to England* (Baghdad, 1919). Also, Philby, H. St. J. B., *Cultivation of Cotton in Mesopotamia* (Baghdad, 1919).

² Thomas, R., Note III, 1919, p. 10. Also, *Baghdad Times*, April 14, 1923.

³ Results of the early studies of dates were embodied in Dowson, H. V., *Dates and Date Cultivation* (Cambridge, 1924); experiments with wheat in Garbett, C. C., *Note on Wheat Experiments, Mesopotamia*, 1917-18 (Baghdad, 1918) and those of other experiments in leaflets published by the Department.

⁴ Most of the technical staff, both gazetted and non-gazetted, of the Department came from India as did most of the experimental equipment. *Admn. Report of the Department of Agriculture in Mesopotamia*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1921), pp 2-3.

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Mudīr al-Mu'ārif (Director of Education) in every wilayet, each having a budget,¹ staff, syllabus and long list of schools. To judge by results, however, the system was a 'whited sepulchre'. The schools were rarely as numerous nor as well attended as government statistics indicated; the teachers possessed little learning and even less moral character. Arabic was little stressed as a language. Shī'is, comprising the majority of the population, would not send their sons to government schools, invariably taught by Sunnis, nor were they encouraged to do so by the Sunnī Ottoman Government.

Mr. Dobbs, as Revenue Commissioner, had, in early 1915, studied the educational problem and had written suggestions for British policy.² He advocated extreme caution in initiating a new system in order that the mistakes made in India might be avoided. The shortage of primary teachers led him to declare that if it were not for the urgent necessity of equipping Arabs for government service and for avoiding the imputation that the British Administration was not inclined to provide educational facilities, he 'should be inclined to advise that not a single school should be opened for the next two years'.³ Under the circumstances, however, he recommended that one or two primary schools be opened and that subsidies be given to the American Mission Schools under Mr. John Van Ess and to the Carmelite Frères School. The opening of other schools would have to be left to the future.⁴ Thus from the beginning, the necessity of encouraging education to provide youths for government service became a guiding factor and stimulated the establishment of educational facilities where the natural tendency on the part of the British authorities was to restrict

¹ A pre-war Budget for Baghdad Wilayet was:

Law School and Secondary School	£T. 9,000
Other schools (from Local Revenue)	£T. 25,000
Total	£T. 34,000

Revenue Report, 1917, p. 45.

² Dobbs, H. R. C., Notes on Education, February 15th, 1915.

³ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 11.

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education or to regard it as of secondary importance in the work of regenerating the country. Nevertheless, only two primary schools were established by the end of 1915, although subsidies had been granted to the two institutions already mentioned.

TABLE I

<i>Main Headings</i>	1915-16	1916-17	1917-18	1918-19	1919-20
	Rupees	Rupees	Rupees	Rupees	Rupees
1 Headquarters Administrative Expenditure.*	5,54,230	11,83,425	24,18,253	33,90,100	73,60,714
2 Political Officers, Revenue Establishments	5,48,892	9,19,085	51,89,233	93,21,690	70,67,420
3. Customs	1,11,898	3,85,800	5,80,350	6,75,000	29,64,169
4. Transport	—	—	—	—	30,87,834
5 Judicial	1,20,207	1,27,295	2,14,983	3,73,000	8,21,145
6 Medical	61,345	87,180	1,39,887	4,63,750	20,31,542
7 Education	6,500	23,530	35,500	1,80,000	8,86,808
8 Police	1,99,146	2,86,975	8,90,163	12,04,080	22,71,389
9 Jails	20,126	44,460	98,517	1,67,400	5,44,304
10. Public Works	—	1,05,450	4,61,400	8,74,700	49,63,292
11. Posts	—	—	—	—	23,74,831
12. Telegraphs	—	—	—	—	8,19,868
13. Survey	—	—	—	—	94,859
14. Irrigation	—	—	—	—	38,78,605
15. Agriculture	—	—	—	—	3,81,738
16. Levies	—	—	—	—	66,49,490
Totals	16,22,344	31,63,200	100,28,286	166,49,720	461,98,008

* Includes Salaries, Secret Service, Subsistence Allowances, Sea Passages, Telegrams, Stationery, Press, etc.

Figures for all years, except 1919-20, based on *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 119. Figures for 1919-20 based on actuals in *Budget Estimates*, 1920-21, p. iii.

During the same period only Rs.6,500 were spent on promoting education, or 0.4 per cent of the civil expenditure, Rs.16,22,344.¹ In the following fiscal year,² however, Rs.

¹ Note by Financial Secretary in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 119. For table of expenditures by heads, see Table I.

² April 1st to March 31st.

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23,530 or 0·74 per cent of the total civil expenditure were spent, entirely in Basra Wilayet. Nor did the situation improve after the taking of Baghdad, the attention of the authorities being almost exclusively taken up with consolidating the military and political situation. Expenditure on education in 1917-18 totalled but 0·35 per cent of the total civil expenditure.

Not until the appointment of a Director of Education, Major H. E. Bowman,¹ in September, 1918, was a vigorous start made towards creating an educational system. By the end of 1918, twenty primary schools had been set up,² but expenditure still formed only 1·08 per cent of the total expenditure. The desire for schools and educational facilities, especially the opportunity to learn English, was everywhere manifest, petitions and requests coming from all parts of the Occupied Territories.³ To meet these demands, twenty-one new primary schools were opened in 1919,⁴ while a further fifteen were added in 1920, which, including twenty-four subsidized schools, brought the total number to eighty-five boys' schools of all types, and five girls' schools,⁵ with a total enrolment of 6,182 pupils or one for every 462 of the population.⁶ The proportion of the expenditure for Education to the entire expenditure in this year, the fifth of the British Occupation, had risen to 1·9 per cent.⁷

¹ Egyptian Ministry of Education, 1903-1923, Director Palestine Education Department, 1920-36.

² *Administrative Report of Education*, 1918, p. 10 (hereafter *Admin. Rep. Ed.*, 1918).

³ *Fortnightly Reports of Political Officers, Baghdad Wilayet, 1st-15th June*, 1918: Mandali, p. 23 (hereafter *Fortnightly Rep'ts*); *Monthly Rep'ts, January*, 1919; Basra Sanjaq, p. 32; Qurna, p. 79; *Ibid.*, August, 1919: Erbil, p. 45; *Ibid.*, November, 1919: Dulaim, p. 14.

⁴ *Administration of the Department of Education for the year 1919* (Baghdad, 1920) (hereafter *Admin. Rep. Ed.*, 1919).

⁵ *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 104

⁶ On the basis of the census, 1918-19, of 2,890,000 inhabitants.

Education	Rs.	8,86,808
Total Budget	Rs.	461,98,008

These figures are taken from actual expenditure given in *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. iii. They differ slightly from the estimates given in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 119.

⁷ See Table II.

The years of neglect of education, including the war years, the lack of trained teachers and of equipment and the paucity of the funds sanctioned by the Civil Administration which rendered it impossible to overcome adequately the lack of teachers by bringing them from Syria and Egypt, contributed to the slow creation of educational facilities. Nevertheless, the aims of the Department were kept high. These, as summarized by the Director of Education in 1918, were:

to provide a sound elementary education, on which to base an edifice lasting, enduring and firm. To open new schools gradually as trained teachers become available. To select as teachers only the best candidates, socially, morally and mentally, and to pay them well. To never lose sight of the real object in view — the formation of character and the spirit of good citizenship.¹

As long as British advisers played a decisive part in the educational affairs of ‘Iraq, these aims formed the basis of their policy.

Judicial System

In accordance with Great Britain’s policy of establishing an Arab administration in Baghdad, of which the promise in General Maude’s Proclamation not to introduce alien institutions was a public intimation, the instructions of H.M. Government had made it clear that the Occupied Territories Code was not to be introduced into Baghdad Wilayet.² The policy adopted, therefore, was not ‘to make a clean sweep of the Turkish legal system and to introduce a new system based on English models, as had been done in Basrah Wilayet’, but rather ‘to carry on the Turkish organization of Courts and system of law, making such immediate modifications only as are necessary to ensure justice and a reasonably efficient administration’.³

¹ *Admin. Rep. Ed.*, 1918, p. 10.

² Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, March 29th, 1917.

³ *Administrative Report of Justice from the Occupation of Baghdad to 31.12.17*, p. 4 (hereafter *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1917).

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As at the occupation of Basra, most of the Turkish Judicial personnel had fled. The more recent records had been removed or destroyed. Beyond the institution of a Court of Small Causes and a *Shara'* Court (Muslim Law Court) in July,¹ Civil Courts were in abeyance until the Courts' Proclamation of December 28th, 1917,² reconstituted the Civil Courts under Mr. (later Sir) Edgar Bonham-Carter as Senior Judicial Officer. He had arrived in October, and after studying the situation with the experience gained in his long and distinguished career in the Sudan Legal Department, had outlined the essential requirements to be embodied in the proclamation.

Under the Turks, First Instance Courts had existed at the headquarters of each *Liwā* or District, and of each *Qādha* or Sub-district: a total of ten *Liwā* Courts of First Instance and forty *Qādha* Courts of First Instance in the three wilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. Obviously, from the standpoint of the prevailing poverty and the sparseness of the population, the number was excessive. In addition, most of the judges had been untrained if not actually incompetent. Under the new system, a Civil Court of First Instance, normally to be composed of a British judge and two Arab judges, was to be reopened at Baghdad and later, elsewhere, as deemed necessary.³ Peace Courts which were also Small Cause Courts, such as had been established in Baghdad and a few other places just before the war, were to be reconstituted wherever required.⁴ Elsewhere either Judges of Courts of First Instance, Political Officers or other officers were given the right to officiate.

In the days of the Turks, Appeals lay from the lower Courts to a Court of Appeals situated at the capital of each wilayet.⁵ Decisions from these Courts could be revised by the Court of

¹ *Proclamations, 1916-1918*. Proclamation No. 8, July 2nd, 1917.

² *Ibid.*, Courts' Proclamation No. 17, December 28th, 1917. The date 'end of December, 1918' given for this Proclamation in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 94, is obviously a misprint.

³ *Ibid.*, Courts' Proclamation, Section 3 (1).

⁴ *Ibid.*, Section 5.

⁵ Normally composed of a Turkish President and four Arab Judges. *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1919, p. 1.

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Cassation at Constantinople. The Courts' Proclamation abolished appeals to any Court outside 'Iraq,'¹ and replaced all other Courts of Appeal by a single Court of Appeal composed of a British President and two Arab Judges.²

Religious Courts

The importance of reconstituting *Shara'* or Religious Law Courts, as provided in the Proclamation,³ had been recognized in 1917 by Mr. Bonham-Carter. He had then pointed to the respect with which the Courts were regarded in Muslim countries, to the practical advantage of deciding certain classes of cases by Muslim Judges in accordance with Muslim Law, and to the immense additional political advantage of associating with the Government the influential religious class of the '*Ulamā* from which the *Qādhīs* were drawn.'⁴ He had indicated these alone as adequate reasons for continuing them.

Sunnī *Qādhīs*, therefore, were appointed with these ends in view to fourteen centres by the end of 1918, and to twelve additional ones by the end of 1920, as well as to the *Shara'* Court set up in Baghdad in July, 1917. A long standing grievance was partly remedied by permitting Shī'īs to refer their cases to Shī'a *Qādhīs*. Under Turkish rule, the Shī'īs had been forced to submit their personal status cases, if they took them to court, to the Sunnī *Shara'* Courts where the cases were decided in accordance with Sunnī Law. Shī'a religious Judges under the name of *Nayabat-al-Ja'fariya* were appointed in 1918 to six centres and to six others by the end of 1920.

Criminal Courts

The reorganization of the Criminal Courts was more difficult than that of the Civil Courts. The Ottoman Criminal Procedure required a multitude of Courts, investigating magistrates

¹ Courts' Proclamation, Section 9

² Ibid., Section 6.

³ Ibid., Section 10.

⁴ *Admn. Rep. Justice*, 1917, p. 4 (12).

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and procurators, which it would have been beyond the capacity of the Civil Administration to supply. Nor would it have conduced to the effective administration of justice if the Magistrates, most of whom were English officers with little previous experience of the administration of law, attempted to follow the elaborate Ottoman Procedure.¹

In addition, the Ottoman Penal Code presented difficulties. Although based on the French Penal Code, it had been subjected to so many amendments since it was issued in 1859 that it was, in the opinion of the Senior Judicial Officer, 'unscientific, ill-arranged and incomplete'.² The first difficulty was overcome by the creation of a special code known as the Baghdad Criminal Procedure Regulations,³ brought into operation January 1st, 1919. Until then all criminal cases had been tried by Military Governors and Political Officers.

Although the Regulations adopted one or two sections from the Ottoman Criminal Procedure,⁴ the ultimate origin of which was the French Criminal Procedure, its main provisions revealed the inability of those in the Civil Administration to dissociate themselves from Indian traditions or to escape from the application of British Military Law. Both of these formed the basis of the Sudan Code of Criminal Procedure from which the Regulations were drawn. The new Regulations were admittedly subject to the exigencies of war and of military occupation.⁵ Offences committed by members of the Army of Occupation even against the inhabitants of the country were not to be tried under them. It was expected, however, that after the conclusion of hostilities, a permanent Code would be prepared.

¹ *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1920, p. 2 (7)

² *Memorandum on Baghdad Penal Code*, by the Senior Judicial Officer, November 21st, 1918. Also *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1918, p. 2 (7)

³ Promulgated by Proclamation of General Officer Commanding, November 15th, 1918 (These Regulations hereafter *Bd. C. P. Reg.*).

⁴ Particularly Chapters III and IX, concerning Procurators, and Chapter XI, concerning Civil Complaints and Civil Damages. For Ottoman Criminal Procedure, see Young, Sir G., op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 226 ff.

⁵ *Bd. C. P. Reg.*, Sec. 2 (1).

Four classes of Criminal Courts were to be constituted: 1. Courts of Session; 2. Courts of Magistrates of the First Class; 3. Courts of Magistrates of the Second Class. 4. Courts of Magistrates of the Third Class.¹ A Court of Session was to be a Court consisting of three Magistrates, of whom one at least must be a Magistrate of the First Class.² Political Officers and British Judges were to be Magistrates of the First Class, Assistant Political Officers and Arab Judges were to be Magistrates of the Second Class.³ The Civil Commissioners might appoint any person a Magistrate of the First, Second or Third Class.⁴

The Ottoman Penal Code was replaced on January 1st, 1919, by the Baghdad Penal Code,⁵ based largely on the former, but with amendments and additions from Egyptian sources, in turn based on the French Penal Code.

Among the tribes, the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation continued to be applied with considerable success.⁶ It was regarded in the tribal areas as ‘undoubtedly the most satisfactory’ method of settling tribal disputes,⁷ as the reason for decrease of crime⁸ and as ‘one of the props of the tribal system’.⁹ Although doubt was cast on both the wisdom and ability of the Administration to continue the tribal system indefinitely,¹⁰ only in ‘Amāra Division was uncertainty felt as to the usefulness at that time of the Tribal Disputes Regulation.¹¹

¹ *Bd C. P. Reg*, Sec 4

² *Ibid*, Sec. 5.

³ *Ibid*, Sec 6.

⁴ *Ibid*, Sec 5.

⁵ Promulgated by Proclamation of the General Officer Commanding, November 21st, 1918

⁶ For views of Political Officers *Admin. Reports*, 1918: *Shatrah (Nasiriyah)*, p. 387; *Qurnah*, p. 306; *Kut*, p. 384; *Admin. Report, Hillah*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 3; ‘*Amarah Division Admin Report*, 1920-1921 (Baghdad, 1921), p 7; *Monthly Rep'ts*, January, 1919, Basra Sanjaq, p. 32

⁷ *Admin. Reports*, 1918: *Hillah*, p. 127.

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Nasiriyah*, p. 355.

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Hillah District*, p. 144.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, ‘*Amarah*, p. 336; *Hillah District*, p. 34; *Hillah Division*, pp. 120-1; ‘*Amarah Report*, 1919, p. 9; ‘*Amarah Report*, 1920-1921, p. 25.

¹¹ ‘*Amarah Report*, 1919, p. 11.

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Amalgamation of Basra and Baghdad Courts and the Creation of the Judicial Department

The political and administrative considerations which motivated the amalgamation of the administration of the Basra and Baghdad wilayets in September, 1918,¹ applied with equal force to the judicial systems which had not then been assimilated.² On January 1st, 1919, however, the two systems were finally consolidated,³ the 'Iraq Occupied Territories Code and all Indian and British Acts operative under it being repealed with the exception of nine Indian Laws and one English Law, set forth in a special schedule. 'The change was effected without difficulty and was welcomed by the population since it replaced a foreign system of law and procedure by one with which they were familiar.'⁴

The judicial system of Mōsul, the administration of which H.M. Government had at one time desired to organize separately, in anticipation of it being assigned to France at the Peace Settlement, was also assimilated, on the same date, to the system in operation throughout the Occupied Territories.

The number of Courts established under the Civil Administration, 1914-20, had been recognized as being as insufficient as the number under the Turks had been excessive.⁵ Expansion and reform, however, had proved difficult owing to the necessity of subordinating the policy of the Department to that of the General Administration, owing to the lack of funds⁶ and to the

¹ *Supra*, pp. 111-112

² Cogent reasons for amalgamating the two judicial systems were advanced in *Review Admin. Basrah*, 1917, p. 6.

³ *Basrah Courts' Amalgamation Proclamation*, 1918, by the General Officer Commanding, December 24th, 1918.

⁴ *Admin Rep Justice*, 1919, p. 4 (12); *Admin Report*, 1918: *Nasiriyah*, p. 355.

⁵ *Admin. Rep Justice*, 1918, p. 1; *ibid.*, 1919, p. 2 (4).

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1920, p. 8 (16). The proportion of expenditure on Judicial services to total expenditure and to receipts, based on figures given in Table I, p 152, is as follows:

difficulty in finding suitable staff, whether ‘Iraqi or English, to undertake them.¹

Recognition was not lacking of the unsatisfactory nature of legislation which, during the whole period of the Occupation was by proclamation by the General Officer Commanding, or by regulations or orders issued by the chief civil authority and the Judicial Officer, under authority of the General Officer Commanding. Lieut.-Colonel Knox, Senior Judicial Officer, in his report for 1917 had commented:

It is high time that he (Senior Judicial officer) be relieved of his legislative duties, which should be the special task of a legal Secretary . . . Assigning work to one such person would put an end to notices of spurious legality, threatening the public with dire and unspecified penalties for dubious offences.²

Mr. Bonham-Carter, on his side, believed that while considerable legislation would be necessary before the Courts could contribute to better conditions in ‘Iraq, no radical legislative improvements could be undertaken without the coming of peace and without a Representative Legislative body.³

Under Mr. Bonham-Carter, the policy of employing ‘Iraqis

¹ *Admin Rep Justice*, 1920, p 8 (16)

² *Review Admin. Basrah*, 1917: *Report on Admin of Civil and Criminal Justice in Basrah Wilayet, by Courts established under the I.O.T. Code, during 1917*, p. 107.

³ *Admin. Rep. Justice*, 1919, p. 9 (23); *ibid* , 1920, p 8 (16).

	1917-18	1918-19	1919-20
	Rupees	Rupees	Rupees
Percentage of Expenditure on Judicial services to total Expenditure	2 14%	2'24%	1'78%
Percentage of Expenditure on Judicial services to total Receipts	1'57%	1'41%	1'43%

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both as Judges and as clerical staff was applied from the first. Although difficulty was often experienced in making suitable selections of Judges and *Qādhīs*,¹ he 'had no hesitation in saying

TABLE II

The following Table indicates the nationality of personnel of the Judicial Department, 1918-20

	1918* (Baghdad Wilayet only)	1919†	1920‡
British	6	10	11
Indians	—	4	6
'Iraqis (Muslims)	82	197	247
„ (Christians)	1	9	12
„ (Jews)	9	9	12
Syrians	—	1	1
Egyptians	—	1	—
Armenians	2	1	—
Total non 'Iraqis (A)	8	17	19
Total 'Iraqis (B)	92	215	271
Percentage of (A)	8	7.3	6.6

* *Admn. Rep. Justice*, 1918, p. 5.

† *Ibid.*, 1919, p. 8.

‡ *Ibid.*, 1920, p. 7.

that the work had been done efficiently'² through the 'valuable services of the Arab Judges and staff', without whose 'help it would have been hardly possible . . . to carry out the policy of applying Turkish Law and Procedure'.³

To this policy of rendering more than lip-service to the principle of employing Arabs wherever possible may be attributed the comparative immunity of the Judicial Department from the criticism and hostility directed by 'Iraqi Nationalists, during the period before the establishment of the National Government, against the unsympathetic attitude in other Departments of the Civil Administration.

¹ *Admn. Rep. Justice*, 1918, p. 6 (15).

² *Ibid.*, p. 2 (5).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 6 (15). Also *ibid.*, 1920, p. 8 (15).

POLICY OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

BEFORE the publication of the Anglo-French Declaration, November 7th, 1918,¹ those in authority in Mesopotamia apparently assumed 'that the policy envisaged by the British and the French Governments in the Middle East was one in which the principles and methods followed by Lord Cromer in Egypt would, with suitable modifications, find acceptance both on the spot and at home'.²

General Maude's Proclamation, the Prime Minister's Declaration of January 5th, 1918, concerning non-annexation of Turkish territory³ and President Wilson's fourteen Points,⁴ which had been accepted both by the Allied and the Central Powers as the basis of Peace,⁵ had been regarded by those in charge in 'Iraq as merely introducing disturbing elements into the situation.⁶ These utterances were held to be inconsistent with the traditional aims of British policy in the Middle East and with confidential information received concerning the Secret Agreements. They were therefore disregarded.

¹ Released simultaneously in London, Paris, Washington and Cairo, November 7th, 1918. The Declaration when published in Baghdad bore the date of November 8th, 1918. For text, see Appendix IV.

² Thus wrote the Acting High Commissioner 12 years later; Wilson, Sir A. T., *Mesopotamia*, 1917-1920, p. 110.

³ *The Times*, January 7th, 1918.

⁴ Made in an address to U.S. Congress, January 8th, 1918. Text. *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, III (1918), 950 ff; App. 3.

⁵ November 5, 1918. See *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. VI, p. 24. Turkey and Austria, who had signed their Armistices previously, were not legally bound by the agreement of November 5, but the Allies had propagandized the subject peoples of the two Empires on the basis of the Points and could not repudiate them entirely. *Ibid.*, p. 24, also Wright, Quincy, *A.P.S.R.*, November, 1926, p. 744.

⁶ President Wilson's 14 Points were withheld from publication in 'Iraq by the authorities until October 11th, 1918: *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 126.

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The Anglo-French Declaration, however, placed a different complexion on the situation. Issued after the Armistice of Mudros, it was generally accepted throughout the East as a pronouncement of policy by victorious Powers no longer engaged in encouraging a non-Turkish population to hostilities against the Turks. In the eyes of the Acting Civil Commissioner, however, it was a 'disastrous error'.¹

Nothing in the political situation in Syria or 'Iraq rendered such a declaration necessary. Unfettered by such an announcement, France and Great Britain could have come to an agreement as regards their spheres of influence and have proceeded to endow the indigenous populations with institutions calculated to attain the objectives mentioned in the Declaration.²

So strongly convinced was he that nothing but ill could follow if H.M. Government persisted in a literal interpretation of the Declaration that he took the first opportunity to voice his disapproval, not only of the Declaration but also the policy it symbolized, in a telegram to the Secretary of State for India.³ The telegram, in part, is given below:

Your telegram Nov. 14.

I should not be doing my duty if I did not first of all record my convictions that the Anglo-French Declaration of November 8th, in so far as it refers to Mesopotamia, bids fair to involve us in difficulties as great as Sir A. H. MacMahon's [*sic*] early assurances to the Sharif of Mecca.

It is for the representatives of H.M. Government on the spot to make the best of the situation created by this Declaration, and as Government is aware I am trying to do so, but unless the latter is superseded or modified by a pronouncement of the Peace Conference, I anticipate that in years to come we shall be faced with the alternatives of

¹ Wilson, op. cit., p. 103.

² Ibid.

³ Telegram, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, No. 9926, November 16th, 1918.

evading the spirit whilst perhaps keeping within the letter of this Declaration, or of setting up a form of Government which will be the negation of orderly progress and will gravely embarrass the efforts of the European Powers to introduce stable institutions into the Middle East.

The Declaration involves us here on the spot in diplomatic insincerities which we have hitherto successfully avoided and places a potent weapon in the hands of those least fitted to control a nation's destinies.

I would emphasize the almost entire absence of political, racial or other connexion between Mesopotamia and the rest of Arabia.

If the future of this country is to be dealt with successfully it must, I am convinced, be treated independently of Arab problems elsewhere.

The Arabs of Mesopotamia will not tolerate that foreign Arabs should have any say in their affairs, whether those Arabs come from Syria or from the Hijaz. In practice they dislike and distrust both. National unity means for them unity of Mesopotamia, and not unity with either Syria or Hijaz. So, too, they resent the importation of social or administrative institutions or methods that savour of India.

The average Arab, as opposed to the handful of amateur politicians of Baghdad, sees the future as one of fair dealing and material and moral progress under the ægis of Great Britain, and is clear-sighted enough to realize that he would lose rather than gain in national unity if we were to relinquish effective control. He will learn more quickly than the Indian. But he is still behind him in education and experience.

Irrespective of this, the tribal element is a constant potential source of dissension and grave public insecurity. Nor can we afford to ignore the mutual contempt and jealousy that exist between townsmen and tribesmen.

With the experience of my Political Officers behind me, I can confidently declare that the country as a whole neither expects nor desires any such sweeping schemes of independence as is adumbrated, if not clearly denoted, in the Anglo-French Declaration.

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This reaction of the Acting Civil Commissioner to the policy of the Declaration was only natural to one of his background, training and experience. His services in the Indian Army, in Persia and in the Persian Gulf had confirmed him in what he believed to be the needs and interests of India and of the British Empire as a whole, in whose greatness he gloried. He was fully aware of all the reasons which had brought the Expeditionary Force to Mesopotamia and for which such great sacrifices had been made. These interests of the Empire in the Middle East, which were paramount with him as he was frank to admit,¹ could be served but ill by relinquishing 'Iraq to an indigenous administration. On December 10th, 1918, he put forward his opinion in the following words:

My view is that the strategical centres of the Middle East lie in Baghdad and the Caucasus, in both of which the Muhammadan population greatly predominates. If we encourage the idea of Arab, as opposed to European predominance in Arab-speaking countries which have been wrested from the Turk at the cost of British blood and British wealth, we shall without doubt excite latent religious hatreds between Sunni and Shi'ahs in 'Iraq, thereby depriving ourselves of some of the strategic advantages which the possession of this ganglion gives us.

By occupying Mesopotamia during the war we drove a wedge into the Muhammadan World, thereby preventing the possibility of a combination of Muhammadans against us in the Middle East. I submit that it should be our policy under peace conditions to keep Mesopotamia as a wedge of British Controlled Territory. That it should not be assimilated politically to the rest of the Arab and Muhammadan World, but remain insulated as far as may be, presenting a model to the rest. . . .²

The importance of 'Iraq in the Middle East was again emphasized in a telegram of July 21st, 1919:

¹ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

² Telegram No. 10973, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, December 10th, 1918.

It is impossible to install a real Arab Government in Mesopotamia and for us to make the attempt will be to abandon the Middle East to anarchy.

If I may be permitted to say so, the declaration of 8th November took little account of the facts as they are in Mesopotamia, but it is not too late to give this pronouncement a fresh and virile interpretation such as will enable us to make Mesopotamia the keystone of our policy in the Middle East.¹

The military importance of Baghdad was stressed in his note on Demobilization in Mesopotamia:

If Baghdad is strongly held, and ample reserves of war materials and means of transportation be kept on the spot, military requirements for the frontier of India will be correspondingly reduced; the Middle East would be dominated, in a military sense, from Baghdad and our political influence would be proportionate to our potential military strength. Great Britain alone as trustee for the civilized nations of the world can ensure the peace of the Middle East, and Great Britain is the only Power who would be willingly accepted in this capacity by the Nations of the Middle East, who, our Treaty in 1907 with Russia notwithstanding, still see in British policy an altruism and tolerance which they fail to discern elsewhere.²

The Acting Civil Commissioner, however, did not fail to point to the value of the material resources in ‘Iraq, in his telegram of July 21st, 1919, as additional reasons for altering the Anglo-French Declaration:

Lastly, the capital value of the Oil Fields in Mesopotamia is £50,000,000 based on a conservative estimate and there are other sources of potential wealth such as ports, steamers, railways, roads and buildings, built by British capital whether private or public and which, at least, count for another ten millions.

¹ Telegram No. 8169, Political, Baghdad to S/S for India, July 21st, 1919.

² Note on Demobilization in Mesopotamia, dated November 21st, 1919.

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Imports this year are estimated at about ten millions, mainly British, although trade has not yet revived.

The declaration of November 8th as it stands affords little guarantee for a stable government, upon the existence of which depends the retention and development of these assets.¹

In common with other men of similar training, he believed in England's peculiar mission: to bestow its gifts of efficient administration, of impartial justice, of honest finance and of security on backward peoples who, in return for these services were to assume places in the economic and defensive system of the Empire.² His attitude was, apparently, one prevalent among British administrators in India: that as long as the material well-being of the subject peoples was being advanced, no other standard need be set up by which to judge the administration. As long as administrators spent the best of their bodily and mental vigour on the people, there was no need to justify the measures which kept them in authority. Political aspirations and the desire for self-government were to be dismissed as vagaries of ungrateful extremists or to be repressed as firmly as wayward thoughts in any adolescent youth.

Whether or not a liberal application of the Anglo-French Declaration was expected, it would seem that, following its appearance and a further divergence of opinion between London and Baghdad, traced in detail in succeeding pages, the policy in 'Iraq tended to develop in accordance with the views of the Acting Civil Commissioner. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the main efforts of the civil authorities, from the capture of Baghdad until the Insurrection of 1920, were increasingly directed, not merely at meeting the needs of the country but at establishing a regime so substantially British and so definitely dependent on the British Empire, on the one hand, so convincing in its show of machinery and of material

¹ Telegram No. 8169

² 'I felt it to be in our power, as in that of no other people, to seek justice and ensure it - to protect minority interests - the fair treatment of which is the best rough test of any civilization.' Ibid, pp. x, 322.

progress, brought about by the British administration and so ostensibly supported by local opinion on the other, that the influence of the ‘Sharifian’ school in Whitehall Councils might be checked and that H.M. Government might hesitate before wrecking the established administrative machinery by handing it over to the Arabs.¹

That such was the aim of the Civil Administration seems to be borne out by the tendency to increase, from 1918 onwards, the size and extent of the Headquarters Administration, to the neglect of other services. Secretariats, Departments, Directorates, Bureaus, Circles and varieties of forms, reports, files and procedure were created in the best Indian administrative tradition to such a degree as to draw down the censure of even the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon, formerly Viceroy of India.²

Examination of the annual expenditure from 1914 also seems to indicate that even when the increase of occupied territories is taken into consideration, the steadily increasing funds devoted to Headquarters Administration expenditure, culminating in an approximate 220 per cent increase between 1918-19 and 1919-20,³ and the stringency of funds for those branches of the administration which directly benefited the public, such as Education, Judicial and Medical Services were based on the aim of building up a machine for

¹ Not all officials of the Civil Administration held these views. Miss Gertrude Bell, O.B.E., attached to the Administration on Intelligence work, never lost sight of the value of ‘Iraq in the Imperial system but she looked forward to it taking its place as an Arab state. She was at no time sympathetic to the delay imposed by the Foreign Office and to the resistance of the Civil authorities to Arab participation in the Administration. Indeed, she actively opposed these attitudes. In a hitherto unpublished letter to Col. T. E. Lawrence, with whose views she was more in sympathy, she wrote, on July 10th, 1920, at the height of the political unrest: ‘On the whole the wonder is that there are so many moderates and reasonable people among the inhabitants of this country. I try to count myself among them but I find it difficult to maintain a dispassionate calm when I reflect on the number of blunders we have made. Now at last we are making a beginning in the right direction.’

² *Sunday Times*, September 20th, 1920.

³ See annexed table of expenditure: *supra*, p. 126.

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the future. Indeed, the explanation for the failure to create adequate social services must be found, not in the lack of funds or of suitable personnel, but rather in the will to create them.¹

Further examination of the budgets for 1919 and for 1920 seems to indicate the intention, in anticipation of the continued extensive employment of British and Indian officials, to make provision for equipment such as motor transport, to acquire land and to build offices, billets and residential quarters such as the Alwiya cantonment. The transport budget for 1919-20 was set at Rs. 50,62,280; land acquisition at Rs. 12,01,250; while approximately 40 per cent of the Public Works budget was set aside for plans to promote the comfort of these British and Indian officials. The estimated amounts for 1919-20 were not entirely spent in that year,² but the estimates of 1920-21 provided for even larger budgets.³ Transport was allotted Rs. 60,31,641 while Rs. 98,43,500 were set aside for Public Works, of which offices and residential quarters for officials compose the largest single item.⁴

It may be argued that the small proportion of revenue devoted to services which directly benefited the civil population was not a true index of the benefits accruing to them, as the Army undertook a number of services, such as irrigation, agricultural development, building of roads and bridges which would have normally fallen to civil revenues. These activities, executed and originally paid for by military authorities,

¹ Surpluses occurred every year of the occupation:

* 1915-16	Rs. 29,46,298
* 1916-17	Rs. 49,45,050
* 1917-18	Rs. 52,23,762
† 1918-19	Rs. 94,61,745
† 1919-20	Rs. 110,73,932

Total Rs. 336,51,777

* From Financial Secretary's Note, *Review C Admin* 1914-20, pp. 118-19.

† From Actuals in *Budget Estimates*, 1920-21, p. i.

² *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. iii

³ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 112. Also *Budget Estimates of Expenditure for the Civil Administration for the year 1920-1921*; *Directorate of Military and Civil Works* (Baghdad, 1920).

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did undoubtedly confer great benefits on the country, causing a development within a period of two or three years under the stimulus of war, such as it otherwise would not have gained in as many decades.

It must not be overlooked, however, that these works and expenditures were originally undertaken to facilitate winning the war to which they contributed no less than many manifold activities on which no other return had been demanded or expected, a fact recognized by Sir John Hewitt, who, in his report to the Army Council in 1919, stated:

We are unanimously and emphatically of opinion that there is no ground for the suggestion that the expenditure of Army funds has been prompted by the desire to provide for afterpeace developments, and we consider that they have been uniformly expended with the primary object of securing the efficiency and comfort of the force.¹

Nevertheless, the demands made by the military authorities for repayment of their expenditures, incurred at unprecedented rates, for objects which they considered, often arbitrarily, would prove useful to the civil population, and the enforced necessity of taking over unfinished programmes of Irrigation and other departments, conceived and executed on a war-time scale, often without proper supervision or trained personnel,² placed an undue strain on the budgets of the Occupied Territories.

To meet these budgets, including the expenditure on those objects ‘which could only be justified or explained’ as Mr. Asquith declared in the House of Commons, ‘on the assumption that you are going to deal with ‘Iraq as a province or

¹ Hewitt, op. cit., p. 27.

² A typical example, cited Hewitt, op. cit., pp. 18-22 and App 16-19, is that of the purchase of irrigation pumps by an inexperienced officer, dispatched to India without adequate instructions. Two hundred pumps were asked for, of which the pre-war price, in new condition, averaged £188, delivered in Basra. After months of delay 14 second-hand pumps were delivered, at a price averaging £1,177 in Bombay. The pumps were eventually resold by the Director of Agriculture at a considerable loss.

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district which is going to be governed in the Anglo-Indian fashion',¹ revenue collection was pressed forward on the basis of the former Turkish demands but with rigid insistence on the payment of the full demand wherever presented, such as the Turk had never been able to do. In the two years, 1918 and 1919, the Civil Administration collected Rs. 803,44,502,² or an average of twice the revenue collected in 1911, which had been equivalent to Rs. 206,57,000.³ In 1920 the revenue receipts were Rs. 693,22,587, excluding railway revenue,⁴ or three and a third times the Turkish receipts of 1911. The original estimate had been Rs. 760,65,698.⁵ The surplus for 1919 alone was one-half the total receipts of the Turks in the pre-war year just mentioned, while the entire surplus accumulated in the period of the Military Occupation was one and a half times the revenue collected in the same pre-war year. These figures are all the more remarkable when the amounts remitted as subsidies or for political services, as in the 'Amāra and Dulaim Divisions, are taken into consideration.

It need not be supposed, however, that taxation was unduly oppressive, although it tended to press most heavily on the agricultural worker to whom the burden was eventually passed under the prevailing land tenure. Prosperity was general: trade was flourishing, the price of agricultural products was high, wages had risen beyond the bounds of imagination, and rents had soared. In addition, classes who had never paid taxes were no longer able to evade payment by bribery or force as in pre-war days.⁶ Others who had paid little, escaping through faulty assess-

¹ *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CLI (1922), pp. 1554-5; also *ibid.*, Vol. CXXX (1920), p. 2234.

² This total (exclusive of revenue grains supplied to the Army, valued at 60 lacs *Review C Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 118) is based on Actuals in *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. 1.

³ *Bulletin Annuel de Statistique*, 1327. For comparison of land-revenue receipts see *supra*, p. 118.

⁴ *Admin. Rep.*, 1920-1922, pp. 23-4

⁵ *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. ii.

⁶ *Handbook of Meso.*, Vol. I, p. 145, estimates that in pre-war days seven-tenths of the population of the Wilayet of Basra escaped scot-free of all taxation and paid nothing whatever except perhaps bribes.

ment or official discrimination, were now forced to pay in full.

The political unrest of 1920 was not primarily due to this heavy taxation, as Lord Islington declared in the House of Lords,¹ but the fact remains that the taxation was harassing. The inability of the landlords, dignitaries, and tribes to evade taxation as they had once escaped it influenced them to throw their weight against a regime which was determined to collect what it demanded. Moreover, gratitude for the fact that for the first time in the lives of the tax-payers, tangible and concrete returns for their money were visible, was often lost in the knowledge that they had no voice in the initiation or incidence of taxation or in the choice of the objects of expenditure which, because they were essentially desirable in the eyes of the British administrators, were placed in the budget estimates regardless of whether or not the expenditure had corresponding value in the desires and standards of the tax-payers or whether it was necessary for the peculiar needs of the country.

Notwithstanding early instructions to the contrary, as on March 29th, 1917, the Civil Administration employed comparatively few Arabs in responsible administrative positions. Arabs drawing Rs. 600 or more per month² on August 1st, 1920, numbered 20 and formed but 3·74 per cent of the 534 officers in the same category.³ The remaining 514 officers were British or Indian officials. Nor were the various advisory Councils, of which so much has been made as indicating the participation of responsible Arabs in their own government,⁴ of any practical value, having been so organized as to make their effect negligible on the conduct of the Administration except in minor local affairs.

¹ *Parl Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. XL (1920), pp. 850-1.

² Following the official division as in *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 122.

³ The Arabs so employed were distributed among the departments as follows: Judicial Department, 10; Divisional Political Staff, 4; Irrigation, 3; Tāpū, 2; Waqf, 1. Telegram No. 9804, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, August 14th, 1920.

⁴ *Review Civil Admin.*, O.T., 1914-1918, pp. 24-6. *Ibid.*, 1914-1920, pp. 131-2.

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This situation was due partly to the lack of 'Iraqis who, by training, education and character, could stand comparison with the ability and efficiency of the British and Indian officials, and partly to the view, in accordance with the local official policy that direct British control must be maintained, that 'the interests of the country will be served by having a large proportion of British personnel in all branches of the Administration'.¹ Indeed, it was from Indian rather than Arab sources that both administrative methods and officials were drawn. In 1917, 29 of the 59 officers serving in the Civil Administration of Baghdad Wilayet, came from services in India, either directly or on loan from the military authorities. The proportion, roughly, held good in Basra Wilayet as well.² In 1920, although only 79 of the 507 British Officers drawing over Rs. 600 per month were on the active lists of the Indian Government services, a much greater proportion of these as well as of the 515 British Officers drawing less than Rs. 600 had Indian training and experience. No less than 1280 of the Indian and British officials in the latter category came from the Civil Service of India.³ A total of 2216 Indians was employed, who with the 1022 British officials, composed 50·5 per cent of the total administrative personnel, excluding the railroad staff and the non-administrative ranks of the Police and the Levies.⁴ Of the railway personnel, numbering 24,928 of all grades on April 1st, 1920, 80 per cent were Indians, 3 per cent were Europeans and 17 per cent were inhabitants of the country, including Arabs, Kurds, and Jews.⁵

¹ *Admun. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 3. The figures above, together with the Acting Civil Commissioner's persistent refusal to set up an Arab Government in Mōsul, as ordered by H.M. Government, May 9th, 1919, make it difficult to understand his later statement (Wilson, op. cit., p. 313), 'from the outset I did my best to induce H.M. Government to allow me to introduce a very large Arab element into the Civil Administration'.

² *Admun. Report, Baghdad*, 1917, p. 2.

³ Telegram No. 9268, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, July 31st, 1920.

⁴ Table III. Also, Telegram No. 9804, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, August 14th, 1920.

⁵ *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 118.

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The Acting Civil Commissioner has disclaimed with perfect sincerity all intention on his part for thus organizing Mesopotamia along Anglo-Indian lines.¹ Nevertheless, the fact remains that whatever his personal intentions may have been, the great

TABLE III
Officers and Personnel
Employed by the Civil Administration, August 1st, 1920.⁴

	<i>British</i>	<i>Indian</i>	<i>Inhabitants Occupied Territory</i>
Part I Officers and Personnel drawing over Rs. 600 per month			
Central Administration	5	—	—
Divisional „	106	—	4
Other branches	396	7	16
Total	507	7	20
Part II Officers drawing less than Rs. 600 per month			
Central Administration	55	62	123
Divisional „	28	316	862
Other branches	432	1,831	2,167
Total	515	2,209	3,152
Grand Total	1,022	2,216	3,172
Total non-Arab staff			
3,238			

Above does not include Railways or non-administrative rank and file of Police and Levies (less than Rs. 600).

* Based on *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 122, and on various monthly *Lists of Officers (Part I and II) Serving Under the Civil Commissioner, M.E.F.*

strides toward creating a bureaucracy, staffed and administered on Indian lines as has been indicated above, took place during his period of office. The early division of the country into political districts as in British India with a British officer at each key position, responsible to the central administration, to which voluminous reports and statistics were dispatched in

¹ Wilson, Sir A. T., op. cit., p. 304.

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accordance with Indian practice for every aspect of life within the division, was extended and the hierarchy of officials increased from 1918 to 1920. The very titles borne in India, Civil Commissioner, Political Officer, Assistant Political Officer, Revenue Officer, Judicial Officer and others were reproduced in the 'Iraq administration.¹

Whether or not the Acting Civil Commissioner desired to extend the Indian system or not, the shadow of India was over him at all times. Such administrative practices as he had learned by 1914, when at the age of thirty he was inducted into the political service in Mesopotamia, had been learned in India. His early assistants with a few notable exceptions, had been trained in Indian methods and with a tenacity characteristic of Indian Civil Servants, refused to acknowledge that methods applicable to Indians might not be suitable for Arabs. Officers came from other parts of the Empire but the Indian tradition remained.²

Much of the Indian influence on the character of the administration in 'Iraq was undoubtedly due to the fact that India had provided both the motive and the personnel for the Expeditionary Force. The original intention of making Mesopotamia a dependency of India had been given up but the rumour persisted and had to be officially denied.³ The early suggestion that 'Iraq might provide an outlet for India's surplus population⁴ had subsided but had not entirely died out even in official circles.⁵ The strongest claim, however, which India

¹ Political Officer H. R. P. Dickson had suggested in 1917 that familiar Arab titles be given to the British officers. *Admn. Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh*, 1916-1917, p. 20.

² There has been a suggestion of a Civil Service on the lines of the Indian Civil Service, but comprising 'Iraq, the Sudan and the Levant generally Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, March 29th, 1917; also Ormsby Gore, W., *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. VII (1920).

³ Telegram No 3070, Balfour, Paris, to Political, Baghdad, February 10th, 1919.

⁴ *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. IV (1917), p. 87

⁵ The Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, writing in February, 1918, in *My Indian Diary* (1930), p. 250, seems to have had in mind some colonizing scheme for Mesopotamia.

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and Indian methods had in ‘Iraq lay in the interests of the Indian Empire in the future of the country¹ to which it had been bound so long by political and economic ties. The political relation might be severed but these interests had to be safeguarded, as none knew better than the Acting Civil Commissioner. To him, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for India, who had lent his support to the dispatch of the Expeditionary Force in 1914, wrote on March 12th, 1918:

Entirely different currents are flowing now, and we must shape our course to them if we are to get what we want in ‘Iraq. The old watchwords are obsolete, and the question is how we are to secure what is essential under the new ones. The thing can be done, but a certain re-orientation is necessary. The ‘Arab façade’ may have to be something rather more solid than we had originally contemplated.²

¹ The recognition of the interests of India in the House of Commons, ‘The matter cannot be settled without a great deal of careful study and conference with the Indian authorities and others’ (*Parl. Debates*, H of C., 5th S., Vol. cxx (1919), p. 1798), tended to confirm the Arabs in their belief that India might take over ‘Iraq. Also *infra*, p. 240.

² Cited Wilson, *op cit.*, p. 166

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THE Armistice of Mudros, October 30th, 1918, terminated hostilities between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire.¹ Its signature apparently found the British Government without a clearly defined policy for 'Iraq other than that set forth in 1917, subsequently modified to include Basra as well as Baghdad, and that proclaimed generally for all Arab countries in the Anglo-French Declaration.'² Nor could H.M. Government, although the Interdepartmental Committee on Near and Middle East affairs began almost at once to meet in an attempt to frame 'a policy for those territories likely to remain under British influence',³ hope to bring immediate order to the complexity of aspirations, interests and viewpoints left in the wake of the war. Agreements, Declarations and Correspondence had piled up conflicting responsibilities. Promises and Proclamations, made under the stress of abnormal war-time conditions, had to be liquidated or England's prestige and reputation for fair dealing would be forfeited. It was essential to reconcile where possible the Husain-McMahon Correspondence with the Sykes-Picot Agreement among the three parties concerned, in order to satisfy the aspirations of the Arab Nationalists whose war services, in response to the encouragement of the Allies, gave substance to their demands, and to ensure that the interests of the British Empire, for which blood

¹ *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, III (1918), 611 ff., *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. II, p. 496.

² The original 'intention of the Anglo-French Declaration was primarily to clear up the existing situation in Syria which Arab suspicion of French intentions had created'. Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, November 29th, 1918.

³ Young, Major Sir H. W., *op cit.*, p. 279.

and treasure had been so lavishly expended, should not be bartered for transitory gains or for momentary considerations.

The solution of these problems was rendered none the less difficult by the necessity of settling them to the satisfaction of the Allied Powers and of France in particular, of adjusting them in relation to European problems which for the first time since the days of Napoleon assumed a greater share of attention from H.M. Government than did those of the Empire. In addition the necessity existed for obtaining for such settlements the approval, not only of the Peace Conference at Paris, at which President Wilson's fourteen Points threatened to play a prominent part, but also of world opinion which, because of the constant appeals to it during the war, had acquired the authority of a super-tribunal.¹

In formulating a policy for ‘Iraq, the primary decision lay between direct control by Great Britain or indirect control through some form of indigenous government which would guarantee essential Imperial interests. The question was further complicated by uncertainty as to the area to be occupied. Was it to be Basra only, as foreshadowed at the outbreak of the war and as still urged in some quarters, or would it be Basra and Baghdad, as the amalgamation of the two wilayets in September, 1918, seemed to presage? Or would British control be extended, as the Anglo-French negotiations seemed to suggest, to Mōsul and on to Dair az-Zūr or even Jazīrat ibn ‘Umar and Birejik as some military experts desired?²

Direct control of any area, save perhaps that of Basra Wilayet, would run counter to General Maude's Proclamation, to the Anglo-French Declaration, and to the general tenor of the Husain-McMahon Correspondence as well as to the Prime Minister's statement of January 5th, 1918, and to the twelfth of President Wilson's fourteen Points. It would, on the other hand,

¹ For discussion of world-opinion and its influence on post-war diplomacy, see Nicolson, Harold, *Curzon, the last Phase* (1934), pp. 382 ff.

² Wilson, op. cit., p. 116.

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meet the views of the Government of India,¹ of the officials of the 'Iraq Administration, many of whom were still on the active list of Indian services, and of the Imperialists in general who saw in the occupation of 'Iraq the logical climax of three centuries of British activity in the Middle East. It would ensure the safety of the alternative route to India, of which Baghdad was to be the Clapham Junction of the air, the protection of India from Bolshevik Russia, now more dangerous than ever before, her ambitions sustained by insidious social doctrines,² and the safeguarding of commercial interests, of which oil in Persia, in the Transferred Territories and at Kirkūk has assumed primary importance.

On the other hand, if Great Britain were to support an Arab Government, problems would immediately arise as to the type of Administration to be established and as to the degree of power and responsibility with which it was to be endowed, bearing in mind both the necessity of safeguarding British interests and the fact that the Arab State must be constructed almost from the foundations.

Among those who would restrict the participation of Arabs in the government of 'Iraq were those who favoured direct British control. At the other end of the scale, varying in their views as to the degree of responsibility to be given to an indigenous administration, were the Arabs themselves, having an unlimited belief in their rights and in their own untried abilities; the Englishmen who, like the late T. E. Lawrence, believed in the sanctity of Great Britain's pledged word; those who believed, as doctrinaires believe, in the rights of Arabs to a national existence; and those who held that the interests of the Empire could be as well served and at a much less cost by friendly Arabs supported by Great Britain, as by a direct administration of the country.

¹ The Government of India, however, was somewhat perturbed by the prospect of the financial responsibilities involved; Ormsby-Gore, W, *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. VII (1920), p. 93.

² For Lord Curzon's views, see *infra*, pp. 178-9, also *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. VII (1920), p. 98; Vol. VIII (1921), pp. 21, 33.

The possible alternative of complete withdrawal by Great Britain was complicated by the undoubted fact that the Turks would immediately return, against which she had long set her face as being inconsistent with her own interests. The British Government, however, from the first, had refused to make any reassuring announcements with the result that uncertainty, even fear of the future existed among many of the inhabitants, particularly in regard to the future of Mōsul.¹

The creation of an independent Arab State following a British withdrawal was a distinct possibility if the Anglo-French Declaration were to be taken literally, of which the establishment of the Arab regime in Damascus gave some hope. This line of action the Arab Nationalists were to demand and the British Press² was to urge in the coming months, but apparently it was never seriously considered by H.M. Government. Nor did it meet the approval of those in ‘Iraq who were bringing order where confusion had reigned before, those who were engaged in creating a complicated administrative machine, those who genuinely feared for the prospects of an Arab State in the presence of both internal and external dangers, and all those who saw in even partial withdrawal a complete disregard of Imperial interests.

Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the dispatches of the next few months should give the impression that H.M. Government would welcome any inspiration which would point a way out of the maze in which they found themselves. Nor is it surprising that the inability to frame a straightforward policy in the presence of so many conflicting issues and then

¹ A number of the inhabitants, especially ex-Turkish officers, regarded the return of the Turks with favour. The Acting Civil Commissioner drew attention to the influence of this class of inhabitants in Telegram No. 10025, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 19th, 1918.

² It is one of the curious phenomena of the day that the British Press, in keeping with its hysterical misinterpretation of the post-Armistice European situation, should vehemently demand the evacuation of the Middle East areas in which, during pre-war days, it had insisted in no uncertain tones that Great Britain should maintain, at all costs, her vital interests.

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the reluctance to give tangible evidence of British intentions towards 'Iraq until peace had been made, should, by coinciding with the earnest efforts of the Acting Civil Commissioner to impose his own views for direct British administration of the country, prolong the period of inaction, facilitate the growth of political unrest and dissatisfaction among the 'Iraqis and increase the difficulties of the eventual settlement for the country.

In 'Iraq itself, only by the addition of Mōsul to the Occupied Territories was the *status quo* altered. General Marshall, whose troops had been within fourteen miles of Mōsul on October 31st, continued to advance under orders received from the War Office on November 1st and on the authority of Clauses VII and XVI of the Armistice. Mōsul itself was occupied on November 7th in spite of the indignant protests from 'Ali Insan Pasha, the Turkish Commander, who maintained that the terms of the Armistice did not cover the occupation of the city or the country beyond.¹ The administration of the wilayet, in deference to the Sykes-Picot Agreement which assigned it to France, was organized separately from that of Baghdad and Basra, with the exception of the Judicial system which was assimilated on January 1st, 1919, to that of the remainder of the Occupied Territories.²

The end of the war brought no other indication of the future save a proclamation by the General Officer Commanding and the Anglo-French Declaration. The Proclamation by General Marshall, on November 2nd, 1918,³ stated: 'We are now in a position to show that the promises that have so often been made to you are to be kept at the first possible opportunity.' The Anglo-French Declaration of November 8th, following closely

¹ This contention formed one of the main arguments of the Turkish claim to Mōsul, not relinquished until the Treaty of Angora, June 5th, 1926: *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, 123 (1926), Part 1, pp. 599 ff.

² Even separate postage stamps were issued: Turkish fiscal stamps overprinted I.E.F. 'D' with new values.

³ *Proclamations, 1914-1919*, pp. 20-1: Proclamation No. 31. It was drafted by the Acting Civil Commissioner.

on the appearance in the ‘Iraq Press of President Wilson’s fourteen Points, withheld from publication until October 11th by the Civil Administration,¹ had introduced a new factor into the situation, although it was dismissed by the Acting Civil Commissioner and local official circles as being too idealistic to form the basis of official policy. Its publication, however, had ‘thrown the whole town (of Baghdad) into a ferment.’² Local Officials believed that even worse consequences might follow if it were taken literally as an indication of the policy of H.M. Government.

Feeling as the Acting Civil Commissioner did concerning the Declaration and the policy it implied,³ he could have been in no happy frame of mind to receive the following telegram on November 19th, 1918, from the Secretary of State for India:⁴

Colonel Lawrence, now home on leave from Syria, has submitted proposal to H.M. Government for dealing with Arab question. He advocates viz: 1. Lower Mesopotamia, 2. Upper Mesopotamia, 3. Syria, to be placed respectively under ‘Abdullah, Zeid and Feisal, sons of King Hussain. Hussain himself would remain King of Hejaz and would ultimately be succeeded by his eldest son Ali. He would have no temporal authority in three states above-mentioned and in fact no position at all there save insertion of his name in Friday prayers in all mosques as Emir el Momenin . . . It is of course understood that both states would be in the British sphere and Lower Mesopotamia under effective British control. I recognize that these proposals as involving definite separation of Mosul from Baghdad conflict with recommendations in Baghdad telegram 8745 though interstatal boundary does not appear inconsistent with that suggested in Baghdad telegram 8744; also that importation ‘Abdullah into Mesopo-

¹ *Review C. Admn.*, 1914-1920, p. 126.

² *Letters of Gertrude Bell* (2 vols., 1927), Vol. II, p. 463 (hereafter, *Bell, Letters*).

³ *Vide supra*, pp. 137 ff.

⁴ Telegram, S/S for India to Foreign, Delhi, repeated Political, Baghdad, November 18th, 1918.

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tamia would be in direct opposition to (Ibn Sa'ud).¹ But I should be glad if you would review whole question in light of existing conditions and let me have your views on Lawrence's proposals with as little delay as possible.

In the opinion of the Acting Civil Commissioner, the proposals not only failed utterly to meet the situation in 'Iraq but they also confirmed his fears of the degree to which H.M. Government were permitting themselves to be guided by the unpractical counsel of the Western Arabia school. He prefaced his reply with statements from shaikhs and notables of Dīwāniya, Rumaitha, Nāsiriya, Qal'at Sikar, Hai and Kūt, in which they expressed themselves as desiring British rule only.² He then proceeded, in a second telegram,³ to answer the proposals. They were wholly impracticable. The introduction of the sons of the Sharif, however acceptable Faisal might be to the Syrians, was in the interests of neither the British nor the inhabitants of the country, nor to the wishes of the latter. Division of the country into Upper and Lower Mesopotamia had no historical, political or economic basis. The Wilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mōsul were essentially one unit and should be administered as such under effective British control. He concluded by saying:

I would therefore urge H.M. Government if they wish to promote the welfare of peoples of Mesopotamia and value aid to spirit underlying Anglo-French Declaration, to exclude this country definitely once for all from any contemplated Sharifian settlement and from further discussion in that connection, our past conversations with the Sharif notwithstanding. Our moves are being carefully watched by critical

¹ But compare the frequent assertion, as found in Kohn, Hans, *A History of Nationalism in the East* (1928), p. 308, that Great Britain at no time considered the effect on Ibn Sa'ūd of the introduction of sons of Sharif Husain into Mesopotamia and Syria, in the light of the above telegram. See also, *infra*, ch. xvii.

² Telegram No. 10030, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 20th, 1918.

³ Telegram No. 10031, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 20th, 1918.

audiences and any move capable of being attributed to political motives rather than desire for welfare of Mesopotamia will evoke bitter criticism.

A few days later he telegraphed:

Arab state under Arab Amir, including Basrah, Baghdad and Mosul is considered an ideal solution by all.

British High Commissioner and British Advisers in all the ministries of the Arab State and throughout the country are unanimously desired.

All agree in wishing Sir P. Cox to be the first incumbent of the post.¹

He put forward the idea of a plebiscite to take the opinion of the country, saying:

All agree that the opinion of the country must be taken before any decision can be rightly come to and on the clear understanding on which the inhabitants of the country themselves rely, that a protectorate will in due course be declared and that for the present military administration will continue. I am prepared to arrange for this in a manner consonant with educated opinion and not inconsistent with public order. I do not doubt that our confidence will be justified by results.²

Although he reported that none agreed as to the Amir to be chosen, four names had been put forward which he submitted ‘in the order of public preference as far as can be ascertained’.³ 1. Hadī Pasha al-‘Umārī; 2. Member of family of Sultan of Egypt; 3. Son of Sharīf of Mecca; and 4. Naqīb of Baghdad. Of these, Hadī Pasha was suggested as the most eligible candidate. He would be especially welcomed in Mōsul, from which the family originally came. Concerning the second name, he pleaded that insufficient knowledge of Egyptian affairs excused him from expressing an opinion.⁴

¹ Telegram No. 10250, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 24th, 1918, paras. 4, 5, 6.

² Ibid., para 7.

³ Ibid., para. 8.

⁴ Ibid., para 8. Also, Telegrams No. 10251, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 24th, 1918; S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, November 28th, 1918; No. 10465, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 29th, 1918.

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In regard to a son of the Sharif, he stated:

I am now convinced that the third proposal would meet with widespread acceptance in Baghdad, and that it would probably be well received outside because all know who the Sharif is. It is also considered that he would be acceptable to Shi'is on account of the Sharif's well-known latitude in religious views. I am, however, strongly opposed to it. For reasons connected with Persian Gulf and Central Arabian politics and on other grounds.¹

The other candidate put forward, the venerable religious dignitary, 'Abdur Rahmān al-Gailānī, Naqīb of Baghdad, he negated as a possibility on account of his great age, his failing health and his lack of influence save in Sunni religious circles. In addition, the Naqīb was not known in Basra and Mōsul, which would be a further disadvantage in case Mōsul and Kurdistan were added to the prospective State. Nor were any of his family better qualified.²

Under the existing circumstances, it no doubt seemed to the Acting Civil Commissioner that the solution lay in another alternative candidate as head of the proposed new state, which he put in the same telegram:³

A fifth alternative has not yet been discussed in Baghdad, but if I might be authorized to suggest it would probably meet with immediate acquiescence in Baghdad and would be even more acceptable to the rural districts, namely that

¹ Telegram No. 10250, para. 8. Sir Arnold Wilson, writing in 1931, in reference to his sentiments towards a son of the Sharif as ruler of 'Iraq, transmutes 'strongly opposed' above to 'misgivings' (*Mesopotamia*, 1917-1920, p. 108) and also apparently forgets entirely his Telegram 10973, December 10th, 1918, in which he stated that he 'was in complete opposition to the nomination of a son of the Sharif as Amīr'.

² The Acting Civil Commissioner also stated 'The above appreciation differs fundamentally from that formed by Sir Percy Cox in 1917'. The latter's views at that date were those expressed in the *Handbook of Mesopotamia*, p. 128: 'Much the most influential Sunni in Mesopotamia is the Naqib of Baghdad, the official head of the Arab community in that town . . . It is worthy of note that extreme deference is paid to the Naqib of Baghdad and his family by many of the most influential and wealthy, as well as the humblest and poorest, of Indian and Afghan Moslems.'

³ Telegram No. 10250, para. 12.

‘ I R A Q

Sir P. Cox should be appointed High Commissioner for the first five years without any Arab Amir or other head of the State, but with Arab Ministers backed by British Advisers. I earnestly hope that this course will be adopted if it is at all compatible with our national peace policy and the general scheme of things in Arabia.

Its adoption will save Government, the public in Mesopotamia and the representatives of His Majesty's Government on the spot from being rushed into a premature decision.

A solution along this line as proposed must have appealed to the Acting Civil Commissioner for reasons mentioned in his telegram,¹ but it must have also met his own personal views by supplying a check to the dangerous tendency towards Arab Nationalism by restricting the power to be placed in Arab hands, and by ensuring effective British control with the minimum of controlling machinery. The arrangement would secure, for a few years at least, a protected Arab National State with a maximum of protection and a minimum of Arab Nationalism.

No doubt he relied on the personal popularity of Sir P. Cox to overcome any threatened opposition arising from disappointment that an Arab Amir was not to be set up immediately, or that the Anglo-French Declaration was not to be given a more literal interpretation.

Authorization of the Plebiscite

In London, the Interdepartmental Committee on November 27th considered the views and suggestions of the Acting Civil Commissioner. Still unable to enunciate a concrete policy, the Committee resolved to formulate a general statement which might guide the Acting Civil Commissioner, and to request him to obtain expressions of public opinion.²

¹ He returned to the attempt to influence H.M. Government to accept his views in Telegram No 10465, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 29th, 1918.

² Young, op. cit., p. 280.

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This statement of policy, the first which H.M. Government had enunciated for 'Iraq since the Armistice, was received in Baghdad with the order for the plebiscite on November 30th. After declaring that the final status of the Arab provinces would be settled at the Peace Conference, the statement did little more than reiterate the policy of the Anglo-French Declaration, although, in conclusion, it stated that H.M. Government had no intention of relinquishing control or of abandoning their friends. It also betrayed their indecision by stating: 'In the meantime our attention is being given to the question of the best form of Government to set up.'¹

In authorizing the plebiscite, H.M. Government said in the same telegram:

We are anxious in particular that you should render us an authoritative statement of the view held by the local population in the various areas affected on the following specific point.

(1) Do they favour a single Arab State under British tutelage stretching from the northern boundary of the Mosul Wilayet to the Persian Gulf?

(2) In this event, do they consider that a titular Arab head should be placed over this new State?

(3) In that case, whom would they prefer as head?

In our opinion it is of great importance to get a genuine expression of local opinion on these points, and one of such a kind that could be announced to the world as the unbiassed pronouncement of the population of Mesopotamia.

On the same day that the authorization was received, the Acting Civil Commissioner sent his orders to the Political Officers throughout the country. His instructions, which cited the salient points of the above telegram and of related correspondence, stated:

In connection with the first point, you should ascertain whether the inhabitants of your area wish to form a part of an

¹ Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, November 28th, 1918.

‘Iraq state stretching from Raqqah on the Euphrates and Jazir ibn ‘Umar on Tigris to Basrah and the head waters of the Greater and Lower Zab. This question only arises in Kurdistan, Mosul Wilayet and Dair uz-Zor. But it is of greatest importance. Alternative is establishment of separate state, roughly Mosul Wilayet not under British Protection.

As regards second point the correspondence annexed to this memorandum sufficiently indicates the arguments for and against and the possible alternatives.

As regards third point, answer is of course inseparable from the decision in point two. Here again the correspondence is sufficiently explicit as regards possible choices. Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the importance of avoiding the exacerbation of religious differences which might follow upon an indiscreet selection in this connection. . . .

As soon as you conveniently can after the receipt of this letter, you should discuss the questions raised therein confidentially with the principal personalities in your area, and ascertain from them what the trend of public opinion is likely to be, and inform me accordingly.

When public opinion appears likely, under the guidance of the persons you have consulted, to take a definitely satisfactory line, you are authorized to convene an assembly of all leading notables and shaikhs with a view to placing before them the above questions, informing them that their answers will be communicated to me for submission to Government. When public opinion appears likely to be sharply divided or in the unlikely event of its being unfavourable, you should defer holding a meeting and report to me for instructions.

In such cases, it may be anticipated that the favourable verdict of neighbouring districts will tend to have a favourable effect in forming public opinion.

When opinion is favourable, it is desirable it should be reduced to writing and signed by as many as possible.¹

The task of conducting the plebiscite presented grave difficulties, of which the Acting Civil Commissioner as Chief

¹ Memorandum 27190, Civil Commissioner to Political Officers, Baghdad, November 30th, 1918.

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Political Officer and as the agent of H.M. Government in carrying out the plebiscite must have been fully aware from the time he suggested it to H.M. Government. To extract the desired information and, at the same time, to maintain public order and to prevent the exacerbation of religious and racial feeling would not be the least of these problems in a land where the two chief Islamic sections were highly antagonistic to each other; where the religious leaders of Najaf and Karbalā opposed any secular government as a matter of principle; where Christians and Jews live as uneasy minorities; where Arab, Kurd and Turcoman possessed racial antipathies; and where propagandists, Nationalist, Turkish and Bolshevik, were already at work.

He must have recognized also, although H.M. Government apparently did not, that the first of the three questions would be regarded by many, not merely as a choice between a single Arab State or several, but rather as a referendum between independence and British control. He may have felt, in spite of his confident assurances to H.M. Government, just six days before, that public opinion as he knew it was in favour of continued 'British advice, assistance and control', that a free expression of opinion, uncontrolled and unorganized, might result in such an outburst of feeling against British control that would undermine all the administrative work of the past two years and leave no basis, save that of arms, on which Great Britain might establish her claims to occupy and to control the country.

The most careful examination of the instructions fails to produce the impression that they were framed primarily to meet the difficulties of maintaining order and quiet in the land. The Political Officers had been instructed to convene assemblies not when they were likely to be orderly and peaceful, but when public opinion was 'likely to take a definitely satisfactory line'. They were ordered to report to headquarters for further instructions, not when the situation was likely to be disorderly but

when public opinion was ‘likely to be divided or unfavourable’.

Nor does examination of the communications from the India Office to the Acting Civil Commissioner reveal that H.M. Government had given any indication of what they would consider ‘favourable or unfavourable’. Nothing in the telegram ordering the plebiscite indicates that H.M. Government was not genuinely seeking for guidance in setting up the best forms of government in ‘Iraq; that it had reached any definite conclusions concerning the questions it had sent to the Acting Civil Commissioner; or that its instructions were not to be followed literally. It would appear that as far as H.M. Government was concerned, any straightforward, authoritative statement of genuine and unbiased views would be welcomed as indicating the trend of public opinion, on which they might base the government of the new state.

The emphasis placed by the Acting Civil Commissioner on securing ‘satisfactory opinion, together with the inclusion of his own strongly worded telegrams as guides as to what might be considered satisfactory, seem to point to a desire on the part of the Acting Civil Commissioner to make sure that the results of the plebiscite would be satisfactory to his own proposals. It is possible that he had seen, at the time he suggested a consultation of public opinion, the opportunity, in a well-controlled plebiscite, to confound and discredit, once and for all, the Western Arabia party and others of like ilk who sought to give independence to ‘Iraq by demanding a literal interpretation of the clause in the Anglo-French Declaration, ‘the establishment of national governments and administrations drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of indigenous populations’. If this group could be confronted with the established fact that all sections of public opinion had been consulted and did not want independence but rather continued British control, he believed it would no longer be a menace in the councils of H.M. Government.

It may be also that he had seen from the first the opportunity

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which a plebiscite presented to convince H.M. Government, palpably without strong convictions of its own, save the observations of the Anglo-French Declaration, that his own proposals drew 'their authority from the initiative and free choice of indigenous populations', and therefore afforded the only real bases on which H.M. Government, in safety and in self-interest, could establish the new government.

It must not be imputed to the Acting Civil Commissioner that he suggested the recourse to public opinion and then took steps to ensure answers favourable to his own proposals, because they were merely his own views. It may be suggested, rather, that he genuinely believed that his policy, founded on his own knowledge of the country, on his own background and training as a servant of the Indian Empire, and on a desire to promote its interests as well as those of the people of 'Iraq, presented the only way to draw H.M. Government away from the dangerous tendencies which they seemed to be following, and of combating the idealism of those who, from Cairo and from Whitehall, had encouraged and sympathized with the cause of Arab Nationalism.

THE PLEBISCITE OF 1918-1919

IN obtaining 'the views held by the local population',¹ the Acting High Commissioner believed that the extension of the plebiscite to the rank and file of the inhabitants was both impracticable and unnecessary. The masses were too illiterate, too ignorant and dependent on their leaders to merit consideration. The garden cultivators and date growers of the Tigris and the Euphrates, the orange growers of Ba'qūbā, the shepherds of the Dulaim, the rice cultivators of Dīwāniya and Shāmiya, the marsh dwellers of 'Amāra and Qurna, the tribesmen throughout the land and the townsmen of little substance were regarded as having neither opinions of their own nor ability to form them other than as echoes at the behest of their religious and secular leaders. The attention of the Civil Administration was therefore directed to those elements of the population who by position and by character were presumed to be favourable to continued British control, and whose opinions might be put forward as representative.

In the tribal districts and in small towns the plebiscite was confined to the shaikhs and land-owning dignitaries, called together in assemblies where they gave their declarations under their seals and signatures. Among the shaikhs, dependent on the British for support of their position,² for possession of their lands, as at 'Amāra, or for their highly-prized subsidies,³ and

¹ Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, November 29th, 1918. Cited, *supra*, p. 161.

² During the troubles of 1920, many shaikhs were forced into the towns, as they had no power to maintain themselves otherwise over their tribes.

³ As in Dīwāniya Division, where every shaikh until 1920 received a subsidy from the Civil Administration

with whom the British Political Officers were usually on terms of friendship, the declarations or *madhibat* were almost unanimous for continued British rule. At a *majlis* in 'Amāra, at which the Acting Civil Commissioner was himself present,¹ the shaikhs declared that they desired 'Englishmen speaking Arabic' and that they would not accept French, American or Arab officials. They requested that Sir Percy Cox become the governor of 'Iraq. In conclusion they asked that no higher offers for their lands be entertained and that they be protected in possession thereof as long as they were loyal to the Government.² The Qurna shaikhs replied in much the same vein.³

In Nāsiriya, a declaration or *madhbata*, signed by 271 tribal shaikhs, town notables and others, implied the continuance of the British administration; rejected the idea of an Amīr as not coinciding 'with our interests nor with the interests of 'Iraq in general';⁴ and also requested that the management of their affairs should be undertaken by Sir Percy Cox.

The tribal shaikhs of Dīwāniya and of the Hilla Division in their declarations approved of continued British control. The former thanked the British Government for its desire to give them an Amīr which they agreed was in accordance with common sense and the dictates of their religion which enjoined them to appoint an *Imām*. They considered it premature, however, not only because of their own lack of experience in affairs, but also because no man seemed suitable for the office.⁵ The tribal shaikhs around Karbalā, in which city the acute hostility of the *Mujtahids* made the suspension of inquiries desirable in accordance with the Acting Civil Commissioner's instructions, also declared for British administration and for Sir Percy Cox.⁶ From Kūt al-'Amāra, Musaiyib and Khānaqīn

¹ *Monthly Reports, December, 1918*: 'Amāra, p. 7.

² *Self-Determination in 'Iraq* (Secret compilation of Declarations in Arabic, with English translations) (Baghdad, May 17th, 1919): 'Amāra Declaration, p. 8.

³ *Ibid.*, Sec. 2, Qurna Declaration, p. 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Nāsiriya Declaration, p. 11.

⁵ *Self-Determination*: Section 8, Hilla Declaration, No. 4 (Dīwāniya), p. 17.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Section 8, Hilla Declaration, No. 5, p. 18.

came similar pronouncements¹ of approval of British rule and requests for British officers.

In larger centres, as in Basra, individuals of importance were interviewed personally by the Acting Civil Commissioner and by the Political Officers.² At Basra, where most of the dignitaries so interviewed were landowners or had benefited personally by the British Occupation, the majority of the declarations were for British Control.³ In Mōsul, the ten declarations⁴ taken from representatives of religious communities, seven of them from non-Muslim groups,⁵ asked for British rule directly or for British protection. Two of the Muslim groups, Kurds, asserted that they would never live under Arab rule, as did also the Yazīdīs of Jabal Sinjar. The other Muslim declaration, representative of nearly 65,000 Muslims of Mōsul city⁶ and about 100,000 non-Kurdish Muslims of the wilayet, also asked for British protection.⁷

In other districts, notably the Holy Cities, Najaf, Karbalā and Kādhimain, and in Baghdad, the course of the plebiscite did not run so smoothly nor were the pronouncements so favourable. In Najaf, 'the subject passed through three stages as far as the Government officials responsible for conducting it were concerned. At first sight, it appeared to present no great

¹ *Self-Determination*. Section 4, Kūt Declarations, pp. 9-10; Section 8, Hilla Declaration No. 3 (Musaiyib), p. 16; Section 10, Khānaqīn Declaration No. 1, p. 20.

² *Monthly Reports, December, 1918*. Basra, p. 10; Hilla, p. 14.

³ *Self-Determination*: Section 1, Basra Declarations, pp. 1-5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Section 14, Mōsul Declarations, pp. 15-28.

⁵ Representing 18·3 per cent of the total population of the wilayet, according to the official estimates of 1918-19, which gave the figures for Mōsul Wilayet, excluding Kirkūk, as:

Muslims:		Non-Muslims:	
Sunnīs	425,813	Christians	55,370
Shī'īs	22,100	Jews	13,835
		Others	31,180

Total 447,913

Total 100,385

⁶ *Report, Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, 1919, Part I, Mosul* (Calcutta, 1920), p. 28, estimated the population of the city at 80,000, of which four-fifths were Muslims, the remainder being Christians, with a negligible number of Jews.

⁷ *Self-Determination*: Section 14, Mōsul Declaration, No. 2, p. 26.

difficulty'.¹ The Acting Civil Commissioner, realizing the strategic importance of Najaf, appeared before the 'Ashraf, representing the divines and tribal shaikhs, and explained to them that their opinion was to be asked on three questions. The gathering was unanimously in favour of British protection from Mōsul to the Gulf without an Amīr. Two days later, however, a Shī'ī of some local reputation came from Baghdad to Najaf and persuaded the dignitaries not to send the original petition.² On learning of the difficulty, the authorities got in touch with the leading notables including Saiyid Kādhim Yazdī, with whose help 'the matter was brought to a successful conclusion',³ a series of fourteen declarations from individuals and groups being secured.⁴ Some of these asked for a British Protectorate and an Amīr when the country should be ready for him. Several asked outright, however, for an Arab Government with an Amīr, no mention whatever being made of Great Britain.

In the city of Karbalā, the religious leaders or *Mujtahids* issued a decree or *fatwā* that any person who desired other than a Muslim government was an infidel. Under this pronouncement the people of the town hesitated. When they did make a declaration,

their opinions were not in accordance with those taken by the Najafis. Fortunately, in Najaf the step had been irrevocably taken, and there could be no turning back. The double effect was that in Karbala no progress was made and the opinion formulated was never expressed officially, while in Najaf the discussion was closed beyond reopening.⁵

In Kādhimain, anti-British feeling ran high. 'The 'Ulamā threatened with excommunication and exclusion from the

¹ *Admin. Report, Shamiyah Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 30.

² *Memorandum on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia* (Secret Memorandum No. S24, by Miss G. L. Bell, February 22, 1919), p. 3. An abridged version appears in Wilson, Sir A. T.: *Mesopotamia*, 1917-1920, App. 3.

³ *Admin. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 30.

⁴ *Self-Determination: Section 7, Shāmiya Declarations*, pp. 14-15.

⁵ *Admin. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 30.

mosque anyone who voted for British Occupation.’¹ A group of inhabitants, however, was found which drew up a declaration in which the question of protection was left until after the Peace Conference.²

In Baghdad, the centre of anti-British agitation, the difficulties facing the Civil Administration were even greater than elsewhere. The plan of delaying the plebiscite in Baghdad to the last in the hope, as expressed in the instructions to the Political Officers, that favourable declarations in other districts might influence Baghdad opinion, would not, it was soon apparent, produce the desired results. The inhabitants of the city, more politically minded and less inarticulate than other sections of the country, would not be influenced or even controlled as in other towns or in the tribal areas.

The attempt to convene an assembly of local dignitaries, carefully selected by persons believed to be favourably inclined to British rule, also failed. The Acting Civil Commissioner had proposed that the twenty-five Sunnī delegates should be selected by the Sunnī *Qādhī*.³ Similarly, the twenty-five Shī‘a representatives were to be chosen by the Shī‘a *Qādhī*, ‘a creation of the British Administration, no Shī‘a *Qādhī* having been recognized by the Turks . . . a weak and colourless individual whose self-effacing piety’ was his ‘best recommendation’.⁴ The heads of the Christian communities were to nominate the Christian delegates, and the Grand Rabbi, the Jewish representatives.

¹ *Memo. on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia*, p. 4.

² *Self-Determination*: Section 13, Baghdad Declaration, No 8 (Kādhimain). A translation of the declaration, indicative of the trend of opinion in the Holy Cities, is as follows:

‘In accordance with the liberty conferred on us by the Great Powers, the principal of which are the two esteemed Governments of Great Britain and France, we, being of the local Arab nation, choose a new Muslim Arab Government to be ruled by a Muhammadan King, one of the sons of our Lord the Sharif, bound by a local *majlis*, and the question of protection will be considered after the Peace Conference. Dated 5th Rab‘ath Thāni, 1337.’ (Signed by 143 Muhammadan residents of Kādhimain.)

³ The Naqīb, although asked to act with the *Qādhī*, had refused.

⁴ *Memo. on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia*, p. 4.

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In the selection of the Muslim delegates, on whom the character of the declarations of Baghdad opinion would depend,¹ the *Qādhīs*, 'either by intent or under religious or political pressure, did not execute their task loyally'.² Instead of selecting representatives, they called 'meetings of their communities for the purpose of selection. At both gatherings, extremely inflammatory language was used and the delegates chosen were bound down to ask for an Arab Government without European protection'.³ Not all the Muslims so chosen would serve, however. Seven Sunnīs and one Shī'ī resigned and were replaced by five Sunnīs. The group, with whom the Christians and the Jews would not act, passed on January 22nd, 1919, a declaration of which the following is a translation:

As it has been understood that the object of the Governments of Great Britain and France in the East is the liberation of the people and the constitution of local Governments and administration founded on a practical basis, according to the wishes of the inhabitants, we being of the Muslim Arab nation and representing the Muslims of the Shī'a and Sunnī Communities inhabiting Baghdad and its suburbs, resolve that the country extending from northern Mōsul to the Persian Gulf to be one Arab State, headed by a Muhammadan King, one of the sons of our Sharīf Husain, bound by a local Legislative Council sitting at Baghdad, the capital of 'Iraq.⁴

The anti-British declaration of the Muslim delegates may well have been a disappointment to the Civil Administration. The vehemence of the group, however, brought about a reaction among the landowners and the more sober-minded notables who, responding to the suggestions judiciously thrown out by

¹ If friendly Muslim magnates were chosen as intended, the Assembly would almost surely give the desired declaration since the non-Muslims were known to be standing solidly for continued British rule.

² *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 128.

³ *Memo. on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia*, p. 5; Telegram, No 1077, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, January 26th, 1919.

⁴ *Self-Determination: Section 13, Baghdad Declaration, No. 2, p. 23.*

members of the Civil Administration, readily brought in declarations formulated along the desired lines.¹

Ostensibly the results of the plebiscite confirmed the views put forward by the Acting Civil Commissioner to H.M. Government. An almost universal desire that Mōsul should be included in the new State had been expressed.² Notables, both individually and collectively, of seven Divisions³ had indicated a desire for British administration without substantial changes. A majority of declarations in five Divisions had manifested a desire for an Arab Government but, as the Acting Civil Commissioner had predicted, admissions were made that no suitable person could be found and that consequently British protection was desirable. Two Divisions had specifically declared against a son of the Sharīf of Mecca. The Acting Civil Commissioner's suggestion of Sir Percy Cox as head of the new State⁴ had been supported by declarations from four Divisions.⁵ The three declarations which had declared for an Arab Government with a son of the Sharīf as ruler⁶ were discounted as being the opinion of irresponsible and fanatical elements aroused by Nationalists and by ex-Turkish malcontents.⁷

In reality, it seems certain that while the greater portion of public opinion at that moment, on the simple issue of con-

¹ *Self-Determination*: Section 13, Baghdad Declaration, Nos. 1, 3-9, pp. 23-5.

² The Nāsiriya Declaration (*Self-Determination* Section 5, Declaration No. 5, p. 11) stated the common belief

'Ever since our boyhood we have been hearing that 'Iraq is composed of these wilayets Basra, Baghdad, and Mōsul, which as a whole are called 'Iraq. Their capital has always been Baghdad. Anyhow, Mōsul is attached to Baghdad, as Baghdad is watered by Mōsul and Mōsul gets food from Baghdad by the sea trade. We, therefore, can never agree that the 'Iraq country should be detached from the Mōsul Wilayet.

'In the beginning of Islām, when war was waged between 'Alī and Mu'awiyah, Syria and its dependencies were under Mu'awiyah, while 'Iraq, along with Mōsul, was controlled by 'Alī. This is a sufficient reason.'

³ 'Amāra, Qurna, Mōsul, Kūt, Basra, Hilla and Khānaqīn.

⁴ Telegram No. 10250, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 24th, 1918, cited *supra*, pp. 159-160.

⁵ 'Amāra, Nāsiriya, Karbalā and Baghdad (two).

⁶ *Self-Determination*: Section 13, Baghdad No. 2, p. 23 and Kādhimain (Baghdad No. 8), p. 25; Section 9, Ba'qūbā (town), No. 3, p. 19.

⁷ *Memo. on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia.*

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tinuance of British Occupation, was in favour of such rule, either direct or in support of an Arab Government, the picture was not so definitely clear-cut; public opinion was not so one-sided; nor was pro-British sentiment so preponderant as the declaration and the reports forwarded to the India Office might seem to indicate. The instructions issued by the Acting Civil Commissioner, the method of selecting those who signed the declarations, the personal interviews conducted by the Acting Civil Commissioner and by the Political Officers and the safeguards adopted so that none but favourable views might be registered, precluded a 'genuine expression of local opinion' in 'Iraq from ever finding its way to H.M. Government, unless the local opinion were satisfactory to the Civil Administration itself. The knowledge that all statements of opinion with signatures and seals would be forwarded to the Government by the Political Officers in accordance with instructions, made it certain from the beginning that most notables both tribal and urban, in order to keep themselves in the good books of the *Hakūma* or Government would make the protestations of loyalty and devotion which the British authorities so manifestly desired.

Not all of the measures taken to ensure favourable declarations were so indirect. Seven Arabs were deported from Baghdad for their activities in connection with the plebiscite. The declaration of the chosen representatives of the Baghdad Muslims, far from being accepted as the official declaration as originally intended, was dismissed as being unrepresentative of the politically and economically important inhabitants of Baghdad.¹ The opinion formulated by the city of Karbalā, the second most important of the Holy Cities of 'Iraq, was 'never expressed officially',² on account of the opposition to British rule which it contained. No declaration was obtained from

¹ *Memo. on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia*, p. 6.

² *Admin. Report, Shamayah*, 1919, p. 30. Cf. *Admin. Report, Hillah Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 17.

Sāmarrā, the fourth of the Holy Cities. No declarations were taken in the Dulaim Division, either from the tribes or from Fallūja, Ramādī or other towns. One declaration signed by twenty Muslims represented 160,000 Arab Muslims of Mōsul Wilayet. Official pressure had to be brought to bear in Najaf¹ before its notables produced satisfactory declarations.

The plebiscite as ‘an authoritative statement of the views held by the local population’,² also failed to indicate the elements of opposition in the country and to reveal their relative strength. It gave no hint, for instance, of the large section of opinion, particularly strong in Basra,³ which, while recognizing the benefits and the increased prosperity of British rule, found the constant growth of the military machine, including ports, camps and depots; the continuation of military regulations; the maintenance of demands for forced labour and the very efficiency of the administration with its insistence on promptness, probity and justice, too disturbing to their life-long habits of mind and of action and too much of a strain on their patience to be endured.⁴

The plebiscite gave no hint that the tribesmen, uncivilized, even barbarous, were already restive under the British tribal policy which gave the shaikhs relying on British support almost unlimited power over the details of tribal life, a power too often abused for the advancement of the shaikhs’ own personal interests. It gave no inkling of such tribal feeling, which was to grow in intensity during the next eighteen months and which was to pave the way for the rebellion against both shaikhs and the British rule which maintained them in control.

The *Mujtahids* of the Shi‘is and the other religious dignitaries who, firm in their opposition to any but a theocratic Muslim State, would allow no idols other than of their own making,

¹ *Admn. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 30.

² See Telegram, cited *supra*, p. 161.

³ See statement by the Rev. J. Van Ess, cited Wilson, op cit, p. 112, confirmed to writer, in April, 1934.

⁴ *Admn. Report, Shamiyah*, 1919, p. 1.

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were dismissed, although their power over the masses was enormous, as too ignorant of modern state-craft, too self-centred and too alien to be allowed to influence the creation of a new state.

The Nationalist elements, composed of those who had worked for Arab autonomy before the war, those who prided themselves on being the intelligentsia of 'Iraq, and the religious leaders, were brushed aside, although they were destined to grow in power and influence during the coming months, especially under the stimulus of Nationalism in Syria, as being too negligible, too irresponsible and too full of sound and fury to merit consideration. No inferences seem to have been drawn from the fact that the anti-British declarations, almost identical in tenor and phraseology, pointed to a carefully organized opposition, just as the close resemblance of many of the pro-British declarations indicated the care and attention which the Civil Administration had devoted to the conduct of the plebiscite.

The failure of the plebiscite to represent all these elements of current opinion in their relative importance and to reflect local opinion in its true proportions, was destined to mislead H.M. Government in its attempts to set up a new State satisfactory to the inhabitants of 'Iraq, and, by making it complacently unaware of the need for quick and decisive action in settling the future of the country, to prepare the ground for the disastrous events of 1920.

COMMITMENTS, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROPOSALS, DELAYS

IN the few months following the Armistice, it became increasingly evident that any original intention or desire which H.M. Government may have had of giving effect to their promises to guarantee Arab independence¹ would be circumscribed by the necessity of preserving the *Entente cordiale* in the face of more pressing problems arising in Europe and by imperial interests, held to be even more insistent than at any time before or during the war.

In Syria, it became clear that the Arab Government set up at Damascus chiefly by the efforts of Colonel Lawrence, with the concurrence of H.M. Government, in accordance with the promises of 1915-16 and the Declaration of Cairo, June 11th, 1918,² that Arabs should keep what Arabs could win, would be abandoned to French protection, in exchange for compensation elsewhere. The advice given to Amīr Faisal, both before and during his visit to Europe in the winter and spring of 1918 and 1919,³ was but a warning of the application of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, revised along lines discussed by Lloyd George and Clemenceau in December, 1918,⁴ and formalized at the San Remo Conference in April, 1920.

In return for British concurrence in the application of French

¹ Lawrence, although one of the chief agents in convincing the Arabs that these promises were genuine, was sceptical throughout the war of the intention of H.M. Government to fulfil them. *Op. cit.*, pp. 502, 545, 550-2, 556, 608. Also Philby, *Sunday Times*, July 21st, 1935. The reported understanding between Lloyd George and Clemenceau, December, 1918, *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. VI, p. 141, also gives the same impression, although at the secret meeting of the Four Powers, March 20th, 1919 (Baker, R. S., *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, Vol. III, pp. 1-19), the former defended the British promises to the Arabs.

² Lawrence, *op. cit.*, p. 555, Young, Sir H. W., *op. cit.*, pp. 276-7.

³ *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. VI, pp. 142, 144.

⁴ Tardieu, A., in *L'Illustration*, June 19th, 1920. His account seems confirmed by Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 78-9.

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control¹ to Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, for British support against American objections to such extension, and for French participation in oil development in Mōsul Wilayet, the French were to agree that Mōsul Wilayet was to become part, *de jure* as well as *de facto*, of the Occupied Territories of Mesopotamia. France was also to relinquish her claim to administer Palestine. Great Britain, instead, was to assume direct control of all Palestine, essential for implementing the Balfour Declaration of November 2nd, 1917, regarding the establishment of a National Home for Jews,² and for securing the western base and springs of the two arches of land and water communications between the Eastern Mediterranean and India.³ Palestine was to be withdrawn from the Arab sphere, thereby laying the basis for Arab bitterness, for whether or not Palestine was originally included in the lands promised to the Arabs, as they stoutly claim and as representatives of Great Britain as earnestly deny,⁴ the Palestine Arabs had been without doubt propagandized into believing that they were fighting for their freedom from foreign rule.⁵

¹ Statement of French policy in Near East *Journal des Débats*, Dec. 29th, 1918.

² For text, see facsimile of Mr. Balfour's letter to Lord Rothschild, Stein, L., *Zionism* (1926); also *The Times*, November 9th, 1917, and *infra*, App. II. For origins: *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. VI, pp. 170 ff.; Stein, op. cit., ch. IV.

³ Roughly speaking, one arch, resting on Egypt and on India, passes through Palestine, Transjordan, and the Syrian desert to Baghdad and thence down the Tigris and Euphrates valleys and the Persian Gulf to India. The other arch, inverted, based also on Egypt and on India, passes down the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and around Arabia to India.

⁴ Palestine was never specifically reserved from territories guaranteed to the Arabs by any of the letters to Sharif Husain from Sir H. McMahon. The latter's explanation in a letter to the Colonial Office, March 12th, 1922, nearly seven years after the original correspondence, that he meant Palestine to be so excluded, although it was not mentioned, is hardly proof that it was excluded. On the other hand, the claim made by Amin Rihāni, the Lebanese poet, of a secret treaty of January, 1916, granting to Sharif Husain all territory between the northern boundaries of Aleppo and Mōsul Wilayets and the Indian Ocean, and between Persia and the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, except Aden (*Kings of Arabia*, Vol. I, p. 60), which he maintains (*Manchester Guardian*, January 22nd, 1934) must be considered authentic until formally denied by the British Government, can scarcely be accepted as historical evidence that the treaty exists.

⁵ *Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929* (Cmd. 3530), pp. 124-7, with documents. Also, Hogarth, D. G., *Quarterly Review*. Vol. CCXXXIV (October, 1920), p. 420.

‘ I R A Q

For ‘Iraq, the keystone of the upper arch of the overland route to the East, H.M. Government had evolved the policy of creating a state or series of states as part of a chain of friendly countries between Europe and the borders of India. The new ‘Iraq States, in accordance with the prevailing tendencies in political thought, with the desire to honour, as far as convenient, British pledges and with the fundamental necessity of easing the British taxpayers’ burdens, for which the Northcliffe Press and other journals had taken up cudgels, were to be administered according to the wishes of the inhabitants of the country in so far as they coincided with strict British tutelage and control.

With the policy of creating a chain of friendly states Lord Curzon, Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had been long in agreement.¹ In late 1917 and early 1918, he had urged their creation, particularly in Persia and in ‘Iraq, in the occupation of which he saw the logical climax to three centuries of British activity in the Middle East. He had then held, in common with other members of the Cabinet, including Sir William Robertson,² that Germany, operating through prostrate Russia, was still the chief enemy of Great Britain in Asia, although concern had not been lacking that Bolshevik doctrines might reach India, a fear which was later to become paramount. He had proposed that neither Germany nor her allies should ever again be permitted to occupy Palestine or Mesopotamia. Every effort should be made to re-create Russia — ‘even though it may take ten or twenty years’ — as a bulwark against German

¹ ‘It was all part of a perfectly definite and logical policy which had taken shape with his first glance at the political map of Asia while still a boy at Eton, and had remained clear-cut in his mind ever since. It rested upon a single and quite simple conception — the creation of a chain of buffer states stretching from the northern confines of India to the Mediterranean sea, to serve as a screen, giving protection against attack to India and the arterial line of communication between Great Britain at one end and Australia, New Zealand, and the Far East at the other.’ Ronaldshay, Lord, *The Life of Lord Curzon* (3 vols., 1928), Vol. III, p. 209

² For Sir William Robertson’s strongly worded appreciation to the War Cabinet, March 14th, 1918, see *O.H.*, Vol. IV., p. 138.

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penetration towards India, and finally, 'we must endeavour by any means in our power to secure a friendly Persia and a loyal Afghanistan'.¹ Sir Percy Cox's mission to Persia in 1918-20 had been to bring Persia, rehabilitated by Great Britain, into treaty relations. The full success of British policy in Persia depended on possessing in 'Iraq what would be 'tantamount to a British frontier'.²

Bolshevik Russia replaced Germany, in Lord Curzon's opinion, as Great Britain's chief enemy in Asia, but his policy remained the same, as was indicated in his address to the Central Asian Society, October 12th, 1920. He said then, in part:

Our aim is to give security to what we possess . . . I hold that what we have to do is to try to make islets in the ocean, peaceful spaces in the chaos, landing places in the storm; to elaborate palisades of stable and peaceful states around the fringe of India. It is for that object that I am working.

We want . . . freedom from the contagion of Bolshevik misgovernment and anarchy, which will not only be injurious to the British Empire, but which will mean its ruin.³

Not until January, 1919, when he was Acting Secretary of State while Mr. Balfour was at the Peace Conference was he able to give effect to his policy. Even then he did not possess full responsibility, Mr. Balfour remaining titular Secretary of State until October, 1919. Nor had he a free hand. Mr. Lloyd George, assuming that the Foreign Office was but an extension of No. 10 Downing Street, kept his fingers on most affairs. Nevertheless, Lord Curzon, although circumscribed on most of the great problems of the day, placed his impress on Egypt and the Middle East. The Treaty of 1919 with Persia whereby it was to have become a link in the chain was due to his initiative. His influence on Middle East and 'Iraq affairs was facilitated

¹ Extract from address by Lord Curzon to the Imperial War Cabinet, June 25th, 1918. Similar views had been put forward in a Memorandum of September 21st, 1917.

² Extract from address by Lord Curzon to Eastern Committee of War Cabinet, December 30th, 1918.

³ *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. VIII (1921), pp. 8-9.

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by his position as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Middle East Affairs, sometimes called the Curzon Committee,¹ through which he practically took charge of matters concerning ‘Iraq, in spite of the protests of Mr. Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India, who was nominally responsible for its affairs.²

However desirous H.M. Government may have been to consolidate their position in ‘Iraq that it might act as a British frontier in the Middle East, they were still unable to decide upon the method of giving effect to their policy and were still reluctant to take any action which might be assailed in the Peace Conference or which might prejudice them in world opinion. To H.M. Government in such a state of mind, the results of the ‘Iraq plebiscite as sent to London must have been indeed welcome. In the trends of ‘Iraqī public opinion as reported, they seemed to find sufficient promise of a solution of their difficulties to justify an advance towards setting up the new government and a further statement of policy. The India Office telegraphed to Baghdad on February 14th:

They [H.M. Government] will be glad if you will telegraph outline of constitution of Arab State or group of States, which you would propose on basis of wishes of inhabitants, as disclosed in telegrams and of necessity of effective and indisputable British control. By Anglo-French Declaration we are committed to indigenous administration and we must adhere to this, not only in letter but in spirit. Our objective should be a flexible constitution, giving full play to different elements of population and recognizing and incorporating local peculiarities and idiosyncrasies such as will provide for Arab participation as the time goes on in the actual Government and Administration of country, and preventing Arab nationalists from being drawn into opposition to British control.

These general ideas may not be any great hindrance to

¹ *Parl. Debates*, H. of C, 5th S., Vol. CLI (1922), p. 1559.

² Letter, India Office to Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, July 15th, 1919.

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you in endeavouring to work out solutions of an extremely difficult problem, but they will serve to show you what is in the mind of H.M. Government.¹

The promises of the Anglo-French Declaration, thus, were not overlooked, but to any who might demand full independence on the basis of that document, H.M. Government could now point to the array of documents resulting from the plebiscite as proof positive of the concurrence of the population in the form of government proposed. To those who demanded that Great Britain should not forego her imperial interests, they could point to the 'effective and indisputable British control' which they proposed to maintain in accordance with the expressed wishes of the inhabitants. The difficulties of giving a tangible and workable expression to this dual-purpose policy were realized but, relying on the support of the more substantial elements of the population, which they understood to be behind them, H.M. Government might well have believed that a beginning could be made.

The acting Civil Commissioner's draft Constitution for which the India Office had asked was ready on February 20th.² Five days later, he left for Paris and London to discuss the situation in person. His constitutional proposals were based on the following assumptions:

(1) There will be no Arab Amir, but a British High Commissioner.

(2) Mosul Wilayet and Dair uz-Zur will be included in Iraq, as also those portions of Kurdistan which are now a part of Mosul Wilayet and which are not included in the future Armenian state, i.e., the whole of the basin of the Greater Zab. This is necessary in order to admit of inclusion of Assyrians.

¹ Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, February 14th, 1919

² The draft proposals, in Secret Letter S/11, dated February 20th, 1919, were sent to Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, Senior Judicial Officer, to Col. Evelyn Howell, Revenue and Financial Secretary, to Col. F. C. C. Balfour, Military Governor of Baghdad, and to the Political Officers of Divisions with the request that they discuss the proposals among themselves and with leading notables.

(3) British control, however expressed in words, will be effective in practice and will be ensured by retention of adequate military and air-forces distributed primarily with a view to aid the civil power in the maintenance of order.

(4) Adequate British financial support for the 'Iraq State in its early stages, firstly by loan secured on revenue, secondly by allowing Civil Administration to take over surplus military assets such as railways, bridges, motor works, electric plant, etc., at a low valuation.

The proposals in an abridged form were:

(1) 'Iraq to be ruled by a High Commissioner having under him four Commissioners controlling provinces as follows: Basra, . . . Baghdad, . . . Euphrates, . . . Mosul . . . If Kurdistan is included there will be five Commissioners.

(2) Divisional Councils . . . to be made full use of as advisory and deliberative but not as legislative bodies. . . .

(3) Provincial Councils to be formed in each of the above provinces from members selected of their own choice by the Divisional Councils. The latter are nominated bodies. . . .

Carefully selected Arabs of good birth and education, especially from those in government posts in Syria,¹ were to be given, from the outset, positions of executive and administrative responsibility,² as

Governors of Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul and 'Amarah, with a specially chosen British official of ability and character as Municipal Commissioner and Adviser to the Governor, in which dual capacity he could control finances and mitigate inevitable inefficiency in early stages.

This draft constitution had been formed, the Acting Civil Commissioner declared, 'in consultation with the most experienced officers on my staff, on whom the responsibility of giving

¹ Cf his views here with those expressed in his Telegram No. 9926, November 16, 1918, cited *supra*, p. 138.

² The tribal districts were to be excluded from the operation of such a scheme, since it would not be welcome to the tribes or to the officials who, moreover, were not 'fit for responsible district work from any point of view'.

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effect to it will fall. I am authorized by them to assure Government that it will have their whole-hearted, if cautious support.'¹ All the proposals, however, did not have the whole-hearted support which was claimed for them. The division of the country into provinces, the erection of Provincial and subsidiary Councils, and the scheme of indirect election to the latter commanded general agreement, but other proposals, as the establishment of town Governors, found little support. The Revenue Secretary stated frankly: 'The more I think of Wilson's four town Governors the less I like them.'² The Military Governor of Baghdad was convinced of the 'impossibility of finding men who could run an administration so closely involved as that of Baghdad with military and technical departments, which will continue to be run by Englishmen'. There was also the 'difficulty of getting British officials to serve under natives'.³

It was the Judicial Secretary, Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, whose ability and experience had established him as one of the outstanding senior officials, who offered the most trenchant criticisms. His familiarity with India, the Sudan and Egypt, and with the judicial and administrative practices there, and his store of experience and knowledge enabled him to approach the task with a more mature judgment and, perhaps, a more tolerant spirit than did some of the other officials.⁴ In a letter to the Acting Civil Commissioner, March 11th, 1919, Sir Edgar pronounced himself strongly in favour of the proposed provinces. They would facilitate the adaptation of administrative measures to local sentiment and make it 'easier to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Shiyahs'. They

¹ Draft Proposals, February 20th, 1919.

² Letter, Col. E. B. Howell, to Sir E. Bonham-Carter, February 21st, 1919.

³ Secret Letter, C.9/1: Military Governor, Baghdad, to Acting Civil Commissioner, February 24th, 1919.

⁴ He had already written a memorandum, 'The Place of the Arab in Administration' (Confidential prints are dated February 5th, 1919, but typescript versions exist dated February 8th, 1919), remarkable for its reasoned appreciation of the situation. For his achievements in reconstituting the Judicial system, employing Arabs both as Judges and staff, see *supra*, pp. 128 ff.

might lead, also, to a federal form of Government, under which ‘self-government as regards internal affairs could be combined most easily with the control of the protecting power’.

His main objection to the proposals, however, was that they did not

go far enough, either to satisfy the declarations which had been made on behalf of the British Government nor to put the Arabs in a position to obtain a fair and increasing share in the administration . . . I think from the outset some Arabs should be employed as Assistant Political Officers and Deputy Assistant Political Officers . . . I consider also that the positions of importance should be given to Arabs in the Civil Administration either as Ministers or as Assistant Secretaries and that a Legislative Council should be formed, similar to the Council of Ministers in Egypt, consisting of the Arab Ministers or Assistant Secretaries and a rather larger number of the principal British heads of departments. Notwithstanding the impossibility of now finding men fitted for the position,¹ I think it wise to give the designation to these appointments of Ministers rather than Assistant Secretaries. To begin with, the Arab Ministers would be little more than figure-heads, but their position would be none the less valuable. It would maintain the social and political status of the Arabs and would encourage the employment of Arabs in lower posts and without any upheaval such as would be necessary to replace a British head of a department by an Arab. An Arab Minister of ability could, at any time, make his influence felt and exercise real powers. If all posts of importance in the Administration are reserved for the British, this must necessarily lower the status of the Arab, and make it increasingly difficult to introduce Arabs into the Administration.²

The Acting Civil Commissioner, on arriving in Paris, took part in the discussions for which he had been summoned. He also discussed the problems of ‘Iraq and Arabia in general with

¹ He had reviewed this difficulty in his Memorandum of February 5th, 1919.

² He embodied his suggestions in a ‘Tentative Draft of Arab Institutions’ (not dated); see App. v. There is no indication that it was ever submitted to the Acting Civil Commissioner.

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numerous individuals, English, American and French. The atmosphere, in his opinion, was dominated by the Western Arabia viewpoint, the experts being lamentably ignorant of conditions in 'Iraq and even in Persia.¹ On the other hand, he himself created the impression that he was out of touch with conditions under which the Peace Conference was proceeding, and that he had little conception of the strength of Arab Nationalism or of the forces which had given rise to it.

In London, his appeals for an official pronouncement of the intentions of H.M. Government regarding 'Iraq were not fruitful. It was felt that until further progress had been made toward the settlement of peace, the telegram of February 14th must suffice.² The Secretary of State for India agreed that the Acting Civil Commissioner should make specific proposals, and suggested that Lord Curzon might help him in formulating a policy and in obtaining sanction for his plans.

The Acting Civil Commissioner bespoke the aid of Lord Curzon in obtaining an agreed scheme on which to build and an accepted policy by which he might be guided. His constitutional proposals, drawn up in February, were placed, by the arrangement of Lord Curzon, before the Interdepartmental Committee on Middle East Affairs on April 6th, at a meeting before which he appeared personally. His proposals for provinces (five instead of four proposed) in 'Iraq proper' were sanctioned, together with Provincial Councils for each. Divisional and Municipal Councils were to be developed and consolidated. Arab Advisers were to be appointed to the British heads of three Departments of State: Revenue, Justice and Education. The Arab Secretaries of the Divisional Councils were sanctioned as Advisers to the Political Officers, and Arabs were to be appointed Presidents of the Municipal Councils of Baghdad, Basra, and 'Amāra.

In deference, however, to Lord Curzon's *idée fixe* that nothing should be done to anticipate the decisions of the Peace Con-

¹ Wilson, op. cit., p. 116

² Cited *supra*, p. 180.

ference, the appointment of a High Commissioner and the Provincial Commissioners, as suggested by the Acting Civil Commissioner, were not sanctioned, while the distinction between Mōsul and ‘Iraq proper was to be continued by giving the former an Arab administration.

The Acting Civil Commissioner left England armed with authority to proceed along these lines.¹ The formal official authorization which, however, reached Baghdad on May 10th, the day following his arrival there, read as follows:

We authorize you to take in hand the construction of five provinces for ‘Iraq proper on the same lines as recommended by Howell in enclosures five and six of your letter of April 6th. You will also proceed with the creation of the Arab province of Mosul fringed by autonomous Kurdish States under Kurdish Chiefs who will be advised by British Political Officers.

We also approve of the formation of Provincial Councils and the development and institution of Divisional and Municipal Councils.²

The references to ‘‘Iraq proper’ and to ‘Arab province of Mosul’ were undoubtedly disconcerting to the Acting Civil Commissioner. The inference, however, that the above telegram was his first intimation that H.M. Government intended to exclude Mōsul from the operations of the proposals, which he later claimed had ‘been accepted almost without discussion’,³ and that his strenuous efforts of the next few months were due to his anxiety to counter this new and unexpected turn in policy, as he later implied,⁴ seems hardly in accordance with the facts available. The Secretary of the Committee, in his account of the meeting of April 6th has stated: ‘The meeting decided to make a start by creating five provinces in Mesopotamia proper and an “Arab” province of Mosul, etc.’⁵ and that

¹ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 286; Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

² Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, May 9th, 1919.

³ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 123.

⁵ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

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the Acting Civil Commissioner had returned 'armed with authority to proceed on these lines'.¹ His continued efforts to influence the policy of H.M. Government were due more to his desire to make a final attempt to ensure the inclusion of Mōsul in the new state, his efforts in London having already proved unsuccessful, than to any reaction to what he has inferred was a novel policy suddenly put forward by H.M. Government.

The Acting Civil Commissioner had long considered the inclusion of Mōsul in 'Iraq as essential. Sir William Marshall's strong action in completing the conquest of the Wilayet after the Armistice had met with his approval.² It had rounded out 'Iraq geographically and had pushed back the Turks to a more natural frontier. It had brought under British protection the Christian population, including the Assyrians who, encouraged by the Allies, had taken up arms against the Turks. It had put the wilayet's economic resources, including its revenue, at the disposal of the rest of 'Iraq of whose autonomous existence without these potentialities, the Acting Civil Commissioner was inclined to be sceptical. It gave Great Britain control of oil resources which, if not wholly proven, were enough to disturb the chancelleries of several nations and to produce the petroleum clauses of the Anglo-German Agreement, 1914, the Oil Agreement, May 15th-17th, 1916, and the Berenger-Long Agreement, April 18th, 1919.³

He saw little reason, other than the Sykes-Picot Agreement, why 'Iraq and Great Britain should forego these advantages by any post-war settlement. Inasmuch as Lloyd George had given him to understand that the French claim to Mōsul, under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, had been settled as far as France was concerned, he saw no justification for the non-extension of the proposed new regime to the wilayet. Any serious attempt to set up an Arab Administration would be followed by violent

¹ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

² Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

³ Also the San Remo Agreement, April 25th, 1920; *Brit. and For. St. Papers* cxiii (1923), 350; *Misc. No. 11* (1920), Cmd. 675; see also *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. vi, pp. 182-3; App. 2, Part 1.

protests against such discrimination from Arab Nationalists of Baghdad and lower ‘Iraq, where little self-government had been authorized save Arab advisers, Municipal Presidents and local Councils, stripped of any real authority or power. He also foresaw that when Mōsul was assimilated, as it would undoubtedly be, any attempt to bring its Arab Government into line with the rest of ‘Iraq would be met by storms of opposition, not only from the Arab inhabitants of Mōsul but also from those of ‘Iraq and of the entire Arab world, intent on demanding their rights in the face of the hostile Western Governments.

Accordingly, when an announcement was made of the impending changes on the occasion of the King’s birthday celebration in Baghdad on May 29th, the Acting Civil Commissioner spoke only in generalities. No mention of Mōsul was made nor was any hint given as to the future administration which H.M. Government proposed to establish there.¹

A few days later he renewed his efforts to win H.M. Government to his opinion. In answer to a telegram from H.M. Government, thanking him and his staff for their work and stating that his recommendations marked an important stage towards a definite form of administration, and that the ultimate Constitution must await the coming of peace,² the Acting Civil Commissioner declared on June 7th, that it was difficult, if not impossible, to proceed with constitutional organization, until the future of Mōsul had been settled. He asked that he be permitted to make an announcement regarding Mōsul in about a fortnight’s time.³

¹ Text: *Proclamations*, 1914-1919, No. 49, pp. 38-9. The speech was the combination of a draft prepared by Col. E. B. Howell, May 7th, and a draft prepared by the Acting Civil Commissioner, May 21st, 1919. In view of this announcement, reprinted in local papers and in official compilations, it is difficult to understand the Acting Civil Commissioner’s statement: ‘H.M. Government had firmly refused either to make any public announcement themselves in regard to Mesopotamia, in amplification of the Anglo-French Declaration of November 8th, 1918, or permit me to do so’ Wilson, op. cit., p. 237.

² S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, June 6th, 1919.

³ Telegram No. 6403, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 7th, 1919.

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Lord Curzon, on the receipt of the telegram, which did not officially reach the Foreign Office until June 24th,¹ took the position that the creation of the sanctioned provinces, councils and advisory positions were steps in devolution and in decentralization from the temporary military administration. He could not understand, moreover, why the application of such steps should be dependent on the inclusion of Mōsul in 'Iraq or on any particular combination of provinces. The original sanction for the Acting Civil Commissioner's proposals had not implied that any combination of provinces or that even the guardianship of H.M. Government would be permanent. A telegram to this effect was dispatched to Baghdad, July 5th, which stated in conclusion: 'Any action which would give rise in Mosul Wilayet or elsewhere to the impression that the future political status of 'Iraq has already been decided upon should therefore be most scrupulously avoided.'²

Still unsatisfied, the Acting Civil Commissioner, instead of devoting his energies whole-heartedly to the execution of the proposals which he had himself drawn up, entered into further correspondence with H.M. Government, endeavouring to obtain their approval to the inclusion of Mōsul in the new regime.

Growth of 'Iraqī opposition

In the meantime, opposition to British control had continued to grow both in 'Iraq and in Syria. A letter in January, 1919, from the 'Iraqī officers in Syria, welcoming the Anglo-French Declaration as an indication that no part of 'Iraq was to be under foreign rule, had been followed in early June by another letter, supposed to have been written by Amīr Faisal himself, and addressed to Sir Gilbert Clayton, Chief Political Officer of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. The letter suggested that the severity of the British officials in 'Iraq had begun to turn

¹ Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 287-8.

² Telegram S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, July 5th, 1919.

away the regard of the people, and that if the Anglo-French Declaration signified anything, the time had come for a change. His own officers felt strongly the need for the acceleration of a National Government and fully understood that the longer the present system existed the greater would be the difficulty in changing the system later.

Lord Curzon, however, believed that no further action was necessary. He had already, two months before, sanctioned what he believed was the limit of Arab self-government compatible with a military occupation. No reply was sent.

The incident of Nāji Beg as-Sūwaidī, in addition, confirmed both the Arabs and the British officials of the hostility and bad faith of those on the opposite side. The Acting Civil Commissioner, on his journey from London to Baghdad, had interviewed two of the ‘Iraqī officers in Damascus. He had admitted that affairs in ‘Iraq were not perfect, and that he was ready to do what he could to meet their views. He had pointed out his difficulty in obtaining good men for positions in ‘Iraq. He had at once agreed when the two officers had asked whether he would consent to a representative being chosen from among their number to go to Baghdad and to make suggestions.

Accordingly, Nāji Beg, a capable and ardent Nationalist, of an old Baghdad family,¹ arrived in Baghdad, early in June. He soon found, contrary to the expectations which the interview with the Acting Civil Commissioner had aroused in himself and in his fellow ‘Iraqīs, that he was to be merely a cog in the British machine and that his advice would not be heeded and was not even wanted.²

¹ Nāji Beg, now known as Nāji Pasha, was a son of Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī who, as a prominent Arab Nationalist in Baghdad before the war, had suffered imprisonment at the hands of the Turks (*Events in Turkish ‘Iraq*, July, 1913), and who took a large part in the post-war Nationalist movement in ‘Iraq. Nāji Pasha had been a popular *Qaimmaqām* of Najaf under the Turks (*ibid.*, April, 1913). He was Acting Civil Governor of Aleppo under the Damascus Government, and has been Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, etc., of ‘Iraq.

² In an interview with the writer, Nāji Pasha stated that he believed that he had been asked to come to Baghdad to assist and to advise in setting up a National Government. On discovering his mistake, he resigned.

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His subsequent resignation and return to Syria confirmed the opinion of the 'Iraqīs in Syria that the British authorities in 'Iraq regarded them as active enemies who were trying to undermine British influence in the country, and that no real opportunities would ever be given to the 'Iraqīs to manage their own affairs. The Acting Civil Commissioner, in his turn, was convinced that his view of the Arab Nationalists was the correct one: that they were incapable and inconstant and that nothing constructive might be expected from them. When, therefore, the Acting Civil Commissioner's opinion was asked on a draft reply¹ to a Memorandum which the 'Iraqī officers had sent to the Foreign Office demanding the immediate establishment of a National Government, he gave way to a characteristic outburst, deprecating in no uncertain language that an important announcement should be drawn from H.M. Government by 'such small fry'. He suggested, however, that if a reply were believed to be necessary it 'should be restricted to an intimation that the writers appear to have been misinformed as to the progress of events in Mesopotamia, and that it is open to them to go to Mesopotamia to see things for themselves'.²

Some form of reassurance to the 'Iraqī officers was held to be necessary by both Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu. A new reply was drafted. After stating that 'pending the decision of the Peace Conference as to Mandatory power and nature of Mandate it would be premature to attempt constitutional experiments', it followed the Acting Civil Commissioner's suggestion for a reply and pointed out that if the officers would visit the country they would find that Provincial and Divisional Councils were already being formed 'to ensure measure of Arab participation compatible with military occupation and mutual interest in political future'. The appointment of Nāji

¹ Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, July 15th, 1919.

² Telegram No. 8107, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, July 19th, 1919.

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Pasha was mentioned as evidence of the goodwill of H.M. Government.¹

Whatever the effect of the reply at the time on the Acting Civil Commissioner to whom it had been repeated for his information, he was later to claim that it came as ‘a serious blow, not less serious because it was addressed to Cairo, for communication to a group of prominent ‘Iraqī Officers in the Sharifian service, and was the outcome of telegraphic correspondence extending over four months’.² The evidence available makes it difficult to understand how he could have regarded the reply, drafted by H.M. Government on the lines he had himself put forward on July 19th, as the unexpected and disastrous result of his own efforts extending over four months of telegraphic correspondence.³ His correspondence during that period had been concerned principally with persuading H.M. Government to limit Arab participation in the administration and not to extend it, and with urging the inclusion of Mōsul in a British-administered ‘Iraq. Nor is it easy to understand just how the reply which he had assisted in drafting was a blow or check to the carrying out of the proposals with the execution of which he had been entrusted in May. The excerpt which he later extracted from the telegram and presented in a setting of his own fashioning in his *Clash of Loyalties*⁴ might well give such an impression if it were not known that he had already been informed in the telegram of July 5th that constitutional experiments, other than those already sanctioned, could not be approved. The telegram of August 9th, taken as a whole and in its proper setting, can be considered only as a blow to the demand of the ‘Iraqī officers for immediate National Government. Far from being a rebuff to him, the telegram

¹ Telegram, No. 249, Foreign Office to Sir Gilbert Clayton, Cairo, August 9th, 1919, repeated to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad.

² Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

³ *Ibid.*: ‘I eventually elicited the following pronouncement from the Foreign Office (9th August) . . .’

⁴ *Ibid.*

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indicated that the British Government stood behind him in his attempts to realize the measures he had proposed in April and should have been extremely welcome to him in his attempts to combat any scheme of Arab Government as implied in the Anglo-French Declaration. Indeed, so far was the Acting Civil Commissioner from being actually affected by the 'serious blow', as he has endeavoured to indicate, he was assuring H.M. Government within the following week that, while the constitutional proposals sanctioned in May would require a year to put into operation, they would meet the needs of the country for many years to come.¹

In Syria, the agitation for a National Government at Baghdad continued, eventually overflowing into 'Iraq itself and swelling the local movement there until it broke into a flood of rebellion. The telegram of August 9th from the Foreign Office had not satisfied the 'Iraqī members of Faisal's staff. Nājī Pasha's appointment had been no answer to their aspirations; his resignation had been the confirmation of their fears. What they wanted, they declared, was assurance that the existing military administration was not to continue. They found

the attitude of the British officials was more than that of administrators of a foreign population who were incapable, and would always remain incapable, of governing themselves than that to which the Baghdadi officers had become accustomed on the other side, of friendly advisers who started on the assumption that the Arabs were managing their own affairs, and that it was not for them to do more than make friendly suggestions for the improvement of their plans.²

The delay in setting up the various measures which had been sanctioned seemed to the inhabitants of 'Iraq no less than to the 'Iraqī officers in Syria to point to a lack of goodwill on the part of the Acting Civil Commissioner and to give substance

¹ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

² Nūri Pasha as-Sa'id to Major Sir H. W. Young, cited *ibid.*, p. 297. Confirmed by Nūri Pasha to the writer, December 18th, 1934.

to the belief that no real aid to the achievement of their aspirations could be expected from that quarter.¹ Rumours were about that the mandate system was but annexation in a new form, and that colonization by the British and by the Government of India had not been abandoned. The coming of 550 English women, wives and relatives of officials, pointed to the establishment of the British for a long stay. The establishment of farms for experimental work in cotton-growing was interpreted as further evidence of India's intentions towards 'Iraq. Confidence was difficult to maintain in the face of so many facts and rumours. The 'Iraqis, like their fellow Arabs, lacked patience to await developments. They desired results, and these immediately and in a tangible form. Cool and far-sighted heads were not lacking, but they were not always in control. The majority believed, as Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari was to remark later to Miss Gertrude Bell: 'My lady, complete independence is never given, it is always taken.'²

The establishment of the Syrian State, immediately following the Armistice, encouraged the 'Iraqis to look to their own country where direct British administration continued.³ The growing insistence of the Syrians that posts in the Damascus Government be given to Syrians only made it necessary for the 'Iraqi officers there to seek new outlets and opportunities for their energies. 'Iraqi officers, disguised as Beduins, had already toured Mesopotamia during July. They had reported that the temper of the country was rising, and that active agitation and continuous propaganda, backed with funds, might win independence from Great Britain if it were not freely given.

Other propagandists began to slip over the desert. Societies

¹ The attitude of the 'Iraqi Officers in Syria was ably reviewed by Gertrude Bell in her confidential note, *Syria in October*, 1919, pp. 3-4 *passim*.

² Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 569. Lawrence had continually drilled the same principle into the leaders of the Movement in Western Arabia: 'I had preached to Faisal, from our first meeting, that freedom was taken not given.' Lawrence, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

³ *Syria in October*, 1919, p. 11.

already existing throughout 'Iraq became the channels of Nationalist agitation. Anti-Government and anti-British sentiment and discontent in the towns, in the religious centres, among the tribes and among the unemployed ex-officials, were stimulated and then skilfully assimilated to the nucleus of Nationalist feeling already existing among those who believed in Arab and in 'Iraqī independence as desirable in themselves. Appeals to religious fervour and fanaticism, to pride of race, to Nationalist feeling, to cupidity, and to all the elemental instincts in each of the component groups which had been drawn into the movement, were working their spell during the days when politicians of the West, like Joshua of old, bade the East stand still until the battle at Paris over the spoils should be ended.

H.M. Government was not entirely unaware that public opinion in 'Iraq during the last months of 1919 was not the same as had prevailed in the final months of 1918. As early as August 23rd, when a police report of July 7th stated that

every Moslem Arab of education in Baghdad was a member of a society, with branches in all the important towns in Mesopotamia, which was described as simply a pan-Arab and anti-foreign organization formed with a view to the expulsion of the British and the establishment of Arab rule.¹

Mr. Montagu's suggestion that an announcement should be made that Great Britain would remain in the country, in some form or other, was negatived by the British delegation at Paris which deprecated such action as injudicious in view of the state of affairs at the Peace Conference.

In October and November, when even more disturbing news was received of the temper of the country, of the attitude of the 'Iraqī officers in Syria² and of the slowness with which the constitutional proposals were being executed,³ Lord Curzon,

¹ Cited Young, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

² *Syria in October, 1919.*

³ After six months, only four of the nine Divisional Councils and none of the Provincial Councils had been formed. On further inquiry, it was discovered that the Acting Civil Commissioner did not contemplate moving in the matter that year. Young, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

in alarm, called a meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee, November 10th. The Committee agreed that the first condition for recovery of confidence and for the future settlement of the country was the return of Sir Percy Cox. This would be difficult, however, until the Mandate was announced and he could act with complete authority.¹ The Mandate would probably not be given before the New Year, but an early announcement of his impending return was desirable. It was hardly possible that he could take up his new duties until the autumn.

In his turn, the Acting Civil Commissioner also realized that the temper of the country was altering. He assigned, correctly, much of the change to trans-desert sources but, considering the authors to be unimportant, he was inclined to underrate the necessity to take their views — a mistake which was to have serious consequences. Resentful of the Western Arabia policy, he was ready to believe that Sharif Husain's inordinate ambition, that England's golden sovereigns and the Arabs' love of plunder were the sole motives behind the movement in the West. He shut his eyes to the other factors. His contacts with the Middle East had hitherto been primarily in India, Persia and the Persian Gulf.² His first-hand acquaintance with Arabs and his knowledge of their character had been limited to the lower Tigris. He had no personal knowledge of the deep hold which Independence and Nationalism, as abstract ideas, had upon the 'Iraqī participants in the Arab Movement. He could not realize, therefore, that the motives which had helped to sustain them during months of desert warfare would continue to do so, even if their enemies were France or Britain.

He did not seem to realize that, however much the dignitaries of Baghdad might repudiate the officers as men of

¹ Reference to Sir Percy Cox in Tehrān, found him unprepared to return without complete authority.

² He had spent about ten days in Baghdad, July, 1911: *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, July, 1911.

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importance and position,¹ many of the latter had been the life of the pre-war Arab Movement and had been instigators of several disturbances in the Turkish army.² Moreover, they had created positions for themselves by their ability, first in the Turkish Army and then in the Arab Movement and, in consequence, had acquired a reputation in popular opinion equalling their actual importance. In addition, the 'Iraqīs had in Mōsul, Basra, Baghdad and outlying districts, families, relatives and friends who cast up, at their instigation, waves of increasing size in the sea of 'Iraqī Nationalism.

Outwardly paying lip-service to Arab participation, his real opinion, not only of Arabs but also of those who advocated their wide participation in the government and administration of 'Iraq, came out in his memorandum on Miss Bell's note on Syria.³ He disagreed with her fundamental assumption that 'an Arab State in Mesopotamia . . . within a short period of years is a possibility, and that the recognition or creation of a logical scheme of government on these lines, in supersession of those on which we are now working in Mesopotamia, would be practical and popular'. He declared:

My observations in this country and elsewhere have forced me to the conviction that this assumption is erroneous, and although I am aware that in holding this view I differ from authorities and observers both at home and abroad . . . I venture, probably for the last time in my present capacity, to lay before H.M.'s Government the considerations which have led me to this conclusion. . . .

I therefore regard the creation of an Arab Government

¹ Practically every 'Iraqī who served under Faisal has occupied, upon his return to 'Iraq, positions of responsibility in the 'Iraq Government. Their enemies declare that this monopolization of high office has been due to British influence, and to the fact that they have constituted themselves a ruling clique. Their friends maintain their position has been due to their ability and experience.

² As in Baghdad, from March to July, 1913. *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, March, April and July, 1913.

³ Letter No. 34436, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for India, November 15th, 1919.

on the lines advocated as inconsistent with effective British Administration or indeed with effective control of any sort. For some years to come the appointment of Arab Governors or high officials except in an advisory capacity would involve the rapid decay of authority, law and order followed by anarchy and disorder . . . Effective British administration is vital to the continued existence of Mesopotamia as an independent state or administrative entity.¹

He continued to express his conviction, both in this memorandum and in other dispatches to H.M. Government,² that he was working on right lines and that good administration would counteract serious political discontent — a characteristic belief of Anglo-Indian administrators.

In the end, however, he was forced to the reluctant conclusion that his ‘right lines’ were not those approved by H.M. Government nor those which would find acceptance in the country itself. The Prime Minister’s speech in the House of Commons on February 23rd, 1920, reaffirming the Anglo-French Declaration; the discouraging attitude of the Foreign Office regarding his proposals for further administrative and financial measures (August and March); the seizing of the bit into their own teeth by the Arab Nationalists in Syria when Sharīf Faisal was declared King of Syria and Sharīf ‘Abdullāh, King of ‘Iraq;³ and the rising temper in ‘Iraq convinced him, as he had never been convinced before, that his views, as expressed in the dispatch of November 15th, were unacceptable to H.M. Government and untenable in the new situation. Sharifian influence was still his bugbear, however, and, in a last-hour attempt to exclude it, he approached H.M. Government in a series of telegrams, March 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st proposing measures which he had so long opposed, as for

¹ Letter No 34436, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 15th, 1919.

² As in telegrams No 750, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, January 18th, 1920; No 1485, same to same, February 3rd, 1920.

³ By Syrian and ‘Iraqi Covenanters at Damascus, March 8th, 1920.

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instance, 'a Central Legislative Chamber . . . Arab members in charge of Departments, with British Secretaries'.¹ In addition, believing that the declaration of the Prime Minister, 'we shall claim the right as Mandatory Power of Mesopotamia including Mosul,'² signified the end of his long struggle for the inclusion of Mōsul and that the assignment of the Mandates was not far off, he set about to prepare a Constitution which would both satisfy H.M. Government and effectively block any Sharifian manifestos regarding 'Iraq, and at the same time would cast the administrative machinery in a mould of his own devising.³ He therefore appointed a Committee, with Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter as Chairman, to formulate constitutional proposals.⁴

In London, Mr. Montagu, in the light of recent events, such as the Dair az-Zūr incidents,⁵ of the Acting High Commissioner's telegrams and of the imminent announcement of the Mandate of 'Iraq for Great Britain, again suggested that a statement should be made at once of the intention of Great Britain to set up a National Government in an Arab State in 'Iraq.

The terms of the announcement, tentatively discussed by representatives of the Foreign Office and of the India Office, March 26th, were left to the Interdepartmental Committee. The Committee, on April 13th, agreed that 'Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu should formulate an announcement for immediate

¹ Telegram No. 3599, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, March 20th, 1920.

² *Parl. Debates*, H of C., 5th S., Vol. cxxvii (1920), p. 664. This view was confirmed by a telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, March 26th, 1920. The latter took advantage of the opportunity to urge that 'including Mosul' should mean 'all the Mosul Wilayet as administered by the Turks': Telegram No. 3883, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, March 28th, 1920.

³ Telegram No. 3600, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to India Office, March, 21st, 1920.

⁴ The committee, usually known as the Bonham-Carter Committee, was also composed of Col. E. B. Howell, Major H. H. F. M. Tyler, Col. F. C. C. Balfour, and Major R. W. Bullard.

⁵ See *Review C Admin.*, 1914-1920, pp 133-8. Also *infra.*, pp. 254 ff.

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publication in Mesopotamia’. A telegram to this effect was dispatched to the Acting Civil Commissioner.¹

Seeing that his plans would go awry if the announcement, preceding his new Constitution, left no opportunity for its application, and feeling that H.M. Government were still pursuing the wrong policy, he begged that the announcement should be deferred until they had seen and considered the answer which he would send on April 27th,² when the report of the Bonham-Carter Committee would be forwarded.

In the meantime, however, Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu had difficulty in reaching an agreement on the draft announcement. Mr. Montagu, in accordance with the personal conviction which impelled him to advocate Indian reforms and under the influence of Miss Bell and others, wished to announce that a representative National Government would be erected. Lord Curzon, although professing himself converted to the idea of self-governing native States, could not overcome his lifelong belief in England’s mission to rule nor his mistrust of native ability. He hesitated to go as far as Mr. Montagu. The discussions were still in progress when Lord Curzon left London for the conference at San Remo. They were not resumed until after the Mandate for ‘Iraq had been granted to Great Britain.

¹ Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, April 14th, 1920.

² Telegram, No 4848, Civil Commissioner to India Office, April 21st, 1920.

CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT FOR 'IRAQ: PROPOSALS, COUNTERPROPOSALS, ANNOUNCEMENTS: APRIL-JUNE, 1920

THE constitutional proposals of the Bonham-Carter Committee had been intended by the Acting Civil Commissioner to form the second stage in the transition from Civil Administration under Military Occupation to a peace-time Government. The Committee, therefore, had been instructed 'to frame specific proposals . . . for the establishment of constitutional Government in this country consistent with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Anglo-French Declaration and other public announcements'.¹ Its attention was called to the past correspondence between Baghdad and H.M. Government, especially to the India Office telegrams of November 28th, 1918, and February 14th, 1919.²

Although the Committee in preparing its Report apparently did not see the draft Mandate for 'Iraq' then in existence,⁴ the proposals of the Committee represent the first embodiment of the principle of the mandatory system in a Constitution³

¹ Telegram No 5110, Civil Commissioner to S/S for India, April 26th, 1920

² *Ibid.*

³ According to Sir E. Bonham-Carter, November 28th, 1935.

⁴ Drawn up in the spring of 1919 by Commander D. G. Hogarth, Miss Gertrude Bell and Col. T. E. Lawrence, with the concurrence of the Acting Civil Commissioner.

⁵ Several points of similarity exist between the draft mandatory document and the Committee's Proposals. Article I of the draft Mandate stated that the 'Organic Law (or Constitution) shall be framed in consultation with native authorities'. This principle formed the second of the three conditions which the Committee believed the Constitution should fulfil

Article I also stipulated 'Provisions designed to facilitate the progressive development of Mesopotamia as an independent state'. Similar provisos in the Committee's Report were: (a) Initiation of the policy of employing natives of

and, as such, foreshadowed the ‘Iraq Organic Law or Constitution of 1924. The conditions which its constitutional proposals were to fulfil, therefore, were summarized by the Committee as follows:—

(a) Subject to the tutelage of a Mandatory Power, the Government must be an indigenous Government.

(b) The form of Government must be adopted by the free will of the inhabitants, subject to such powers as are necessary to enable the Mandatory Power to perform its mandate.

(c) The constitution must contain necessary securities to enable the Mandatory Power to perform the trust confided to it of ensuring the well-being and development of the people. This implies the maintenance of peace and order (Para. 3).¹

The complete fulfilment of the second of these conditions — the form of the new government to be adopted by the free will of the inhabitants — was deemed to be impossible until the Mandate had been granted and until more settled conditions had been obtained when a consultation of public opinion could take place. The latter, the Committee suggested, might be accomplished by inviting the Legislative Assembly, which it was proposed to set up, to voice its opinion on the Constitution at not later than the Assembly’s third session (Para. 9).²

¹ Extracts and summaries here are from the official text in *Report of the Baghdad Committee on Constitution for ‘Iraq* (Secret), dated Baghdad, April 26th, 1920 (India Office No. B. 343; Foreign Office No. E. 6011).

² *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, is palpably in error when it states: ‘Within a period limited to two years, the Legislative Assembly was to draw up an Organic Law for the Permanent settlement of the country’ (p. 141). No such proviso was present in the proposals, nor was the duration of the sessions, referred to above, indicated in the Report. The failure to state the length of the sessions and to name a definite period in which the permanent constitution was to be considered drew down severe criticism, notably from Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs, *infra.*, pp. 213 ff.

the country in preference to any other persons (Para. 4, Sec. 7). (b) The composition of the Council should be considered as tentative only (Para. 15, Sec. 5). (c) The Educational and Political progress of the country should be periodically re-examined (Para. 19).

Article III reserved foreign relations to the Mandatory Power. The proviso is reproduced in Para. 2 of the Report.

GOVERNMENT FOR IRAQ

Until that time the country was to be administered on the basis of its proposals for which the Committee claimed the sanction of such native authority as existed, since the proposals had been formulated after consultation with 'local notables of weight and standing'.¹ In lieu of a more extensive expression of 'free will' the Committee may have well believed that such opinion formed an adequate background for the provisional Constitution.

The Report indicated, in addition, that the Committee was not unaware of the grave difficulties inherent in the conditions of the country itself. the religious divisions, the antagonisms between townsmen and tribesmen, the deplorable lack of education and of political morality and the dearth of capable and honest indigenous administrative personnel (Para. 4). So strongly did the Committee feel that the gulf between the townsmen and tribesmen was, for the present, unbridgeable that it stated:

We desire to place on record definitely that in the tribal area, for many years to come, direct control by the British Officers in charge of Divisions is a *sine qua non*, since no one else commands the confidence of the people to a degree which will ensure obedience to the orders of the Government without the presence and not infrequent use of armed force (Para. 4, Sec. 7).

With these observations and reservations, the Committee turned to the main problem: the devising of governmental machinery which might be called indigenous but which would ensure, as much as possible, the initiative and direction and the definite ultimate control remaining in British hands. The fact that the general problem had been faced and solved with varying degrees of success in Indian Native States and in Egypt did not make facing the specific task in 'Iraq any the less difficult.

¹ Telegram No. 5110, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, April 26th, 1920.

If insufficient responsibility were placed in the hands of the Arabs or if the machinery was too transparently dependent on British officials, there would be no satisfaction of Arab aspirations and further agitation would continue. On the other hand, if sufficient means were not retained to ensure the acceptance of British direction in matters which the mandatory Power considered essential, not only for the ‘well-being and development of the people’ but also for the maintenance of its own position in the dual role of a Mandatary and of an Imperial Power, the mandatory principle would be defeated and the British position would be rendered intolerable. Its position in the country would then rest on the force of arms alone, an undesirable alternative, the ultimate necessity of which, however, had been recognized.¹ The expense of a large army would be objectionable to British taxpayers and its enforced use would proclaim the failure of Great Britain to govern by civil measures alone.

In the establishment of a Council of State under British control, fashioned much on the pattern of the Council employed in Egypt before the war, the Committee sought the solution of the problem. The Council was to be, ostensibly, the principal executive authority and also the Second Chamber to a representative Legislature (Para. 15, Secs. 1 and 8). In its name were to be promulgated ‘state executive decisions, and executive decisions of the various departments issued to the public’ (Para. 15, Sec. 8). It was to legislate and to impose taxes, normally with the concurrence of the Legislative Assembly (Para. 18, Sec. 2a). In cases of conflict or of necessity, however, the Council was to have power to legislate without the Assembly’s concurrence (Para. 18, Sec. 2b). To the Council was also reserved the annual budget, on which advice only might be given by the Assembly (Para. 18, Sec. 6).

The President of the Council, who was not necessarily to have departmental duties, was to be an Arab of good social status and

¹ Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 578: ‘No Government in this country, whether ours or an Arab administration, can carry on without force behind it.’

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prestige (Para. 15, Sec. 3). Associated with him were to be eleven Council members of which the majority, initially at least, were to be English¹ (Para. 15, Sec. 5). The British members of the Council, under the title of Secretaries of Departments, were stipulated as the Chief Executive Officials of such Departments, with the exception of that of *Auqāf* or Pious Bequests (Para. 15, Sec. 9). The Arab members were to be Advisers to the Departments. Each Adviser was 'to be consulted by the Secretary on all matters of importance and to have access to all departmental papers, and to have the right to refer to the Council of State any difference of opinion between themselves and the Secretaries' (Para. 15, Sec. 9).

The functions delegated to the Council appeared to give it extensive powers and to make it what the Committee had claimed for it, the Chief Executive Authority of the State. Nevertheless, final effective authority remained in British hands through the power of the High Commissioner to appoint and remove at his pleasure members of the Council² (Para. 15, Sec. 2), and through his power to overrule the decisions of a majority of the Council. His decision was 'to be deemed for all purposes the decision of the Council' (Para. 15, Sec. 7). Control was also effected, more indirectly, by the predominance of British members on the Council, the Arab President being excluded from voting save in equality of votes (Para. 15, Sec. 6). These

¹ The composition tentatively proposed included six British members with votes and five Arab members with votes divided among the various departments as follows:

	<i>English</i>	<i>Arab</i>
President	—	1
Department of Interior	1	1
Department of Justice	1	1
Revenue (including lands)	1	1
Education	1	1
Finance	1	—
Public Works and Health	1	—
<i>Auqāf</i>	—	1
	<hr/> 6	<hr/> 6

² In practice this would probably apply to Arab members only.

arrangements whereby British officials became titular as well as actual heads of departments with Arab Advisers, and whereby the former composed a majority of the Council, were not entirely in accordance with the views of the Chairman, Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, as expressed earlier in his Memorandum on the Place of the Arab in Administration of February 5th, 1919, and in his Tentative Draft of Arab Institutions, drawn up in the spring of the same year.¹ The arrangements suggested in the Report, furthermore, were not in accordance with those of the Egyptian pre-war Council on which the proposed Council had been professedly modelled. It was to them that H.M. Government took the greatest exception and which caused the eventual rejection of the Report as a whole.

The Council of State, under British direction and control, had been designed as the chief instrument of government. The Committee hoped, however, that the elective Legislative Assembly,² for which the body provided in the Egyptian Organic Law of 1913 was taken as a model,³ would give the ‘Iraqis the greatest impression that they were participating in the Government.

In the Assembly to which members, estimated at fifty, were to be elected from all classes, the Committee proposed that British Departmental heads should be given the right to attend, to speak and to introduce measures but not to vote (Para. 15, Sec. 10; Para. 17, Sec. 5). A British Joint-Secretary for the Assembly to assist in matters of procedure was also stipulated (Para. 17, Sec. 6).

For the election of members it was suggested that members

¹ But cf. views in his letter to the Acting Civil Commissioner, March 11th, 1919, cited *supra*, pp. 183 ff. For text of draft see App. v.

² The Committee used both ‘Council’ and ‘Assembly’ in reference to this legislative body. ‘Assembly’ is employed more frequently and in Paragraph headings, as in Para. 17, Secs. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7; Para. 18, Secs. 2b, 3, 5, 6; ‘Council’ is used in Para. 17, Secs. 2, 4, and Para. 18, Sec. 2a. ‘Assembly’ will be used here throughout in reference to this body.

³ Organic Law of Egypt, July 21st, 1913, Parts II, III, IV. Text: *Acc’ts and Papers*, 1913 (Cd. 6878) lxxxi, 307.

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for the larger towns should be elected by the Municipal Councils; for the Divisions by the Divisional Councils and for areas predominantly tribal, the tribal subsections would elect their headmen, who were in turn to elect the shaikh of the tribe, subject to confirmation of the Government (App. C).

Application of the elective principle to the Assembly removed, theoretically at least, one means of control which had been applied to the Council of State. The impotence of the Assembly as a legislative body, however, stripped it of any real power to oppose the will of the Council of State itself or of the Mandatory Power as expressed through the Council of State. Its greatest influence over the Government would be its power to ask questions in writing (Para. 18, Sec. 8) and in its reflection of public opinion of the country. As such an agency it could indirectly, especially when public opinion was too strong to be denied, influence the Government both through its power of passing resolutions on internal affairs¹ (Para. 18, Sec. 5) and its refusal to co-operate with the Government.

For all posts, other than those directly controlling the administration, who were to be British, the Committee advised that where an 'Iraqī could be found capable of filling a post, he should be employed in preference to any other person. It stated that 'on this canon, it would be possible to employ more natives than hitherto and in higher posts' (Para. 4, Sec. 7).

In conclusion, the Committee expressed its opinion that periodic inquiries, perhaps every seven years, should be made into the state of the country and into the desirability of extending or restricting self-government (Para. 19).

Another period of stalemate in setting up constitutional government was to follow the submission of this Report on April 26th and 27th.² Two days before its reception in London, the principal Allied Powers, meeting at San Remo,

¹ On these resolutions the Council was not obliged to take action, other than to give reasons for not accepting them.

² Summarized in Telegrams Nos. 5111, 5112, 5113, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, April 26th and 27th, 1920.

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April 24th and 25th, had formally assigned the Mandates for ‘Iraq and Palestine to Great Britain and that for Syria to France.¹

No official announcement of the action at San Remo for publication in ‘Iraq was forthcoming, however, until after May 3rd, when Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu composed their differences concerning the form of the statement of policy sanctioned April 13th, which, they believed, should accompany the announcement that Great Britain had accepted the Mandate for ‘Iraq.

In the meantime, the Acting Civil Commissioner, who had received the news through Reuter’s, had withheld permission to publish it until May 3rd. It was then issued together with a *communiqué* of his own couched in general terms, the only reference to the future government being: ‘The establishment of Civil Administration will give an ever-widening field to native energies.’²

Two days later, on May 5th, the Acting Civil Commissioner received the official announcement from H.M. Government with instructions that it was to be published immediately. The first part of the statement referred in vague generalities to the action of the Powers at San Remo. It called attention to the previous declarations of H.M. Government’s ‘firm intention to promote the creation of a form of civil administration based upon representative indigenous institutions which would prepare the way for the creation of an independent Arab State of ‘Iraq’ and to the important steps which had already been taken in this direction.’³

In the second part it stated:

The time has now arrived for ‘Iraq to reap the fruits of this course, and for a further forward step to be taken in the development of national life of the people. His Majesty’s

¹ *The Times*, April 26th, 1920.

² *Baghdad Times*, May 3rd, 1920; also Wilson, op. cit., pp. 248-9.

³ Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, May 4th, 1920.

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Government have accordingly directed the Civil Commissioner to take immediate measures in consultation with the Councils and with approval of local opinion in all parts of the country to frame definite proposals with above-named object.¹

In conclusion, the Acting Civil Commissioner was notified that the Bonham-Carter proposals were under consideration.

The proposed announcement met with immediate and open opposition from the Acting Civil Commissioner. The consultation of opinion, he believed, would produce no proposals which could guide H.M. Government² and would, in fact, be fraught with danger. It would mean delay when speedy action was essential. The issue in any such consultation would become again, as in 1918-19, that of Arab independence versus British control. He was well aware that since the time he had suggested and carried out the earlier plebiscite, the temper of the country had changed and that no amount of official control or organization, such as had been employed on that occasion, could produce declarations for British control which would ring true, although many substantial elements of the population were still pro-British. He voiced his opposition in a strongly worded reply, May 8th, stating in part:

It is with great regret that I find myself compelled to ask His Majesty's Government to reconsider this portion of their announcement.

I submit that it is for H.M.G. as Mandatory Power to prescribe what form of Government shall be set up in the immediate future.³ To refer the question afresh to Divisional

¹ Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, May 4th, 1923.

² H.M. Government, in reality, had little expectation that proposals from the inhabitants of 'Iraq would be of value, even if the Bonham-Carter proposals were submitted to the Councils as suggested. The consultation had been sanctioned in order to avoid the appearance of imposing a constitution on the people, and to comply with the conditions of the Mandate Telegram No. P. 3797, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, May 12th, 1920. See also Young, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

³ But cf. his views, of three weeks later, on the imperative necessity of consulting local opinion, cited *infra*, p. 218.

Councils and to ‘local opinion’ can have but one result. The extremists who, following the example of their colleagues in Syria, are demanding absolute independence for ‘Iraq with or without ‘Abdullah will by threats and by appeals during the coming month of Ramadhan to religious fanaticism win over moderate men who have hitherto looked to Government for a scheme offering a reasonable chance of success and which they can support.¹

It was not merely the danger of excitement of public opinion which aroused his opposition. The announcement, if made, would mean once again the ruin of his plans and desires for the future of ‘Iraq. He had already abandoned, partly from necessity and partly from personal motives, his first constitutional proposals, ostensibly based on ‘Iraqī opinion obtained in the plebiscite of 1918-19, but in reality carefully designed to preserve the pattern of the direct British administration which he had so diligently created. His original antipathy to Arab participation in the administration had been submerged in order to win the sympathetic attention of H.M. Government and of the moderates among the ‘Iraqīs for his second attempt at drafting a Constitution which incorporated his views on the future administration of ‘Iraq.

The announcement, however, implied that H.M. Government without reference or consideration to the Bonham-Carter proposals, with which he was in full agreement,² had settled on a policy which, if published, would sweep away all his efforts to check Arab Nationalism and to maintain his administrative machinery, would destroy what he believed to be the immediate means to consolidate the moderate party behind British policy and would give the final victory to the Western Arabia party.

In addition, therefore, to his request that H.M. Government

¹ Telegram No 5559, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, May 8th, 1920.

² Telegram No. 5603, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, May 1st, 1920.

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reconsider their announcement, he pressed for permission to announce as an alternative the Bonham-Carter proposals. He stated:

If during the next seven days I can be authorized to announce that H.M.G. provisionally approve of the Constitutional proposals made by me and have instructed me to communicate them to leading inhabitants with a view to giving effect to them in the autumn, there are grounds for hoping that we shall be able to count on the support of a strong block of moderate opinion. Once this is done we shall be in a position to deal with extremists.

An announcement that Sir Percy Cox will shortly return as High Commissioner would also be of great value in this connection.

I beg for orders on these lines at the earliest possible date.¹

Additional opinion from the Bonham-Carter Committee, repudiating the authority and the ability of the Councils, was also dispatched as confirming his viewpoint.² In putting forward their views the Committee seemed to forget, however, that the initiation and development of the Councils had been originally suggested 'to secure full benefit of co-operation by tribal leaders and large landowners in the administration of these territories', and in the expectation that 'the constitution of a future advisory or Legislative Assembly for the whole of Mesopotamia, when the time is ripe, will be much facilitated by the development of these bodies and of the Municipal Councils'.³ The Councils had been sanctioned by H.M. Government, in April, 1919, with that end in view: a preliminary step towards an indigenous government. The Committee apparently overlooked the fact that the declaration by the Hilla Divisional Councils had already been used as evidence of

¹ Telegram No. 5559.

² Telegram No. 5611, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, May 10th, 1920

³ Telegram No. 9696, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 10th, 1918.

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the country's desire for British control of the national destiny.¹

The Acting Civil Commissioner's telegrams, including one received from him on May 15th,² and the Bonham-Carter Committee Report itself were considered by the Interdepartmental Committee on May 17th. In face of the strong objections made by the Acting Civil Commissioner and by the Baghdad Committee, the London Committee agreed that the second part of the announcement should be withheld.

The Committee was not so ready to recommend the Bonham-Carter proposals, which had been undergoing a close scrutiny in both the India Office and the Foreign Office, for immediate announcement in Baghdad as Great Britain's policy for constitutional government in 'Iraq, as the Acting Civil Commissioner urged.

The proposals, to the Interdepartmental Committee, seemed to set up a government based on an 'Anglo-Indian' ideal, whereas the Committee believed in something more approaching an 'Indian State' ideal. Lord Curzon pointed out that the 'proposed constitution was not an Arab Government inspired and helped by British advice, but a British Government infused with Arab elements to a gradually increasing extent'. Mr. Montagu went further and suggested that the Mandate should be exercised in the form of a treaty with the people of the country rather than in accordance with a mandate document.³

The criticisms were not from Whitehall officials who had no personal knowledge of the country, its people or its administrative difficulties. Major H. W. Young, Secretary to the Interdepartmental Committee, who had served both in Mesopotamia and in Western Arabia, believed that the necessary

¹ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 212; so also was regarded the later decision of the Basra Council, June 22nd, 1920; *Admin. Report, Basra Division*, 1920, pp. 2-3; Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

² Telegram No. 5803, Civil Commissioner to S/S for India, May 15th, 1920.

³ Major Sir H. W. Young maintains that he himself had already proposed the policy a month and a half earlier: *op. cit.*, p. 313.

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control in 'Iraq could be secured to Great Britain as effectively through British advice and protection to the new State as by the retention of direct executive control, as contemplated by the Bonham-Carter Committee.¹

Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs who, as Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, had examined the Report on behalf of the India Office,² believed that no great objection would be found to the general premises of the first fourteen paragraphs of the Report (Sec. 1). He maintained, however, that it would be

hardly advisable to make the President or Members of the Council removable at the pleasure of the High Commissioner for that would make the Council too obviously the High Commissioner's passive instrument. If removable, they should be removable by the British Secretary of State. In any case a period should be fixed for holding of posts (Sec.2).

He went on to point out that

if a British Secretary has technically all the executive power and the Arab member is a mere adviser, the position of the Arab member will be so weak as to deceive no one. It would seem greatly preferable to make the Arab members technically responsible and to give the British Secretary the right to refer to the High Commissioner any important differences of opinion between themselves and their members (Sec. 2).

He declared, moreover, that the relation of the High Commissioner to the Council had been given only general definition. Only his power of overruling decisions and his power of appointment and dismissal bound him to the Council. No provisions were made for periodical reports from it to the High Commissioner. Room for criticism was also found in the failure

¹ Op. cit., pp. 312-13.

² *Memorandum by H. R. Dobbs, C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, on proposals of Bonham-Carter Committee* (India Office, B. 342).

to provide for specific representations of Indians,¹ Jews and Christians on the Council and of Indians and of large commercial firms trading within the country in the Assembly (Secs. 2, 4); for adequate arrangements for appointment and dismissal of administrative officials (Sec. 2); and a definite statement regarding the length of the sessions of the Legislative Assembly (Sec. 1). In addition, Mr. Dobbs objected to the methods proposed for electing tribal representatives as impairing the power and prestige of the shaikhs who, he believed, should be given full support and backing (Sec. 2).

In view of these criticisms and of others made during the discussion of the Report in London, it seemed clear to the Interdepartmental Committee that the proposals were unsuitable; they did not grant the degree of self-government to ‘Iraq which H.M. Government was now ready to give and they were also inadequate in other respects. It was agreed that permission to announce them immediately in Baghdad should be withheld.

The decisions of the Interdepartmental Committee were conveyed to the Acting Civil Commissioner on May 20th in the following terms:

H.M. Government greatly appreciates the care and ability expended by Bonham-Carter’s Committee in preparation of scheme. Their recommendation will receive fullest and most attentive consideration. Framing of the mandate for ‘Iraq is now engaging the active attention of H.M.’s Government and as you have realized, orders on your proposal, which may have to take a different shape, cannot be passed until a decision has been reached on this point. Publication of the announcement conveyed in my telegram of 4th May may be postponed in view of your proclamation of May 3rd.

¹ Mr Dobbs’s viewpoint as an official of the Government of India was stated in Section 2: ‘In view of the very large part which Indian officials and personnel must, for a very long time to come, play in Mesopotamia, it would seem advisable to have at least one Indian Member of Council or at least one Indian Secretary.’

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Meanwhile, no further action should be taken on announcement made. I hope to be able to send you fuller instructions shortly.¹

The reply of the Interdepartmental Committee filled the Acting Civil Commissioner with apprehension. The reference to 'framing the mandate' seemed to presage new and disheartening delays at a time when action was imperative. The failure to approve of the Bonham-Carter Report left him little with which to combat the growing unrest in 'Iraq. His telegrams to H.M. Government were, however, not without results. At the second of the two meetings of the Interdepartmental Committee to re-examine the draft Mandate in the light of recent developments, Mr. Montagu's suggestion of the establishment of a provisional Government with Sir Percy Cox in charge, on the lines proposed by the Bonham-Carter Committee but with increased Arab participation, was approved. The Interdepartmental Committee agreed that Mr. Montagu should draft the telegram along these lines.

Events had now begun to move more swiftly towards an announcement of intentions of the British Government towards 'Iraq. They were not swift enough, however, to prevent open conflict between the inhabitants of 'Iraq and the forces of Great Britain.

Excitement had been running high in Baghdad following the announcement of the Mandate. Meetings organized by the Nationalists had been held in the mosques where orators in the name of independence, race and religion had urged their listeners to rise against the British. Clashes between Nationalists and the authorities had already taken place, and it had been necessary to patrol the streets with armoured cars. The group of fifteen Baghdad Nationalists, known locally as the *Mandubīn* or Delegates, had approached the Acting Civil Commissioner asking for an opportunity to lay their proposals before

¹ Telegram No P. 3839, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad May 20th, 1920.

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him for transmission to H.M. Government. He had tried to avoid giving the interview. He did not wish to give any opportunity for a demonstration and he felt that he had nothing definite with which to counter their demands. He held, moreover, that the *Mandubîn* were unrepresentative, referring to them in his dispatches as self-elected Delegates, although they had received the approval of a public meeting held in one of the principal mosques. Realizing, however, that they had a large popular following and that they could sway great masses of public opinion, he finally gave them an appointment for the morning of June 2nd, at the Turkish *Sarai* or Government headquarters. He took the precaution, however, of inviting by name about forty other dignitaries of all religions, supposed to be favourably disposed to the British regime. To cope with possible demonstrations or disorder among the expected crowds, special police arrangements were made, troops were held in readiness at the barracks and R.I.M.S. *Comet* with steam up and trained guns was stationed on the Tigris opposite the *Sarai*.

At the meeting, the Acting Civil Commissioner explained the desire of H.M. Government to give a National Government and the difficulties which had been encountered. He declared that they were then about to make an announcement along the lines proposed in the Bonham-Carter Report of which he gave an outline. He reminded his hearers that nothing was to be gained by hasty action, and that with the best will in the world an indigenous National Government could not be set up at once. He warned them that any attempts at disorder or violence would be met with force and that the military authorities would be called in if necessary.¹

The Delegates professed themselves unsatisfied with the proposals and presented their own petition asking for the immediate formation of a National Arab Convention for ‘Iraq,

¹ Text: Telegram No. 6583, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 2nd, 1920

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elected according to Turkish Electoral Law. The Convention would be empowered to draw up proposals for a National Government as promised in the Anglo-French Declaration. They also asked for freedom of the Press. With these demands a number of the invited notables, contrary to the Acting Civil Commissioner's expectations, associated themselves and declared that 'Iraqi independence was the concern of the entire Arab people.

The meeting itself, although feeling ran high, had been conducted with dignity. As those attending began to disperse, the immense crowd which filled the Court of the *Sarai* hissed and shouted abuse at the British officials. The *Mandubīn* were cheered and several of the leaders were carried out on the shoulders of the crowd. No clashes occurred, however, between the crowds and the police.

In forwarding the petition and an account of the meeting, the Acting Civil Commissioner threw the entire blame for the 'movement reaching its present uncompromising form, backed as it is by skilfully fomented public excitement' on the failure of H.M. Government to allow him to make the announcement of the Bonham-Carter proposals before the beginning of Ramadhan as he had requested on May 8th.

He then declared:

It is probable that in the present temper a proposal that the country should submit even for a limited period to a provisional Constitution as to which they had not been consulted would be met on the part of the Nationalists by a Declaration of Independence. Such proposals would be represented as contrary to the Anglo-French Declaration, the real meaning of which is little understood and widely misrepresented, and would harden public opinion against us, while if the present temper continues the proposed Legislative Assembly would on being summoned convert itself into a Constituent Assembly though not so authorized.¹

¹ Telegram No. 6584, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 2nd, 1920

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He submitted that the difficulty could be countered only by calling a Constituent Assembly and by inviting Sir Percy Cox to spend a few days in Baghdad on his way to England from Tehran. His visit and the anticipation of his return would ‘do much to restore public confidence, which has been shaken’.¹

Five days later, on June 7th, authority² was sent from London to make an immediate announcement of Sir Percy Cox’s return and of the general application of the Bonham-Carter proposals which, subject to reservations on points of details, were ‘accepted in principle as furnishing a generally suitable basis on which to construct provisional institutions such as are postulated by Mandate’.³ Permission to call a Constituent Assembly was withheld.

In his acknowledgment of the telegram, the Acting Civil Commissioner stated that the authorized announcement would be made at the end of Ramadhan, or about June 18th.⁴

Although H.M. Government was on the point of giving the Acting Civil Commissioner his immediate objective — a public announcement of Great Britain’s intentions — the latter’s long suppressed misgivings as to the direction in which the policy of H.M. Government was tending, could no longer be held back. He could not avoid seeing how his strenuous efforts of the past two years to determine policy in ‘Iraq had failed. Step by step,

¹ Telegram No. 6584, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 2nd, 1920

² Telegram No. P. 4216(1), S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, June 7th, 1920.

³ It is somewhat surprising that the Secretary of State for India should have used the words ‘subject to reservation on points of detail’ when the differences of opinion between Baghdad and London were fundamental, as, for instance, in the matter of a Council of State. The Baghdad authorities advocated a predominantly British Council; the India Office, a predominantly Arab Council; and the Foreign Office a wholly Arab Council. Mr. Montagu, however, may have believed he was acting in the spirit of the decision of the Interdepartmental Committee, on June 1st, and that he was but recognizing the *fait accompli* of June 2nd, when the Acting Civil Commissioner outlined the proposals in Baghdad. In any case they were not to be applied until Sir Percy Cox had returned to Baghdad as High Commissioner.

⁴ Telegram No. 6976, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 9th, 1920.

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he had been forced out of every position from which he had attempted, on the one hand, to mould 'Iraq along the lines he believed to be best, administered and staffed in the best Anglo-Indian traditions, and, on the other, to defeat the influence of Arab Nationalists, the Western Arabia party and other doctrinaires. In his opinion, H.M. Government, in weakly giving way to the policy advocated by such groups and in embracing a literal application of the Anglo-French Declaration and the League of Nation's mandatory system, had set out on a perilous path, illumined only by the broken lights of sentimentalism.

He gave vent to these views in a telegram of June 9th,¹ dispatched before receiving the telegram from the Secretary of State. In it he also pointed out that the failure of Great Britain to maintain adequate troops and administrative officers in 'Iraq had contributed to the growth of the opposition prevailing in the country.² He declared in conclusion:

We cannot maintain our position as mandatory by a policy of conciliation of extremists. Having set our hand to the task of regenerating Mesopotamia, we must be prepared to furnish alike men and money and to maintain continuity of control for years to come. We must be prepared, regardless of the League of Nations, to go very slowly with constitutional or democratic institutions, the application of which to Eastern countries has been attempted of late years with such a little degree of success. If His Majesty's Government regard such a policy as impracticable or beyond our strength (as well they may) I submit that they would do better to face the alternative, formidable and, from the local point of view, terrible as it is, and evacuate Mesopotamia.

His telegram brought to an end, in effect, the long struggle between H.M. Government and the Acting Civil Commissioner over policy for 'Iraq. The alternatives he had proposed, control

¹ Telegram No. 6948, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, June 9th, 1920.

² Cf. his views expressed later: 'A substantial reduction in the military forces in Mesopotamia during 1919 would have greatly facilitated the pacification of the country.' Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

without reference to the League of Nations or immediate evacuation, were rejected as unacceptable by the Interdepartmental Committee, on June 16th. Lord Curzon believed that the middle course of maintaining Great Britain's position through the goodwill of the people could be maintained. He had sympathy and admiration for the Acting Civil Commissioner personally, but his latest telegram, together with previous indications of his attitude, proclaimed him as unable to bring himself to carry out the policy which H.M. Government, through the Interdepartmental Committee, had consistently advocated. Lord Curzon's views found support in the Committee, and following a Cabinet decision on the subject, June 17th, the text of an announcement to replace that sent on June 7th, and a request for Sir Percy Cox to come to England at once were telegraphed to Baghdad.¹

The text of the announcement made in Baghdad on June 20th, is as follows:

His Majesty's Government, having been entrusted with the Mandate for Mesopotamia, anticipate that the Mandate will constitute Mesopotamia an Independent State under guarantee of the League of Nations and subject to the Mandate of Great Britain, that it will lay on them the responsibility for the maintenance of internal peace and external security, and will require them to formulate an organic law to be framed in consultation with the people of Mesopotamia and with due regard to the rights, wishes and interests of all the communities of the country. The Mandate will contain provisions to facilitate the development of Mesopotamia as a self-governing state until such time as it can stand by itself, when the Mandate will come to an end.

The inception of this task H.M. Government have decided to entrust to Sir P. Cox, who will accordingly return to Baghdad in the autumn, and will resume his position, on the termination of the existing Military Administration, as Chief British Representative in Mesopotamia.

¹ Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, June 18th, 1920.

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Sir P. Cox will be authorised to call into being, as provisional bodies, a Council of State under an Arab President and a General Elective Assembly, representative of and freely elected by the population of Mesopotamia. And it will be his duty to prepare in consultation with the General Elective Assembly, the permanent organic law.¹

It was the first straightforward public announcement of a concrete and specific policy which H.M. Government had made in 'Iraq since the Armistice, a year and eight months before. Even so, another five months were to elapse before the policy could be put into effect. In the interval, the temper of Nationalism in 'Iraq was to rise to the point of armed rebellion which was to shake the country to its foundations.

¹ *Compilation of Proclamations, Notices, etc. . . . Relating to Mesopotamia, September 1st, 1919, to September 30th, 1920* (Baghdad, 1920) (Hereafter *Proclamations, 1919-1920*) Announcement No. 49, dated June 17th, 1920

ARAB NATIONALISM IN 'IRAQ
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NATIONALISM as an organized movement in the name of the Arab peoples first arose in the Lebanon and in Syria. In Beirūt, Damascus, Aleppo and Jaffa, the imaginative and volatile Syrians, influenced primarily by French education and political thought and, to a lesser extent, by the American theory of government by 'consent of the governed', inculcated by American missionary schools,¹ began to work for Arab separation from the Ottoman Empire. The Movement gathered converts throughout the Arabic-speaking world. In Arabia, the revolt of Imām Mahmūd Yahiā of Yemen, of Saiyid Idriss of Assir in 1906, and the defeat of Turkey's ally, Amīr ibn Rashīd of the Shammar, by Ibn Sa'ūd in the same year, were taken as indicating the Arabs' desire for independence. The revolt at Port Said of 400 Syrian troops on their way to Yemen was also taken as evidence of the unity of the Arabs. In Paris, a group of Syrians, including Najīb Azūri who had been forced to leave Turkey in 1904 because of his pro-Arab activities, agitated for Arab independence through the French Press and through Arab committees in France and Egypt. Through the *Ligue de la Patrie Arabe*, founded in 1904 by Najīb Azūri and Eugène Jung, an ex-official of the French Colonial Service, who saw the great benefits which would accrue to France through the Arab Movement,² stirring appeals were made to the Arabs³ and to

¹ Chief among these was the Syrian Protestant College, founded in 1866, now the American University at Beirūt.

² His viewpoint is apparent in his works: *Les Puissances devant la Révolte Arabe* (Paris, 1906) and *La Révolte Arabe* (2 vols., Paris, 1924-5).

³ Text: Najīb Azūri, *Le Réveil de la Nation Arabe dans l'Asie Turque* (Paris, 1905), pp. 1-3; Jung, E., *Les Puissances devant la Révolte Arabe*, pp. 24-9; Kampffmeyer, G., *Damaskus. Dokumente zum Kampf der Araber um ihre Unabhängigkeit* (Berlin, 1926), pp. 99-100.

the peoples of Europe and America.¹ Najib Azūri also founded, in April, 1907, with the collaboration of M. Jung, *L'Indépendance Arabe*, through which, as well as through other avenues, he continued to work for the Arab Nationalist cause.

By 1908, however, little remained of the once promising Arab Movement. In spite of its sudden flowering, it had not yet taken sufficient root. The gendarmes and troops of 'Abdul Hamid, brought into operation against the rebellious chiefs and revolutionaries, had not been the only cause of its failure. The Young Turks by more subtle means had undermined it. The Committee of Union and Progress, by promising much in reforms and in privileges to every community, to be fulfilled once the Hamidian regime should be overturned, had obtained the support not only of Arab leaders but also of other non-Turkish groups, for the bloodless Revolution of July 24th, 1908.

The new regime did indeed seem to foreshadow a new era of liberty, fraternity and equality. The Committee, commonly known as the C.U.P., had proposed to consolidate the revolution by instituting parliamentary self-government in which all nationalities in the Empire were to participate in proportion to their numbers. Throughout the Empire, rival communities, bitter enemies and revolutionary leaders vied in praising the new order. Najib Azūri, in a valedictory number of *L'Indépendance Arabe*, September, 1908, declared that all for which Arabs had been striving would be attained under the aegis of the Committee. His work for the Arab cause had therefore come to an end.²

The first auspicious augury, however, was short-lived. Within the Western concept of nationality, then in the ascendancy in the Near East and nowhere more so than within the C.U.P. itself, existed contradictions which produced irreconcilable antagonisms in the heterogeneous and polyglot Empire³

¹ Text: Jung, op. cit., pp. 22-4; Kampffmeyer, op. cit., pp. 100-1.

² Declaration cited, Jung, *La Révolte Arabe*, p. 23.

³ For political effect of language differences in the Ottoman Empire, see note by Mary Mills Patrick in Mears, E. G., *Modern Turkey* (New York, 1924), pp. 35 ff.

and which contributed to its final break-up. The non-Turkish groups could not and would not permanently renounce the ideal of an independent state for every nation: part and parcel of the Western concept. The Young Turks, on the other hand, could not abandon the ideal of sovereignty over the whole population and territory within the frontiers of the State, equally a part of the same concept.¹ Thus, while ‘Ottomanism’ in the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress meant in theory that all sections of the Empire were to enjoy equal cultural liberty and that all were to be represented in Parliament and in government services on a proportional basis, in reality it came to mean that the non-Turkish elements were to be enfranchised and tolerated only in so far as they accepted the Committee’s programme in full. In Arab lands, the ‘Ottomanizing’ policy involved a ban on Arabic language and literature — the original basis of the Arab revival — the compulsory use of Turkish in official circles and in schools, and the abandonment of all institutions and customs which Arabs cherished.

In Syria, the effect of the programme of the C.U.P. was to revive the Arab Movement and to increase the resentment of the inhabitants against the Turks. A section, composed largely but not exclusively of Catholic Christians, turned to France, their traditional protector and cultural mentor, for support and intervention on their behalf. France, nothing loath to increase her influence in a region which she had long coveted, welcomed the overtures. Through her consuls and diplomatic officials, secret negotiations were carried on with the Nationalists, which, when discovered by the Turks after the outbreak of the war, brought death and imprisonment at the hands of Djemal Pasha to those involved.²

¹ Toynbee, A. J., and Kirkwood, K. P., *Turkey*, (1926), p. 53

² Thirty-four Syrians were sentenced to death, five to imprisonment and four to exile, largely on the evidence of documents taken from the French Consulate in Beirût. Facsimiles of some of the documents may be seen in the Turkish Red Book, *La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne* (Stambul, 1916). On Georges

Another group composed principally of Druse and Muslims of the Lebanon and of Damascus, who since the massacres of 1860 had looked upon Great Britain as their protector, approached the British Consul-General in Beirut with the request that the British Government should assist the Arabs in their struggle against the Turks.¹ A delegation of Syrian Muslim notables visited Lord Kitchener, High Commissioner in Egypt, petitioning Great Britain to annex Syria to Egypt and to give Syria an independent administration.² Lord Kitchener, no less than H.M. Government, was aware of the ultimate importance of extending British influence in western Arabia as well as on the coast of the Persian Gulf and with Ibn Sa'ūd. Such influence was essential if a Khalifat independent of Ottoman control and of German influence was to be created,³ and if the still nebulous project of a Trans-Arabia railway from Akaba to the Persian Gulf was to be realized. The advances of the Syrians and of the Arab Nationalists were, therefore, tactfully received although no action was taken. Sharif 'Abdullāh on behalf of his father, Sharif Husain of Mecca, also approached Lord Kitchener in February, 1914, concerning which incident the following statement for publication in this work has been authorized by Drs. G. P. Gooch and H. V. W. Temperley, editors of the *British Documents on Origin of the World War*, 1898-1914:

The facts appear to be that Abdullah Pasha, on the way to Constantinople in February, 1914, asked Lord Kitchener

¹ *Figaro* and *Le Temps*, November 18th, 1912; *L'Eclair*, December 2nd, 1912.

² *Le Temps*, November 18th, 1912; *L'Echo de Paris*, February 28th, 1913; also Najib Azūri to Quai d'Orsay, March 16th, 1913, cited Jung, op. cit., pp. 60-1.

³ For an indication of the influence of this policy on war-time negotiations see *Aufteilung der Asiatischen Türkei*, especially No. 32, Nicolson to Sasanov, March 20th, 1915, p. 30.

Picot, French Consul-General in Beirut, and a co-negotiator of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, must rest the onus for allowing these documents to fall into the hands of the Turks. On the declaration of war, M. Picot, unlike his British colleague who spent the night burning his Consular files, merely relied on American Consular seals placed on the safe containing the incriminating papers. The Turks, disregarding both the seals and American official protests, burst open the safe.

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what would be the attitude of the British Government in case of a revolt of the Grand Sheriff against the Turks. Lord Kitchener gave him no encouragement but agreed to transmit the information to London, saying he thought it improbable that Sir Edward Grey would send any reply. On the day (February 14th) that Lord Kitchener's despatch on the subject arrived, a telegram from him reached Grey to the effect that the quarrel of the Grand Sheriff with the Turks had been amicably settled. Difficulties began again at the end of March, but the matter seems to have gone no further in London. Kitchener refused to see Abdullah on his return journey, but sent a message giving him no encouragement and saying that the only British interest in Arabia was the safety and comfort of the Indian pilgrims.

In Syria, still another group of Nationalisms hoped to obtain decentralization by means of agitation and by exerting pressure both locally and on the authorities at Constantinople. Another revolutionary group, for the most part Muslims of Damascus and the Syrian hinterland, aimed at complete independence and membership in a confederation of Arab states.

Behind the movement were ranged the Arabic Press and the Arabs domiciled in Egypt, in France, in the United States, in South America and in Australia.¹ In Syria, including the Lebanon and what is now Palestine, Arabic journals increased 850 per cent in the period 1904 to 1914 over the preceding ten years,² 33 journals being established from 1894 to 1904

¹ Tarazi, Vicomte Philippe: *Arabic Periodicals* (Beirut, 1933)

² Newspapers and magazines established in Arab countries, during the periods, 1894-1904 and 1904-14, are given below, arranged according to their present political divisions.

	1894-1904		1904-14	
	Newspapers	Magazines	Newspapers	Magazines
Syria	1	2	73	14
Lebanon	15	14	117	51
Palestine	1	0	26	5
‘Iraq	1	1	61	9
Hijāz	0	0	6	0
	—	—	—	—
Total	18	17	283	79

and 286 in the period 1904 to 1914.¹ In Egypt and in the United States, the Arabic press,² with a wide circulation even in the Ottoman Empire,³ was a powerful agent, by its constant and bitter denunciation of the Turks, in arousing Nationalist sentiment among Arab peoples.⁴

In 'Iraq, no less than in Syria and Arabia, the 'Ottomanizing' policy of the Young Turks stimulated the Nationalist Movement. It continued, however, to lag behind the Movement across the desert, even as it had been slower to develop. Cut off by its geographical position and by its lack of communication from the West, 'Iraq lay torpid, a potentially rich Turkish Siberia but lacking educational facilities and the stimulus of new ideas and of political thought such as prevailed along the Mediterranean coast. Conservative in thought, the Sunnī Muslims were slow to withdraw their political allegiance from the Sultan whom both religion and tradition had established as their religious head.⁵ The Shī'a priesthood, Persian for the most part, hated the Osmanlis both as Sunnīs and as oppressors, but possessed little community of interest with the Arabs, although Arabs of the Shī'a sect formed a majority of the population of 'Iraq.

The social structure, based fundamentally on the soil, and not far removed from feudalism, was stony ground for Nationalism. Landlords sought only relief from taxation. Shaikhs desired individual freedom for themselves and their tribes. Merchants, principally Jews, perhaps the most progressive single element in the land, had little deep feeling for either

¹ The life of a journal during the Turkish regime was often not long, particularly if in opposition to the Government. Suppressed journals frequently reappeared under new names.

² From 1904 to 1914, 385 Arabic newspapers and magazines were founded in Egypt, North and South America: Tarazi, *op cit*

³ Although banned from Turkey, they were distributed through the foreign post offices.

⁴ Djemal Pasha, in particular, resented the part played by the Arabic Press abroad: Turkish Red Book, *La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne*, pp 12-13.

⁵ *Infra*, p 235, for typical view on the sanctity of the Ottoman regime

Turk or Arab except as productive of order, stable finance and equity in the courts, essential for their commerce. There were few professional men, such as doctors, lawyers, teachers and civil officials, who formed the backbone of the Movement across the desert. Nevertheless, from them and from the Arab Army officers came the leaven of pre-war Nationalism in ‘Iraq. Trained for the most part in the professional and technical schools of Constantinople, they had been touched by the Western political theories permeating the capital. They had been in contact with separatists from Syria and from other parts of the Empire. The Arab officers of the army, in particular, as members of the only numerous and organized class in the Empire which received a systematic Western training and which, therefore, was exposed to Western thought, assumed important roles in the Movement.

Not merely the policy of crushing Arab feeling and sentiment and of turning Arabs into good Turks aroused the ‘Iraqis. The secularizing policy and the irreligiousness of the Young Turks had offended many religious dignitaries who wielded great power and influence. The Naqīb of Baghdad, Saiyid ‘Abdur Rahmān al-Gailānī, for instance, found little to command his respect or obedience in the new regime. Although he himself habitually refrained from political activities, his son, Saiyid Mahmūd al-Gailānī, described as an Arab of the Arabs and knowing no Turkish, took a prominent part in the opposition to the C.U.P.

In spite of the discontent in ‘Iraq, rife and acute as it was, little trace appeared on the surface before late 1910. The measures employed by the C.U.P. to stamp out disaffection were too vigorous and too harsh for opposition to show itself openly. In the Chamber of Deputies, however, from the midst of the group of Arab Deputies, to which all the ‘Iraqī members, except Isma‘il Haqqi Beg Baban the Kurd, had attached themselves, ‘Iraqī feeling was publicly voiced.

Underground, however, the Movement had taken on form

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and substance.¹ At Constantinople, Arab Army officers, among whom 'Iraqīs were the most prominent, formed *Al-'Ahd*, a secret group pledged to work for Arab independence. Its membership throughout the Empire was said to number 4000.² Allied in purpose was the *'Assibat-al-Hamra*, the 'Iraqī counterpart of the Committee of Decentralization, with its headquarters in Cairo.³

The separatist tendencies shown by other non-Turkish portions of the Empire were not without influence on Nationalism in 'Iraq as well as in Syria. The detachment from the Empire of Bosnia, of Bulgaria and Crete, the demand for reforms and decentralization in Macedonia, supported by the Great Powers, the revolt of the Druses in the Hauran and of the Arabs in Transjordan in 1910-11 and the demand of the Albanians for fiscal reforms in 1909 and 1911, while regretted by Muslims as weakening the strength of Islam, encouraged the Arabs as a whole to demand decentralization for themselves. Rashīd al-'Umārī, head of the powerful 'Umārī family of Mōsul, a member of which was advocated by the Acting Civil Commissioner in 1918-19 as head of the 'Iraq state,⁴ expressed the views of many Arabs with whose sentiments he was in close touch when he said, in October, 1911, to the British Vice-Consul: 'As the Albanians have demanded and got what they wanted, I hope we shall do the same'.⁵ It was generally believed that the end of the Turko-Italian war would find the Arabs united in a protest against the Turks and in an attempt to set up an Arab dynasty and an Arab Khalifate.⁶

The convening of Parliament at Constantinople also en-

¹ *La Question Syrienne*, p. 12. A fairly comprehensive history of several Arab secret societies is to be found in the same work, pp. 9-123.

² *Ibid.*, Jung, op. cit., p. 32.

³ Alleged to have had 10,000 members and 75 branches in Syria and Palestine alone, Jung, op. cit., p. 61.

⁴ Telegram, No 10250, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November, 1918 cited *supra*, p. 158.

⁵ *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, October, 1911.

⁶ *Ibid.*, November, 1911.

couraged ‘Iraqī Nationalists by bringing them into contact with the ardent Nationalists of other parts of the Empire, who, in spite of the great care with which the C.U.P. had conducted the elections, found seats in the Chamber. With them the ‘Iraqīs made common cause in the Moderate Liberal party, founded by Prince Sabah-ed-Dīn in opposition to the C.U.P., and later in the *Itilāf* or Coalition party. These parties were not merely sectional groups, although the ‘Iraqī branches of the former, founded in Basra and Baghdad in August and September, 1911, were known in ‘Iraq as the *Hurr-i-Mū’tadīl*, while branches of the *Itilāf* to which the Moderate Liberal party gave way in early 1912 were known as *Hurriya wa Itilāf*. The organization of the parties extended throughout the Empire, the branch in Basra, for instance, being formed by Saiyid Talib Pasha in obedience to a telegram sent by a person unknown.

In the years 1910 and 1911, ‘Iraqī feeling also sought means of outlet through the press. In these two years were established 36 Arabic newspapers or 60 per cent of the 61 founded in ‘Iraq during the period 1904 to 1914; 22 or nearly 40 per cent being started in 1911 alone.¹ Of these, 19 were established in Baghdad. In the same 2 years, were founded 6 of the 9 magazines established in the same period of 1904 to 1914. A number of these papers were periodically suppressed by the Turks, after which the owners reissued them under new names.

In the years 1912 and 1913, the movement firmly established itself in ‘Iraq. The British Resident in Baghdad in an official report in early 1912 stated:

I have been much struck of late by the increasing freedom with which anti-C.U.P. and anti-Turkish sentiments are expressed here. Hitherto this was regarded as treason to the State . . . This growing political confidence of non-Turkish Muhammadan elements is noticeable even among officials. . . . It is clear also that the eldest son of the *Kiliddar* of Najaf

¹ Based on Tarazi, op. cit.

and 'Abdur Rahman Pachachi, welcome the formation of a new party which would assert Arab interests. If political developments here follow a normal course and if the people of the country have any real political convictions and courage — two conditions of which the fulfilment is doubtful, the support of the Baghdad province will by and by be lost to any party which does not concede to the Arabs political equality with the Turks.¹

Nowhere did the rising opposition show itself more clearly than in the local elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 1911 and in the following years. Pressure was used by the C.U.P. to secure the return of its candidates. Nevertheless, Saiyid Mahmūd al-Gailānī, whose anti-Turkish sentiments were well known, was elected as well as Fū'ād Effendi, a Baghdad lawyer, known to be in opposition to the C.U.P. In Basra, the elections represented both local opposition to the C.U.P. and the personal ascendancy of Saiyid Talib Pasha, son of the Naqīb of Basra. All the deputies elected, in addition to himself, were his partisans, being his cousin, his father's clerk, a friend of the Naqīb's family and another member of the *Hurriya wa Itilāf*. According to the British Vice-Consul at Basra, 'no pressure was used, however, all the *Itilāfīs* representing the free choice of united suffrage.'²

Saiyid Talib Pasha ibn Saiyid Rajab was one of the outstanding figures in pre-war Turkish Arabia and, until his enforced removal from Baghdad by Sir Percy Cox, April 16th, 1921,³ played a prominent part in the creation of modern 'Iraq.⁴ He came of an old family of Basra, doubly influential because of its wealth and its hereditary religious leadership. His native ability, enhanced and developed by a fair education, by residence at Constantinople and travel in Europe, found full scope in political activities. A vigorous personality, of great charm

¹ *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, March-April, 1912.

² *Ibid.*, October, 1912.

³ *Infra*, p. 322.

⁴ His interment at Zūbair, following his death in Munich, July, 1929, drew an immense crowd from every part of 'Iraq and was made the occasion of eloquent tributes to his work for Arab Nationalism

and dignity, although given occasionally to tempestuous anger, he had collected around him a band of followers and adherents, bound to him both by fear and affection. His generosity to the poor was proverbial, but it was the liberality of a Robin Hood: his funds for his benefactions and for his retinue, as he himself was not wealthy, were not infrequently obtained by levies, reminiscent of blackmail, on wealthy Arabs in southern ‘Iraq.

His personal ambitions, not necessarily of an unworthy character, were undoubtedly strong. To ‘Abdul Hamīd he had submitted a comprehensive scheme for the inclusion within the Empire and under his personal authority, of Al-Hasā of which he had been *Mutasarrif*, and of a large portion of central Arabia. The proposal was not unnaturally rejected at Constantinople.

After the Revolution in 1908, which he, in company with many other Arabs had hopefully supported, he turned against the C.U.P. and its programme. He assumed in the name of Arab Nationalism the leadership, both in the Chamber of Deputies and in southern ‘Iraq, of the opposition to the Turks in Basra Wilayet. So closely did his efforts on behalf of Arab separation and his own ambitions seem to coincide, however, that even now it is debatable whether his actions were primarily designed to further the Arab cause or to carve out a portion of the Ottoman domain for himself, as the Shaikh of Kuwait had already done, and as Ibn Sa‘ūd was in the process of carrying out in Al-Hasā. His many enemies, including Shaikh Ajaimī as-Sa‘dūn, which his ruthlessness and his energy had made for him, subscribed to the latter view. They constituted one of the principal handicaps to the Nationalist Movement as led by Saiyid Talib, since they would not have acquiesced without a struggle in any measure of decentralization by which he profited. These charges of personal ambition were to be recalled and enmities rekindled in 1920-1 when Saiyid Talib put forward, with some justification, his claim to the headship of the ‘Iraq state.

Whatever his motives, Saiyid Talib advanced Arab National-

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ism both in Basra Wilayet and throughout 'Iraq in the years immediately preceding the war. On February 20th. 1913, at a meeting in his house, attended by all the principal Arabs of Basra, a *madhbata* or petition was drawn up. It asked for permission to summon the Provincial Council with the view of elaborating a scheme of reforms needed in the wilayet, which, it was urged, should be similar to that recently sanctioned for Syria. It proposed that all taxes be devoted to local needs. Despite its veil of temperate and courteous language, the *madhbata*, to which about three hundred leading citizens of Basra added their signatures, was in reality a demand, the first to be made, for autonomous government for Basra.¹

The future government and administration of 'Iraq were the primary subjects of discussion at an Arab Conference held at Mohammerah, March, 1913, attended by the Shaikh of Mohammerah, himself an Arab although a Persian subject, by the Shaikh of Kuwait, by Saiyid Talib and by a highly-placed Turkish official. It was agreed that each leader should do all in his power to advance the claim of 'Iraq to independence or, at least, to self-government. Emissaries were commissioned and dispatched to Karbalā and Najaf to stir the people there and to prepare them for further activity. The Arab Nationalists in Baghdad, Constantinople, Syria, Egypt and Arabia, with whom Saiyid Talib had already maintained correspondence,² were informed of the decision of the Conference.

In the following month Saiyid Talib made a test of his power. On April 23rd, a deputation of Basra notables headed by himself visited the Acting *Walī*. They demanded the dismissal of certain officers of the Gendarmerie who, they believed, belonged to an anti-Arab society. The demand was rejected by Constantinople, whereupon Saiyid Talib hinted that the Arabs might resort to force. The British Vice-Consul, in alarm,

¹ *Events in Turkish 'Iraq*, February, 1913; *ibid.*, March, 1913.

² For Saiyid Talib Pasha's relations with the Decentralization Committee in Syria and Egypt, see *La Question Syrienne*, pp. 102-3.

immediately asked for a ship of war for the protection of British interests.¹ H.M.S. *Alert* arrived at Basra on May 4th. Saiyid Talib, however, finding that Shaikh Ajaimi had moved with his Muntafiq tribesmen towards Basra with the intention of supporting the Government and that a new Wilayet Law had been promulgated, agreed on May 12th to press Arab demands with moderation.

The new Wilayet Law, together with an official circular from the Ministry of Interior conceding wide official use of Arabic in ‘Iraq, had supposedly granted self-government on paper, but neither Saiyid Talib nor other Arab leaders were misled as to its real nature. The new law, if ever applied, which they doubted, still kept real power in the hands of the *Walī* or Governor, while they had in mind actual participation by Arabs in the Government. In spite of the momentary check to the Nationalists at Basra, the Arabs elsewhere redoubled their efforts to obtain the full measure of their demands.

The Arab Movement had developed faster in Basra than in Baghdad, due to the efforts of Talib Pasha, but Nationalism was not lacking in strength in the latter city. In closer contact than Basra with the Nationalist Movement at Constantinople and among the Syrians and Egyptians, the Baghdad Nationalists had divided themselves into four groups. One section consisted of partisans of Saiyid Talib and the Basra Nationalists. Another looked to Syria for leadership and assistance. Still another group was in correspondence with Egypt, from which it was rumoured that the Khedive would be elected King and *Khalifa* of the Muslims. The fourth group formed a separate Baghdad party, relying chiefly on their own efforts and on their own leaders. These groups, however, were without hard and fast lines, and in the spring of 1913, when a concerted effort was made to unite the Arabs of ‘Iraq, Syria and Egypt in presenting demands to Constantinople, the groups apparently sank their differences and began to work together. The local secret

¹ *Events in Turkish ‘Iraq*, May, 1913.

Patriotic Society, formed in 1912 to expel the Turks and to establish autonomous government, had as members the principal Arabs, including more than a hundred Arab officers of all ranks. Manifestos and literature from Basra and Constantinople attacking the Turkish Government circulated in the city. Placards appeared on the walls of Baghdad, as on March 18th, exhorting Arabs to rise against their oppressors and to demand autonomy or decentralization. The reforms announced in April and May were dismissed as being inadequate. The newspapers *Bain an-Nahrain* and *al-Misbāh*¹ took courage and demanded further reforms and decentralization. A delegate, Taufiq as-Sūwaidī, son of Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, an outstanding leader in the Movement, was nominated to the first Arab Congress held in Paris, June 18th, 1913. Even more significant was the growing hostility between the Turkish and the Arab officers of the 13th Army Corps in the Baghdad Barracks, and between the Turkish and Arab civil officials of the Wilayet.²

The Turks were not inactive in the face of these manifestations of Arab feeling. Arab teachers and *mullas* were appointed to advocate faithfulness to the Government, inspired articles appeared in the Press,³ and reforms were promised. Spies were increased and following a search in Baghdad by the police for a supposed emissary of Egyptian and Syrian Nationalists, a sudden arrest of Arab leaders was made, June 14th. Among them were: Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, Saiyid Kāmil Effendi, proprietor of the suppressed *Bain an-Nahrain*, Shukrī Effendi and Salmān Effendi. Mahmūd Effendi, editor of *Bain an-Nahrain*, was also

¹ Founded in Baghdad by Muhammad Kāmil, December 9th, 1909, and by 'Abdul Husain al-'Uzri, March 7th, 1911.

² *Events in Turkish Iraq*, March to October, 1913, *passim*.

³ *Al-Zuhūr* (Baghdad) published the following, March 14th, 1913, under the heading 'Decentralization':

'Some Muhammadans want decentralization. They ought to know that decentralization is not permissible according to the Muhammadan Law because the centre of the whole Islamic world is the town of the *Khalifa*. Christians are said to be making great progress by means of decentralization, but Muslims must recollect that Christians have three Gods and can, therefore, have more than one centre. Muslims, having only one God, can have but one centre.'

arrested at ‘Amāra. All were released two days later with the exception of Saiyid Kāmil.¹

The murder at Basra of Farīd Beg, Gendarme Commander, who, it was reported, had come to Basra to kill Saiyid Talib and twelve other Arabs in opposition to the C.U.P.,² and of Badi‘ Nūrī Beg, *Mutasarrif* of Muntafiq, by followers of Saiyid Talib, on June 20th, intensified the anti-Turkish aspect of Saiyid Talib’s agitation in Basra. The failure of the Turkish Government to bring him to book emboldened Arabs, both at Basra and at Baghdad. The official circular from the Minister of Interior, extending special considerations to Arabs, such as three Ministers of State, five Waliships, ten Mutasarrifships, etc.,³ was dismissed without confidence. In Basra, the Reform Committee with Saiyid Talib at its head published its programme⁴ which, if realized, meant the transfer of the real authority from Constantinople to the Administrative Council of Basra Wilayet. In addition, the Reform Committee issued a long appeal to troops and Arab tribes in the wilayet, denouncing the Turkish Government, and calling upon all Arabs to arise and throw off the Turkish tyranny by asserting the independence of ‘Iraq.

In Baghdad, all of the seven members elected by Baghdad city on September 8th, as its members to the first General Council of Baghdad Wilayet, were in opposition to the C.U.P. Manifestos, including especially virulent ones from Aleppo, demanding decentralization, continued to circulate. A new vernacular newspaper, *An-Nahdha* or ‘The Awakening’, published by Muzāhim Beg Pāchahjī, one of the Arab leaders began to appear in the first week of October.⁵ The quarrel between the Turkish and Arab officers would have burst into open violence without the intervention of General Muhammad Daghistani, who appealed to their honour as soldiers.

¹ *Events in Turkish ‘Iraq*, June, 1913.

² So ‘Izzat Beg, sent as successor to Farid Beg, declared. *Ibid.*, July, 1913.

³ *The Times*, July 3rd and 4th, 1913.

⁴ *Al-Dastūr* (Basra), August 22nd, 1913.

⁵ Baghdad, October 3rd, 1913.

NATIONALISM BEFORE 1914

In spite of arrests in the middle of October of leaders of the Arab Movement, including Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, Shaikh Sa'īd Effendi, Hamdī Beg Pāchahjī, Mahmūd Beg, head of *Nadī' Watanī*, or Native Land Club, and Bahjat Beg, fresh demands for decentralization were formulated. A general conference to meet at Kuwait in early 1914 to consider Arab questions was proposed in November. Representatives of Amīr Ibn Sa'ūd and of the Sharif of Mecca, with whom Saiyid Talīb had long been in correspondence, and Amīr Ibn Rashīd of the Shammar, Shaikh 'Ajaimī of the Muntafiq, the Shaikh of Kuwait and Saiyid Talīb were to be among the delegates. Ibn Sa'ūd, in response to the invitation, replied that when the time came to rise he would be ready, but that the moment had not come.¹ Neither he nor the other Arab potentates were as yet able to sink their personal ambitions and enmities in the common cause. The conference was never convened.

In this same inability to make common cause seems to lie the failure of Arab Nationalism to make even greater progress before 1914 than it had actually made. In no way did the essential individualism of the Arab character reveal itself more than in these early days of the Arab Movement. In spite of the correspondence and interchange of views between the various sections of the Arab world, in spite of the manifestos and literature issued in the name of the Arab peoples, in spite of the essential unity of the aims and purposes of Arab Nationalism, the Movement tended to break into sectionalism, limited by the horizons of immediate locality. The rank and file of the Movement, no less than the sectional leaders, regarded with mistrust any leaders whose ascendancy seemed to overshadow their own interests and to detract from their own importance. Personal rivalries, religious differences and sectional animosities thus hampered the progress of the Movement, stultifying its efforts and nullifying its effectiveness. Nevertheless, the Movement

¹ The statement in *The Times*, December 27th, 1913, that the Arab chiefs had composed their differences proved to be unsubstantiated by facts

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was firmly established in ‘Iraq no less than in other parts of the Arab world. Nor was it without promise of success. In July, 1914, the Central Government came to the decision that all other measures having failed, Saiyid Talib was to be appointed Wali of Basra:¹ a victory for the Reform Committee as well as for Saiyid Talib himself. Before the appointment could be made, however, Turkey had joined Germany in arms and the Indian Expeditionary Force had appeared in the Shatt al-‘Arab.

¹ So Ta‘alat Beg informed H.B.M. Ambassador in Constantinople *Events in Turkish ‘Iraq*, June-July, 1914

THE GROWTH OF NATIONALISM IN IRAQ, 1914-20

Nationalism in 'Iraq: 1914-18

DURING the war, Arab Nationalism flickered fitfully in 'Iraq. Talib Pasha proffered his services to the Indian authorities, offering to raise southern 'Iraq against the Turks. The military and political officials, however, trusting to their own resources and desiring no alliances which might complicate the eventual disposal of 'Iraq, made it known that his aid was not only unacceptable but that it would be wise for him to remain out of 'Iraq. He therefore went to Ceylon in 'voluntary exile'¹ until 1917, when he was permitted to go to Egypt. 'Iraqī officers in the Turkish Army, including Nūrī as-Sa'īd, 'Abdullāh Damlūjī² and others, who came to offer their services, were met with suspicion and sent into detention camps in India and in Egypt.

The Turks, on their side, assigned the remaining Arab officers, in so far as it was possible, to posts presenting little opportunity for displaying their Nationalist sentiment. In Baghdad, by the end of 1916, they had deported or imprisoned all the educated Arabs and all notables suspected of possessing separatist opinions. Risings in 1915 and 1916 at Najaf, Karbalā, Hilla, Kūfa and Tūwairij, and appeals to the British for support against the Turks, nevertheless, indicated that the 'Iraqīs had lost nothing of the Nationalist feeling nor of their hatred of the Turks. Some of the disturbances, however, as at Najaf, in April, 1915, and at Karbalā, April, 1916, no doubt owed their

¹ *Review C. Admin*, 1914-1920, p. 2.

² Dr. Damlūjī, finding that he was *persona non grata* to the British, made his way to Ibn Sa'ūd, whose service he entered. He later returned to 'Iraq, serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1930-1.

origin to the traditional intolerance of the Holy Cities to external secular authority, strained to a breaking point by Turkish attempts to impose conscription and exactions, rather than to any conscious Nationalist aspirations.

Turkish authority was reasserted in most cases only after great difficulty, the revolting cities being treated with considerable severity, as at Hilla in November, 1916, when the Turks further outraged ‘Iraqī feeling by hanging notables suspected of being Arab Nationalists responsible for the revolt. Had the British authorities during 1915 and 1916 felt able to make a straightforward declaration of future policy and to give definite leadership and adequate support to the Arabs, in response to their requests, the ‘Iraqīs might have further asserted themselves in a general movement to expel the Turks who, at the time of the local risings, were in imminent danger of losing the Middle Euphrates, one of the Empire’s richest granaries.

The revolt of the Arabs in the Hijāz had comparatively little effect in stimulating Arab Nationalism in ‘Iraq during the war. In 1916, the news of the Sharīf of Mecca’s revolt was circulated among the tribes by the British authorities in an effort to encourage them to rise against the Turks.¹ For the most part, however, and particularly after the British had captured Baghdad, news of the progress of the revolt was apparently withheld or minimized in ‘Iraq, in accordance with the Arab policy of the Government of India and of General Maude.² The efforts of Sir Percy Cox, Miss Gertrude Bell and of other political officials were concentrated on establishing friendly relations with the Arabs and in consolidating British prestige and a commanding political position rather than on the development of further Arab Nationalism which might come into conflict with British policy. Nevertheless, through newspapers from Egypt, through letters from ‘Iraqīs serving with the Sharifian army and by word of mouth filtering across the desert,

¹ *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p 30

² *Supra*, ch v.

the Arabs in 'Iraq were kept in touch with the powerful forces operating among the Arabs in Syria and the Hijāz.

The proclamation sent to Baghdad by H.M. Government and issued by General Maude following the capture of the city inspired the Nationalists with hope for the success of their cause. Taken in conjunction with other statements which followed, it became one of the charters on which they based their claim to a national existence.

Post-War Nationalism: Factors leading to the Insurrection of 1920

Nationalism in 'Iraq after the war, as in every part of the world where it has manifested itself, has been compounded of varied elements, forces and influences, almost baffling in their complexity. Some of the participating elements have been unrelated and even antipathetic to each other, while others apparently homogeneous, have operated from entirely different motives. Some of the factors originated in the prosecution of a great war, others out of the post-war settlement among the victorious nations. Still others have been deeply rooted in the peculiar conditions and history of the country. Never has this variety and complexity been greater than in the period from the Armistice of Mudros to the Insurrection of 1920, when these elements and factors, whatever their previous relationships, coalesced for a time under the stress of Nationalism in an attempt to achieve freedom from external foreign control.

No single factor was more potent in stimulating the national aspirations of the Arabs than the war-time statements emanating from Great Britain and her Allies, defining their attitude to the Ottoman Empire and its non-Ottoman peoples. General Maude's Proclamation, Mr. Lloyd George's speech of January 5th, 1918, President Wilson's Twelfth Point and, above all, the Anglo-French Declaration, in conjunction with Allied propaganda freely employed in Arabia and in Syria and with the Husain-McMahon Correspondence, convinced the 'Iraqis, both

in the country and outside its borders, notwithstanding the efforts of the Civil Administration to the contrary, that their national aspirations were about to be realized at the hands of Great Britain.¹

Not until the post-armistice attempts of the Civil Administration to check demonstrations of Nationalist feeling in the plebiscite conducted by the Acting Civil Commissioner and by the continued Government control over vernacular newspapers,² until the continued efforts of the Administration to consolidate its hold on the country and until the apparent reluctance of H.M. Government to give effect in ‘Iraq to its declarations, at the same time that it was assisting in the establishment of the Damascus Government, seemed to indicate that Great Britain had no intention of keeping its promises, did Nationalist impatience give way to an organized opposition.

It has been maintained that the principal source of opposition to the British, discounted at the time because its authors were held to be unimportant, came from ‘Iraqī officers serving in Damascus,³ and that had it not been for the flood of Sharifian propaganda, backed by large sums from the Damascus Treasury,⁴ filled by British subsidies, and by active hostilities at Dair-az-Zūr and in the upper Jazīra, ‘Iraq would have settled

¹ For effect of these declarations see *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, pp 126-7; Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p 463, also *supra*, pp. 137 ff

² Until June 1st, 1920, when permission was given to Razzūq Dā‘ūd Ghannām to start *Al-‘Iraq*, all newspapers in ‘Iraq were owned and controlled by the Civil Administration. *Al-‘Iraq* was pro-British in policy and existed largely on the proceeds for printing Government notices.

³ Wilson, Sir A. T., *Mesopotamia*, 1917-1920, p 260; *Baghdad Times*, February 25th, 1922.

⁴ Whether sums sent from Syria to ‘Iraq amounted to £160,000, stated to be the total by a well-informed ex-official in the Civil Administration or to the few thousands of pounds which participants in the Movement have stated to be the total, it seems certain that funds from Syria, together with sums from Najaf, Baghdad and other centres in ‘Iraq, provided the sinews for Nationalist agitation, 1919-20. Faris Beg Khūrī, Finance Minister to Amīr Faisal, has categorically denied to the writer that any funds for use in ‘Iraq were paid from the Treasury. Nevertheless, the funds from Syria may have come indirectly as through Sharif Zaid. The Bolsheviks and the Turks are also alleged to have supplied funds. *Review C Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 144; Wilson, *op. cit.*, p 310.

into contentment and peace. The collective effort of the 'Iraqis abroad undoubtedly played a decisive part in arousing Nationalist feeling, as will be indicated later. They have been among the foremost, however, in denying the validity of the view that they formed the only effective element in opposition to British policy.¹ Such a view, in addition, ignores the history of 'Iraq Nationalism and disregards the fundamentals of Arab character.

The pre-war Nationalist Movement had been occasioned less by the evils of the Turkish administration, although these undoubtedly aggravated the discontent, than by the fact that the Turks, in spite of a common religion, were non-Arab rulers and that they barred the way to independence which for better or for worse, the Arabs desired. 'Iraq after the armistice had few of the administrative evils prevalent in pre-war days of which to complain; but the British regime was foreign and military. It was not Muslim, it was not Arab and, above all, it barred the way to autonomy which, more than ever before, stood as the goal of Arab aspirations. Under such circumstances, good administration which, according to the prevailing Anglo-Indian ideas, should have quieted all political discontent, counted for little. Indeed, in many districts, the very efficiency and thoroughness of the administration were regarded as sufficient justification for rebellion. The Arab saying, 'Better Jahannam of our own creation than Paradise of another's making', has its roots in Arab character.

Independence was desirable for its own sake, as Mr. H. St. J. Philby pointed out, in an address, June 23rd, 1920, to the Central Asian Society:

What they [the 'Iraqis] want, like the people of Arabia and Syria, and want because they are Arabs, is complete independence, nothing more and nothing less, and that is exactly what the British Government promised them in the most unequivocal terms by joining with the French in the

¹ So in interviews to writer, 1933-5; also *Al-'Iraq*, February 27th, 1922.

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momentous proclamation of November, 1918 . . . Great as the diversity of sentiment in various sections of the Arab world in regard to many matters — religion, politics and the like — there is the completest unanimity in regard to one point, the passionate love of liberty which is characteristic of the Bedouin stock to which not only the people of Syria but the bulk of those of Mesopotamia belong by origin.¹

It is not too much to believe that even if the ‘Iraqī officers in Syria had stood aside from the post-war Nationalism in ‘Iraq, the Movement under the leadership of those in the country and activated by internal forces would have eventually burst into open rebellion. It must not be overlooked that everywhere in the East the belief in the right of European Powers to govern and to dominate no longer carried the same weight as it had done previous to the war. Replacing it was the democratic theory of the consent of the governed which, largely through the efforts of the Great Powers themselves, had come to mean Self-Determination of all peoples. To the influence which the new theory exerted may be attributed the partial cause of the Nationalist outbursts in Egypt in 1919, the disturbances in India, the Anglo-Afghanistan Agreement of 1919, the risings in the Rif, the resistance of the Turks under Mustafa Kamal to the Allies, as well as the insurrection of 1920 in ‘Iraq.

Full use of the Arab’s love of liberty, of his pride in his race, blood, language and history was made by the Nationalist leaders. These included, in addition to those who had taken part in the pre-war Movement, such as Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, Shaikh Ahmad, Shaikh Dā‘ūd, Muzāhim Beg and Hamdī Beg Pāchahjī, others whose Nationalism had been of a more recent growth. England’s history as an imperial Power and every trace of evidence, relevant and irrelevant, pointing to India’s desire to colonize ‘Iraq, were recalled in opposition to the concept of a free Arab people, with a long and rich past,

¹ *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. VII (1920), p. 114.

once again the masters of the ancient city of the Abbasid Khalifs and possessing an honourable place among the nations of the modern world. It seemed to matter little to the Nationalists that two essentials, not to mention others, of a modern democratic state — a background of moderately well-informed and articulate public opinion and an adequate supply of trained and honest indigenous administrative personnel — were lacking and that the acquisition of such essentials would be a matter of years. Nor did they apparently take into consideration that the external dangers from Turkey, Persia and rival Arab states might be as great a threat to the future of the new state as the internal difficulties of maintaining it, once it had been created. The right to a national existence, the 'Iraqi Nationalists in company with their fellow Arabs elsewhere¹ considered to be indubitably theirs, both on the basis of the promises of the Allies and on that of the doctrine of self-determination. On these bases and not on any specific criteria of capacity, they rested their claims to independence.²

In a part of the world where differences of religion and of sect are synonymous with differences of race and of nationality, where religious fanaticism still lies close to the surface, and where allegiance to religious authority has still to be replaced by allegiance to the State, it is not surprising that Nationalism, begun as a political movement fostered by lawyers, teachers, writers and soldiers, should assume a religious aspect and acquire the support of the priesthood and of religious dignitaries. The latter recalled that the glories of the Arab past in Damascus, in Egypt, in North Africa and in the city of the Abbasids had been at their height in the days when Islam had been dominant and when the *Khalīfa* had been head of the

¹ Amir Faisal when he appeared before the Peace Conference in Paris, February, 1919, stressed the right of self-determination of the Arab peoples: Miller, D. H., *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (22 vols. New York, 1926), Vol. xiv, pp. 227-34.

² For an excellent study of capacity for independence as opposed to rights to independence, see Ritsher, W. H., *Criteria of Capacity for Independence* (Jerusalem, 1934).

State as well as of Islam. To them, particularly to the Shī‘a ‘*Ulamā*, Nationalism meant the erection once again of an Islamic State, with the priesthood in their rightful dominant position. It meant a state freed from the contaminating influences of the West, purified from tendencies to exalt secularism and able to stamp out opposing sects and *millet*s. The merging of political independence with theocratic independence and the co-operation of political and religious leaders were in reality identical with the post-war *rapprochement* of the Sunnī and the Shī‘a sects, representing, generally speaking, the political and religious aspects respectively of the Nationalist Movement. The alliance, of which the first indication was in the summer of 1919, when Sunnīs attended two of the memorials held for the deceased Shī‘a *Mujtahid*, Saiyid Muhammad Kādhim Yazdī, had not come easily. Between the two Muslim sects was a deep gulf of bitter differences and hatred as great as any which separated Protestant and Catholic in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was bridged only by determined effort on the part of the Nationalist leaders, chief among whom were the Shī‘is, Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr¹ and Ja‘far abū Timman,² and the Sunnīs already mentioned.

The *rapprochement* undoubtedly increased the scope and the force of the Nationalist movement, drawing to it the Shī‘a tribes and the masses in town and country whose fanaticism rose and fell in obedience to the almost unlimited authority of the divines over them. It was, however, not without its dangers to the Nationalist cause. At times it was almost impossible to discern whether the Movement was being directed by the priesthood of Najaf, Karbalā and Kādhimain or by the political leaders of Baghdad, Mōsul and Syria. Moreover, the *rapprochement* was ever precarious, the leaders failing to agree once the Insurrection had got under way. Indeed, even to-day, the

¹ Member of well-known Shī‘a family and the most active of the Baghdad Shī‘a Nationalists. Now a Senator of ‘Iraq.

² A Shī‘a merchant of Kādhimain known for his uncompromising opposition to British policy in ‘Iraq. Now Minister of Finance.

Shi'is of the Holy Cities and of the tribes of the Euphrates Valley maintain, in substantiation of their claims to a greater share in the Government of 'Iraq,¹ that it was they who brought about the Insurrection of 1920 and, therefore, brought independence to 'Iraq. It was also doubtful for a time whether the Movement would degenerate into a localized *ḡhād*, such as actually occurred in the Muntafiq in 1920, or whether it would pave the way for the creation of an Arab state under a Hāshimī ruler as the political leaders desired.

To the tribes, as the most powerful single weapon at their disposal, the Nationalist leaders paid particular attention, although they, as townsmen, normally feared the tribesmen as much as they professed to despise them as uncivilized. The tribes, north of Najaf, along the Euphrates and in the Jazīra, being more accessible to Damascus and Aleppo, were susceptible to Sharifian propaganda emanating from those centres. Among the tribes of the Middle and Lower Euphrates, predominantly Shi'a, the Nationalists from the Holy Cities and Baghdad found the most fertile ground for their politico-religious propaganda, although the Banī Tamīm, the 'Azza and other tribes between Baghdad and Ba'qūbā were not unaffected.

Normally inter-tribal and inter-sectional politics dictate tribal attitude and behaviour. Concerted action among the tribes becomes possible only when they are moved by an idea or motive transcending their local and sectional interests, a rare occurrence. The 'Iraq tribes had not been untouched by pre-war National aspirations, which had, in fact, accentuated tribal antipathy to the Turks,² but a feeling of national consciousness had never taken firm hold among them or become a compelling motive of action. It is unlikely that Nationalist propaganda spread by Sharifian agents or from Shi'a centres would have taken root in tribal minds had it not been for the

¹ As in the tribal risings of the spring of 1935. See an illuminating article, MacDonald, A. D., *J. R. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. XXIII (1936), Pt. 1, pp. 27 ff.

² *Note on Tribes for General Staff*, p. 3.

fact that the propagandists concentrated strongly and persuasively on matters nearer to their hearts and to their personal advantage than the abstract concept of a national existence.

National independence thus became attractive to the tribes not because of any theory of indigenous administration or any hope of an Islamic state,¹ but because it promised an escape from Government, particularly one insistent on the payment of taxes. Their concept of the ideal government was one with bread in one hand and a club in the other: that is to say, dispensing benefits for which they were not called upon to pay, and maintaining a strong justice with impartiality. The Turks had in no way lived up to this conception. The British Administration at its inception had been promising, but it had gradually lost its ideal character. Tribal districts were now forced to pay revenue such as they had never paid before² and as they were never to pay again.³ In the Muntafiq, for instance, the collection of revenue per capita had increased from less than one-fifth of a rupee (As.2 Ps.10 or 3d.) in 1916⁴ to Rs.5 As. 10 in 1919 (about 8s. 6d. in sterling). It fell again to Rs.1 As.4 (about 1s. 11d.) in 1922,⁵ rising to Rs.4 As.5 (6s. 6d.) in 1929, above which it has never risen. Nor did the tribesmen see

¹ *Admin. Report Muntafiq*, 1920, p. 4; *ibid.*, 1921, p. 5

² *Supra*, pp. 118, 145. The Banī Hūchaim paid heavy taxation for the first time in their history in 1919 *Admin. Report, Diwaniyah Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1.

³ The collection of Revenue in the Muntafiq, 1916 to 1928 was:

1916 Rs 52,464 (*) Only Nāsiriya and Sūq ash-Shuyūkh districts occupied.

1919 16,61,823 (*)

1922 3,68,508 (†) April 1st, 1922, to February 1st, 1923.

1926 10,02,659 (‡)

1928 12,77,233 (§) The peak year before fall in prices.

(*) *Admin. Report Muntafiq*, 1921, p. 31; (†) *Report of the Accountant-General*, 1922-23 (Baghdad, 1924), pp. 11-12; (‡) *Report on the Operations of the Revenue Department, Ministry of Finance*, 1926-27 (Baghdad, 1927), p. 23; (§) *Ibid.*, 1928-29 (Baghdad, 1929), p. 32.

⁴ Based on a population of 295,537, the average of the estimate 320,000 in 1918-19 and that of 271,074, made in 1930-1 for the League of Nations. Ditchburn in *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, p. 1, estimated the Muntafiq population at 300,000.

⁵ April 1st, 1922, to February 1st, 1923.

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benefits flowing directly to their districts in proportion to the taxation. The receipts for the great tribal Divisions of Muntafiq. Dīwāniya and Shāmīya in 1920 were estimated at Rs.55,33,100 or nearly one-quarter of the total local revenue of the fourteen divisions.¹ The purely divisional expenditures in the three divisions were Rs.19,29,440 or 18·8 per cent of the total divisional expenditure.²

Another grievance dominated tribal feeling. The tribal policy adopted by the British authorities in 1915-16 for restoring the power of the shaikhs, largely for military reasons, had been extremely valuable but it had been carried beyond its original and logical conclusions. It had carried with it the necessity of supporting the paramount shaikh in all but the most flagrant uses of his power. Events had proved, however, that these shaikhs had abused their authority, using it for their personal aggrandizement. The other shaikhs and tribesmen, sullen and resentful of the growing autocracy of the Government shaikhs, found in Nationalism a promise of release both from the shaikhs and from the Government which supported them.³ It is a fact that in the Insurrection of 1920 the enmity of the insurgent shaikhs and tribesmen in many centres was directed less against the British, in spite of Shī'a incitement, than at the paramount Government shaikhs⁴ who, in many cases, were forced into the towns from which they dared not stir. In this atmosphere the exhortations of the religious firebrands to rise, slay and loot produced results far greater than the intrinsic merit of their Nationalist propaganda would justify.

Nevertheless, in spite of the undeniable power of fanatical religion among the turbulent tribesmen and in spite of the tribal grievances and hatreds which both Shī'a and Sharifian

¹ *Budget Estimates, 1920-1921*, p. iv.

² *Ibid.*, p. v.

³ *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 143. But cf. *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1921, pp. 2-3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9 (7g); Shelswell, G. H., A.P.O. Samāwa. *Official Report on the Causes of the Tribal Disturbances in the Samāwah District*, August 9th, 1920.

propaganda fused into action, it was not until the rumours of a weakening government seemed to be borne out by its inability to control the situation, that the tribes were emboldened to rise. To the tribal mind, it would have then been a mistake not to have struck when there was a likelihood of the British being overwhelmed and folly to have supported the regime if it were falling. Until that time, however, little evidence of tribal disaffection was apparent. Thus, when reviewing the local political situation in 1919, the Political Officer of Hilla Division reported that a mild form of unrest, connected with the anti-British propaganda emanating from Karbalā, had passed over his Division. It had manifested itself in lawlessness, in murders, attacks on pilgrims and by desertion of Levies with rifles, but prompt action such as the deportation of the ringleaders, the operations of gunboats and the imposition of fines had brought peace.¹ He believed little genuine anti-British feeling existed, except at the Holy City. He warned the Civil Administration, however, that the ‘whole series of episodes is instructive of what may recur any time until the future of ‘Iraq is definitely announced’.² In Dīwāniya, Major C. K. Daly, the Political Officer, reported that an undercurrent of Sharifian propaganda had blown through the Division without leaving any appreciable effect,³ but that the natural lawlessness and truculence of the Samāwa and Rumaitha tribes were causing difficulties in administration.⁴ In the Shāmīya Division, in which Najaf was located, the annual report stated that while the religious authorities had co-operated thus far with the Government, the tribes obviously were ‘marking time’ with an eye on the future, and that they would act accordingly as the Government seemed strong enough to reach them.⁵ In the Muntafiq, the influence of propaganda aided by Sharifian gold⁶ had made itself felt. Certain of the

¹ *Admn. Report, Hillah Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1.

² *Monthly Reports, August*, 1919, Hilla, p. 22.

³ *Ibid.*, Dīwāniya, p. 25.

⁴ *Admn. Report, Diwamiyah*, 1919, p. 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Shamiyah Division* 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Muntafiq*, 1920.

Political Officers, however, believed that the Sharifian influence would have little effect in the Muntafiq because of the self-interests of the *fallahin* and *sarkals*. The Officers stated, however, that it would take low taxation and firm treatment to ensure the maintenance of these friendly relations, the Muntafiq Arabs being like gunpowder: the slightest spark would send them off. The tribes were reported as being quiet at that moment, but with arms at hand, their towers still standing and with a consciousness of their fighting ability, they were dangerous potentialities. They could be persuaded to do almost anything by agitators with a free hand and plenty of money.¹

Opposed to the British for entirely different reasons but nevertheless joining actively in the agitation against them were the many ex-officials of the former regime repatriated in 'Iraq. Some of these, discontented with the pensions paid them from the Civil Treasury, favoured any regime which would give them employment. Most of them, however, hated Great Britain and sought the return of the Turks or else desired a Muslim Government joined to a pan-Islamic Federation headed by Turkey.

The Nationalists could also count upon the support of many of the landlord class who, accustomed under the Turkish regime to exercise their privilege of collecting their rent to the last piastre without obligation either to the land or tenant, now found a strong arm imposed between them and the *fallahin*. Tenants, also, who had managed by devious means to escape payment of rent, had little reason to wish for the continuance of a Government which insisted on the payment of rent as well as of revenue. To them, as well as to many other classes, the insistence of the British Administration on its standards of justice, order, punctuality, the conduct of public business and sanitation, had little counterpart in their customs and in their habits of thought. Its unrelenting efficiency and thoroughness and even

¹ Shatra District Report in *Admin Report, Muntafiq Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 92.

its probity were unfamiliar, irksome and unnecessary. The very benefits of the British regime, although rightly and sincerely appreciated in many quarters, were not uncommonly regarded as bribes, or folly or as things of unknown import.¹ The sudden and, in many instances, the complete change from the old to the new, in spite of all the good intentions of the administrative officials, undoubtedly left the Arabs often bewildered and aggrieved whereas in other circumstances they should have been grateful. It may also be questioned whether a greater adaptation of Western administrative methods to the existing conditions would not have been possible and whether a greater latitude between the spirit and the letter of the system employed could not have been permitted. It seems probable that had the Civil Administration been less anxious to justify its continued existence by proving its superiority over the previous regime and over all other possible regimes, as well as its efficiency and its ability to turn Arabs into good citizens along the lines favoured by the Acting Civil Commissioner; had it been staffed with men older and more experienced in dealing with Arab character and temperament;² or had the Civil Administration shown itself more sympathetic to the idea of an Arab Government, instead of merely paying it lip-service as a possibility in some remote and indefinite future, many of the classes who hardened their hearts against the once-popular British regime would have continued to support it.

Only gradually during 1919 did the National Movement take on shape and substance. In the Holy Cities, religious agitation against the British which had remained comparatively quiet during the lifetime of the Chief *Muhtaid*, Saiyid Kādhim Yazdī,

¹ *Admin. Report, Kirkuk Division, 1920* (Baghdad, 1922), p. 7.

² On June 1st, 1920, according to the *Monthly List of Gazetted Officers, Part I* (Baghdad, 1920), 96.3 per cent of the Divisional Political Officers had not reached their fortieth birthday. Two-thirds of them had not reached their thirtieth birthday and 23 per cent were 25 years of age or younger. Of the entire administrative staff, 87.5 per cent were less than 40 years of age, and 42 per cent were less than 30 years old. The Acting Civil Commissioner himself was 35 years of age.

who was in receipt of a large subsidy from the Administration, took on new virulence under Saiyid Muhammad Ridhā, son of Saiyid Muhammad Taqī Sharazī, the new Chief *Mujtahid*, who was entirely under his son's influence. Saiyid Mirza Muhammad Ridhā, it was alleged,¹ was in contact with the Bolsheviks and with the Turks. He and his associates were arrested in Karbalā for fomenting disorders in September, 1919, but he was released under guarantee from his father. In Kādhimain, the hostility of the winter of 1918-19 had not abated.

In the south, as in Basra, sentiment remained in favour of the British.² In 'Amārah, the Political Officer reported that 'the year has been one of peace, nothing has occurred to belie the sentiments expressed by the shaikhs towards the British Government on the visit of the Civil Commissioner to 'Amarah in December, 1918, and one may suppose they were genuine.'³

In the north, in the Kirkūk district, elements of discontent were reported by the Political Officer of the Division, Captain S. H. Longrigg. He believed that within twelve months trouble might be expected if efforts were not made to placate the discontented sections of the population.⁴

In Baghdad, as in other districts, Nationalist agitation went on largely under cover. Public meetings could not be held except with government consent, although the mosques often were used in the later stages of the Movement for political meetings. Secret meetings were held in private houses. As no newspapers were permitted save those owned by the Government, placards and circulars were distributed in the city. Secret societies embracing practically all the educated Muslims were formed in every town. Nationalist agents were sent to towns and tribes to stir up the country and to collect funds, ostensibly for a National Secondary School in Baghdad but in reality to

¹ *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 144.

² *Admin. Report*, 1919, *Civil Administration, Mesopotamia*, (Calcutta, 1920), Part IV, Basra.

³ *Admin. Report*, 'Amarah Division, 1919 (Baghdad, 1921), p. 2.

⁴ *Admin. Report*, Kirkūk Division, 1919 (Baghdad, 1921), p. 5.

provide for propaganda.¹ The school was actually started in January, 1920, the usual Government subsidy having been requested and obtained. It was, however, less of an educational institution than a centre for disseminating anti-British propaganda and a forcing-house for young Nationalists.²

The chief encouragement to the Nationalist Movement, in late 1919 and early 1920, came from the incidents occurring at Dair az-Zūr and in the country between it and Mōsul where, as points fairly accessible to Syria and Turkey, Arab national sentiment was being stirred and cultivated from Syrian and Kamalist sources.

At the armistice, the definite boundaries between Turkey and Mesopotamia and between Mesopotamia and Syria had not been defined. In the middle of December, 1919, for reasons still obscure,³ the Civil Administration took over the town of Dair az-Zūr and the region around it controlling the trade artery between Aleppo and the trans-Euphrates hinterland, although the Commander-in-Chief had refused military support for any point above al-Qaim on the Euphrates.

The town, from the outset, became a bone of contention between the Civil Administration and the Damascus Government. Captain F. E. Carver, sent to take over, found that an Arab *Mutasarrif* had been appointed under orders from the Governor of Aleppo, Shukrī Pasha al-‘Ayyūbī. The latter, after pressure had been applied from Damascus, was constrained to withdraw the *Mutasarrif* and his Arab associates and to declare that they had acted contrary to instructions. Great Britain, following conversations with France in September, 1919, agreed that the line of the Khābūr valley should be the provisional frontier, in spite of protests from the Civil authorities

¹ According to Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, in an interview with the writer.

² Ibid., also *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 140.

³ The request of the inhabitants for a British Officer has been the only official reason (*Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 133), but Sir Arnold Wilson suggests that the undesirability of leaving a no-man's land for a possible invasion of the Turks was the motive (Wilson, op. cit., p. 229).

in Baghdad that the line split tribal units. The subsequent evacuation of Dair az-Zūr on December 25th, 1919, under circumstances somewhat damaging to British prestige,¹ became the precursor of militant Arab Nationalism.

Propaganda at the hands of Ramadhan ash-Shallash, of Maulūd Pasha, a Mōsulī, formerly on Amīr Faisal's staff, of the *Mudūr* of Mayyādīn, situated below the provisional frontier, and of other Arab officers increased and became more and more threatening. Gendarmes were enrolled at higher rates than paid in 'Iraq; officials were appointed at high salaries; shaikhs were given gifts; and taxes were collected within British territory. Letters and incitements to *Jihād* were broadcast to shaikhs as far south as 'Amāra, with the aim of discrediting the British Administration. The tribes themselves were urged to violence against everything British. The Shammar, the 'Aqaidāt and other tribes, not loath to revert to their ancient ways, robbed caravans and attacked convoys. Throughout the period, the Damascus Government protested that the Dair az-Zūr officials were an embarrassment to it, but in reality they seemed to enjoy its support and approval. They persistently demanded that the British withdraw to Wādī Haurān, some miles below 'Āna. The proclamation in Damascus of 'Abdullāh Ibn Husain as King of 'Iraq, March 8th, by *Al-'Ahd al-'Irāqīya* or 'Iraqī Covenanters, augmented the vehemence of their demands. Only the British desire to avoid open conflict in which they could not be sure of success prevented hostilities. Sahitiya was evacuated early in May and Abū Kāmal a few days later, the frontier being set at just above al-Qaim, about fifty miles above 'Āna. These steps, including the original one of evacuating Dair az-Zūr, were construed by the 'Iraqī Nationalists as demonstrating the validity of the Arab demands as well as being signs of British military weakness which, in truth, had influenced British policy. Accounts of how the British army had been turned out of Dair az-Zūr and, in turn, out of Abū

¹ *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, pp. 134-6.

Kamāl and now awaited a final blow at ‘Āna at the hands of the Arabs led by the Sharīf ‘Abdullāh, filled the Syrian newspapers and circulated in the coffee shops of Baghdad, Mōsul and every town in the land.

Nowhere was the anti-British feeling engendered by these activities more apparent than in Mōsul and in the surrounding country. In Mōsul during 1919, striking progress had been made under British administration. Public security was vastly improved, taxation equalized, the city so cleansed that the transformation appeared miraculous to those who had known it in pre-war days.¹ Education had been encouraged and medical treatment had been extended to all.² Trade had been stimulated and a return of prosperity seemed imminent. Nevertheless, it was evident that ready acquiescence by the Muslims in British Administration was being rendered extremely difficult by the general acceptance of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, by the delay in signing the peace treaty with Turkey, by the existence of an Arab State in Syria and by the claims of Islam and of self-interest.³ Indications had not been lacking of the activities of the Nationalist society, *Al-‘Ahd al-‘Irāqīya*, which had been introduced, it was said,⁴ by Jamīl Beg Midfai, a native of Mōsul and a member of Amīr Faisal's staff,⁵ and by ‘Ibrāhīm Kamāl Beg when they visited Mōsul in March, 1919.

Following the occupation of Dair az-Zūr by the Damascus Government and the appointment of the violently anti-British *Mudīr* to Mayyādīn, the society gave open manifestation of its hostility to the British Administration in the form of meetings and in the posting of anti-government notices, ranging in subject from obscene abuse to well-written proclamations calling

¹ See Sykes, Sir Mark, *The Caliph's Last Heritage* (1915), p. 3389.

² *Admin. Report*, 1919, *Mesopotamia*, Part 1, Mōsul, p. 32.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 8.

⁴ *Admin. Report, Mosul Division*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1921), p. 3.

⁵ As leader of the attack on Tall ‘Afar, he was excluded from the amnesty of 1921. He was pardoned in April, 1922, and has been three times Prime Minister of ‘Iraq as well as Minister of Interior, Minister of Defence, etc.

upon Arabs to rise and die for their fatherland. For the most part, *Al-'Ahd* seemed to be composed of young men: doctors, lawyers, schoolmasters (a number of whom had been dismissed in the winter of 1919 for too violently proclaiming their anti-British sentiments) and the like. Nevertheless, while the members may have been unimportant individually, collectively they were important. The moderates, as is usually the case, held their peace and remained passive. *Al-'Ahd*, on the other hand, being well organized and having definite aims, gained the ear of the populace.¹

It became evident that the society in Mōsul was in contact with members of the parent society in Dair az-Zūr and beyond, and that the Mōsulīs were prepared to rise should any opportunity be given them by the Sharifian forces. In late March, 1920, the first definite reports that the Arab Government intended to attack Mōsul were received and throughout April and May the tension increased. Outside Mōsul, the Shammar Jarba under 'Ajil al-Yawar, Michal al-Fāris Bunaiyan, Hamaidī and others, the Khābūr Jūbūr under Muslat, the 'Albū Nimr, the 'Aqaidāt and other tribes² were rendering life and property unsafe. From April onwards, the concentration of tribal raids on military supply-camps and on military convoys between the Shargat rail-head and Mōsul pointed to other purposes than mere desire for loot, and to a higher control than that of tribal shaikhs. The methods employed seemed to indicate that the former officers of Faisal's Arab Army had not forgotten the tactics used by Colonel Lawrence and his fellow officers against the Turkish lines of supply in the Hijāz and in Syria. Instead of

¹ The Society was admitted by the authorities to be extremely well organized (*Ibid.*, p. 5). Not until late May was the Government able to identify definitely even a few of the leading members. Of the other two patriotic societies, the *Haras* (the continuation of the pre-war secret society) and the *Hullal*, nothing was known to the authorities except the names.

² For locale and strength of these tribes: *Note on Nomad Tribes*, by Major J. I. Eadie; *Note on Tribes and Shaikhs of 'Anah-Albu Kamal Districts*; *Arab Tribes of the Baghdad Wilayet*, *Note on Tribes for General Staff*; and *Handbook of Mesopotamia*, pp. 110 ff.

Turkish garrisons being reduced by means of British arms and funds, it was now British forces, isolated at Mōsul, which were being rendered ineffective by means of Turkish arms and by forces stimulated by both Turkish and British funds.¹

On May 30th, the British authorities at Mōsul sent to Baghdad a warning based on the information that an Arab Army under Jamīl Beg Midfai, styling himself ‘Commander of the Northern ‘Iraq Army’, had gathered at Tall Fajāmi on the Khābūr, with Mōsul as its objective. The warning was disregarded by the military authorities at Baghdad.² Except for reconnaissances by aeroplanes and armoured cars which failed to locate the approaching Arabs, no other efforts to oppose them were made by the Mōsul military authorities until too late.³ The only chance of checking the Arab forces lay in the hope that the Gendarmes at Tall ‘Afar, considered as one of the most promising companies, could interpose themselves between the approaching army. Treachery had been at work, however. During the night of June 3rd, Captain Stuart, Commander of the Gendarmes, was murdered by Muhammad ‘Alī Effendi, one of the Gendarme officers. It was then too much to hope that the men would rally to the support of the British. Early on the morning of June 4th, tribesmen rode into the town, followed by the Arab Army under Jamīl Beg Midfai and by a large force of the Jūbūr under Muslat, and of the Shammar under ‘Ajil, Bunaiyan and Hachīm. The three British other ranks, after defending themselves for several hours from the roof of their billet, were killed by bombs. Two armoured cars sent out from Mōsul were ambushed, overturned and their crews, numbering fourteen, were killed. A reconnoitring aeroplane was shot down and narrowly avoided capture. In the meantime, Captain Barlow, who had been out on reconnaissance

¹ It seems certain that arms as well as funds came to the Sharifian officers at Dair az-Zūr from Turkish sources, and that the British subsidy to the Damascus Government also kept them in funds. *Review C. Admn.*, 1914-1920, pp. 138-9.

² Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

³ *Admn. Report, Mosul*, 1920, p. 1.

had been captured by tribesmen and afterwards killed while trying to make his escape.¹

From Tall 'Afar, raiding parties from the tribes attacked the Mōsul-Shargāt road and did considerable damage to the military convoys. Letters were sent to all the surrounding country, urging it to revolt and attack Mōsul, where a rising was expected. When, however, the outposts of the Arab army came in contact with the British column, sent out from Mōsul on June 5th, Jamīl Beg and his officers fled to Dair az-Zūr.

It was evident to British observers that the Movement had derived its strength from the general belief that either Sharīf 'Abdullāh or Sharīf Zaid were behind it in person. 'There is no reasonable doubt', the Political Officer for Mōsul wrote later, 'that the expedition was organized by the *'Ahd* organization in Syria, that it was armed from the Sharifian arsenal in Dair az-Zur, that Faisal deprecated it but was aware of it, and that it was actively encouraged and financed by Zaid'.²

The failure of the Arab Army to make a stand, the non-appearance of the expected Sharīf and the prompt action of the British troops convinced the countryside as well as most of the inhabitants of Mōsul that they had best stand by the existing order. Nevertheless, the *'Ahd* was too well organized to give up hope. On June 6th, the first notice bearing its five-pointed seal was published, predicting the immediate expulsion of the British. The notices continued until June 17th, when the last one appeared, repudiating the decision of the San Remo Conference and reiterating the kingship of 'Abdullāh. Rumours filled the air of a gathering of fresh forces for an attack on Mōsul. The fall of Damascus and the occupation of Syria by the French in late July ended the trans-Euphrates period of Nationalism. Its inspiration during the next few months came from Baghdad.

During July, letters were received from Baghdad, telling of the notable work achieved by the *Mandubīn*, and calling on the

¹ *Admin. Report, Mosul, 1920, pp. 1-2.*

² *Ibid., p. 2.*

patriots of Mōsul to do similar good work. On August 6th, at a *maulūd* held in the Nebī Jūrjis Mosque, the congregation, after several highly patriotic speeches, was asked to name forty delegates to formulate and present demands to the Government. The following demands were submitted:

- (1) Preservation of personal rights and liberties, with special reference to deserters and to certain unfortunate incidents connected with the behaviour of the troops.
- (2) Freedom of speech and the Press.
- (3) Acceleration of the calling of the ‘Iraq Constituent Council, the elections for which should be held in principle according to Turkish law.
- (4) That it should be recorded that the two ex-deputies, Dā‘ūd Effendi Yūsufanī and Hasan Beg, who had been invited to serve on the Electoral Committee in Baghdad, were not to be considered as representatives of Mosul.¹

The High Commissioner’s reply, received on October 6th and declared to be satisfactory by the older members of the Forty, together with his later visit to Mōsul, did much to restore confidence. The period of the Baghdad Nationalist influence in the Mōsul area came to an end. Further stimulus for the region was to be received from Mardīn, Diyārbekr and other points over the Turkish frontier whither Arab officers had gone in the hope of receiving help. Some assistance had already been given, as to Jamīl Beg but other promises failed to materialize at opportune moments. In the end, many of the Arabs realized that any aid given by the Turks was in the furtherance of their own interests and was anti-British and anti-French rather than pro-Arab. Had the Turks given substantial assistance when it was most needed or had the various anti-British elements in Upper ‘Iraq risen in unison, the situation might have got out of hand on several occasions when it was touch-and-go. As it was, Mōsul and the British forces there were so isolated and so difficult to keep supplied

¹ *Admn. Report, Mosul, 1920*, p 4

with necessities, that on July 14th, when the prospect of early reinforcements from India to keep lines of communication open and to meet the situation in lower 'Iraq seemed faint, the Acting Civil Commissioner actually put forward the proposal to give up the whole Wilayet of Mōsul.¹ The proposal was vetoed both in India and London and means were found to maintain the garrison.

In the remainder of 'Iraq and particularly in Baghdad, the incidents on the upper Euphrates and the news of Sharīf 'Abdullāh's election, on March 8th, had spurred the Nationalists to renewed agitation² to which the Covenanters at Damascus continued to give their support. These activities led Miss Gertrude Bell, whose Intelligence work kept her in close touch with Arab sentiment, to write on April 10th:

I think we're on the edge of a pretty considerable Arab nationalist demonstration with which I'm a good deal in sympathy. It will, however, force our hand and we shall have to see whether it will leave us with enough hold to carry on here. . . .³

The announcement, on May 3rd, that Great Britain had been assigned the Mandate for 'Iraq further agitated the Nationalists to whom it came as fresh proof that Great Britain had no intention of keeping her early promises. Their opposition was based on objections more fundamental than any failure to appreciate the concept of trusteeship originally implied in the mandate system.⁴ That failure, it has been

¹ Haldane, op cit, p. 235. Also Telegrams. Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, No 8785, July 21st, 1920; No 9889, August 16th, 1920.

² A series of letters, dated 23 Rabiab (April 12th), 1920, and addressed to the King of Syria (Faisal) and to the King of 'Iraq ('Abdullāh), later fell into the hands of the authorities. The letters congratulated the two Amirs in their election, and assured the latter a welcome from his loyal subjects. They were signed by the Shaikhs and Saiyids of the Shāmiya, the Samāwa, the Rumaitha (Banī Hūchaim) and the Muntafiq tribes, and by the notables and Saiyids of Najaf, Kūfa, Hilla and of the Shāmiya. Every one of the signatories, with the exception of two, took leading parts in the Insurrection of 1920.

³ Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 486

⁴ Wright, Quincy, *Mandates under the League of Nations* (Chicago, 1930), pp. 314 ff.

maintained, was aggravated by the unfortunate use of the Arabic words ‘*amr* for Mandate and *amīr* or *mamūr* for the Mandatory, with their connotations of subservience to a ruling person or power and of a ruler, respectively, instead of the words *intidāb* and *daulāt muntadibah*, from the root *nadaba*, to choose, or of other words implying trusteeship, from the root ‘*amūna*.¹ The latter view ignores Arab intelligence as well as the strength of Arab national sentiment. Whatever the Arabic word used, ‘Iraqī Nationalists could only view the mandatory system, then as in after years when the course of events in Syria, Palestine, Africa and the Pacific gave substance to their contentions, as imperialism in a new guise and as colonization under a new name.² It meant subjection to a foreign power and the consequent loss of national independence. The Nationalist newspaper *Al-Istiqlāl* stated the feeling of Nationalists generally in 1920 as well as in 1922, when it said:

We do not reject the mandate because of its name but because its meaning is destructive of independence . . . Words like *intidab*, *wusayah*, *himayah*, *itiman*, *musa‘adah*, *muhaliḥ*, *iṣṣraf* and *musharafah* are used by the colonizers; they all translate mandate and are intended to deceive weak nations. The name only is changed, just in the same way as they talk of liberating humanity, helping the weak, etc.³

The attempt to make the Mandate more palatable by maintaining that it was an obligation laid on Great Britain by the League of Nations was countered by the refusal of the Nationalists both to recognize the authority of the League to give mandates⁴ and to regard Great Britain’s assumption of responsibility in ‘Iraq as an altruistic response to the League.

¹ *Baghdad Times*, May 26th, 29th, June 20th, 1922.

² ‘Iraqis refuse foreign restriction of liberty, under whatever name.’ *Al-Mufīd*, June 8th, 1922.

³ *Al-Istiqlāl* (Baghdad), June 5th, 1922; *Al-Rāḥdān* (Baghdad), June 5th, 1922; *Al-Mufīd*, June 8th, 1922.

⁴ ‘Iraq does not recognize authority of the League of Nations to give Mandates. Why have the mandates for ‘Iraq, Syria and former German colonies been given while no one will take Armenia?’ *Al-Mufīd*, June 8th, 1922.

They, and Arabs in general, viewed the assignment of mandates in the same light as did Lord Curzon when, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he said in the House of Lords, June 25th, 1920:

It is quite a mistake to suppose . . . that under the Covenant of the League, or any other instrument, the gift of the mandate rests with the League of Nations. It does not do so. It rests with the Powers who have conquered the territories, which it then falls to them to distribute, and it was in these circumstances that the mandate for Palestine and Mesopotamia was conferred upon and accepted by us, and that the mandate for Syria was conferred upon and accepted by France.¹

One of the first results of the announcement in Baghdad was a series of secret meetings of the Nationalist leaders who resolved on still stronger measures of propaganda and on a closer *rapprochement* between Shi'is and Sunnis. Counter-demands to the Bonham-Carter proposals, well known in Baghdad at the time, were also to be formulated and presented to the British Government, by the *Mandubīn* or Delegates. This body of fifteen or seventeen Nationalists had been selected from the larger group and the list had then been submitted, in the autumn of 1919, for approval to a political gathering in one of the mosques. This had been given.²

To further the Shi'a-Sunni *rapprochement*, religious services known as *maulūds*, in honour of the birth of the Prophet, were organized in the month of Ramadhan, beginning May 19th. In these *maulūds*, held alternately in every Shi'a and Sunni mosque, leading members of the two sects took part, by special invitation of the mosque authorities or of the secular heads of the city quarter in which the mosques were located. Following the religious ceremonies, which usually combined both Sunni and Shi'a rites, were patriotic speeches and poems appealing

¹ *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. XL (1920), p. 877.

² According to Saiyid Muhammad al-Sadr.

to patriotism, to honour and to religion. So keenly was public feeling aroused by these nightly meetings that several clashes between the police and Nationalists took place. The turbulent gathering of Nationalists, on May 24th, to secure the release of one of their number, arrested because of a speech made at a *maulūd*, provoked such an alarming disturbance that armed cars patrolled the streets, firing shots over the heads of the crowd. General unrest settled on Baghdad. Bazaars closed on the slightest rumours. Attacks on solitary British officers and men were frequent. The presentation of the Nationalist demands by the *Mandubīn* to the Acting Civil Commissioner and his staff at the *Sarai* on June 2nd became, as already indicated,¹ a great Nationalist demonstration, the news of which was spread throughout the country. The announcement, on June 20th, that Sir Percy Cox would return to set up an Arab Government had a favourable reception among many influential ‘Iraqīs, but it was received with mistrust by Nationalists as a whole. The *Mandubīn* again demanded, on June 30th, ‘the formation of a General Council for ‘Iraq’ which they expected to declare the immediate and complete independence of ‘Iraq.’²

While the agitation was increasing in Baghdad, Shī‘a divines of the Holy Cities had also intensified their efforts among the tribes and the provincial towns. Broadsheets from their printing presses, letters and documents, some of them carrying the forged signature of the Chief *Mujtahid*, Saiyid Muhammad Taqī, were circulated. These exhorted true believers to defend Islam against the infidels and urged them to send delegates to Baghdad to form an Islamic Government. A covenant binding the tribes to a concerted rising was signed by a number of shaikhs.³

Plans for the rising seem to have been definitely formulated at Karbalā in the middle of June when groups of shaikhs and

¹ *Supra*, pp. 216-17.

² *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, p. 2.

³ Letter, *Mandubīm* to Military Governor and Political Officer of Baghdad, June 30th, 1920.

notables went there on pilgrimage. Later, at a tribal gathering at Shumali, the leading shaikhs between Shināfiya and Hilla unanimously determined to follow the lead of Yūsuf as-Sūwardī and Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr. As a result of incitement from Baghdad, the Holy Cities and Syria, the tribes and towns became increasingly restless. A train was derailed above Baghdad in late May, and others below Hilla in early June. Petty crimes increased at an alarming rate. Arabs in government service began to resign. The collection of revenue on winter crops became more and more difficult. In Shatra, in the Muntafiq, it had already been intimated to Captain Mead, the Assistant Political Officer, on May 17th, that should he persist in carrying out chain or rope measurement of crops, he would be forcibly resisted.¹ The arrest of six agitators at Hilla² relaxed the tension there, but the arrest and deportation to Henjam³ of Mirza Muhammad Ridhā and nine others at Karbalā on June 22nd added to the perilousness of the situation on the middle Euphrates. The arrest of Hajjī Muklūf, the principal agitator in Dīwāniya, did nothing to check the rising there. Signs of incipient unrest were manifest everywhere and a lapse into former lawlessness and anarchy seemed imminent. It was clear that only a spark would be needed to send off the train of insurrection.

¹ *Adm. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, pp. 2-3. This method of crop assessment, introduced by the Turks, is described in detail in *Revenue Report*, 1917, p. 18. As late as 1929, rope measurement was employed in the Muntafiq and elsewhere in Iraq as a normal method of crop assessment: *Report of Revenue Department*, 1928-1929, pp. 11-13; also App. O. But cf. Wilson, op. cit., p. 282.

² Telegram No. 7289, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to P.O. Hilla, June 16th, 1920.

³ According to the official *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf*, p. 629 ff., Henjam is a small, rocky and dismal island in the Persian Gulf not far from the Clarence Straits. Its climate in summer is 'barely tolerable', the heat being terrific and aggravated by moisture, sandflies and other insects.

THE INSURRECTION OF 1920

AT Rumaitha on the lower Euphrates, always a centre of unrest, the incident occurred which precipitated the Insurrection. On June 30th, the Dhawalim section of the Banī Hūchaim broke into the Government *Sarai* to release their Shaikh who had been detained by the Assistant Political Officer, as the result of a dispute over an agricultural loan.¹ The local disturbance became the occasion of the general rising. The entire tribe, under orders from Najaf and Kūfa, besieged the Political staff and garrison from July 4th; cut the railroad above and below Rumaitha, while other tribes attacked the Government offices at Samāwa and besieged the two companies stationed there. The railroad was again cut above and below Samāwa.² The situation was not irreparable, however, and had prompt and effectively directed action been taken with sufficient troops, the rising might have been quickly suppressed, although the tribes appeared to be under the direction of 'Iraqī ex-officers from Baghdad and Syria. At Rumaitha and Samāwa, the British had definitely entered upon a trial of strength with the tribes. The tribal leaders were well aware of the essential objectives before the British: relief of the garrisons and the reinstatement of the Government. The immediate achievement of these two objectives was to be the determining factor either for peace or for insurrection in the rest of the country.

¹ *London Gazette*, July 5th, 1921, p. 5330, Dispatch No. 3 (with Appendixes) from Lieut.-Gen. Sir J. A. L. Haldane, November 8th, 1920 (hereafter *London Gazette*). Also Report, Lieut. P. T. Hyatt, A.P.O., Rumaitha, August 10th, 1920; Note on Outbreak of Disturbances at Rumaitha, C. Daly, P.O., Dīwāniya, August 26th, 1920.

² Telegram No. 8233, Civil Commissioner to India Office, July 8th, 1920.

INSURRECTION OF 1920

Although the general situation had long been known to be threatening, only 4200 British troops and 30,000 Indian troops were available for active service out of the total force estimated at 133,000.¹ Nor were the necessary steps following the outbreak taken with the requisite speed and decision. Sir Aylmer Haldane, Commander-in-Chief, had returned on June 24th, to the Persian Hill station where the bulk of his Headquarters Staff was already in residence. Moreover, Military Headquarters tended to place little faith in the reports of the Political Officers regarding the seriousness of the situation.² The resultant lack of co-operation on this initial occasion, as on later occasions, was not without disastrous consequences.

Two attempts to relieve Rumaitha were unsuccessful³ and led to further encouragement of the tribes. Not until July 20th was a relief column, after severe fighting, able to reach the town which was evacuated the next day.⁴ Samāwa was not relieved until October 14th. In the meantime, the Miskhab tribes below Najaf marched on Abu Sūkhair, on July 13th. The following day, the southern Banī Hasan tribe arose. On July 20th, Kūfa was besieged and was not relieved until October 17th. On the same day the Banī Hasan attacked Kifl, to relieve which, a force including three companies of the 3rd Manchesters was dispatched in intense heat and without adequate arrangements for water. The force met with overwhelming disaster, less than half the original number returning to Hilla. The incident was magnified by rumour. Practically the whole of the middle Euphrates rose. Rumaitha, Hindīya Barrage and Musaiyib had already been evacuated; Samāwa and Kūfa

¹ *London Gazette*, p. 5330 (9); Appendix No. 1; Haldane, Sir J. A. L., *The Insurrection in Mesopotamia*, 1920, p. 325. Sir Aylmer estimated that of these troops only 500 British and 2500 to 3000 Indian troops were available as a mobile force; *ibid.*, p. 72.

² For the Commander-in-Chief's attitude to Political Staff, Haldane, *op. cit.*, p. 92; also Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-6.

³ The additional troops sent July 1st, 2nd and 3rd were insufficient to beat off the insurgents, and the relief expedition, sent July 7th, was forced to return after severe fighting; *London Gazette*, p. 5331.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5332 (28).

were besieged and other points had been either cut off or endangered. Withdrawal from Dīwānīya to Hilla, which had been repeatedly attacked, was deemed essential. It was effected under great difficulties, July 30th.¹ For a time, no order could be maintained outside the line of defences immediately about Baghdad.²

The British reverses on the middle Euphrates not unnaturally reacted on the situation on the lower Euphrates and in the Muntafiq. On July 30th, Saiyid Hādī al-Mūqutar from Najaf appeared in the Samāwa area, establishing himself at Khidhr. Supported, it was alleged, by ‘an immense quantity of gold’,³ he became the leading figure among the insurgents, inflaming the tribes to a *Jihād* with but one aim: the overthrow of the Civil Administration in the lower Euphrates. Other Saiyids and ‘*Ulamā*, operating on the Gharrāf, at Shatra and at Khidhr, joined him in preaching the *Jihād* which was declared from Karbalā about August 6th.⁴ These activities were doubly effective on the tribes in conjunction with what appeared to be continued British reverses. Musaiyib had been reoccupied on August 12th, and Hindīya Barrage on August 13th, but the evacuation of Qal‘at Sikar on August 12th, following an attack on it, led the insurgents to believe that they had inflicted a military defeat on the Government and had driven it from a large portion of the country. The insurgents’ belief in the success of the rising seemed confirmed by the British loss of Khidhr with two armoured trains on August 13th; by the isolation by land of Samāwa on the same day; by the loss of several British vessels on the upper Euphrates on August 15th; by the evacuation of Shatra on August 20th;⁵ by the capture of the *S.9* with all on board, on August 28th; by the evacuation of

¹ *London Gazette*, p. 5335 (50-8).

² *Review C. Admin*, 1914-1920, p. 147.

³ *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, pp. 20, 21.

⁴ *London Gazette*, p. 5337 (66).

⁵ Not August 27th as in Haldane: op. cit., p. 215. See *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, pp. 20, 21.

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Sūq ash-Shuyūkh, on September 1st; and by the annihilation of a British force as it attempted to evacuate Samāwa railway camp, on September 3rd. In Nāsiriya alone, no rising took place, although it often appeared to be dangerously near. The appearance in the Muntafiq of the relief column for Samāwa at the end of September lessened the anxiety, but not until after the relief of Samāwa, October 14th,¹ and the submission of the Rumaitha tribes, did the rising collapse in the Muntafiq.

In the meantime, northward and westward of Baghdad fresh risings had broken out. In Ba'qūbā Division, the Mahrut Revenue Office was raided by a section of the Kharkīya tribe, on August 8th. On the following day, the same tribesmen attacked Abū Hawā Station. Diltāwa fell to the insurgents, August 12th. It had early come under the influence of Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr who, after the attempt to arrest him at Baghdad, August 12th, made it his headquarters² from which he encouraged the insurgents, especially at Sāmarrā.³ Ba'qūbā, which had always been anti-British, was evacuated by the British on the same day. Shahrābān, where a small but influential group of Nationalists had been in touch with the Baghdad leaders, was captured, August 13th,⁴ by the tribes, who killed Captain W. T. Wrigley, Captain J. T. Bradfield, Captain E. L. Buchanan,⁵ and two British Warrant Officers. A provisional Arab Government was then set up.⁶

Qizil Ribat and Khānaqīn, where the revolt was largely the work of the Dilo Kurds, without any trace of the national

¹ *London Gazette*, p. 5342 (114).

² *Admin. Report, Diyalah Division*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1922), p. 8; Haldane, op. cit., p. 233.

³ *Admin. Report, Samarra Division*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1921), pp. 1, 3.

⁴ See *Admin. Report, Diyalah*, 1920, pp. 2, 7. Haldane, op. cit., p. 164, gives date as August 15th.

⁵ Mrs. Buchanan, who had been slightly wounded, was rescued and protected until the relief column reached Shahrābān. See Buchanan, Z., *In the Hands of the Arabs* (1921).

⁶ For composition of this provisional government: *Admin. Report, Diyalah*, 1920, p. 6.

aspirations such as played a part in other districts, fell on August 14th. In Mandalī, where the Naqīb, Saiyid ‘Ilyas Agha, had enlarged on the Nationalist views held by Saiyid Talib Pasha with whom he was in close touch, a provisional government was also formed. It took over in an orderly manner from the Deputy Assistant Political Officer. Although not efficient, it succeeded in maintaining law and order until late October when it lost its authority. From Ba‘qūbā the insurrection spread to Kirkūk Division, but only in Kifri did open outbreaks occur. The tribes entered the town on August 26th, killing the Political Officer, Captain G. H. Salmon.

On August 27th, Ba‘qūbā was reoccupied by British Forces. The next day, a force from Kirkūk entered Kifri. On September 6th, a relief column reached Qizil Ribat,¹ another column occupying Shahrābān two days later.² Diltāwa was reached September 24th. Not until November 20th, when a cavalry column occupied Mandalī, did that area come under control again.

Among the tribes west and north-west of Baghdad, Colonel G. E. Leachman, by his vigorous methods and with the aid of liberal subsidies³ and the valuable assistance of Major J. I. Eadie, Assistant Political Officer at ‘Āna,⁴ of Shaikh ‘Alī as-Sulaimān of the Dulaim and of Shaikh Fahād Beg of the ‘Anaiza,⁵ who remained loyal throughout, was able to preserve

¹ During the Insurrection, the British Consul at Kermanshah arranged for the Sīyabī tribe in Persia to make extensive raids on the Dīlo tribes in ‘Iraq, who had been mainly responsible for the risings at Qizil Ribat and Khānaqīn. After the raids the tribe returned to Persia, *Admin Report, Diyala*, 1920, p. 5.

² *London Gazette*, p. 5338 (78).

³ Subsidies to shaikhs and Secret Service allowances in the Dulaim Division, of which Colonel Leachman was Political Officer, increased from Rs. 50,000 or £3,750 in 1919 (*Budget Estimates*, 1919-1920, p. 10) to Rs. 279,000 or £21,000 in 1920 (*Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. 21). Cf. Main, E., op. cit., p. 75, for claim that Leachman ‘had single-handed and without a penny to spend on bribes held the Upper Euphrates tribes in this time of full rebellion, all the troops having been withdrawn.’

⁴ For tribute to Major Eadie’s work on the Upper Euphrates during the Insurrection see Haldane, op. cit., pp. 106, 171.

⁵ For value of these shaikhs’ loyalty and support see *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 147.

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peace until his murder, on August 12th, by Shaikh Dhari of the Zoba' tribe. His death was the signal for risings from Fallūja to 'Āna, the British forces being forced back from Hit to Ramādī which, with Fallūja, were cut off from Baghdad. Relief reached Fallūja on September 24th and Ramādī two days later.¹ Hit was not reoccupied until October 4th.

Around Sāmarrā, the fourth of the Holy Cities, the preaching of Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, supported by an influential shaikh, the events in Ba'qūbā Division and the natural unrest among the tribes brought about a rising.² The town was unsuccessfully attacked on August 28th, Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, it was reported, directing the insurgents himself.³ Other points were also attacked, but by the middle of September order had been generally restored.

In the 'Arbīl area, the courage and strenuous efforts of the British officers, whose lives were in constant danger, saved the situation although several outlying posts had to be abandoned. Mōsul, as already indicated, and Sulaimāniya did not rise although much uneasiness existed.

In the south, the Tigris valley remained quiet.⁴ Not a shot was fired either in 'Amāra or in Basra where the Nationalist agitation, conducted chiefly by Yūsuf Kamāl and his father-in-law, Saiyid 'Umarī of the Khudair Mosque, collapsed with the former's deportation.⁵

In Baghdad itself, practically no disturbance occurred⁶ although an outbreak had been expected on August 12th. The comparative quietness of the city was partly due to the

¹ *London Gazette*, p. 5339 (86).

² *Admin. Report, Samarra*, 1920, pp. 1, 3.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴ Amīr ar-Rabī'a, when pressed for arrears in taxes in 1922, maintained that, in response to British promises in 1920 of remission of his taxes, he alone had prevented the Insurrection from spreading to the Tigris valley.

⁵ *Admin. Report, Basra Division*, 1920 (Baghdad, 1921), p. 1.

⁶ The most serious disturbance occurred on August 3rd when the Mechanical Transport Depot was fired by young Nationalists who had mixed among the Arab labourers. The complete loss of petrol and other supplies threatened to paralyse transport. Other incendiary attempts on dumps and stores were thwarted. *London Gazette*, p. 5335 (49).

continual presence of troops, partly to precautionary measures which, directly or indirectly, removed most of the Nationalist leaders from the capital,¹ and partly to restraining influences in the city. Moderate Nationalists, such as Saiyid Talib Pasha, who had been allowed to return to ‘Iraq in February, 1920,² Saiyid ‘Abdur Rahmān al-Gailānī and many others, held aloof from the Insurrection, seeing in it a poor foundation for the new State. Others who had urged forward the Movement both in town and tribe drew back in fear and dismay at the destruction and at the unleashed forces which, if they reached Baghdad, would respect neither friend nor enemy.

By the end of September, it was apparent that Government forces were in the ascendancy although the rising had not yet collapsed. British troops, reinforced from India,³ had assumed the offensive everywhere, the knowledge of which cooled the ardour of many tribesmen whose expectation of dire punishment to be inflicted urged them to make speedy submission. The news of Sir Percy Cox’s return, October 1st, brought a reaction among many of the Nationalists. In many areas, however, as about Samāwa, Rumaitha and Mandalī, the insurgents held on until punitive columns reached them. The end might have come much sooner had it not been for the intransigent anti-British divines at Najaf, who demanded that negotiations should be conducted only through them.

Indicative of their ambitions, two documents, one from the Middle Euphrates and one from the Gharraf, were forwarded to the Political Officer both couched in identically

¹ The attempt to arrest Yūsaf as-Sūwaidī, Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, Ja’far abū Timman, ‘Alī Bazirqan and Shaikh Ahmad Shaikh Dā‘ūd, on August 12th, resulted in the apprehending of the last named only. Several Arabs were killed when the police fired into Nationalists obstructing the arrest of their leaders: Telegram No. 9752, Civil Commissioner to S/S for India, August 13th, 1920.

² *The Mandubīn* believed that he had been brought back to create a moderate Nationalist party dependent on Great Britain. He certainly gave great assistance to the Civil Administration for which it was, at the time, grateful. Letter, Political Officer, Basra, to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, June 26th, 1920.

³ A total of 4883 British and 24,508 Indian reinforcements besides an Air Force squadron and Medical units were brought to ‘Iraq. *London Gazette*, App. 4, p. 5346.

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the same phrasing and language; they were a demand for the institution of a theocratic Government built up on one of the fundamental principles of the Shi'a doctrine. Signed by many prominent shaiikhs and leaders, these letters were evidence of the power and hold of the Shi'a divines on the religious emotions of the uneducated tribes.¹

The effect of the Insurrection has been variously judged. To the British Government, it was a revolt against authority, costing 426 British lives, 1228 wounded and 615 missing and prisoners,² as well as 8450 casualties among the insurgents.³ It involved the expenditure of millions of pounds sterling from the British Treasury. It inflicted incalculable damage in the country itself. To the war-weary British public and to the Press, it was the occasion for the revival of the cry 'Evacuate Mesopotamia'. To the British officers and men in 'Iraq, it was a tragedy, wasting lives, spreading destruction and anarchy and sweeping away much of what they had achieved. It was a tragedy, however, in which, often isolated with violent death never far distant and frequently facing almost insuperable difficulties, they played their parts nobly and in accordance with the best traditions of their race for courage and devotion to duty and for heroic exertions in the cause to which they had given themselves. None excelled the Acting Civil Commissioner once the rising had begun, in Herculean labour and in meeting the exigencies of the situation or in devising means to bring the issue to a successful end. His unfaltering trust in and support of the men on whom responsibility devolved, his messages of encouragement and his apparently inexhaustible strength made him a leader to whom officers and men could look with assurance. The actions of these men as a whole and the individual performances of Colonel Leachman, Captain Bertram Thomas, Captain Salmon, Major Ditchburn, Captain

¹ *Admun. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, p. 19.

² *London Gazette*, App 4, p. 5346.

³ *Ibid.*, App. 5, p. 5347.

Crawford, Captain J. S. Mann, Captain W. R. Hay and a host of others in the summer of 1920 added another chapter, no less splendid, no less inspiring than those which precede it and those which will follow it, in the history of British manhood serving in difficult times and against desperate odds.

To ‘Iraqīs, the Insurrection, although suppressed, has been a National War of Independence, directly responsible for forcing the British Government to set up an Arab Government and, eventually, to grant independence: an opinion shared by many writers.¹ Popular opinion has regarded as national heroes those who led the Insurrection or who took a conspicuous part in it; as martyrs, the ‘Iraqīs who lost their lives.² Political preference has been given to those who, by their actions both before and during the Insurrection, had proven their attachment to the Nationalist cause.

No evidence is available to show that, because of the Insurrection, a wider measure of immediate Arab participation in the Government was given by the High Commissioner after his

¹ Cf. Toynbee, A. J., *Islamic World*, p. 530; Coke, R., *The Arab's Place in the Sun*, p. 193; Wright, Q., *A.P.S.R.*, November, 1926, p. 746.

² See *Al-Istiqlāl*, March 9th, 17th, 1922: *Al-Rāfidān* and *Al-Mufid*, August 25th, 1922. The following lines appeared in *Al-Istiqlāl*, February 2nd, 1928, when Shaikh Dhari was convicted of the murder of Lieut.-Col. Leachman, August 12th, 1920:

You shall be brought to book some day, you who waylaid Dhari!
 Oh ye! Set free the slayer of Leachman!
 He has shaken London with all her might.
 We are humiliated after you, Oh Dhari!
 The culprit's abode shall be swept away.
 Victorious is Dhari's standard!
 You have taken advantage of an opportune moment, Oh London;
 Time is treacherous, Oh Cousin!
 Why this long absence, ye moon of the world!
 We have grown weary in the slaying of so many British soldiers.
 Oh ye! Bow down in homage to the slayer of Leachman.
 Honour and Glory are thine, ye slayer of Leachman.
 Lie in peace, ye slayer of Leachman!
 Oh Shaikh, enjoy thy sleep.
 Throughout the land, ye have no like
 Others before you have done it, Oh Cousin
 Ye are equal to a state with all her might.
 Sing out hallelujah to the slayer of Leachman!

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arrival. There is evidence, rather, that because of the chaos and unsettled condition of the country, he was unable to give as extensive powers to the Arab Government as he had hoped in June, 1920, when the announcement had been made of the provisional Government, the outlines of which had been foreshadowed in March, 1920,¹ formulated by the Interdepartmental Committee on June 1st, and sanctioned by the Cabinet in the middle of June. At the most, the Insurrection, by indicating the strength of Nationalist sentiment in 'Iraq and by arousing opposition in Great Britain to the retention of the Mandate, due to the fear of further heavy and unremunerative expenditure, stimulated the adoption of the policy of implementing the Mandate by means of a treaty and of bringing 'Iraq into the League of Nations more quickly than H.M. Government had originally contemplated when assuming the Mandate. It must be remembered, however, that the project of a treaty with an Arab Government in 'Iraq originated before the outbreak of the Insurrection. It was made as an official suggestion by Mr. Montagu, on May 17th, 1920, and it is even possible that it was proposed some weeks earlier by an official in the Foreign Office.²

While the immediate policy of H.M. Government was not changed and its future policy was altered more in method of procedure than in spirit as a result of the Insurrection, nevertheless the rising did exercise considerable influence on the people of 'Iraq themselves. The Insurrection can scarcely be called national in the strict sense of the word, yet it did indicate a certain national consciousness which in the next few years was to become more clearly defined. The consolidation of the divergent elements in the rising, although merging only temporarily and from different motives, indicated to the 'Iraqis the power of concerted action against which even the forces of the British Government were not invulnerable. The Insurrection revealed, at the same time, the weaknesses and

¹ *Supra*, pp. 199-200, 212, 220-221.

² Young, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

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inherent divisions in the people themselves, which their leaders were later to make efforts to eliminate, not always with success or without friction. In addition, it brought forward leaders who were to assume increasingly important roles in the movement towards national independence either in co-operation with the British Government and its policy of gradual emancipation or in opposition as part of the Nationalist group which demanded immediate and complete independence.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
PROVISIONAL ARAB GOVERNMENT

No conditions could have seemed more unfavourable for the establishment of a new government than those prevailing when Sir Percy Cox, under a salute of seventeen guns, sailed up the Shatt al-‘Arab to Basra, October 1st, as His Britannic Majesty’s High Commissioner, with full authority to proceed along the lines indicated by H.M. Government in the proclamation dated June 17th, 1920.¹

A good half of the country was still in active rebellion. The insurgents held Karbalā, Najaf, Tuwairij, Rumaitha, Hit and a great portion of the Euphrates valley, including the middle sections of the railroad. In the Muntafiq, only one point, Nāsiriya, remained in the hands of the Civil Administration, Samāwa and Kūfa were still besieged. On the Diyālā, the most savage aspects of the Insurrection had passed, but authority had still to be established by the shaikhs and by the British. The provisional Government at Mandalī had not yet collapsed. In the ‘Erbil area, British authority had practically vanished, In Mōsul, apprehension still persisted in the face of Kamalist propaganda. Raids and attacks on the Shargāt-Mōsul road continued, culminating in the raid by the Albū Hamad on October 24th, when the well-known Nationalist, Sharīf al-Farūqī, was killed, together with several others. Revenue payments had ceased in many parts of the country. Government offices and legal archives had been looted.² Buildings, bridges, railway lines and property³ had been destroyed.

¹ Issued June 20th, 1920. Text: *supra*, pp. 220-1.

² At Ba‘qūbā, Diltāwa, Hilla, Karbalā: *Admin. Report, Justice*, 1920, pp. 3-4.

³ Damage to the railways, together with loss of commercial revenue during the Insurrection, has been estimated at Rs. 55,000,000 or £412,500: *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 24.

Private feuds had sprung up in their former vigour. Confidence in British methods built up by many months of hard and patient work, had been swept away. Habits of obedience to authority had been lost in the welter of anti-Government violence. Complete control was not to be thoroughly re-established until the spring of 1921.

Sir Percy Cox saw clearly that a complete consultation of the wishes of the inhabitants by means of a representative Assembly as to the nature of the permanent Government was impossible for a time, at least three or four months being required to set up the machinery and to obtain a decision.¹ He deemed it essential, however, to initiate immediately some form of National government regardless of the unfavourable conditions and his own private misgivings.² Undue delay would mean disappointment and bitterness, arising from frustration of the hopes of a speedy amelioration of conditions which had been aroused in all classes. Confidence in the British Government and its good faith had to be established among the Nationalists and revived among Great Britain's friends. Pacification had to be furthered by removing, as far as possible, the causes which had given rise to the Insurrection. Not least, a start had to be made towards the reduction of British expenditure, so urgently demanded by H.M. Government at the behest of the British people.

Consultations with the notables of Basra, of Nāsiriya, which was visited by air on October 3rd, of Qurna, of Qal‘at Sālīh and of ‘Amāra, undertaken with the view of restoring confidence and of acquainting himself with current opinion, aided the High Commissioner in formulating even before reaching Baghdad on October 11th, the procedure by which he hoped to give effect to H.M. Government's policy of instituting a National Government.³

¹ *Note on Political Developments in Mesopotamia subsequent to October 1, 1920* (League of Nations Publication No. C. 465, M. 341, 1921), p. 3 (hereafter *Political Developments in Meso.*).

² For his account of these misgivings see his ‘Historical Summary’ in *Bell, Letters*, Vol. II, p. 527.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 562. Sir Percy Cox's own statement (*ibid.*, p. 527) that he arrived in Baghdad on October 5th, is obviously a misprint.

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In the strenuous days following his arrival, which had been marked by a genuine welcome from all sections of the populace of the Baghdad area, he continued to take his bearings and to prepare for the establishment of the Council of State around which the new Government was to be constructed. Influential Baghdadis and shaikhs, individually, and lesser folk, collectively, marshalled with an unerring sense of proportion by Miss Gertrude Bell, now in her element, came to pay their respects and voice their hopes, complaints and opinions. British officials with whom Sir Percy was to work, many of them strangers to him, were consulted individually and in council. A substantial group, including Miss Bell, who became his Oriental Secretary, Major L. W. Yetts, M.C., Major S. G. C. Murray and Captain J. N. Clayton, aligned themselves, together with Mr. H. St. J. Philby and Mr. C. C. Garbett, who had come out with Sir Percy, in sympathetic support of his policy. Many of the other administrative officials, however, were sceptical of an Arab Cabinet, even opposed to it and did not disguise their feelings. Most of them, as loyal supporters of the Acting Civil Commissioner and of his view of the role of Great Britain in the country, could not bring themselves to accept at first the new viewpoint.¹ Sir Percy Cox, convinced that the situation demanded either Arab Government or British evacuation, went his way, in spite of the controversy aroused in official circles.

Sir Percy Cox's plans made no great claim to originality. They were but modifications of the Bonham-Carter Committee proposals, along the lines deemed more feasible by Lord Curzon, Mr. Montagu and the Interdepartmental Committee in the preceding May, but differing from the earlier proposals in the spirit in which they had been formulated and with which they were to be applied. This difference of spirit and Sir Percy

¹ Lord Islington, June 25th, 1920, had prophesied just such opposition when he said in the House of Lords. 'Sir Percy Cox will, when he goes (to Baghdad) be opposed by a formidable and established bureaucracy.' *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. XL (1920), pp. 852-3.

Cox's reputation for dignity, wisdom and equitable dealing, won as Chief Political Officer before and during the war, and as Civil Commissioner before his departure to Persia, were his chief assets among the 'Iraqis. To them, his return, repeatedly requested,¹ was the augury of better days. His presence was a guarantee of sympathy for Arab aspirations, of consideration for their viewpoint and of a maturity of judgment in initiating the new Government. To these factors as well as to his methods of approach and of action and to the loyal service rendered by the British officials associated with him, many of whom subjected their personal convictions to their sense of duty, rather than to originality of plan or to the chastened spirit of the country, must be attributed the successful inauguration of the provisional Government, in the face of distinctly unfavourable circumstances. To the same factors may be attributed also the continued acceptance of the Government in spite of the fact that it only partially satisfied even the moderate Nationalists who, while appreciating the need for British assistance, sympathized with the strong current of feeling for complete independence, still running high in the country.²

No formal action was taken until October 21st, when at a council composed of Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, Colonel Evelyn Howell, Colonel S. H. Slater, Major R. W. Bullard, Mr. H. St. J. B. Philby, and Miss Gertrude Bell, he presented his scheme for a provisional Government: a Council of Arab Ministers, supervised by British Advisers and under the ultimate control of the High Commissioner. After three hours of strenuous discussion in which his proposals were vigorously countered, his scheme was finally carried with

¹ *Self-Determination in 'Iraq*, pp. 8, 11, 18, 23-5; Bell, Miss Gertrude, *Memorandum on Political Views of the Naqib of Baghdad*, February 6th, 1919 (hereafter *Political Views of the Naqib*).

² *Political Developments in Meso.*, p. 2. A British official, later intimately connected with the administration of 'Iraq, wrote on February 1st, 1921, concerning the provisional Government: 'The Arabs of Mesopotamia would be extraordinarily credulous if they thought they had really been given a "National" Government. But, from all I hear they are under no such illusion.'

PROVISIONAL ARAB GOVERNMENT

unimportant alterations.¹ This scheme, Sir Percy announced, would be laid before the Naqīb of Baghdad, whom he had resolved to ask to assume the presidency of the Council of State.

The question regarding the head of the Provisional Government had been a vital one from the outset. Saiyid Talib Pasha, who had been active in British interests since his return to 'Iraq, had been originally in Sir Percy's mind for the position, but consultation with opinion in Baghdad and in Mōsul, which he had visited on October 16th, indicated such strong fear of Saiyid Talib's personal ambitions that Sir Percy felt obliged to turn elsewhere.

Saiyid 'Abdur Rahmān al-Gailānī, Naqīb al-'Ashraf, Baghdad, who had been repeatedly suggested by local notables, seemed to be a more logical choice. The high public prestige and religious standing of this venerable dignitary had led him to be considered, by H.M. Government, in November, 1918, as a possible Amīr of 'Iraq,² on the basis of a recommendation made by Sir Percy Cox as early as April, 1917. The Naqīb as the head of the Council of State would guarantee the most favourable reception possible for the new Government and would enable Sir Percy Cox 'to include Talib Pasha without making him President, a course which would have excited opposition in certain quarters.'³

It was doubtful, however, in view of the Naqīb's great age, ill-health and habitual seclusion, whether he would accept. He had voiced his determination to take no part in political activities to Miss Gertrude Bell in February, 1919, when he had said, in order to emphasize his decision: 'Not if it were to save 'Iraq from complete destruction would I alter what I have now spoken.'⁴ Miss Bell who had kept in friendly contact with him

¹ Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 567-8.

² Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, November 22nd, 1918.

³ Telegram, High Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, October 26th, 1920.

⁴ Bell, *Political Views of the Naqīb*, p. 11.

believed that his determination had not changed and wrote in a letter of October 17th, 1920: ‘I am convinced not only that the Naqib will refuse for himself but that he will also refuse to recommend anyone else.’¹

Friendly relations and mutual respect had always existed between Sir Percy Cox and the Naqib. Of Sir Percy, the Naqib had said in 1919, in the same interview quoted above:

There are a hundred and a thousand men in England who could fill the post of Ambassador in Persia, but there is none but Sir Percy Cox who is suitable for ‘Iraq. He is known, he is loved, and he is trusted by the people of ‘Iraq. He is a man of sober years . . . I bear witness in God that if Sir Percy Cox had been in Baghdad we would have been spared the folly of asking the people to express their wishes as to the future.’²

When Sir Percy Cox, therefore, formally asked the Naqib on October 23rd to head the Council of State, urging on him his duty to ‘Iraq and hinting of harm that might come from the personal ambitions of others, the Naqib, influenced by his personal regard as much as by Sir Percy’s arguments, consented after much hesitation and heart searching. The joy and satisfaction which his consent created has been well described by Miss Bell:

In came Mr. Philby and others, and on top of them Sir Percy. Every one but Mr. Philby melted away, and we two turned to Sir Percy, breathless with excitement. ‘Well,’ he said, ‘he has accepted.’ He had come straight from the Naqib who had agreed to undertake the formation of the provisional government. So the first success is scored and no one but Sir Percy could have done it. Indeed, that even he should have induced the Naqib to take a hand in public affairs is nothing short of a miracle. Sir Percy’s delight and satisfaction was only equal to ours and we all sat for half an hour

¹ Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 586.

² Bell, *Political Views of the Naqib*, pp. 8-9.

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bubbling over with joy and alternatively glorifying the Naqib and the High Commissioner.¹

The High Commissioner had envisaged a Council consisting of a President and eight Ministers, each heading a Department of State, advised by the existing British Secretaries, and about ten members without portfolios, the whole to be representative of the former three wilayets and of the various communities.² He had already, by October 14th, drawn up a list of 'Iraqīs whom he considered desirable for the first Council but, in order that the new Government might have an 'Iraqī and not a British façade, it seemed important that the invitations, the distribution of posts and all kindred matters should emanate from the Naqib and not from the High Commissioner. In this as well as in all subsequent steps in organizing the provisional Government, however, the essential points were either suggested or approved by the High Commissioner,³ although every precaution was taken to avoid giving such an impression and thereby offending 'Iraqī sensibilities.

Invitations to the following 'Iraqīs, requesting them to participate in the establishment of the new Government as heads of departments, were issued on October 25th:⁴

President	The Naqib
Minister of the Interior	Saiyid Talib Pasha
„ of the Finance	Sasūn Effendi Haskail
„ of Justice	Hasan Effendi Pāchahjī
„ for Education	'Izzat Pasha
„ for Defence	Ja'far Pasha al-'Askarī
„ for Public Works	Muhammād Effendi Fadhil
„ for Commerce	'Abdul Latif Pasha Mandīl
„ of Auqāf	Mustafā Effendi 'Alūsī

¹ Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 568

² *Note on the Establishment of a Council of State for 'Iraq*, India Office, B. 363, November 30th, 1920, pp. 8-9.

³ Telegram, High Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, October 26th 1920.

⁴ Ibid.

The names which carried most weight were those of the Naqib, Saiyid Talib Pasha and Sasūn Effendi. The last named, a member of one of the leading Jewish families of Baghdad, having distinguished connections in India and England, had been a member of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies since 1908, and in 1913 had filled the post of Finance Minister of the Empire. His wisdom and integrity were widely esteemed, and rumour had suggested that he would have been offered the Ministry of Finance in the Independent Arab Government had it been inaugurated by Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī and Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr. Hasan Effendi Pāchahjī was generally accounted as the ablest advocate in Baghdad. ‘Izzat Pasha, of Turkish descent and a native of Kirkūk, had held high military rank under the Ottoman Government and had a considerable reputation throughout ‘Iraq. Ja‘far Pasha, a native of Baghdad had held military rank under the Turks and subsequently with Faisal, being awarded the D.S.O. and C.M.G. by the British Government. He had been Military Governor of Aleppo in the year before the fall of Damascus. Muhammad Effendi Fadhil, of Mōsul, was a former Turkish deputy and was acting Mayor of that city. ‘Abdul Latīf Pasha Mandīl, a wealthy landowner and merchant of Basra, had been, active in the Basra Divisional Council. Mustafā Effendi ‘Alūsī, who came from one of the leading families of Baghdad, had been *Qādhī* in many parts of the Ottoman Empire, including Mecca.

Those asked to join the Government without portfolios were: Hamdī Pasha Baban, a Kurd and head of the old ruling family of Sulaimāniya; ‘Abdul Majīd Effendi Shawī, Mayor of Baghdad; ‘Abdul Rahmān Pasha Haidarī and Fakrī Effendi Jamīl Zadah, notables of Baghdad; ‘Ahmad Pasha Sanī, of Basra; ‘Abdul Jabbar Pasha Khaiyat and Dā‘ūd Yūsufanī, leading Christians of Baghdad and Mōsul respectively; and four Shī‘is, namely ‘Abdul Ghanī Kūbbah, head of the principal Shī‘a family of Baghdad; Saiyid Hādī Qaswinī, of Hilla;



JA'FAR PASHA AL-ASKARĪ

PROVISIONAL ARAB GOVERNMENT

‘Ajil Pasha ibn ‘Alī Samarmad, formerly paramount Shaikh of the Zūbaid; and the Amīr Muhammad Saihūd, chief of the Banī Rabi‘a.¹

Tension ran high within British official circles until support for the new Council became assured. Hasan Effendi Pāchahjī and Hamdī Pasha Baban sent refusals, not unexpectedly, to the invitations. Saiyid Hādī Qaswini excused himself on grounds of health. The refusal of Sasūn Effendi, whose absence from the Council would have been irreparable, caused consternation until he was persuaded to withdraw it.² Mustafā Effendi ‘Alūsī accepted the vacant post of Minister of Justice, the Ministry of *Auqāf* remaining vacant for the moment. Acceptances from all others were received by the President who, in high spirits, was full of determination to work hand in hand with the High Commissioner yet not to allow his place as Prime Minister to be usurped by any other member of the Council.

The Council of State of the First Arab Government in Mesopotamia since the Abbassids’ assembled for a preliminary meeting on November 2nd, but without all members present. Beyond a discussion of the relation between the Arab Ministers and their British Advisers,³ little action was taken. This delicate problem, together with that of the position of the High Commissioner, formed the subject of a special Memorandum by Mr. Philby, which, after it had been discussed with the Naqīb, came before the second meeting of the Council, November 10th. At this meeting, at which all members were present, Mr. Philby’s Memorandum was accepted save in small particulars. The Council also passed a resolution recommending the release, under suitable guarantees, of twelve of the deported Nationalists.⁴ The Memorandum, finally issued as *Instructions for the Council of State*, following the

¹ *Political Developments in Meso.*, p. 4.

² Bell, *Letters*, Vol II, p. 570.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Proceedings of informal Meeting of the Council of State, November 10, 1920*, in *Note on Council of State*, pp. 6-7.

third meeting of the Council, its first formal session, on November 13th, became the first Constitution of ‘Iraq.¹

The Instructions defined the Council of State (Sec. II) and the relations of Minister and Adviser (Secs. III, IV, V). They differed from the Bonham-Carter proposals in designating each Arab Minister as Head of a Department of State, for the administration of which he was to be responsible, subject to: (a) control of the Council of State; (b) the advice of the British Officer selected as his Adviser; and, in the last resort, (c) the supreme authority of the High Commissioner (Sec. III).

All official business was to be placed before the Council by the Minister through the Adviser, while all decisions of the Council were to be conveyed to a Minister through his Adviser (Sec. IV). Administrative appointments were to be made by the Council, on the recommendation of its members, subject to the approval of the High Commissioner (Sec. XIV). An Adviser could attend and could speak at any meeting of the Council at which matters concerning his Department were under consideration, but he could not vote (Sec. XI). The Instructions defined exactly the position of the High Commissioner and stated definitely that his decision was final on all matters (Sec. I) whether resolutions of the Council of State (Sec. X) or administrative questions (Secs. IIIc and XIV). In thus defining the authority of the High Commissioner, the Instructions avoided the omission for which the Bonham-Carter Committee Report had been so severely criticized.²

The following day, November 11th, two years after the war had ceased on all fronts, the provisional Government for ‘Iraq came into judicial being by a proclamation of the High Commissioner to that effect.³ It was as follows:

¹ Text: Appendix vi.

² Particularly in the *Memorandum by H. R. C. Dobbs . . . on Proposals of Bonham-Carter Committee* (India Office, B. 342). See *supra*, pp. 213-4.

³ *Note on Council of State*, pp. 3-4, *Political Developments in Meso.*, p. 8; *Admin. Report, 1920-1922*, pp. 82-3.

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Whereas by Notification, dated the 17th June, 1920, it was announced that His Majesty's Government had authorised the calling of a General Elective Assembly for the purpose of preparing an organic law for 'Iraq;

And whereas it is considered expedient that, pending the convocation of such General Assembly and the framing thereby of an organic law, the Government of the country should be conducted subject to my supervision and direction, by a provisional National Government;

Now, therefore, I, Major-General Sir P. Z. COX, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., by virtue of the authority vested in me as High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, do hereby proclaim as follows:

1. There shall be constituted a Council of State consisting of a President, Ministers for the following Departments: Interior, Finance, Justice, Auqaf, Education and Health, Defence, Public Works, Commerce, and such other members without portfolios as may be nominated.

2. Until the organic law is promulgated and brought into effect, the Council of State and Ministers shall be responsible for the conduct, subject to my supervision and control, of the administration of Government, excluding foreign affairs, military operations and in general military affairs, except such military affairs as concerns solely the locally recruited forces.

Made at Baghdad this 11th day of November, 1920.

P. Z. COX,
High Commissioner for Mesopotamia.

ORGANIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

SIR PERCY COX had recognized the immediate necessity of establishing the provisional Council of State and, as a complementary step, the urgency for giving office to the 'Iraqis. It seems clear, however, that he had no intention of transferring actual administrative power either in the provincial or in the central administration any faster than practical conditions demanded. Until fuller confidence in the provisional Government had been established, until it was working comparatively smoothly and had consolidated its authority, he was content that the attention of the Council should be focused on considerations of measures for the pacification of the country, including a general amnesty; for the formulation of an electoral law; for the repatriation of Arab officers from Syria; for the formation of an 'Iraqi army and, finally, for the organization of the Administration throughout 'Iraq, subject to his ultimate control.

Pacification of the country was uppermost in the minds of both British and 'Iraqi officials. As Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari expressed it: 'The peasant must return to his plough, the shepherd to his flock. The blood of our people must cease to flow and the land must once more be rich with crops. Shall our tribes be wasted in battle and our towns die of starvation?'¹

Sir Percy Cox had dropped all idea of extreme punishment as such for the tribes. He firmly believed, however, that they must be made to submit, by force if necessary. In no other way could they be disarmed or could the authority of the Government be re-established. He set his face resolutely, as had the Acting Civil Commissioner before him, against the

¹ Bell, *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 571.

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repeated offers of the religious leaders of Najaf and Karbalā to act as mediators with the tribes who themselves had asked that the negotiations be conducted through the Chief *Muṭahid*, at whose instance only they would lay down their arms.¹ In refusing to recognize the pretensions of the Shī'a divines, Sir Percy struck the first blow on behalf of the authority of the new Government, to the establishment of which the power of binding and loosing assumed by the 'Ulamā constituted one of the most formidable obstacles.

The general amnesty, for which the council asked in order to facilitate pacification, had to wait for the submission of the tribes and the solution of other political problems. The High Commissioner, however, assented to the proposal of the Council, on November 29th, that sixteen of the forty-five deportees, sent to Henjam by order of the previous regime, be released under suitable guarantees.

Repatriation of the 'Iraqī officers who had served in the Hijāz and in Syria met with early consideration from both the Council and the High Commissioner. Ja'far Pasha, Minister of Defence, who had been the first to make his way back to 'Iraq,² pressed for Government aid to expedite the return of the expatriates, urging it on the grounds of their wretched condition and of the need for their services in 'Iraq. The High Commissioner telegraphed to H.M. Government, on November 27th, for permission to facilitate the return of the officers, of whom a list of 240 names had been obtained from the French Consul in Baghdad.³

The first group, including Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'id, arrived in the middle of February. Nājī Pasha as-Sūwaidī and about

¹ 'Abdul Wahīd, Shaikh of the Fatla section of the Bani Hasan, and Marzūq of the Humaidāt were among the chief shaikhs to make such a demand.

² Bell, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 568.

³ It was considered significant at the time that Yāsīn Pasha al-Hāshimī, Jamīl Beg al-Midfai and Maulūd Pasha were omitted from the French Consul's list. The secret police reports stated that all three were in communication with Kan'an Beg of the Aintab-Urfa command. One prominent ex-Sharifian officer declared that Yāsīn Pasha, if allowed to return, 'would play for his own hand as he did in Syria'.

fifteen others arrived in Baghdad from Kubaisa on March 14th. The main body of officers and their families, numbering 396 in all, sailed from Port Said in a special boat, on February 13th, arriving in Baghdad in early March.

The return of these officers added to the heated atmosphere of Baghdad. Although the expectation of the British officials that they would render assistance in promoting the candidacy of a Sharifian Amir was not disappointed, a number became active partisans of other candidates, especially Saiyid Talib Pasha who made determined efforts to win their support. In addition, considerable jealousy was aroused by their return among ‘Iraqi ex-officials formerly in Turkish service as well as local notables who regarded the officers with suspicion and fear, lest they appropriate all the best posts.

The High Commissioner had repeatedly stated that the Council of State was to be provisional until it was possible to set up a permanent government,¹ the precise form of which, he declared, ‘must be decided by the people themselves and this can only be properly done by a convocation of a National Congress, fully representative of the people.’² He also awaited the convocation of the Assembly since he ‘found himself confronted with questions of policy affecting the future of ‘Iraq with which he did not feel justified in dealing without consultation with representatives of the people of the country.’³

Every reason seemed to exist for the inauguration of the National Assembly within the two or three months which Sir Percy had stated, on November 7th,⁴ to be necessary to com-

¹ *Communiqué* by the High Commissioner, November 7th, 1920. *Al-‘Iraq*, November 15th, 1920. *Political Developments in Meso.*, pp. 7-8. Also Letter No SD./170A, High Commissioner to All Officers of Civil Admin. in Mesopotamia, November 30th, 1920.

² *Communiqué*, November 7th, 1920. Also Telegram, High Commissioner to S/S for India, October 26th, 1920.

³ *Political Developments in Meso.*, p. 3. Also *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 3.

⁴ *Communiqué*, November 7th, 1920. In his telegram to S/S for India, October 26th, however, he had stated: ‘at least three or probably more months must elapse before the election can be completed and a decision reached on the fundamental issues’

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plete the electoral law, to restore the country to peace and to carry out the elections.¹ A draft law, adapted from the Ottoman Electoral Law for use in 'Iraq was presented to the High Commissioner on November 7th² by a Committee composed of ex-deputies of the Ottoman Chamber and of co-opted members under the presidency of Saiyid Talib Pasha, set up according to instructions of the Acting Civil Commissioner, July 9th, 1920.³ Both the High Commissioner and the Council of State gave their early attention to the draft, the latter referring it to a special Committee which first met on November 30th. The restoration of order, on which the elections were to depend, was accomplished by February, 1921.⁴

Nevertheless, the law was not promulgated until March 4th, 1922,⁵ nor did the Assembly convene until March 27th, 1924, although an '*Irāda* convoking it had been issued on October 19th, 1922,⁶ by which time Amīr Faisal had been placed on the throne and the main lines of the government and the principal questions of policy had been settled. Its deliberations, moreover, were specifically restricted, both by the '*Irāda* of 1922 and that of 1924, to the ratification of three documents to be placed before it: the Organic Law or Constitution, the Electoral Law for a Chamber of Deputies and the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty of 1922.⁷

The delay was due in part to difficulties incurred in formulating and in putting into operation a law suited to 'Iraq. One

¹ The Nationalists, in this expectation, formed committees and began to work actively for their candidates during November and December, 1920.

² Letter, High Commissioner to members of the Electoral Law Committee, November 12th, 1920: *Note on Council of State*, pp. 5-6; *Political Developments in Meso.*, pp. 10-11

³ *Compilation*, 1919-1920, Notification No. 50, p. 101.

⁴ Historical summary by Sir Percy Cox: Bell, op. cit., pp. 528-9.

⁵ *Compilation of Proclamations, Laws and Regulations, issued between 1 October, 1920, and 31 December, 1923* (Baghdad, 1924), (hereafter *Compilation*, 1920-1923), pp. 34-42

⁶ '*Irāda*, convoking the Constituent Assembly, October 19th, 1922; *Compilation*, 1920-1923, p. 82.

⁷ Ibid.; '*Irāda* for the Opening of the Constituent Assembly, March 22nd, 1924: *Compilation of Laws and Regulations, issued between January 1st and December 31st, 1924* (Baghdad, 1926) (hereafter *Compilation*, 1924), p. 7.

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of these difficulties arose early in December when the Council disagreed violently over the provisions for tribal representation. It had been originally proposed that thirty tribal representatives should be present in the Assembly: twenty shaikhs of the major tribes and ten members for the smaller tribes, grouped together in each of the new *Liwās*. The Council (with the exception of five members), owing to the traditional fear of townsmen and landowners for the tribes, opposed any special tribal representation, although Sir Percy Cox pointed out that it was essential that every section of the population should be represented in the Assembly which was to decide upon the future of ‘Iraq. Not until Ja‘far Pasha proposed an alternative scheme of two tribal representatives for each *Liwā* with the proviso that tribesmen might register and vote as all other ‘Iraqīs if they so desired, was the question settled.

It would appear, however, that these and other obstacles to the drafting and application of the law, including Saiyid Talib Pasha’s opposition to it,¹ were used by the British authorities as excuses to postpone the inauguration of the Assembly, notwithstanding the official *communiqué* of May 30th, 1921,² assuring the ‘Iraqīs that the elections would soon be held. Evidence was not lacking that attempts would be made to force the Assembly, if convened, to declare for a local and unacceptable candidate such as Saiyid Talib Pasha and to force it to make anti-British declarations. It was known that the Nationalist leaders, including some of the *Mandubīn*, were again active and that the National School party had been revived. It was also reported that several tribes, as those of the ‘Afaq district and the Shammar Dhafir, were contemplating another revolt at Nationalist, Turkish and Bolshevik instigation. Letters had been intercepted in January from Muhammad Ridhā, outlining anti-British plans and giving instructions for

¹ *Admin Report*, 1920-1922, p. 5.

² *Baghdad Times*, May 30th, 1921. See also correspondence between the High Commissioner and the Council of State in *Lisān al-‘Arab* and in *Al-‘Iraq*, July 15th, 1921.

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their execution to the townsmen and to the tribes. Newspapers had become increasingly antagonistic in tone.¹ Violent anti-British posters had appeared on the walls of Baghdad.² It is not surprising, therefore, that the High Commissioner was convinced that any immediate attempt to convene the Assembly would not only be disastrous for British policy and for the installation of the Sharifian Amir on whom British official approval had already fallen,³ but that it would also produce fresh unrest if not actual disturbances of the peace. His view met with corroboration at the Cairo Conference.⁴

Preliminary reorganization of the administration began officially on December 3rd, when by a proclamation of the High Commissioner all the rights, duties and powers formerly possessed by the Civil Commissioner, Judicial Secretary and Revenue Secretary were assigned to the High Commissioner, Minister of Justice and Minister of Interior respectively.⁵ Several of the Ministers, however, had already entered upon their duties, Saiyid Talib Pasha beginning his work as Minister of Interior on November 15th. Conditions had been somewhat chaotic, and the fact that practically all the correspondence was in English proved a difficulty. Nevertheless a satisfactory *modus operandi* was slowly evolved.

The British administration officers had been informed of the changes and given instructions as to their part in the administration directly by the High Commissioner on November 30th. The circular stated in part:

The officers and departments hitherto forming part of the British Civil Administration in 'Iraq will come directly under the orders of the Council of State, and the reorganization of

¹ *Al-Istiqāl* was suppressed, February 10th, 1921, for publishing seditious articles. Its editor and those concerned were given sentences ranging from six to eighteen months and the paper was suspended for one year. *Baghdad Times*, May 9th, 1921.

² As on November 27th, 1920; January 17th; and February 2nd, 1921

³ *Infra*, pp. 309-10.

⁴ *Infra*, pp. 314 ff.

⁵ *Compilation*, 1920-1923, p. 2. Also National Government (Transference of Powers) Proclamation, July 6th, 1921, *ibid.*, p. 7.

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the administrative machine will proceed under its direction, subject to the High Commissioner's general control as rapidly as it is expedient and possible.

Political Officers and Assistant Political Officers in the provinces, and Heads of Departments at Headquarters and elsewhere will henceforth report to and receive orders from the various Ministries.¹

The proposed distribution of the administrative departments among the various Ministries was also communicated to the Political Officers,² who were ordered to address their correspondence accordingly.

The Council of State, in taking charge of the administration and in reorganizing it, showed a clearly marked aversion to the systems prevailing under the Civil Administration. Under that regime, British officials, while recognizing the good Eastern maxim that water from a much used water-skin tastes better than from a new one, had nevertheless attempted to replace the Ottoman administrative system in so far as possible with their own methods, in the name of efficient administration. The Council now evinced the desire, as far as the High Commissioner and the British Advisers would permit, to revert to the pre-war system and methods. In so doing, however, the Council effected, probably unconsciously, a compromise with the ideas and the political philosophy of the West which had given the country its stimulus towards Nationalism. Nationalism with its connotations of independence and of absolute sovereignty over the whole territory within its borders, they knew, appreciated and desired. The methods of administration, the fiscal systems and the form of democratic institutions which the West at that time insisted were inseparable from its concept of Nationalism and from its formula of 'Government by the consent of the governed', they were less ready to accept, in so far as they varied from the methods and institutions under the Ottoman regime. The refusal of the majority of the Council

¹ Letter No. SD/170A, November 30th, 1920

² See Table IV.

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and of 'Iraqis in general to forsake time-honoured systems and procedure may have risen from reluctance to abandon that which had been sanctified by usage and by religious sanction, as well as from an innate shrewdness in avoiding what had not yet been proven to their satisfaction.

The immediate demands of practical administration may have required the British sponsors of the new Government to acquiesce to a great extent in this attitude. Nevertheless, the failure of the provisional council to consolidate such gains as had been made by the Civil Administration and to throw itself whole-heartedly into the task of creating a new state in accordance with the best examples before it, bound the new regime to antiquated systems at the very moment when they were being rejected by the lineal heirs of the Ottoman Empire as unsuitable for the new Turkish State. It marked the tendency of 'Iraq to

TABLE IV

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENTS AMONG MINISTRIES.*

<p>(a) Ministry of Interior.</p> <p>General Administration Police Land Revenue and Excise Agriculture Jails Printing and Publishing</p>	<p>(e) Ministry of Education and Health:</p> <p>Education Health Services Municipalities (as temporary measure)</p>
<p>(b) Ministry of Finance:</p> <p>Finance Accounts Audit Ottoman Debt and special revenues</p>	<p>(f) Ministry of Works and Communications:</p> <p>Buildings Roads Railways Posts and Telegraphs Irrigation Surveys</p>
<p>(c) Ministry of Justice:</p> <p>Judicial, etc. Tapu</p>	<p>(g) Ministry of Commerce:</p> <p>Commerce Customs Port</p>
<p>(d) Ministry of Defence:</p> <p>Levies Gendarmes Local Forces</p>	<p>(h) Ministry of Auqaf:</p> <p>Waqfs Trusts</p>

* *Note on the Establishment of a Council of State for 'Iraq*, India Office, B.363, p. 3.

become the residuary legatee of the Empire whereby its constitution, its electoral laws, its judicial system, its revenue system, its attitude to minorities and its very spirit approximated those of the former regime. In addition, the ground was laid for the continuous struggle within the administration itself between those who preferred the customary ways and those who, educated in the scientific atmosphere of the West, maintained that ‘Iraq must break away from her Ottoman traditions and that more up-to-date forms, imbued with modern ideas and a progressive spirit, must dominate the administration if they and their fellow countrymen were to be ‘able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’.¹

In the re-division of the country into ten *Liwās*, thirty-five *Qādhas* and eighty-five *Nahīyas*, approximating the former Turkish divisions, the Council, on December 12th, exhibited one of its first tendencies to revert to the Ottoman system. The major new divisions, replacing the fourteen divisions of the British Civil Administration which, for the most part had been drawn on carefully considered tribal and ethnological lines, were: Mōsul, Kirkūk, Baghdad, Karbalā, Diyālā, Basra, ‘Amāra, Dulaim, Hilla and Muntafiq.²

In accordance with the Turkish administrative system, the Council also proposed, on December 12th, that an ‘Iraqī *Mutasarrıf* should replace in each *Liwā* the British Political Officer who was to become the Divisional Adviser without executive functions. In each *Qādha* a *Qaimmāqam* was to become the responsible official, while a *Nahīya* was to be placed in charge of a *Mudīr*. To each larger *Liwā*, former Assistant Political Officers were to be appointed Assistant Advisers.

To this arrangement the High Commissioner agreed. He asked, however, that it be not applied to the Hilla *Liwā* until the return of the special Commission, headed by Ja‘far Pasha, which

¹ Article 22, Covenant of the League of Nations.

² Kūt *Liwā*, formed of portions of surrounding *Liwās*, was added January, 1922.

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had been sent to the Euphrates area by the Council to study civil reorganization; to the Muntafiq *Liwā*, until the British troops had been withdrawn; and to the Kurdish districts until their future status had been decided. Sir Percy Cox had already approved of the creation of the Baghdad Municipal Council which, although sanctioned under the previous regime, had been so mistrusted and so hedged with limitations as to be valueless as an instrument of government. The new Council had full executive and financial powers, subject to the general supervision of the *Mutasarrif* of the *Liwā*.

Appointments to administrative offices were vested in the Council of State, subject to the approval of the High Commissioner, by Section XIV of the Instructions.¹ In practice, this arrangement was applied by the Council of State only to those posts for which the Sultan's *firman* had been required under the Ottoman regime. For other posts, appointments were made on the authority of the Minister concerned. In all cases, however, it was understood that no appointments involving the displacement of British or Indian officials were to be proposed to the Council without previous consultation with the High Commissioner.

The actual transfer of power in the provinces awaited the re-establishment of comparative peace and stability. Not until January 10th, therefore, following the return of Ja'far Pasha and the Commission from the Euphrates area, was the Minister of Interior permitted to put forward his first list of administrative appointments.²

The principal criticism of the list came from Shī'a sources. Their original grievances, other than inherent opposition to the British-controlled provisional Government itself, had been

¹ Appendix vi.

² Only four major administrative appointments had been made previously by the Council, all in Baghdad and vicinity; Mahmūd Nādīm Beg Tabaqjali, *Qaimmāqam* of Mandalī, November 19th, 1920; Mumtaz Beg al'Daftari, *Qaimmāqam* of Kādhimain, November 21st, 1920; 'Ahmad Beg, *Qaimmāqam* of Sāmarrā, December 1st, 1920; Rashid Beg al-Khojah, *Mutasarrif* of Baghdad, December 11th, 1920.

that no Shi‘i held a portfolio on the Council. Their resentment was not decreased by the fact that of five *Mutasarrifs* and nine *Qaimmāqams* on the list, only one, a *Qaimmāqam*, was of their sect. The High Commissioner, however, realized the difficulty of avoiding Sunnī appointments. Only a few trained and experienced Shi‘is were available as a result both of their habitual boycott of Turkish service and professional schools and of official Turkish discouragement to the entrance of Shi‘is into office and schools. The list with minor alterations was, therefore, approved in late January, 1921. When, however, the predominantly Sunnī Council continued to indicate, by appointing Sunnīs to the almost entirely Shi‘a districts along the Euphrates, that it was prepared to do little to conciliate hostile opinion of the sect, the High Commissioner felt obliged to make a firm stand for the appointment of Shi‘is to such places, at least, where members of the sect predominated. After considerable persuasion, also, a place in the Council was found for a Shi‘i, the Ministry of Education being offered to Saiyid Muhammad Mahdī Tobatabai of Karbalā.

The reorganization of the Judicial Department under the new administration entailed comparatively few changes. Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, who now became Adviser to the Ministry of Justice, had early adopted the policy of making the fullest use of ‘Iraqīs as judges and officials, and of making no alterations in the institutions and laws with which the people were familiar, except in cases of clear necessity. The idea itself of an Arab Minister was not new. Sir Edgar had suggested such an appointment in early 1919,¹ but it had been deemed premature.

Reorganization of the Criminal Courts became necessary, however, when the Council of State adopted its scheme of reconstructing provincial administration along the lines of the Turkish system. One of the essential features of that system was the complete separation of the executive from the judicial

¹ Memorandum on Place of the Arab in Administration, February 5th, 1919.

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function, whereas under the system employed by the Civil Administration, the British officials, who were now to assume advisory functions only, had been given both executive and judicial functions.¹ The plans for the reorganization of Criminal Courts, when submitted to the Council of State on March 3rd, also included a scheme to strengthen the Court of Appeal by the addition of two judges and to vest in that Court the powers of confirmation and revision formerly exercised by the High Commissioner. Similarly, the powers of revision held by the Political Officers in their divisions were transferred to the Courts of First Instance in the *Liwās*.² In those *Liwās* where Judicial work was light, a Single Judge and an Assistant Judge with powers of a Court of First Instance was approved, in accordance with a scheme which had been brought into force by the Turks just before the outbreak of the war.³ The scheme, as sanctioned by the Council, came into force on May 14th.⁴

Under the Civil Administration, the frequent and numerous appeals to Constantinople, a feature of the Ottoman Judicial System, had been abolished. The Court of Appeal as instituted instead had been also made the Court of Revision for all subordinate Courts. The Council of State now maintained that a Court of Revision or Cassation should be created, distinct from the Court of Appeal. The establishment of such a Court, it held, would be in accordance with Ottoman Law. It would relieve the Court of Appeal of much of its existing work and would in addition constitute a subordinate Court for appeals in important civil cases.⁵ Although the desirability of exercising economy and of avoiding multiplicity of appeals appeared to weigh heavily against the Council's proposals, the policy of supporting the institutions to which popular ideas seemed

¹ *Supra*, p. 129.

² *Admin. Report, Justice*, 1920, p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴ The Courts' (Revision) Proclamation, 1921: *Compilation*, 1920-1923, pp. 4-6. The outline of the Courts as sanctioned is given in detail in *Admin. Report, Justice*, 1920, p. 6.

⁵ *Admin. Report, Justice*, 1920, p. 7.

wedded, triumphed. The erection of the Court was sanctioned. Owing to financial and other reasons, it was not instituted, however, until December 24th, 1925.¹

The transfer of function and authority in financial matters from the British Administration to the National Government, perhaps the most complicated and difficult task of all, was hampered not only by the abnormal conditions resulting from the Insurrection, but also by the inheritance of a tangled web of financial transaction between the Military and the Civil authorities of the previous regime. This legacy conspired to unsettle the Ministry's operations even after the Cairo Conference, in March, 1921, at which the Finance Minister, Sasūn Effendi, himself taking part, had presumably settled the issues at stake among the various British authorities.²

An outstanding difficulty also lay in the fact that all matters pertaining to Finance were not placed under the supervision of the Ministry. This non-centralization of authority may have been due to the desire to establish checks on possible unsound administration. It is more probable that it came about as the result of the inherited British system which in this case had been taken over without great alteration. Following the system in vogue in India, the Civil Administration had introduced two secretariats, those of Revenue and of Finance, and eventually a third, that of Commerce, to deal with financial matters.³ Upon the establishment of the provisional Government, the duties of the Finance Secretary were vested in the Minister of

¹ Royal ‘*Irāda* for formation of a Court of Cassation, December 24th, 1925: *Compilation of Laws and Regulations from 1st January, 1925, to 31st December, 1925* (Baghdad, 1926), p. 36.

² For résumé of financial arrangements reached at the Cairo Conference and their effect on ‘Iraq finances, see *Note on the Administration of the Public Finances of ‘Iraq, 1st April, to November, 1924* (Baghdad, 1925), pp. 11-18.

³ For the manifold duties of the Revenue Department, see *supra*, p. 119. The Finance Department had dealt with all expenditure, currency and resource matters, Budget estimates, accounts and audits. The Secretary for Commerce had been also Chief Collector of Customs until the abolition of the Secretaryship, August, 1920, brought Customs under the Finance Department. See *Note on Organization of Civil Admin. of Meso.*, April, 1920.

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Finance, but those of the Revenue Secretary were absorbed by the Minister of Interior, and those of the Commerce Secretary by the Minister of Commerce.¹ Not until March, 1931, did Excise pass to the Ministry of Finance, and not until October, 1921, following the decision of the Council of State, September 28th, did land revenue, *koda* and other financial duties of the Ministry of Interior come under the control of the Minister of Finance. The result was that while the initial organization approximated that of the original Finance Department, the progressive absorption of additional duties, with the attendant periodic reorganization, produced considerable confusion particularly in the *Liwās*.

In addition to the difficulties of reorganization, the major problem of the Finance Minister was economy, all the more urgent in the face of the unconsidered enthusiasm of some of the Council members, who were ready to remake 'Iraq in the twinkling of an eye. The Ministry had to face a serious loss of revenue attendant on the Insurrection as well as on the fall of prices. The destruction of crops and of gardens and the inability to enforce payments in certain areas, as in the Muntafiq,² resulted in a deficit of 61 lacs of rupees of revenue from agricultural sources alone, while the almost complete stoppage of commercial traffic on the railways, together with the damage to its equipment, produced a deficit of nearly 55 lacs in the Railway Accounts.³ The cost, however, of reorganization and the enforced assumption of the costly programmes already initiated under the policy of the Civil Administration,⁴ much of which was a 'fruitless burden upon the revenue,⁵ largely negated the expected saving for the year 1920-1. Expenditures, in fact, exceeded receipts by 183 lacs, although a

¹ See Table IV.

² *Admin. Report*, *Muntafiq*, 1921, pp. 16-18, App. E, F; *ibid.*, Report of Gharrāf Area, pp. 46-8; *ibid.*, Report of Sūq ash-Shuyūkh District, pp. 57-8, App. A.

³ *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 24.

⁴ *Supra*, Ch. vii.

⁵ *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 22.

surplus of 5 lacs was reported when items properly chargeable to the two regimes existing in the financial year had been taken into consideration.¹

The future was not brightened by the necessity of providing immediately for defence and for the maintenance of order, on a scale larger than anticipated at first, due to the unexpectedly rapid withdrawal of British troops. Defence forces in 1921-2, exclusive of Levies, the cost of which was assumed by H.M. Government, were to cost Rs. 127,09,455,² whereas in the previous year they had cost Rs. 88,50,000 inclusive of Levies.³

Although Defence Forces for the time being took the form of Levies and Police, the Council had provided, on January 6th, 1921, the nucleus of an ‘Iraq General Staff, with Major J. I. Eadie as temporary Adviser until the arrival of Col. P. C. Joyce in April. The creation of a national army was stimulated by the necessity of absorbing as far as possible, the large and articulate group of unemployed and discontented ex-officers from the Turkish army. The problem was further aggravated by the acute jealousy between the ex-Sharifian and ex-Turkish officers. Many of the latter would take no office and publicly predicted the early return of the Turks.

The entire question of the development of the defence forces, together with the question of a ruler for ‘Iraq were among the principal questions brought before the Cairo Conference in March, 1921.

¹ *Admin. Report, 1920-1922*, p. 23.

² *Budget of ‘Iraq Government, 1921-1922* (Baghdad, 1921), Ch viA, viB, vii, pp 10, 12

³ *Admin Report, 1920-1922*, p 25.

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IN the coffee houses, in the tents of the shaikhs, wherever 'Iraqis met in social and political gatherings during the winter of 1920 and the spring of 1921, the question as to the form of the permanent Government and of the person of its ruler was constantly under discussion. The problem of the ruler, both to 'Iraqis and to the responsible British officials in Baghdad and in Whitehall, was much the same as it had been just after the Armistice of Mudros: the discovery of an individual who would command the greatest support among the inhabitants of 'Iraq.

The desire on the part of H.M. Government to set up a ruler who had the support of the people, as reiterated by Lord Curzon in the House of Lords, June 25th, 1920, when he said: 'No announcement would be more welcome to us than a genuine and general expression of opinion in favour of a particular system or even of a particular ruler,'¹ was something more than mere platitude calculated to win the goodwill of the 'Iraqis. A candidate possessing popular support and willing to co-operate with Great Britain in maintaining her interests was inherent in the pattern of the State which H.M. Government had in mind for 'Iraq which, in spite of the implications of its public declarations, was still an 'indigenous government' under 'effective and indisputable British control'.² Without such a head, clothed with executive authority and ostensibly supported by the people, no façade could exist behind which ultimate British control might function without the open employment of armed force. All negotiations, whether unilateral or bilateral, unsupported by public opinion, would fall to the ground for

¹ *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. XL (1920), p. 880.

² Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, February 14th, 1919, cited *supra*, pp. 180-1.

lack of a contracting party, as occurred in the case of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, the Treaty of Sèvres, and as characterized by the early efforts of the French to set up a government in Syria.

No candidate who fulfilled these conditions had been revealed in the Acting Civil Commissioner's summary of 'Iraqī public opinion, in November, 1918,¹ or by the plebiscite of the winter of 1918-19, initiated and rigorously supervised by the Acting Civil Commissioner, who himself was bitterly opposed to an Arab Amīr. The plebiscite had revealed that while a strong desire for an Amīr existed, rival ambitions, local jealousies and lack of outstanding ability made it impossible for the country to settle on any one candidate.²

From that time, although the desire for an Amīr had steadily grown, the difficulty of settling on any single candidate had remained. One section of the ex-Turkish officials, practically all Sunnīs of Baghdad, afraid of being swamped by the Shī'a majority, was imbued with the idea that a Sunnī Turk, as found in the person of Prince Burhan ed-Dīn,³ might better serve their interests than a local candidate or a Hāshimī known to be on comparatively friendly terms with the Shī'īs.⁴ Opposing them, however, was an even larger element of ex-Turkish officials, both civil and military, concentrated largely in Baghdad, Mōsul and Kirkūk, who encouraged the belief, substantiated by persistent propaganda arising across the frontiers, that the return of the Turks was but a question of time.

Among the possible local candidates the Naqīb of Baghdad stood high, although his acceptance of the presidency of the Council and his seeming subservience to the British had earned the disapproval of the ardent Nationalists. In British circles, his great age, his feeble health and lack of suitable dynastic successors counted against him, although, according to members

¹ Telegram No. 10250, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, November 24th, 1918.

² *Supra*, pp. 172 ff.

³ *Political Developments in Meso*, p. 4

⁴ Bell, *Letters*, p. 585.

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of his family, the throne was offered him but under such conditions and limitations as would have made him, in his own words, no more than an 'Iraqi Rajah'. He himself did not seek the throne, although he felt that if it were freely offered him by the people he would be obliged to accept the honour and the duties

Saiyid Talib Pasha of Basra, Minister of Interior, by his ability, his energy and his influence, was the most outstanding local candidate. Since his return from Egypt, where he had rendered valuable services to the Allies in arousing the Arabs against the Turks, he had continued to work as before the war for 'Iraqi Nationalism. He had, however, stopped short of advocating violence to eject the British and during the Insurrection he had rendered further services to the British Authorities, both as intermediary with the insurgents and as Chairman of the Electoral Law Committee. His enemies maintained, nevertheless, that, as in the days of the Turks, his activities were directed primarily towards furthering his own ambitions. Indeed, he freely admitted to the High Commissioner his expectations of becoming Amīr of 'Iraq, which, he predicted in February, 1921, would be accomplished by the autumn of the same year. So great was the alarm and opposition aroused by Saiyid Talib Pasha that any original intention the High Commissioner may have had of using him as head of either provisional or permanent Government¹ was effectually checked by the knowledge that if Saiyid Talib had many followers who professed their willingness to die on his behalf, there were others who would go to the same lengths to prevent him from becoming head of the State.² The High Commissioner's disapproval of Saiyid Talib's activities was not lessened

¹ Bell, *Letters*, p. 562

² Much of the reluctance of Sasūn Effendi and others to support the provisional Government, has been explained by the fear that the British Government intended to support Talib Pasha. Ja'far Pasha is stated to have said in private that 'If he had not hesitated to enter the Cabinet, it was only with the object of defeating Talib Pasha, whose ambitions he regarded as a menace to the country'. *Political Developments in Mesopotamia*, p. 4.

by the knowledge that the Nationalists in many quarters regarded him as the one strong candidate able to oppose the British nor by the fact that his propaganda was ostensibly in favour of the Naqīb into whose place he expected to fall if the Naqīb refused the honour or when his death left it vacant.

Other candidates had been mentioned. The Shaikh of Mohammerah, whose name had been put forward in 1918-19, again announced his candidature on April 5th in a letter to the High Commissioner. Ibn Sa‘ūd was also proposed, largely, it was believed in official circles, to offset the possible success of the sons of the Sharif of Mecca, of whom both ‘Abdullāh and Faisal were freely mentioned. The Agha Khan¹ and even the *Wālī* of Push ti-Kuh were also suggested. In some circles, the possibility of a republic was also discussed.

Sentiment in favour of a Sharifian ruler had not been lacking in ‘Iraq at the end of the war, as the Acting Civil Commissioner had noted in November, 1918,² and as the plebiscite had confirmed.³ At that time it had been vigorously opposed by the Acting Civil Commissioner and by those who held the same opinions on the Arab question. His efforts to exclude and to counter Hāshimī influence, whether engendered locally or in London, as in Colonel T. E. Lawrence’s proposal to divide Arab-Asia into four Hāshimī kingdoms under British influence,⁴ had been negated not only by H.M. Government but also by the efforts of the ‘Iraqīs themselves. The establishment of the Arab Government at Damascus under British aegis and the activities of the ‘Iraqī officers in Syria, in 1919 and 1920, to induce and finally to force Great Britain to keep her promises concerning ‘Iraq, had, as already indicated⁵ encouraged ‘Iraqī Nationalism and, after the election of Sharif ‘Abdullāh as King

¹ For the comments of the Agha Khan on the situation in ‘Iraq in 1920, see Haldane, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5

² Telegram, No. 10250, November 24th, 1918

³ Three declarations, the most secured by any candidate, had demanded a son of the Sharif of Mecca. See *supra*, p. 172.

⁴ Telegram, S/S for India, to Political, Baghdad, November 18th, 1918.

⁵ *Supra*, Ch. x, xiii.

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of 'Iraq, had stimulated sentiment on behalf of the Sharif. The fall of the Arab Government in Syria and the flight of Faisal had taken the wind temporarily from Sharifian sails, as at Mōsul, where the agitation in favour of a Hāshimī candidate had subsided precipitately.¹ The sentiment had rapidly revived, however. By late December, the Shi'a 'Ulamā were credited with saying 'The country will not be content until complete independence, under a son of the Sharif, is achieved'. Much of the support of the Shi'is who, in particular, seemed in favour of a son of the Sharif,² was due, it was held officially, to the fact that they believed that Sharif Husain, generally known to be of liberal religious views, was secretly a member of their sect. The Sharifian officers returning to 'Iraq in early 1921 had also given an impetus to public opinion in favour of a Hāshimī, although they were divided among themselves over the respective merits of 'Abdullāh and Faisal.

The movement towards a Hāshimī was not hindered by the knowledge that a number of the British officials, including the Adviser to the Minister of Justice, the Oriental Secretary and the Private Secretary to the High Commissioner, in private conversations had advocated a Hāshimī and Faisal in particular. As early as November, 1920, Miss Gertrude Bell wrote, as she had already urged upon the Acting Civil Commissioner in the previous July, that the only solution in her opinion was a son of the Sharif for whom, she believed, the Constituent Assembly when convened, would ask.³ A little later, she again wrote: 'I feel quite clear in my own mind that there is only one workable solution, a son of the Sharif, and, for choice, Faisal: very much the first choice.'⁴ The necessity for rapid action in setting up a king to check adverse currents against the new Government, she also recognized, as when she wrote: 'I believe if we could put up a son of the Sharif at once he might

¹ *Admin. Report, Mosul, 1920*, pp. 3-4

² See letters cited *supra*, p. 261.

³ Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 574. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 581.

yet sweep the board; if we hesitate the tide of public opinion may turn overwhelmingly to the Turks. . . .’¹

The High Commissioner had maintained, however, the strictly official view that the provisional Government had been established with the aim of providing machinery whereby the wishes of the people as to the form of the permanent Government and the person of the ruler might be freely expressed. The plan, involving delay, found critics even among the ‘Iraqis.

‘You British wish to build the Government of ‘Iraq in the usual solid English fashion,’ an ‘Iraqi high official, with a reputation for sagacity and insight, is reported to have said to Miss Bell at a dinner in the winter of 1920-1. ‘You want to begin with the foundations and then follow with the walls, the roof and then the decorations. That is not my idea of the way to build now for ‘Iraq.’

‘What do you mean?’ he was asked.

‘Begin with a roof, supported by a few pillars. The roof will encourage us to continue. Otherwise the slowness of building may discourage us. Give us a king. He will be our roof and we will work downwards.’

From the events of the next few months it would seem that both the British officials in Baghdad, including the High Commissioner, and H.M. Government came to the same conclusion: that the roof could not wait for the walls and that the head of the permanent State must be installed before convoking the Assembly. The Assembly came to be considered as a body which was to ratify the choice by H.M. Government of a ruler and to approve of the steps which had already been taken by the provisional Government under British guidance.

Among the members of the Interdepartmental Committee in London, a Hāshimī candidate found the most favour, although the Naqīb and Saiyid Talib Pasha each had their supporters. Lord Curzon, although he strongly disapproved of the action of the ‘Iraqi Covenanters in Damascus in March,

¹Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 585.



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1920, had come to regard 'Abdullāh as the prospective Amīr of 'Iraq. He had demurred, therefore, at the proposal which the Acting Civil Commissioner had telegraphed following the collapse of the Syrian Government. The telegram, in part, was as follows:

'Will His Majesty's Government consider possibility of offering him Amirate of Mesopotamia? Objections entertained on this side to creation of Amirate have hitherto been primarily that no suitable person could be found. We have always regarded Faisal as booked for Syria. Nothing that I have heard during the last few months has led me to modify my views of unsuitability of 'Abdullah and our experience of last few weeks in Baghdad makes it fairly clear that no local candidate will be successful in obtaining sufficient support here to enable him to make good.'¹

Mr. Montagu, on behalf of the India Office, had favourably received the suggestion, but it was dropped² in deference to Lord Curzon and to the Quai d'Orsay which made it clear that Amīr Faisal's 'employment in Mesopotamia immediately after his expulsion from Syria, would be regarded by French opinion as an unfriendly act'.³

Lord Curzon in the following months experienced a change of heart. Once the provisional Government was well under way he adopted, with the approval of the Middle East Committee, the policy of installing Faisal in 'Iraq.

On December 17th, Lord Curzon, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Middle East Affairs, deputed Colonel Kinahan Cornwallis, then attached to the Foreign Office, to call on the same day upon Amīr Faisal, who was then in London, and to offer him the throne of 'Iraq. Colonel Cornwallis had been in close touch with Arab affairs in general and had been closely

¹ Cited Wilson, Sir A. T., *Mesopotamia, 1917-1920*, p. 306.

² Nevertheless, Sharif 'Abdullāh felt it necessary to deny in October, 1920, in *Al-Fallāh* (Mecca) that Faisal would take his place in 'Iraq.

³ Telegram No. 1539, India Office to Viceroy, Simla, for Sir Percy Cox, September 10th, 1920.

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associated with Amīr Faisal in Damascus, where a close personal friendship had developed.¹

Not until one o'clock in the morning, after the Amīr had returned from the theatre, did the interview take place. The offer from the Foreign Office was met with refusal although the conversation lasted until after three o'clock. Faisal remained obdurate. The throne, he declared, belonged to his brother ‘Abdullāh and he, Faisal, could not and would not accept it.

Shortly afterwards, Colonel T. E. Lawrence was asked to approach Sharīf ‘Abdullāh and to attempt to remove his objections to the installation of his younger brother in ‘Iraq. Amīr ‘Abdullāh has since stated that Colonel Lawrence went so far as to offer him a kingdom in Syria if he would renounce the throne of ‘Iraq and that, on the basis of the promise, he, ‘Abdullāh, was gathering his forces preparatory to taking over his kingdom when the British Government intervened, in February, 1921, and compelled him to accept only the southern portion of his brother's former kingdom, the Amirate of Kerak or Transjordan.²

Following the report by Colonel Lawrence that Sharīf ‘Abdullāh would offer no serious objections to the proposal that Faisal should take his place in ‘Iraq,³ Amīr Faisal was again approached. The conversations were continued after the conduct of ‘Iraq affairs fell to the new Middle East Department, created in the early spring of 1921 through the initiative of Mr. Winston Churchill, who was transferred from the War Office to the Colonial Office for the purpose.⁴ By the time of

¹ Later Personal Adviser to King Faisal, 1921-33, and Adviser to Minister of Interior, ‘Iraq, 1921-35.

² Colonel Lawrence was non-committal regarding this statement by Amīr Abdullāh. A search through his papers after his death revealed no reference to the episode.

³ ‘Abdullāh, however, held it against Faisal for a number of years that he had usurped the crown which was his (‘Abdullāh's) by right.

⁴ Mr. Churchill had formulated his plans for the Department by the middle of January (*Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CL I (1921), p. 268), but did not go from the War Office to the Colonial Office until February 14th. The Department formally assumed supervision of Middle East Affairs, March 2nd, *Colonial Office List*, 1921, p. 448.

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the Cairo Conference in March, most of the out-standing points between H.M. Government and the Amir had been settled. It remained for the Cairo Conference to confirm his candidature and to outline the procedure by which he was to be installed in 'Iraq.

The Cairo Conference, March 12th-24th, 1921

The Middle East Division of the Colonial Office had owed its creation to the necessity of devising a less costly British policy for the Near and Middle East and of replacing by unified control the complicated and cumbersome system of divided authority among the Foreign, the India and the Colonial Offices.¹ Mr. Churchill, in taking charge of Near and Middle East affairs, was faced, on the one hand, by the insistent demand of the British public for a radical reduction in expenditure² and, on the other hand, by the necessity, with which his whole political creed was in sympathy, of maintaining and consolidating the territorial gains and the strategical vantage points won in the East as the result of a vast outlay of British blood and treasure. To aid in formulating new lines of procedure in order to achieve these ends, he called a conference of the principal political and military officials of the areas concerned to meet in Cairo on March 12th, 1921.³

The questions considered by the Conference included as problems concerning 'Iraq: the immediate reduction of British expenditure with the consequent revision of policy involving (a) the future relationship of the new State to Great Britain;

¹ *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CXLIII (1921), p. 268.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. CXXVII (1920), pp. 644-5; Vol. CXXX (1920), pp. 2223-84; H. of L., Vol. XL (1920), pp. 848-94; *The Times*, April 5th, 1921, May 9th, 1921; *The Daily Telegraph*, June 25th, 1920.

³ The representatives of 'Iraq who were summoned to the Conference were: the High Commissioner, accompanied by Sir Aylmer Haldane, K.C.M.G., K.C.B., the Commander-in-Chief; Sasūn Effendi, Minister of Finance; Ja'far Pasha, C.M.G., D.S.O., Minister of Defence; Maj.-Gen. E. H. de Vere Atkinson, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., Adviser to the Ministry of Works; Lt.-Col. S. H. Slater, C.I.E., Financial Adviser; Miss Gertrude Bell, C.B.E., Oriental Secretary.

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(b) the person of the future ruler of ‘Iraq; and (c) the nature and composition of the defence forces of the new State which was to assume an increasing share of its own defence. The status of the Kurdish regions in their relations to ‘Iraq was also discussed.

It was apparent, in view of the decreasing revenue, of falling agricultural prices and of the large burdens to be assumed in taking over the Railways, the Port of Basra and other public works from the Army at the latter’s own valuation, that the prospects were not bright for the immediate assumption by the new State of the cost of its defence. Anticipating a discussion of the question, vital from the British standpoint, at Cairo, the High Commissioner after consultation with Sir Aylmer Haldane and the Minister of Defence had, nevertheless, formulated proposals involving substantial saving for the ensuing year and further reductions in the future, consequent on ‘Iraq assuming an increasing share in the responsibilities hitherto devolving on Great Britain.¹ Mr. Churchill was thus able to announce a preliminary reduction of the original estimate of British expenditure in the Middle East for 1921-2, from £35,000,000 to £27,500,000, a figure which was expected to fall to nine or ten million pounds in 1922-3.² The reduction in the British budget, however, necessitated a stipulation that the ‘Iraq budget should provide not less than 55 lacs for the National Army, the strength of which should eventually amount to 15,000 men, and that ordinarily her contributions to defence should not fall below 15 per cent of her revenue,³ a proportion later increased to 25 per cent.⁴

¹ Cox, Sir P. Z, ‘Historical Summary’ in Bell, op. cit., p. 531.

² *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CXLIII (1921), p. 271. Also *ibid.*, Vol. CLI (1922), p. 1547. The actual expenditures in ‘Iraq by the British Treasury, 1920-5 have been stated to be (*ibid.*, Vol. CXCII (1926), p. 4):

1920-1	£32,000,000	1923-4	£5,740,358
1921-2	£23,355,950	1924-5	£4,479,754
1922-3	£7,807,384	1925-6	£4,118,400

³ *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, p. 25.

⁴ Article IV of Military Agreement and Article IV of Financial Agreement, subsidiary to the Treaty with King Faisal, October 10th, 1922, Cmd. 2120.

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In order to enable the High Commissioner to achieve the proposed economies for the relief of the British taxpayer, the Conference agreed that until the 'Iraqī Army could be recruited, equipped and trained, the Levies should be increased from 4000 to 7500 and that they were to be financed by H.M. Government and to be administered by the High Commissioner. The Levies, hitherto, had been composed for the most part of Arabs, with a small number of Kurds. Assyrians were now to be recruited.¹ In addition, six squadrons of the Air Force, stationed at strategic points, were to assume responsibility for the maintenance of order.²

The success of the proposed withdrawal of British troops from 'Iraq depended almost entirely on the creation and maintenance of friendly relations between the 'Iraqīs and the Mandatory Power, which had been temporarily improved by the establishment of the provisional Government. The continuance of strong Nationalist agitation, however, directed against the Mandate on the ground that the relationship which it created had no basis either in British promises or in Arab Nationalism, seemed to indicate that the mandatory regime, as originally conceived and outlined in the draft document, could not be imposed without prolonged military occupation on a scale which British public opinion rendered impossible. The mere prospect of increased hostility, leading inevitably in the absence of adequate military forces in the country to disturbances similar to those of 1920 or even worse, would not only paralyse the efforts of British officials to apply the Mandate and to develop the country but would also lead to an irresistible renewal of British public opinion for the complete evacuation of a country where the game was not worth the candle.

It had already been suggested to H.M. Government, in May, 1920, by Mr. Montagu, that if Nationalist agitation were to

¹ *Admin. Report, 1920-1922*, pp. 44-5.

² Sassoon, Rt. Hon. Sir Philip, *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. xx (1933), p. 399.

be cut at its roots and if a friendly government co-operating with Great Britain were to be established in ‘Iraq, a further step in defining the relations between the two countries might be necessary.¹ This step would consist of an attempt to satisfy national aspirations by disguising the relationship, sanctioned under the terms of the mandatory document then already in existence, by means of a treaty of alliance. Lord Curzon, who had difficulty in agreeing with Mr. Montagu on any subject, had rejected the suggestion at the time. Mr. Churchill took up the idea, all his conversations with Amīr Faisal being conducted on the basis of negotiating a treaty similar to that between Great Britain and Egypt, which would establish Faisal as King of an independent State in alliance with Great Britain. Under such a treaty, the scope of British authority might be more restricted than originally projected, but under skilful handling, the ultimate authority could be made not less effective. It would have the added merit of enabling Great Britain to maintain with less expense her position before the League of Nations without sacrificing her Imperial interests.

When Mr. Churchill arrived at Cairo for the Conference, he had made up his mind that Faisal was the only possible candidate with whom such a treaty might be negotiated. In agreement with him were Sir Percy Cox and many friends and supporters of the Amir at the Conference: T. E. Lawrence, Miss Bell, Ja‘far Pasha, H. W. Young, and others. Amīr Faisal’s high birth, as a son of Husain, Sharīf of Mecca and King of the Hijāz, assured his position among Arabs in general and gave his person a sanctity among the religiously minded, even among the Shī‘is. He possessed experience in the ways of men and in diplomatic usage gleaned from his early life among the Turks at Istanbul, from his sojourn in the desert in the days of peace and of war against the Turks, from his participation at the Peace Conference at Versailles and from his brief day as King at Damascus. Among the Nationalists, his early

¹ Young, Major Sir H. W., *op. cit.*, p. 313.

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espousal of the Arab cause in Syria,¹ his leadership of the Arab forces in the Hijāz and in Syria and his election as the first Arab ruler of Damascus since the Ummayyads, secured his standing as an Arab patriot. His personality and his character which had won and were to continue to win the affection of British officials with whom he associated, were expected to gain the adherence of the 'Iraqīs among whom a strong sentiment in his favour already existed.

His short-lived kingship at Damascus, it was believed, had revealed to him the difficulties of a purely Arab administration and the danger of relying entirely on an Arab army.² British advice and assistance to the new kingdom would, therefore, it was hoped, be welcomed for their own sake and be regarded not merely as onerous conditions imposed by the Power which had given him his throne.

As a secondary consideration, it was felt that Faisal's nomination would, in part, redeem the promises made during the war to the Sharif in particular and to the Arabs in general and thus rehabilitate British prestige in the Arab world. It would, in addition, mitigate Faisal's bitterness against the British Government for what he believed to be its responsibility in his overthrow at Damascus.³

Mr. Churchill believed, moreover, that if Faisal were installed in 'Iraq, the British Government would acquire increased control both over him and over his father, the Sharif of Mecca, who was still proving intractable and exasperating in his relations with Great Britain. At a meeting of the Special

¹ His efforts to secure the release of the Syrians accused of treason during the war nearly cost him his own life. See Djemal Pasha, op. cit., pp. 217-18.

² Amīr Faisal, in his unpublished *Memoirs*, written during his sojourn in Italy in 1920, spoke, however, in glowing terms of his own Arab forces of the desert campaign, and declared that had they fought at Maysalun the French would not have won the engagement.

³ In his *Memoirs*, Amīr Faisal maintained, not always correctly, that he had followed faithfully the advice of his British Advisers in all his relations with the French, relying on the help which they promised; that they had discouraged his summoning of his Hijāzī followers; and that in the crucial hour of his need, they had abandoned him to the French.

Committee dealing with the question of a ruler for ‘Iraq, on the opening day of the Conference, March 12th, Mr. Churchill declared that Faisal should be made to realize that his father’s subsidy as well as the British guarantee to the Sharif of non-aggression from Wāhḥābī sources depended on Faisal’s own behaviour.

Although the approval of Amīr Faisal’s candidature was almost a foregone certainty, the merits of the other candidates were not overlooked at the Conference. The High Commissioner, speaking on March 12th, did not believe that any local candidate could be elected. The Agha Khan, whose interests had become European rather than Asiatic, would not accept the nomination. Sentiment for a Turkish Prince was not strong enough to be considered. By the process of elimination as well as by his own merits, Faisal appeared to be the only possible candidate.

The difficulties attending the installation of Faisal in ‘Iraq were not ignored. Warning notes were sounded as to the undoubted opposition of Saiyid Talib Pasha to any nominee other than himself¹ and as to the probable effect on Ibn Sa‘ūd, an ally of Great Britain, of the establishment of the two new Hāshimī kingdoms: ‘Iraq on the north and Transjordan on the north-west. To counter possible active hostility from Ibn Sa‘ūd who had already shown interest in the political situation in ‘Iraq, the Conference resolved that he should be acquainted with the attitude of H.M. Government to Faisal’s candidature. The High Commissioner, accordingly, telegraphed to the Wāhḥābī leader shortly after the Conference had adjourned. He received in reply a letter, dated May 7th, 1921, expressing Ibn Sa‘ūd’s thanks for the consideration shown him at the Conference.² After Faisal’s departure for ‘Iraq and Mr. Churchill’s

¹ Expected to take the form of anti-Mandate agitation.

² Kohn’s statement, *History of Nationalism in the Near East*, p. 308, that the effect on Ibn Sa‘ūd of the setting up of the Hāshimī princes was overlooked by the British Government, is not borne out by the records of the Cairo Conference. See *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., Vol. CXLIII (1921), pp. 265 ff. Also *supra*, p. 157.

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announcement, Ibn Sa'ūd again wrote, on June 21st, to the High Commissioner stating his willingness to accept the decision of the British Government, but asking that his own position be determined and safeguarded. Some time afterwards he replied in friendly terms to a message from Faisal.¹

A further question arose at the Conference as to whether an 'Iraqi Congress or Assembly should propose Faisal as King. It was pointed out by a member of the special Committee that a concrete proposal must be placed before the Assembly if it were convened or the results of its deliberations would not be satisfactory. Mr. Churchill stated that he knew of no precedent for allowing a Constituent Assembly to choose its own ruler. It was eventually agreed that convocation of the Assembly before the installation of Faisal in 'Iraq was undesirable but that the High Commissioner should use his discretion according to the situation existing at the time. It was also agreed, in order that 'Iraq should appear to choose its own ruler, that a line of procedure should be followed which would give the 'Iraqis the opportunity of demanding Amīr Faisal. The following schedule was provisionally proposed:

April 18th — The High Commissioner would arrive in Baghdad.

April 18th to 21st — Announcement by the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs that H.M. Government approved of Amīr Faisal as a candidate for the throne of 'Iraq. This would be accompanied by a proclamation of a general amnesty issued by the High Commissioner.

April 23rd — Amīr Faisal would send telegrams to Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'īd, to Talib Pasha and to the Naqīb of Baghdad

¹ Letter, Ibn Sa'ūd to Amīr Faisal, July 29th, 1921:

After compliments, etc., 'We thank God for your safety and beg that you will be always safe. May you prosper.

'There is no doubt that you are fit to be the foremost in good action as is proved by the capacity you have shown in solving difficulties and maintaining mutual support for the upkeep of the glory of the Arabs. You may be sure that your brother has no thought nor aspiration other than this.'

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announcing his candidature and saying that he, Faisal, hoped that he would have their co-operation.

April 23rd to May 8th — Nūrī Pasha and other ‘Iraqīs would send telegrams to Amīr Faisal, inviting him to come to ‘Iraq as its prospective King.

May 8th to June 8th — Amīr Faisal would come to ‘Iraq or would send his representatives, the arrival to take place about the middle of May. He or his representatives would be met by such a welcome and response from ‘Iraqīs as to make it unnecessary to convene the Constituent Assembly, except to ratify or to confirm his election as King.

This schedule, finally adopted after minor alterations as to details and dates, implied that the Amīr should come to agreement with H.M. Government in regard to the future treaty, to Great Britain’s position in ‘Iraq and towards the League of Nations and to his own position generally.¹ It also implied that the Sharifian party in Baghdad, stimulated by the announcement of approval by H.M. Government and by judicious promptings emanating from the British Residency, would prove to be sufficiently representative and powerful to merit the invitation to the Amīr to come to ‘Iraq where he could appear only when the ground had been carefully ploughed and harrowed.

¹ *Progress of ‘Iraq during the Period 1920-1931* (Special Report by H.M. Government to Council of League of Nations, Colonial No. 58 (1931) (hereafter *Progress of ‘Iraq*), p. 14).

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To the High Commissioner, on his return from Cairo, fell the delicate task of ensuring that the choice of the 'Iraqīs, when expressed, should fall upon the candidate approved at Cairo.

The undertaking was to prove no sinecure. During his absence, the various candidates and their partisans had increased the intensity of their campaigns, their intrigues and their agitations. The Hāshimī party had not been idle, the most recently returned group of 'Iraqī officers adding new recruits. The Shī'is appeared to be increasingly in favour of a Hāshimī, although neither they nor the 'Iraqī officers had yet been able to come to a decision as to whether 'Abdullāh or Faisal was to be their nominee. Faisal had the greater reputation as a protagonist of Arab Nationalism, but many held that he was too pro-British. His frequent visits abroad also tended to show that he had become a foreigner. 'Abdullāh was regarded as more of a true Arab.¹

The hostility of the pro-Turkish party had been somewhat decreased by the decisions of the London Conference in February and March.² Evidence was not lacking, however, that many of those who had been advocating a Turkish prince were now supporting the Naqīb, in order to prevent the election of a Hāshimī. 'Alī as-Sulaimān of the Dulaim had long been working for the Naqīb,³ for whom, it was also reported, Ibn Sa'ūd was exercising his influence in order to oppose the Sharifians. The Shaikh of Mohammerah was still in the field

¹ *Al-Istiqlāl*, in a leading article, December 17th, 1920, maintained that 'Abdullāh's election at Damascus had been final and binding.

² *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. vi, pp. 32-3, 65-8, 89-90.

³ See letter by 'Alī as-Sulaimān *'Al-Iraq*, April 19th, 1921.

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and did not withdraw his candidature or announce his support of Faisal until Faisal's departure for ‘Iraq.¹

The Naqib himself had shown irreconcilable aversion to a son of the Sharif. As early as February 6th, 1919, he had expressed himself in no uncertain terms, saying:

I am a relative of the Sharif. I come of the same stock and I share the same religious opinions. You will therefore understand that I am not actuated by difference of blood or of thought when I tell you that I would never consent to the appointment of the Sharif or of his son as Amir. The Hijaz is one and ‘Iraq is one, there is no connection but that of the faith . . . I would rather a thousand times have the Turks back in ‘Iraq than see the Sharif or his sons installed here.²

He now desired a public announcement definitely excluding sons of the Sharif. Failing that, he sought assurances that no ruler would be imposed on the people of ‘Iraq contrary to their wishes. He professed himself, however, as satisfied with the High Commissioner's expressions of British official neutrality.

The candidature of Faisal, therefore, had to reckon on the combined opposition of the pro-Turks, the Naqib, Ibn Sa‘ud and Saiyid Talib Pasha who, of them all, was held to be the most formidable. The High Commissioner realized that Saiyid Talib Pasha, in his strategic position as Minister of Interior and as one of the most powerful and influential men in ‘Iraq, might wreck Faisal's chances in ‘Iraq and thus upset all the carefully laid plans of H.M. Government. Saiyid Talib had been undoubtedly gaining ground in Baghdad, where his extraordinary influence over the public mind had been increased by a series of murders, wrongfully ascribed to his revenge against his enemies.³ In the absence of the High Commissioner at the Cairo Conference, which was popularly believed to have been

¹ His letter was published in *Al-‘Iraq*, June 14th, 1921.

² Bell, *Note on Political Views of the Naqib*, p. 10.

³ *Admin. Report, Baghdad Liwa*, 1921 (Baghdad, 1922), p. 2.

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convened to declare Faisal as King,¹ Saiyid Talib had toured the *Liwās* below Baghdad as far south as Rumaitha and Dīwānīya, spending several thousand pounds on propaganda in the name of the Naqīb, but in reality with an eye to his own interests.² More of a realist than the Naqīb and therefore more sceptical of the High Commissioner's assurances, he had also encouraged the widespread belief that whether 'Iraqīs wished for a son of the Sharif or not, a Hāshimī would be set on the throne by Great Britain. Apprehension was felt in official circles lest his next move would be to stir up active opposition to the Mandate.

It had been planned by the High Commissioner that the Arab Ministers should be suspended and their functions carried on by the British Advisers during the critical period when Faisal's candidature was in abeyance.³ The Ministers who favoured Faisal could thus work unimpeded by their official position, Talib Pasha would be removed from a position where he could use official pressure on his own behalf and British officials would be placed in the vital points of control.

The High Commissioner saw, however, that this plan would not be a sufficient check on Saiyid Talib. The opportunity for removing him completely from the scene was found in remarks made by Saiyid Talib at a dinner, given in his own house, April 14th, to which he had invited the French and Persian Consuls, Mr. Percival Landon, of the *Daily Telegraph* of London, other British guests, the Amīr ar-Rabī'a, Shaikh Salīm al-Khaiyūn and Saiyid Husain al-Afnan, Secretary of the Council of State, the whole gathering numbering thirteen. Following the dinner, Saiyid Talib addressed Mr. Landon in Arabic, his words being translated by a member of the party.

Saiyid Talib questioned Mr. Landon as to the measure of

¹ Bell, *Letters*, p. 590.

² *Admin. Report, Hilla Liwa*, 1921 (Baghdad, 1922), p. 3; *Daily Mail*, March 12th, 1921.

³ Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 590-1. Nūrī Pasha, Nāji Pasha and other Sharifians had previously suggested the plan.

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confidence which could be placed in the undertaking of H.M. Government to ensure the freedom of the coming elections. He proceeded to point out that some of the British officers in the employment of the High Commissioner were exercising undue influence in favour of one of the candidates to the throne of ‘Iraq. He inquired whether he should appeal to King George or to the High Commissioner for their removal.

Mr. Landon replied that there might also be officers who were known to be in favour of a local candidate, but that the removal of one group would involve that of another. On a whispered word of advice from the interpreter, Saiyid Talib pursued the subject no farther. He went on to say that should there be indications that the declared policy of the British Government was not being carried out, the Amīr ar-Rabī‘a, with 20,000 rifles and Shaikh Salīm al-Khaiyūn, with all his tribesmen, were ready to see it done. He added that the Naqīb would not hesitate to lodge complaints in India, Cairo, Constantinople and Paris.¹

On receiving what he believed to be a well-substantiated report of Saiyid Talib’s speech, the High Commissioner asked the General Officer Commanding to arrange for Saiyid Talib’s removal. On the same day he was arrested by British soldiers and, under military guard, was removed to Basra and from there deported to Ceylon.²

The High Commissioner felt his drastic action to be necessary. No man, particularly one so prominent, could be allowed to call in question the sincerity of the promises of the British Government or to threaten it with force. Even more imperative, however, was the risk that the continued presence of Saiyid

¹ See also *Communiqué*, April 18th, 1921; *Admun. Report*, 1920-1922, App 6, also *Baghdad Times*, April 18th, 1921.

² *The Times* (London), April 23rd, 1921, published two versions of the incident; (a) from Tehran, dated April 20th, inaccurate and garbled; (b) from Allahabad, April 20th, based on the official *communiqué*. *Daily Telegraph*, April 23rd, also published the Allahabad version. Cf. statement, Coke, R.: *Heart of the Middle East*, p. 230, that owing to censorship, the incident ‘was not reported in the London Press until many months had elapsed’.

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Talib might nullify the decision reached at Cairo: the final effort of H.M. Government to settle the future status of Iraq.

The action of the High Commissioner convinced the great mass of the Iraqis that the British authorities would not hesitate to use strong measures if the occasion demanded it. This widespread conviction probably did more to ensure the acquiescence of the masses of the population in Faisal's candidature, once it was announced, than the absence of Talib Pasha's opposition or the existence of any definite desire among them for a son of the Sharif of Mecca. In any case Faisal's prospects of success immediately improved. The Naqib withdrew his opposition to a Hāshimī, declaring that it would be best to follow the wishes of H.M. Government. A moderate Sharifian party having a definite programme was formed, with the approval of the High Commissioner who, while aware of the immense influence which the Sharifians could exert in creating and enlarging public opinion for Faisal, also realized the necessity of controlling them and of preventing the extremists from using Faisal for their own ends in opposition to the Mandate. Encouragement to the Sharifians was also extended by the vernacular press, particularly by *Ash-Sharq*, under the editorship of the Secretary to the Council of State;¹ by *Al-'Iraq* which took the most prominent part;² by *Lisān al-'Arab* which, under its editor, Ibrāhīm Hilmī al-'Umarī, was pro-Faisal and, for the moment, pro-British;³ and by *Al-Auqāt al-'Irāqiya* of Basra and *Al-Mūsil* of Mōsul.⁴ The *Baghdad Times*, the English newspaper owned by the Government, also published a few pro-Faisal articles.

In the creation of sentiment on behalf of Amīr Faisal and in

¹ Established August 30th, 1920, by Saiyid Husain al-Afnan.

² See particularly its issues of April 25th, 26th, 28th, 29th; May 4th, 7th, 9th to 13th, 21st, 23rd; June 4th, 13th, 14th.

³ Originally published in Damascus, its editor had transferred it to Baghdad, its first number, 401, appearing on June 23rd, 1921. It had not always given its support to Faisal as King of Iraq. Cf. issue of November 13th, 1920.

⁴ Founded in 1921 and on November 14th, 1918, respectively. Both were owned by the Government.

the encouragement of his partisans, the High Commissioner, although obliged to maintain an outwardly neutral attitude, could not in so important a question refrain from taking a hand behind the scenes. The eventual success of Faisal's candidature must be attributed in no small degree to his guiding direction. 'He is a master hand at the game of politics,' wrote Miss Bell on June 12th, 1921, 'it's an education to watch him playing it.'¹

Members of his staff and the British Advisers throughout the country, although nominally neutral, were not so restricted in practice, as Saiyid Talib had pointed out on April 14th. It devolved particularly on Miss Bell, as an enthusiastic supporter of Amir Faisal, rather than as Oriental Secretary, although the prestige of her position and the knowledge acquired through it contributed greatly to her effectiveness, to take the leading personal role in developing and organizing public opinion for Faisal.²

The early statement by H.M. Government of its approval of the candidature of Amir Faisal, followed by Faisal's own announcement that he intended to present himself as a candidate, the declaration of a general amnesty and the efforts of the Amir's supporters in 'Iraq had been expected, in accordance with the schedule approved of at Cairo, to start the ball rolling in his direction.

Neither the announcements nor the amnesty were immediately forthcoming, however, although they had been foreshadowed in the High Commissioner's *communiqué* of April 12th,³ following his return from Cairo. H.M. Government had felt it inexpedient to make its announcement until it had secured the formal approval of the League of Nations for the Mandate. This was being delayed in deference to the inquiries of the United States Government as to Great Britain's intentions

¹ Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 598; also pp. 599, 602, 606-8.

² Miss Bell's letters during this period, *ibid.*, pp. 582-624, partially indicate the decisive role she played in the installation of Faisal. According to Amin Rihānī, *Ibn Sa'ūd*, p. 8, she later seemed to regret the role she had played.

³ *Baghdad Times*, April 12th, 1921; *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, App. 4.

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regarding the 'Open Door' in 'Iraq, where, the former maintained, citing the San Remo Agreement as evidence, that Great Britain had assumed a position inconsistent with the draft Mandate which was specific on the point of economic equality.¹ The amnesty did not appear until May 30th,² due to prolonged consultations with the Quai d'Orsay and the Government of India.

Without the announcements, the situation in 'Iraq hung fire in spite of the strenuous efforts made by Faisal's partisans in the expectation that the Cairo schedule would be followed. It was clear that many of the 'Iraqis were holding back for a definite lead. The answers of Sharif Husain to the telegrams sent him by 'Iraqi notables, asking that he send one of his sons to 'Iraq, were too vague to give the desired stimulus, although they were regarded by many as having been inspired by H.M. Government — it was generally known that he had drawn a subsidy from the British Government.³ In Mōsul, where strong sentiment existed in favour of Amīr Faisal, the efforts of the Baghdad Sharifian party to secure co-operation in sending letters to Sharif Husain were deemed an attempt to force the issue, which should be left to the Constituent Assembly.

Not until early June did the official machinery begin to move, and then according to a modified form of the original Cairo schedule. In the first week of June, H.M. Government telegraphed permission to the Hijāz that Faisal might leave for 'Iraq. Accordingly telegrams from the Sharif, announcing that he was sending his son Faisal to the Arabs of 'Iraq, were

¹ Article 11 of the Draft Mandate for Mesopotamia, *Accts. and Papers*, 1921 (Cmd. 1176), xliii, 721. For this controversy, which aroused much ill feeling on both sides, see *ibid.*, 1921 (Cmd. 1226) xliii, 481; 1921 (Cmd. 1351), xliii, 493. Also Gerig, B., *The Open Door and the Mandate System* (1930), Ch. vi; Secretary Hughes, *New York Times*, October 24th, 1924.

² Text: *Baghdad Times* and *Basrah Times*, May 30th, 1921; *Admin. Report*, 1920-1922, App. 5.

³ His subsidy had ceased in February, 1920. It was renewed subsequent to Faisal's enthronement, but only a single payment of £5000 was made in August, 1921, as the Sharif failed to live up to the conditions imposed: *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., Vol. XLIX (1922), pp. 241-3.

dispatched to ‘Iraqī notables.¹ Accompanied by three A.D.C.s, his private secretary, Colonel Cornwallis (his personal Adviser) and a party of ‘Iraqī notables,² Amīr Faisal left Jidda on June 12th, on R.I.M.S. *Northbrook*.³

The Election of Faisal

The Amīr arrived at Basra on June 23rd. Three weeks later, the Council of State unanimously declared him King of ‘Iraq.

In spite of the delays, the stage was well set for his reception. Mr. Churchill’s long awaited statement in the House of Commons, June 14th,⁴ was published in ‘Iraq, June 17th.⁵ The Naqīb and the Turkish party were disappointed at its pro-Sharīfian tone. They held that Mr. Churchill’s statement that:

They [H.M. Government] wish to make it clear, however, as they have repeatedly stated, that there is no intention or desire whatever of forcing a particular ruler on the people. On the contrary, it is desired that there will be complete freedom of choice and expression of opinion,

hardly harmonized with his declaration:

H.M. Government consider the Amīr Faisal a suitable candidate, indeed, the most suitable candidate in the field, and hope that he will secure the support of the majority of the people of ‘Iraq.

¹ *Al-‘Iraq*, June 13th and 21st, 1921. Sharīf Husain’s telegram to the Naqīb is as follows.

‘Having regard to the needs of the nation and the desire of the inhabitants, my son Faisal has left for your region. Owing to our relationship, I must say to you that it behoves us all to unite so as to give rest to the land, fulfilling its hopes and safeguarding its future. All this will come to pass through your good intentions and your religious and national sentiments. May God prosper you. — Husain.’

² These included a number of Nationalist leaders responsible for the Insurrection, as Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, Saīyid Muhammad as-Sadr, Saīyid Nūr, Saīyid Hādī Mūqutar, ‘Alī Bazīrqān, and ‘Alī Jaudāt Beg. See *Al-‘Iraq*, June 27th, 1921.

³ *Baghdad Times*, June 18th, 1921.

⁴ *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CXLIII (1921), pp. 265 ff.

⁵ *Al-‘Iraq*, June 17th, 1921. The version as published in the official *communiqué*, which is cited above, differs somewhat from that appearing in *Parliamentary Debates* (q.v.). See also *Baghdad Times*, June 17th, 1921, and *Basrah Times*, June 19th, 1921.

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Nor did his first statement agree with the intimation that no other candidate would be considered, since H.M. Government regarded a republic as unsuitable for 'Iraq and they would not 'tolerate the alternative of a Turkish Prince'.

The Sharifian party, on the other hand, was delighted and the public as a whole, it was believed, was glad to have a definite lead from the British Government.¹

The Naqib's attitude to the Amir, however, was above reproach.² He led the Council in giving a national aspect to the Amir's reception. Five Council members were appointed, on June 16th,³ to arrange for ceremonies and for lodging befitting the distinguished visitor: the former King of Syria and the son of a King. A mass meeting of some five hundred people, on June 17th, held under the auspices of Naji Pasha and the *Mutasarrif* of Baghdad, at the suggestion of Miss Bell and with the approval of the High Commissioner, arranged for Baghdad's share in the Amir's reception. It also selected sixty notables to go to Basra to welcome Faisal on his arrival there. In addition, the Mayor of Baghdad sent telegrams to the principal towns, suggesting that they send delegations to greet Faisal.

Amir Faisal arrived at Baghdad, June 29th, somewhat shaken by the manner of his reception in the south. He and his entourage had been led to believe, before arriving at Basra, that the country was solidly supporting him. His reception at Basra by the notables of that city⁴ and of Baghdad, headed by Ja'far

¹ *Al-'Iraq*, June 17th, 1921, and *Lisan al-'Arab*, June 24th, 1921. The latter wrote: 'The Arabs welcome it with great pleasure.'

² The Naqib telegraphed the following welcome to Faisal:

'To the light of the Candle of the family of the Prophet, the Pearly Star in the heaven of honour, H. H. the Amir Faisal.

'I have received with respect Your Highness' telegram which proves your Hashimi sentiments towards me and gives me the happy news of your arrival. Our hearts have been filled with pleasure. We thank you for your speedy and safe arrival. The ministers and the nation welcome you.' (*Al-'Iraq*, June 24th, 1921).

³ June 11th as recorded in *Political Developments in Meso.*, p. 5, is obviously erroneous.

⁴ Three days before Faisal's arrival, the High Commissioner had been forced to discourage severely a petition from Basra bearing about 4500 signatures, asking that Basra be given a separate legislature and full independence in financial, military and police affairs, under the king chosen by 'Iraq.

Pasha, Mr. Philby, representing the High Commissioner, Major W. C. F. Wilson, Adviser of the Basra *Liwā* and Colonel J. H. F. Lakin, representing the General Officer Commanding, had been excellent.¹ His reception elsewhere had been decidedly disappointing. At Ur Junction, the gathering from Nāsiriya had been small and cold. At Samāwa, a large number of shaikhs and tribesmen had turned out and at Dīwāniya, the audience had been fair, but there had been little enthusiasm. At Karbalā, the Indian *Qaimmaqām*, who had little faith in Arab self-government, had left the town the day before Faisal's arrival, without indicating the official attitude towards the Amīr. After an interview with the High Commissioner, however, he had returned to Karbalā and attempted to make suitable preparations, but there had been no spontaneity and the ‘*Ulamā* stood markedly aloof. At Najaf, the ‘*Ulamā* had been reserved, if not hostile. At Tuwairijī and at Hilla, however, Faisal had been more cordially received.²

At the capital, however, where he was greeted on his arrival by the High Commissioner, his staff and a huge crowd of ‘Iraqī notables, the enthusiasm of his welcome was reassuring. The dense and cheering crowds which filled the capital, bedecked with the Sharifian colours, green, red, and black, gave additional proof that the city accepted him.³ The ovation given him the next day at Kādhimain, where he prayed in the mosque according to the Shi‘a rite, was as remarkable as that of Baghdad.

The enthusiasm of these receptions, regarding which his

¹ *Basrah Times*, June 24th, 25th; *Al-‘Iraq* and *Baghdad Times*, June 27th, 1921. The Baghdad and Basra Committees were not present when Faisal arrived. They had gone down stream to meet the *Northbrook*, but they failed to recognize it until too late.

² The lack of enthusiasm and of adequate preparations in the Lower and Middle Euphrates areas was probably not unrelated to the predilection of the Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, who was in charge of making arrangements, for a republic and with his subsequent relinquishment of office in early July. *Communiqué*, *Al-‘Iraq*, July 7th, 1921; also Cox, Sir P. Z.: ‘Historical Summary’ in Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 528.

³ *Baghdad Times*, June 30th, 1921.

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supporters had been genuinely concerned, tended to simplify the situation, but anxious moments were by no means over. The failure of the inhabitants of the lower Euphrates to come forward as expected and the aloofness of the Shī'a divines were disconcerting. It was believed that the Muntafiq tribes were preparing a great manifesto in favour of a republic. Rumours of the formal disapproval of the *Muṭahids* were in the air. The pro-Turks were coldly hostile; the supporters of Saiyid Talib Pasha were sullen; and many people outside the cities were still indifferent. Against these unfavourable manifestations, however, could be set the stream of delegates from the towns of northern 'Iraq, the approbation of Basra and Baghdad, the prospect of approval from Mōsul which had sent a strong and substantial delegation and the gradual winning over of the shaikhs and notables, including the Naqīb's strongest supporter, 'Alī as-Sulaimān, through the efforts of Sir Percy Cox, Miss Bell and Faisal himself. Of the latter Miss Bell wrote, on July 7th, 1922: 'What helps everything is that Faisal's personality goes three quarters of the way. He has been roping in adherents.'¹ His simple dignity, great personal charm and his eloquent speeches, heartwarming and full of wisdom, continued to win the confidence and support of the communities before which he appeared: Christians,² Jews,³ Sunnīs,⁴ and Shī'is,⁵ although his reception at Najaf and Karbalā had been markedly restrained.

Anxiety for the success of his candidature had not diminished the apprehension lest the more ardent Nationalists should

¹ Bell, op. cit., p. 608.

² As at a reception given by the Catholic Christian Community, Baghdad, July 30th, 1921. For excerpts from his speech see Appendix VII (v).

³ For excerpts of speech made at the House of the Grand Rabbi see Appendix VII (iii).

⁴ For speech to the Mōsul delegation see Appendix VII (i); also various speeches, as at the Ja'fariya School, July 9th; *Al-Dijla*, July 11th, 1921. The outburst demanding complete independence at the latter meeting was toned down in *Al-Dijla*.

⁵ As at Kādhimain, June 30th, and at the Husainiya School, July 4th, 1921. See *Al-Dijla*, July 10th, 1921.

attempt to turn the popular enthusiasm into a *coup d'état*. Outbursts coupling complete independence and an immediate declaration of allegiance to Faisal as King of 'Iraq had already occurred, as at meetings held in Faisal's honour on July 4th and 9th.¹ Suggestions that Faisal might be immediately acclaimed King had also come to the ears of the High Commissioner.² Neither he nor Faisal wished it to be said in the future that Faisal owed his throne, not to the will of the people, constitutionally expressed, but rather to a *coup d'état* initiated by the Nationalists who, in return, would expect to influence policy in the direction of complete independence and to share in the administration of the kingdom. The Residency, moreover, had borne the brunt of the battle and it must enjoy the fruits of the victory. Faisal, on his side, had little wish to be placed so soon under obligations to any group, which, if its expectations were not fulfilled, would be the first to turn against him.

The agreement reached at the Cairo Conference that the country should be made, if possible, to declare itself without the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, found support with large groups of Faisal's more moderate adherents. It was now echoed, apparently without inspiration from the Residency, in the vernacular press which dropped its original insistence on the immediate convocation of the National Assembly in order to press for a referendum.³ Faisal himself joined in the insistence for prompt action.

The High Commissioner, feeling that the propitious moment had arrived, took immediate steps. In reply to a letter, July 8th, from the Council of State, inquiring, at his suggestion,⁴

¹ *Al-Dijla*, July 10th and 11th, 1921.

² Bell, op. cit., pp. 601, 602; also *Al-Dijla*, July 2nd, 1921. The Mayor of Mu'adhdham, on July 12th, called together the leading citizens and shaikhs, who declared Faisal to be their King, *Al-'Iraq*, July 13th, 1921.

³ *Lisān al-'Arab*, on July 2nd and 5th, urged the convocation of the Assembly, but on July 6th, recommended a referendum, also on July 8th, 9th and 13th. *Al-'Iraq* insisted on a referendum on July 8th, 9th and 11th; also *Al-Fallāh*, July 10th, 1921.

⁴ Bell, op. cit., pp. 607-8.

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as to the immediate cause of the delay in promulgating the Election Law and as to whether he had any objection to its immediate publication,¹ he stated that the delay had been due to the difficulty 'in finding a formula which would cover the cases of several Kurdish Communities in 'Iraq'. In view of 'the cogent reasons' now before the Council, he was ready to promulgate the Law if suitable arrangements could be made for the Kurds. He feared, however, that the time required for convening the Assembly would be not less than three months. He then pointed out:

There appears to be an increasingly insistent demand on the part of the public for an immediate opportunity to decide who shall be ruler.

To obtain this early decision less centralized machinery will have to be devised and the High Commissioner, in so far as it rests with him, will be glad to facilitate any appropriate special measures which the Council may recommend for the purpose.²

Without further suggestion from the High Commissioner, the Council of Ministers, on the proposal of the President, the Naqib, on July 11th passed a unanimous resolution declaring:

H.H. Amīr Faisal King of 'Iraq, provided that His Highness's Government shall be constitutional, representative and democratic and limited by law.³

The Council passed a further unanimous resolution to communicate its decision to the Minister of Interior in order that it might take necessary action.

Both the High Commissioner and Faisal were delighted with the Council's action, but they agreed that it was still necessary

¹ Letter No. 131/S, Secretary, Council of Ministers, to Secretary to the High Commissioner, July 8th, 1921.

² Letter SD/1631, Secretary to the High Commissioner to Secretary, Council of State, July 8th, 1921.

³ Extract from Minutes of Council of Ministers, July 11th, 1921: *Al-'Iraq* and *Lisān al-'Arab*, July 15th, 1921.

to hold a referendum in order to prove to the world that Amīr Faisal really had the voice of the people. Using his prerogative of confirming resolutions of the Council,¹ the High Commissioner announced that the resolution of July 11th must be supported by the assent of the people, ascertained by a referendum, before he would grant his approval.

In initiating the referendum, every effort was taken to ensure the desired results. Opinion on the resolution was expressed in most *Liwās* by the *Mutasarrif* and the British Advisers. In other *Liwās*, as Karbalā, the meetings were summoned by the British Adviser or by trusted Government officials. In Basra *Liwā*, selected representatives of the population were called in groups to make their declarations in the presence of an Election Committee. Official *madhbatas* were printed, any deviation from which by the addition of Nationalist proposals, was punished,² while riders declaring for further British support were not only permitted but encouraged.³ In addition, the manner of registering the decisions, whereby the vote of the majority of a town or district was counted as its unanimous vote and the 'politics running on wheels greased with extremely well-melted grease'⁴ tended to produce the desired decision.

Nevertheless, the Government did not have its own way entirely. The official *madhbata* did not meet the approval of the Shī'is. Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālīsī, a Shī'a 'Alim of high standing drew up a formula strongly insisting on freedom from external control⁵ and a party was formed to stir up agitation on its behalf. On July 28th, at a mass meeting in Baghdad, ostensibly summoned to sign the official *madhbata*, a modified declaration

¹ Instructions for Council of State, Sec. 10.

² The *Mutasarrif* of Baghdad was forced to resign for permitting the additions to the *madhbatas*.

³ The High Commissioner telegraphed permission for the addition of riders asking for continued British control. The Advisers, as at Dīwāniya, used this permission to obtain such declarations.

⁴ Bell, op. cit., p. 611.

⁵ Cited in *Al-'Iraq*, July 16th, 1921.

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was presented and approved without a dissenting vote.¹ The altered form was presented to the voters of Baghdad, July 29th, with the result that sixty-six of the eighty declarations of Baghdad made the acceptance of Faisal conditional on two points: that 'Iraq should be independent of foreign sovereignty and that the Constituent Assembly should be convened in three months. Kirkūk *Liwa*, still hesitating between joining 'Iraq or the Kurdish enclaves, voted against Faisal. Sulaimāniya took no part in the referendum. In Mōsul, many of the declarations accepted Faisal on the condition that the rights of the Kurds and the minorities should be protected.

Elsewhere, the referendum proceeded quietly. Both at Karbalā and at Najaf, through the skill and assiduity of the *Mutasarrif*, the official formula was signed without additions. In Hilla, many of the forty-one declarations contained a rider, added by permission telegraphed by the High Commissioner, that Faisal was accepted on condition that the British Mandate would continue. Sixteen of the twenty-six Dulaim declarations, five of the seven 'Amāra statements and a number of those from Mōsul added similar provisos. In the Shāmīya country, as at Dīwāniya, voters made a similar condition after the Adviser had informed them that they might add any words they liked. So certain was the result of the referendum that, before it was half completed and a month before his formal accession, Amīr Faisal, at Ramādī, August 25th, received the oath of allegiance as King of 'Iraq from the shaikhs and tribesmen of the Dulaim and the 'Anaiza and from the towns of the Upper Euphrates from Ramādī to Al-Qaim.² On August 15th the Naqīb was asked to undertake the formation of the first Cabinet for the new kingdom.³

The referendum, as it was carried out, was hardly a gauge

¹ The altered declaration is given in *Lisān al-'Arab*, July 27th, 1921.

² *Al-Dyla*, August 1st; *Baghdad Times*, August 5th, 1921 (Fahād Beg's pro-British outburst was omitted); Bell, op. cit., pp. 613-15. For excerpts from Faisal's speech to the Shaikhs, see Appendix VII.

³ Bell, op. cit., p. 618.

‘I R A Q

of spontaneous popular support for Amir Faisal, as official Reports would suggest,¹ nor was it entirely the ‘hasty pretence’ assumed by some popular writers.² It undoubtedly reflected the views of ‘Iraq’s leading inhabitants at the time, as had the plebiscite of 1918-19, which it resembled in a number of aspects. Its result, as published, however, did not constitute a true cross-section of ‘Iraqī opinion, as might have been obtained at a general election or in a Constituent Assembly. It is quite probable that the anxiety of the High Commissioner and of Faisal for an immediate declaration, backed by a referendum, was not due only to the fear of a *coup d’état* or to the necessity of vindicating the assurances of H.M. Government. It may have been based on the knowledge that any election would increase the chances against Faisal, although the majority of the country’s natural leaders, the shaikhs, the landlords and the notables, would probably have voted then for Faisal as they did in the referendum, either from a genuine regard for him or from the more likely desire to follow the lead of the Government, a factor on which the High Commissioner and his staff had steadfastly counted. In view of the altered tone of the country in the next few months, subsequent to the revelation that the proposed treaty did not mean abrogation of the Mandate, a fact hitherto suppressed, it seems possible that had the decision been left to an Assembly elected by the country, no verdict for Faisal as favourable as a 96 per cent majority vote of the population could have been announced.³

Not all the difficulties which faced the Residency in these crucial days had their origin in the state of public opinion in ‘Iraq. The Colonial Office, in the middle of August, sent a

¹ *Admun. Report, 1920-1922*, p. 9; *Progress of ‘Iraq*, p. 14.

² Kohn, Hans: *Nationalism and Imperialism*, p. 212; *History of Nationalism in the East*, p. 309; Coke, R.: *The Arab’s place in the Sun*, p. 245.

³ It is difficult to understand how this figure was obtained. The population of Kirkūk, whether taken on the basis of the 1918-19 census or on that of 1930, forms approximately 6 per cent of the population of ‘Iraq, exclusive of Sulaimāniya.

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cable to the High Commissioner stating that Faisal in his coronation speech must declare that the ultimate authority in 'Iraq lay with the High Commissioner.

Faisal immediately protested that he could not go on if such a statement were required. He pointed out that in the conversations held in London, he had accepted the candidature for the throne on the understanding that a treaty of alliance to replace the Mandate would be negotiated and that his prestige and dignity as king would be safeguarded. It was essential that he appear as an independent sovereign in alliance with Great Britain if he were to win over the extreme Nationalists. The High Commissioner also pointed out to the Colonial Office the unfavourable effect which the announcement would have on the country as well as on Faisal. He submitted that sufficient control could be exercised by less obvious methods. The order was eventually modified, a few days before the enthronement on August 23rd, the day selected by Faisal.¹

Long before the hour set for the ceremony of accession, six o'clock of the morning of August 23rd, all available space in the great *Sarai* Square was filled with tribal shaikhs, religious dignitaries, civil and military officials and notables from all parts of 'Iraq, save Kirkūk and Sulaimāniya. The *Sarai* itself had been decorated with multitudes of 'Iraqī flags of black, white, green and red, and with banners bearing loyal inscriptions. Smart recruits of the National Army were drawn up around the Square. The 1st Royal Berkshires furnished the guard of honour.²

Promptly at six o'clock, Amīr Faisal made his appearance, accompanied by Sir Percy Cox, Lieut.-General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Colonel Cornwallis and A.D.C.s and proceeded across the Square to the raised dais. After Amīr Faisal's salutations to

¹ This day was chosen by Faisal because it coincided with the Shi'a feast of Al-Ghadir, commemorating the nomination of 'Alī as master of the people by the Prophet Muhammad.

² *Baghdad Times*, August 24th, 1921; but cf. Bell, op. cit., pp. 620-1, where the Dorsets are mentioned.

the assembly, the party was seated, Sir Percy Cox on the right and Sir Aylmer Haldane on the left of the Amīr.

Saiyid Husain al-Afnan, Secretary to the Council of Ministers, read the High Commissioner’s proclamation which stated that, in accordance with the referendum on the resolution of the Council of State of July 11th, the Amīr Faisal had been elected King of ‘Iraq by 96 per cent of the people. He then cried ‘Long live the King’. The ‘Iraq standard was broken out, the military band played ‘God Save the King’ — there was no Arab National Anthem — and a royal salute of twenty-one guns was fired.

After a short oration by Saiyid Mahmūd, eldest son of the Naqīb, Faisal spoke with great dignity. He thanked the ‘Iraq nation for its generous and freely given allegiance and the British nation for its support of Arab independence, in which cause he called to mind the services of his father and of the Arabs associated with him. He also thanked

the provisional Government for its zealous services and His Excellency the High Commissioner for his sincere friendship and the Great British Government for its reception of me as King of the Independent State of ‘Iraq, to which high office I am called by the direct will of the Nation.

He outlined the aims of the nation, to achieve which, unity among all classes and the assistance of the friendly British nation would be necessary. He then made known his policy as head of the kingdom:

I will spare no effort to profit by the qualities of every man of the nation, irrespective of religion or class. All to me shall be equal. There shall be no distinction between townsman and Bedui; for me the sole distinction shall be that of knowledge and capacity. The whole nation is my party and I have no other. The interests of the country as a whole are my interest and I have no other.

My first task will be to proceed with the elections and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The nation should

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understand that it is this congress that will in consultation with me draw up the Constitution of its independence on the basis of democratic government and define the fundamental principles of political and social life. Finally it will confirm the Treaty which I shall lay before it, regarding the relations which are to exist between our Government and the Great British Government. Furthermore, the Congress will establish the freedom of religion and worship so that all men may follow their own law and religion provided it does not conflict with security and public morals.

It will also enact certain Judicial Laws which will safeguard the interests of foreigners and insure them against any interference with their religion, race or language and will guarantee equity of commercial dealings with the foreign countries. In this connection I am confident that in consultation with Sir Percy Cox who has proved his friendship to the Arabs in a manner which will ever live in their affectionate memory, we shall, please God, reach our goal.

I appeal to you for union and co-operation, deep deliberation and insight. You must seek knowledge and must work. For the rest, it is for God to help us and grant us success.¹

¹ *Baghdad Times*, August 24th, 1921.

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THE accession of Faisal marked a step forward in the creation of the new state. The next step was the negotiation of the treaty which, since the Cairo Conference, had become the basis of Anglo-'Iraqī relations. King Faisal himself had welcomed the proposed arrangement since only by representing 'Iraq as an independent nation, in treaty relationship with Great Britain, could he control the Nationalists. He had not been alone in advocating the treaty. *Lisān al-'Arab* had made the suggestion in late 1920, while Nūrī Pasha had advocated a treaty to govern Anglo-'Iraqī relations, in February 1921,¹ as had also Nājī Pasha as-Sūwaidī somewhat later.²

Between the British Government's concept of the treaty and that of the 'Iraqīs, however, lay an unbridgeable gulf. To the British Government, the treaty was a means of replacing the mandatory document in regulating its relationship to 'Iraq, at less cost and with less friction than under direct administration, but with no alteration in the position of Great Britain *vis-à-vis* the League of Nations. The Mandate from the League was to be retained as giving Great Britain the juridical right to remain in 'Iraq. The treaty was a method of establishing Amīr Faisal as a contracting party with sufficient power to enable him to administer the country but not to render him dangerous to British interests which the treaty was to safeguard. The treaty was, in short, a method of control.³

¹ Bell, *Letters*, p. 589

² *Ibid.*, p. 602.

³ It was officially stated by the Rt. Hon. H. A. L. Fisher, November 17th, 1921, that the Treaty would be designed to secure 'first, the control of His Majesty's Government over the foreign relations of Irak; secondly, the due fulfilment of the international obligations incurred by His Majesty's Government by treaty, mandate or agreement; thirdly, such measure of financial control as may be necessary'. (*Official Journal*, League of Nations, No. 10-12 (1921), pp. 1216-17.)

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To the 'Iraqīs, the treaty meant the disappearance of the detested Mandate, the very mention of which aroused bitter antagonism.¹ It signified nationhood and independence, since treaties could only be concluded between independent nations.² It was, moreover, the procedure whereby 'Iraq as an undeveloped and poverty-stricken nation was to receive at will support and assistance from Great Britain, as had the Arab State at Damascus, but not by necessity, as implied in the mandatory system which was held by 'Iraqīs to be synonymous with colonization.³ The treaty, in brief, meant national independence.

In these differences of view-point lay the roots of the future conflict between Great Britain and 'Iraq during the next decade.

Although Amīr Faisal seems to have fully understood that the British Government, in replacing the mandatory document by a treaty, had no intention of relinquishing the Mandate,⁴ he gave no indication of the fact prior to his enthronement, either in statements to the Press⁵ or in speeches to the 'Iraqīs.⁶ Indeed, in all his public utterances it was the independence of 'Iraq in alliance with a friendly Power, which was stressed, rather than any limitations to be imposed by the treaty.⁷ H.M. Government, on its side, gave no discouragement to the widespread belief that the election of a ruler and the signing of the treaty meant abolition of the Mandate. The congratulatory telegram from H.M. King George to H.M. King Faisal on the occasion of his accession and King Faisal's reply⁸ had con-

¹ For the basis of this antagonism see *supra*, pp. 261-3.

² *Al-Mufīd*, February 24th, 1922; *Al-Istiqlāl*, May 24th, 1922.

³ *Ibid.*, May 12th, 15th, June 8th, 1922; *Al-Istiqlāl*, April 7th, June 5th, 1922; *Al-Rāfiḍān*, June 5th, 1922; also *supra*, pp. 262-3.

⁴ *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 14.

⁵ As in an interview at Cairo in early April, on his way to Mecca: *Morning Post*, April 12th, 1921.

⁶ See Appendix VII and his Coronation speech, *supra*.

⁷ *Ibid.*, especially (i) Speech to Mōsul Delegation, (ii) Speech to Ministers, (v) Speech to Catholic Community and his Coronation speech, *supra*.

⁸ See Appendix VIII.

firmed that belief.¹ Even after the enthronement, when Reuter's telegram, stating that the draft Mandate for 'Iraq had come before the League of Nations for approval, was published in 'Iraq, on September 8th, it was accompanied by a lengthy official *communiqué* intended to quiet Nationalist apprehension.² The *communiqué* explained that the slow-moving machinery engaged in the production of the Mandate, once started, 'could not be stopped until its work was done . . . although it is common knowledge that the relations of the two Governments are now to be determined in another way'. It stated that its 'obligations to the people of this country and to the League of Nations, the British Government has no intention of repudiating', but the effect of the statement was neutralized by the emphasis on the fact that 'the Mandate as drafted . . . has now become an obsolete vehicle for the expression of relations that will exist between the Government of Great Britain and of 'Iraq from now onward'.

The newly aroused Nationalist suspicions were confirmed in the first unequivocal statement since June 17th, 1920, of the intentions of H.M. Government towards 'Iraq, made by the Rt. Hon. H. A. L. Fisher at Geneva, November 17th, 1921. On that date, Mr. Fisher, after informing the League that Great Britain found it expedient to operate the Mandate by means of a treaty, stated:

It will be understood that the proposed treaty will serve merely to regulate the relations between his Majesty's Government, as Mandatory Power, and the Arab Government of Irak. It is not intended as a substitute for the Mandate, which will remain the operation document defining the obligations undertaken by his Majesty's Government on behalf of the League of Nations.³

In spite of the efforts to minimize Mr. Fisher's statement

¹ *Al-Mufid*, August 19th, 1922.

² *Baghdad Times*, September 8th, 1921.

³ *Official Journal, League of Nations*, No. 10-12 (1921), p. 1217.

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by the insertion of articles in the 'Iraq local press,¹ the speech was followed by a revival of active anti-Mandate agitation.² Such feeling had for some time past lain more or less dormant due to the general desire to see if Great Britain would fulfil her promises; to the excitement incidental to the election of a ruler; to the depreciation of the mandatory relationship by partisans of the rival candidates, who had hoped thereby to win the goodwill of H.M. Government; and, above all, to the encouragement of the belief that the prospective treaty meant full independence. In the end, the anti-Mandate agitation was to show such vigour and strength as to imperil the peace of the country and to convince the High Commissioner of the necessity of taking the reins of power into his own hands once again.

Drafting of the Treaty

The actual drafting of the treaty in so far as it replaced the mandatory document was a 'straightforward though delicate problem', according to Major H. W. Young who arrived in Baghdad, October 15th, 1921,³ to assist in the treaty negotiations. Following the example set by the Bonham-Carter Committee when it had incorporated principles of the Mandate in its abortive Constitution,⁴ the specific obligations originally assumed by Great Britain in the mandatory document⁵ were embodied, as far as possible, in articles in the treaty, King Faisal undertaking on behalf of the 'Iraq Government to carry out the obligations with British support and assistance.

The obligations laid on the mandatory Power to frame an

¹ *Lisān al-'Arab*, December 2nd, 1921; *Baghdad Times*, November 28th, 1921; *Al-'Iraq*, December 2nd, 1921.

² On November 20th and 23rd, Nationalist leaders, including Yūsuf as-Sūwaidi, Shaikh Ahmad, Ja'far abū Timman, Sayyid Muhammad as-Sadr, and others formulated a list of demands, which, if not granted, would be followed by a declaration deposing King Faisal. Police Report, Baghdad, November 26th, 1921.

³ *Baghdad Times*, October 19th, 1921.

⁴ *Supra*, pp. 201-2.

⁵ *Acts. and Papers*, 1921 (Cmd. 1500), xliii, 731.

Organic Law and to ensure religious and educational freedom, contained in Articles One and Eight of the Mandate, were thus reproduced in Article III of the Treaty,¹ with the additional proviso that the Organic Law should prescribe constitutional procedure within the country.

Article V of the Treaty replaced Article Three of the Mandate providing, in terms suitable to the regime, for ‘Iraqī representatives abroad, and for representation of foreign Powers in ‘Iraq, subject to the approval of His Britannic Majesty. Article VIII of the Treaty reproduced Article Four of the Mandate, which had forbidden the ceding or leasing of ‘Iraq territory. Article IX noted the non-application of immunities under the capitulations, which Article Five of the Mandate had definitely abrogated. Article VIII also contained the first section of Article Six, providing for the establishment of a judicial system to safeguard the interests of foreigners. The King of ‘Iraq now agreed to ‘accept and give effect to such reasonable provisions as His Britannic Majesty may consider necessary in judicial matters’. Article XI reproduced almost exactly that section of Article Eleven of the mandatory document which had ensured economic equality in the mandated territory to all members of the League. One important addition was made, however. A new clause extended economic equality to ‘any State to which His Britannic Majesty has agreed by treaty that the same rights should be ensured as if it were a member of the said League’. This addition had its origin in the satisfactory termination of the Colby-Curzon correspondence over the ‘Open Door’ principle in mandated territories.²

The final section of Article Eleven, which had sanctioned the arrangement of a Customs union with other Arab States,

¹ Numbers written in full are employed throughout in reference to the mandatory document (Cmd. 1500); Roman numerals refer to articles of the Treaty of 1922. Ibid., 1922 (Cmd. 1757), iv, 769.

² Ibid., 1921 (Cmd. 1226), xlii, 2181; 1921 (Cmd. 1351), xliii, 495; U.S. Senate Document No. 97, Oil Concessions in Foreign Countries, 68th Congress, 1st Session, p. 55; Gerig, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-1, 143-4.

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was made into a separate Article, XVI, in the Treaty. Article Ten of the Mandate, which guaranteed freedom to missionary enterprise, found a place in the Treaty as Article XII. Article XII providing for co-operation by 'Iraq 'in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease' reproduced Article Thirteen in the mandatory document. The enactment of a Law of Antiquities, to replace the Ottoman Law and to ensure equality of treatment in archaeological research, was guaranteed by H.M. King Faisal in Article XIV of the Treaty, replacing Article Fourteen of the Mandate, in which the Mandatary had undertaken to enact the law.

Article XV of the Treaty reproduced that section of the correspondingly numbered Article in the Mandate, which had provided that the new Government should assume the cost of public works, the benefit of which would pass to the State. In addition, it provided for a separate financial agreement to regulate the transfer of such works and the progressive liquidation of the financial obligation for them, as well as for other financial assistance to 'Iraq. Article XVII, as had Article Nineteen of the Mandate, made provision for referring disputes arising from the interpretation of the Treaty to the Permanent Court of International Justice.¹ The English text was designated as the authoritative version.

Articles Two, Seven, Nine, Twelve, Sixteen, Seventeen and Eighteen of the mandatory document found no counterparts in the Treaty or else were so modified as to lose their original form. Several new articles, on the other hand, found their way into the Treaty.

Once these obligations had been reproduced in the Treaty, other difficulties arose. How were the terms of the Treaty and of subsequent laws to be ensured? If the King or his Ministers, individually or collectively, took steps contrary to good administration, for which Great Britain had become responsible

¹ As provided for in Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,¹ or detrimental to British or international interests, what measures of control were at the disposal of the High Commissioner? What was to be the position of the High Commissioner in the kingdom?

In addition, how were Great Britain's particular interests in 'Iraq's finances and military organization and her responsibility for the judicial system and for rendering administrative advice and assistance to be safeguarded under the new Treaty? The position of the British officials, both on the High Commissioner's staff and in the 'Iraq Government administrative services, had to be formulated and defined. The last question had already occupied the attention of several sessions of the Council of Ministers.

In reaching a solution of these problems, British experiences in Egypt and Palestine were drawn upon, Major Young having obtained numerous suggestions from Sir Gilbert Clayton, Sir Maurice Amos and Mr. E. S. Scott and from the Palestinian authorities on his way to Baghdad.² In consultation with the High Commissioner the conclusion was reached that, while the ultimate responsibility for ensuring observance of the Treaty rested on the High Commissioner, he should divest himself of executive authority, such as had tended to complicate the position of High Commissioners in Egypt. His control should be that of Adviser to the King of 'Iraq. The latter, by a special article incorporated in the Treaty, would recognize the High Commissioner's position as representing His Britannic Majesty and would promise to be guided by his advice. Sir Percy Cox had already been standing at King Faisal's elbow in such a role since the latter's arrival in 'Iraq and 'he was prepared to stake

¹ The relevant passage in Article 22 is as follows:

'Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.

² Young, Major Sir H. W., *op. cit.*, pp. 328 ff.

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upon its effective continuance the due fulfilment by His Majesty's Government of their mandatory obligations'¹. This principle, which was to govern the High Commissioner's position in 'Iraq until 1932, was accordingly incorporated in the Treaty in Article IV.

Effective participation by British officials in the administration and in the judicial system, as well as definite safeguards for British financial and military interests, were eventually guaranteed by stipulating the acceptance and observance by the 'Iraq Government of definite conditions laid down in four subsidiary agreements governing the employment of British officials, military assistance, judicial and financial control.² Within these agreements, provided for in Articles II, VII, and XV of the Treaty, in the drafting of which the British Government was given almost a free hand, since they were completed after the Treaty had been signed, lay the heart of the Treaty. In them was revealed the real nature of 'Iraq's dependence on Great Britain.

In the agreement governing the employment of British officials, the Government of 'Iraq agreed to

appoint a British Official approved by the High Commissioner as and when it may be requested to do so to any of the posts enumerated in Schedule I, hereto annexed.³

It also agreed to observe the conditions of appointment, dismissal, service and pay, which were minutely prescribed in other sections of the Agreement.

Although it was necessary to provide in the Military Agreement, subsidiary to Article VII, that 'Iraq should eventually accept full responsibility for its defence, in order to meet the demands of the British taxpayer, it was also essential that Great Britain should be in a position to guarantee peace and

¹ Young, Major Sir H. W., *op. cit.*, p. 334.

² The subsidiary Agreements, together with the Protocol of April 30th, 1923: *Accts. and Papers, 1924* (Cmd. 2120), xxvi, 453.

³ *Ibid.*, British Officials' Agreement, Article I.

order on the road to India. The first principle was secured by Article I in the Agreement, whereby ‘Iraq undertook, not ‘later than four years from the conclusion of this agreement’ to ‘accept full responsibility for the maintenance of internal order and for the defence of ‘Iraq from external aggression’.¹ In order to create these necessary forces, the ‘Iraq Government also undertook ‘to devote not less than 25 per cent of the annual revenue of ‘Iraq to defence’.²

In the meantime, in order that Great Britain should be in a position to guarantee that ‘Iraq’s military development should be on lines approved by H.B.M. Government, it was agreed that, in addition to the maintenance of British forces in ‘Iraq, British assistance, at the cost of the ‘Iraq Government, should take the form of:

1. Military and aeronautical instruction of ‘Iraq officers in the United Kingdom so far as this may be possible.
2. The provision in sufficient quantities of arms, ammunition, equipment and aeroplanes of the latest available pattern for the ‘Iraq Army.
3. The provision of British Officials whenever they may be required by the ‘Iraq Government within the period of the Treaty.³

The Officer commanding the British Forces in ‘Iraq was to be given authority to carry out inspection of the ‘Iraq forces,⁴ and to make recommendations concerning them. The ‘Iraq Government also agreed to ‘give effect to any of the recommendations of the High Commissioner regarding the movements and disposition of the ‘Iraq Army’,⁵ and that in operations in which British-maintained forces took part, the command of the operations should be vested in a British Military Commander.⁶ Other Articles provided for the application of Mili-

¹ Cmd. 2120, Military Agreement, Article I.

² Ibid., Article IV.

⁴ Ibid., Article VII.

⁶ Ibid., Article IX.

³ Ibid., Article II.

⁵ Ibid., Article VIII.

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tary Law,¹ Martial Law,² the protection of British Forces from disaffection or mutiny,³ and the utilization of the railway, waterway and wireless facilities of 'Iraq'.⁴

The Judicial Agreement, subsidiary to Article IX of the Treaty, re-established in a modified form the special judicial regime prevailing under the capitulations, although these were abolished in name. Foreigners, defined as 'nationals of any European or American State which formerly benefited by capitulations in Turkey'⁵ and 'of any Asiatic State which is now permanently represented on the Council of the League of Nations' were to be tried by Courts containing one or more British Judges.⁶ Provision was also made for right of search in the houses of foreigners.⁷

The King of 'Iraq also agreed to employ British legal experts,⁸ the appointment and termination of appointments of whom were to be submitted beforehand to the High Commissioner.⁹ The King undertook, as well:

that every law affecting the jurisdiction, constitution or procedure of Courts or the appointment and discharge of Judges shall, before being presented to the legislature, be submitted in draft to the High Commissioner for his views and advice on such of its provisions as concern the interests of foreigners.¹⁰

Under the Financial Agreement, subsidiary to Article XV of the Treaty, the 'Iraq Government reaffirmed the financial provisions of the other Agreements;¹¹ accepted the transfer of public works at a valuation of Rs. 94,09,540;¹² agreed to special arrangements for the transfer of the Railways and of Basra Port;¹³ and recognized its liability to assume the share of the

¹ Cmd. 2120, Military Agreement, Article X.

² Ibid., Article XII.

³ Ibid., Article XI.

⁴ Ibid., Articles XIII, XIV, XV.

⁵ Cmd. 2120, Judicial Agreement, Article I.

⁶ Ibid., Article II.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., Article V.

¹⁰ Ibid., Article III.

¹¹ Cmd. 2120, Financial Agreement, Articles II, III, IV.

¹² Ibid., Articles V, VI, VII.

¹³ Ibid., Articles IX, X.

Ottoman Public Debt assigned to it under the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.¹ The ‘Iraq Government also undertook to contract no other financial obligations without the prior consent of H.B.M. Government.²

The Agreement also provided for the acquisition of land and buildings by His Britannic Majesty³ and for exemption from customs duties and taxes on His Britannic Majesty’s property and that of British officials and forces.⁴

In determining the position of British officials employed by the ‘Iraq Government, it was formally laid down that such officials should be responsible to that Government.⁵ It was understood, however, that they stood in a peculiar relationship to the High Commissioner. The theory of this relationship is best summarized in the letter of appointment from the High Commissioner to all British officers entering ‘Iraq service from 1921 to 1930. The relevant passages are:

The members of the High Commissioner’s staff will be the servants of His Britannic Majesty, and responsible for placing the High Commissioner in a position to offer his advice on all subjects referred to in the Treaty. You and your colleagues will be responsible to the ‘Iraq Government and not to the High Commissioner, but His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq has agreed that the High Commissioner should at all times be furnished with such information as he may require relating to your official duties in the ‘Iraq Government; he has also agreed that the High Commissioner should be informed in advance of any step which the Government of ‘Iraq proposes to take which may affect the international and financial obligations and interests of His Britannic Majesty’s Government. This information will be communicated through the Ministry to which you are responsible to the member of the High Commissioner’s staff who is primarily concerned, and the ‘Iraq Government will be

¹ Cmd. 2120, Financial Agreement, Article XVII.

² Ibid., Article XII.

³ Ibid., Article XI.

⁴ Ibid., Articles XIV, XV.

⁵ Cmd. 2120, British Officials’ Agreement, Article VI.

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informed on each occasion that the information has been supplied.

The basic principle underlying the relations between the two Governments is co-operation towards a common end, namely, the establishment of an independent Government of 'Iraq, friendly to and bound by gratitude and obligation to His Britannic Majesty's Government. There is no question of His Britannic Majesty's Government pursuing a policy with any other object in view and, provided that the Treaty and its subsidiary agreements are duly observed, the High Commissioner has been instructed that His Britannic Majesty's Government do not propose to criticize in detail or to influence in any way the detailed financial or administrative arrangements of the 'Iraq Government.

The four principles upon which the co-operation of His Britannic Majesty's Government with the Government of 'Iraq must necessarily be conditional are:

- (1) that the interests of foreigners are adequately protected;
- (2) that the financial interests of His Britannic Majesty's Government are safeguarded;
- (3) that the best possible use is made of the resources of the country; and
- (4) that the administration should conform to the traditions and principles of progressive and enlightened government.

His Britannic Majesty's Government have left the fulfilment of the third and fourth of these principles to the 'Iraq Administration, since His Majesty King Faisal has agreed to employ a number of British officials which will, in the opinion of His Britannic Majesty's Government, ensure that the administration is not conducted in such a way as to prejudice their observance. The Secretary of State desires me to point out to you that although you and your colleagues will not be officially responsible to His Britannic Majesty's Government your appointment has only been approved in the full confidence that you will use your influence to secure the attainment of these objects. The Secretary of State feels that he may rely upon you to do your utmost to uphold British prestige and traditions, and that no occasion will

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arise which will lead to the High Commissioner seeking his authority to bring to the notice of His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq any action on your part which he may regard as detrimental thereto.

The terms of service upon which you are engaged have been set forth in a contract which has been given to you by His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq.¹

Ratification of the Treaty by the Council of Ministers

By the time of Major Young’s departure for England, in early 1922, the main lines of the Treaty had been settled. The King and his Prime Minister had been consulted, but the task had remained throughout in British hands. Not until after the Council meeting of February 19th, 1922, when the Naqib announced that neither H.M. King Faisal nor he felt able to continue the negotiations alone, was the Treaty, which had already received the approval of the Colonial Office, placed before the Council of Ministers. During the eight months the Treaty was before it, the Council suggested numerous amendments, but their main objection was that made by the King and the Nationalists: the Treaty did not specifically abrogate the Mandate relationship.

The Naqib, in particular, agreed with the King that the interests of ‘Iraq and of Great Britain required a treaty but he joined him in pointing out that the attempt of Great Britain to pose as an ally to ‘Iraq and as the mandatory Power to the League of Nations was irreconcilable, as well as unacceptable to the people of ‘Iraq. He hesitated to put his name to a treaty which did not satisfy national ambitions and which would displease the Muslims of India with whom he was intimately in touch and whose good opinion he valued greatly.

The evident reluctance of the King and his Ministers to ratify the Treaty as it stood was not uninfluenced by the increasing intensity of anti-Mandate sentiment, skilfully fostered by the

¹ Cited *Progress of ‘Iraq*, pp. 289-90.

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Nationalists, to whom the King was inclined to turn for support. The great gathering of Sunnī and Shī'a Nationalists from all parts of 'Iraq, at Karbalā, April 12th and 13th, 1922, summoned by Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālīsī, ostensibly to consider measures of defence against the Wahhābīs, whose raids in early March had thrown 'Iraq into a furore of nervous excitement,¹ had been hailed as a body greater than the prospective National Assembly since it had met at the wish of the nation without the influence of the Government.²

Although the formal sessions actually came to little, moderate petitions replacing the original extreme demands,³ the private meetings were more productive. From them developed the organization of much of the later agitation. The vernacular newspapers, which had steadily maintained during the spring that 'Iraq would not accept the Treaty so long as it contained a shadow of the Mandate,⁴ were also to increase their virulence after the meetings.

The Residency attempted to counter this propaganda by inserting articles in the local English papers. These articles, placing the mandatory system in its most favourable light,⁵ insisting that the misunderstandings of the Nationalists arose from the use of the wrong Arabic word for Mandate⁶ and urging as a diversion, that 'Iraqīs should support their new army as a quick means of achieving independence,⁷ merely stirred the Arabic press to fresh denunciations. The papers retorted, in unison, that the word Mandate, however translated, meant the same thing: subjection and colonization.⁸ *Al-'Iraq*

¹ *Al-Istiqlāl*, April 6th, 1922.

² *Al-Mufīd*, April 17th, 1922. The King was believed to be giving his support to the Conference. See his telegram of thanks to the Conference, April 13th, 1922; *Al-Dijla*, April 16th, 1922; also *Al-Istiqlāl*, April 6th, 1922.

³ *Baghdad Times*, April 7th, 1922; but cf. *Al-Mufīd*, same date.

⁴ *Lisān al-'Arab*, February 24th, 1922; *Al-Istiqlāl*, March 1st and 9th, 1922; *Al-'Iraq*, March 3rd, 1922; *Al-Yazīra* (Mōsul), April 4th, 1922.

⁵ *Baghdad Times*, May 26th; July 5th, 6th, 1922.

⁶ *Ibid.*, May 27th, 29th; June 10th, 20th, 1922.

⁷ *Ibid.*, July 12th, 1922.

⁸ *Al-Istiqlāl* and *Al-Rāfidan*, June 5th, 1922; also *supra*, pp. 261-3.

pointed to Syria as a typical example of what the Mandate denoted.¹ *Al-Mufīd* declared that the Mandate, ‘even if veiled under financial control, assistance to the army and ‘Iraq representatives abroad’ must be abrogated.’ ‘Iraq must be created independent before treaties could be made, since treaties were only possible between independent nations.’² In answer to the statement that Great Britain could not, even if she wished, divest herself of her obligations to the League, *Al-Istiqlāl* replied:

We cannot imagine that the League has power to force Great Britain to accept the yoke of the mandate. Everyone has the right to return any responsibility prejudicial to him and his friend. Suppose the League asked Great Britain to put her fleet at its disposal. Would Great Britain agree as she has agreed to the yoke of the mandate?⁴

Al-Mufīd declared:

If weak nations are by terrorism and enticement to sign a document that means slavery and oppression, weak nations will find means to release themselves from responsibility.⁵

British officials themselves were not immune from newspaper criticisms; Major Yetts, Adviser for the Muntafiq *Liwā*, in particular being singled out for attack on account of his alleged pro-Mandate activities.⁶

Mr. Churchill’s declaration in the House of Commons, May 23rd, 1921, to the effect that H.M. King Faisal and the ‘Iraq Government had not refused to accept the Mandate,’ added fresh fuel to the flames. At a gathering in Kādhimain, a programme of further meetings in the mosques, of monster petitions and of telegrams to the British Government and to all foreign governments was drawn up. A great gathering was planned for the evening of May 28th, in the Haidar Khāna

¹ *Al-‘Iraq*, June 7th, 1922.

² *Al-Mufīd*, May 20th, 1922.

³ *Al-Istiqlāl*, May 24th, 1922.

⁴ *Ibid.*, June 23rd, 1922.

⁵ *Al-Mufīd*, June 28th, 1922.

⁶ *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 18th; *Al-Mufīd*, June 19th; *Al-Rafidān*, June 21st, 1922.

⁷ *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., 5th S., Vol. CLIII (1922), p. 995.

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mosque, a special edition of *Al-Istiqlāl* being published to urge the population to attend.¹ Prompt action by King Faisal prevented disturbances at the mosque, but a committee was appointed to approach the King with protests against Mr. Churchill's statement.² Telegrams of protest to foreign governments, to the value of Rs. 1,500 (£115), were prepared but were held up at the instance of the High Commissioner, whose action was later confirmed by King Faisal.³

In the provinces, anti-Mandate and pro-Mandate petitions were producing a heated atmosphere, while revenue payment in the Euphrates area ceased, on the assurance of the Nationalists that the British would soon leave 'Iraq. In 'Amāra and Kūt, the great landowners viewed these assurances with great dissatisfaction. Many shaikhs, resenting the scant consideration already shown them by the Arab Government, feared the time when British control should be completely removed. On the other hand, a large body of shaikhs, including Shaikh 'Abdul Wahid of the Fatla,⁴ and tribesmen, mainly Shi'is and therefore under the influence of the 'Ulamā, sought the overthrow of the British-controlled regime.

Tension was not lessened by the fact that in administrative circles, as early as the end of 1921, a distinction had been made, as by the *Qaimmaqām* of Abū Sukhair, between those who had taken part in the Insurrection of 1920 and those who had been and still were pro-British. The former, particularly in Hilla *Liwā*, by the special orders of the *Mutasarrif*,⁵ were given light revenue assessments, facilities for payment and prompt attention to their complaints. The latter were faced with

¹ *Al-Istiqlāl*, May 28th, 1922. *Al-Istiqlāl* was suppressed July 7th, when the license of *Al-Tauhid* (founded Baghdad, June 24th, 1922) was withdrawn.

² *Ibid.*, May 31st, 1922; *Al-Mufid*, June 1st, 1922.

³ *Baghdad Times*, June 4th, 1922. When the telegrams were held up in Baghdad, the Nationalists chartered a motor to take them to Persia, but the King was persuaded to bring pressure to bear on those concerned, to abandon the scheme.

⁴ Chief instigator of the tribal revolt against the 'Iraq Government in 1935.

⁵ The *Mutasarrif's* campaign, which he carried even into Karbalā *Liwā*, was based on (a) Rejection of the Treaty; (b) Resignation of the Cabinet; (c) Removal of the British provincial Advisers.

unprecedented estimates and with demands for immediate payment, while their petitions received scant consideration.

In Baghdad, the division extended to the Council where heated discussions occurred, as at its meetings of June 12th and 22nd. Ja‘far abū Timman, Minister of Commerce, led the attack on the Treaty, declaring that all the Holy Saiyids and the pillars of Islam were opposed to it. His resignation, on June 26th, was taken as evidence of his sacrificial patriotism,¹ but in British official circles it was maintained that, realizing his post was about to be abolished, he resigned in order to win popularity among the Nationalists.²

Although the Council of Ministers resolved, on June 25th, to ratify the Treaty with a proviso which the High Commissioner had repeatedly urged them to drop, that the Treaty must be approved by the Constituent Assembly,³ it was clear even before the critical days of August, that political antagonisms had received sharp definition. It was apparent that they were likely to increase in bitterness with the prospect of settlement by force only. Both sides had burned their bridges behind them. The ‘*Ulamā*, opposed to the Mandate, had spent heavily on propaganda and were in debt for their taxes. If they were unsuccessful in removing British control, they would be financially ruined. The moral forces on the side of the Government were stronger than in 1920 but the actual forces for repressing disorders were far smaller than two years before. Moreover, the forces included the ‘Iraq army, which under the circumstances was an extremely doubtful element.

An early publication of the Treaty, together with a clear statement of the alternatives between which ‘Iraqīs would be forced to choose, would have cleared the air.⁴ In the absence

¹ *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 27th, 1922; *Al-Tauhīd*, July 2nd, 1922.

² Report on ‘Iraq Administration, April, 1922—March, 1923, Colonial No. 4 (1924), p. 14.

³ Ja‘far abū Timman signed the resolution, dissenting, however, with most of the articles.

⁴ Mr. Churchill’s threat in the House of Commons, July 11th (*Parl. Debates*, Vol. CLVI (1922), p. 1121), ‘to wash our hands of the whole business’, only aggravated public feeling in ‘Iraq. *Al-Mufīd*, July 23rd, 1922.

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of a clear pronouncement of policy from H.M. Government, the demand for withdrawal from 'Iraq made by the British Press and by Parliament,¹ duly reported in 'Iraq, encouraged the Nationalists to believe that continued agitation would force the British to withdraw.

The difficulties facing the High Commissioner and the 'Iraqis favouring the Treaty were not decreased by the attitude of H.M. King Faisal. He recognized the necessity for a treaty in accordance with the conditions of his enthronement, yet he continued to rely on the Nationalists for support in opposition to the terms of the Treaty as placed before him. Prominent Nationalists, such as Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālīsī,² Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, Yūsuf as-Sūwaidī, and others had access to him. Within the palace, Fahmī al-Mudārris and Saiyid Mahdī al-Bāsīr had his private ear. Ja'far abū Timman had been his agent in reporting the Karbalā meetings.³ Although differences of opinion had grown up between the King and the Naqīb, both of them had 'proclaimed to the listening Universe that they will never, so help them God, accept the Mandate'.⁴ The undoubted opposition of the King, together with his telegram to the Karbalā Conference, his favourable reception to the Nationalists, on May 30th, and his relations with the leaders to whom presents of money were known to have been given, confirmed popular opinion that to oppose the Treaty was not to oppose the King.

As a result of his association with the Nationalists, it has since been maintained that the King had been won over to their side.⁵ Such an assertion implies that he embraced Arab Nationalism

¹ *Parl. Debates*, H. of C., Vol. CLI (1922), pp. 1554 ff.; Vol. CLVI (1922), pp. 1085, 1092, 1098-102, 1107 ff.

² By early August, however, a breach between Shaikh Mahdī and the King seems to have been complete. The latter regarded the former as pro-Turk.

³ This did not prevent him from holding a meeting at his house, August 2nd, when the dethronement of King Faisal was put forward.

⁴ Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 643; also *Al-Mufid*, June 26th, 1922.

⁵ *J. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. IX. (1922), pp. 235-7; Hooper, C. A.: *L'Iraq et la Société des Nations* (Paris, 1928), p. 33.

only at the instigation of the ‘Iraqī Nationalists, overlooking the fact that he had, in effect, early dedicated his life to the Arab cause. It disregards his previous work for Arab independence at every conceivable opportunity; at Constantinople; in Syria after the outbreak of the war at the risk of his life; in the Arab revolt; in Damascus in the attempt to set up an Arab State; and at the Peace Conference in Paris. The rejection of Arab claims at Paris and his ejection from Syria had neither curbed nor broken his ardour, as his unpublished *Memoirs* amply confirm. He remained the Arab patriot with dreams of an Arab Federation stretching from the Taurus to the Indian Ocean.¹

In ‘Iraq he found himself the point of balance between his British mentors and his own subjects. To the former, he owed his throne, as well as support for it. To them, he owed the prospect of future development for the country, but on their own terms. To his fellow Arabs, from whom only could come the moral support and the sympathetic public opinion on which he hoped to build the ‘Iraq nation, he owed loyalty to the Arab cause. Only by joining forces with the Nationalists, whose ideas rather than those of the British, more closely approximated his own, could he win from H.M. Government the concessions which would give ‘Iraq real independence and would place more power in his hands to meet the responsibilities which had been thrust upon him by the Treaty.

If he turned to the extreme Nationalists and to the ‘*Ulamā*, therefore, it was because he sought to adjust the balance in favour of Arab Nationalism. If he descended to indirect methods of obtaining his ends, it was because he held that the end merited the means, and because his better judgment was at times swayed and warped by influences within his palace.

¹ In spite of official denials of his anti-French sentiment, Faisal never renounced his ambition of recapturing Syria for the Arab Federation, making ‘Iraq his base of attack.

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So definitely had the King's alliance with the extreme Nationalists affected the situation, that a prediction was made in British official circles in the middle of August that, unless he turned to the moderates, it would be impossible to foresee the outcome of the next six weeks.

The Council of Ministers itself felt that the King, in allying himself with the Nationalists outside the Cabinet, and in apparently approving of their actions, which had included denunciations of the Council, had failed to give it his confidence. These misgivings the Council expressed in a resolution on August 9th, when it requested 'His Majesty to co-operate with this persevering Government in conducting affairs, in order to convince the people that the Government of His Majesty can rely on the confidence of His Majesty'. By stating in his reply that he saw no reason to alter his policy, the King indicated, contrary to the advice of the High Commissioner, that he personally wished the Cabinet to fall. The Ministers, therefore, resigned on August 14th.¹ Their fall was hailed as a blow to the pro-Treaty party, the extreme Nationalists openly declaring that Ja'far abū Timman, Hamdī Pāchahjī and Maulūd Pasha would replace the fallen Ministers, that Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr would be Prime Minister and that the Mandate would be abrogated. Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr immediately issued a manifesto to the people, advising them, among other things, to persevere towards complete independence and to reject the British Mandate by all legal means.²

King Faisal himself added to the critical state of affairs by writing to the High Commissioner, on August 20th, and stating that, in view of the existing uncertainties of policy and lack of definition of responsibilities between himself and the High Commissioner on matters of internal administration, he felt compelled to inform the High Commissioner and through him the

¹ The Naqib remained in office for a few days longer.

² Full text of Manifesto: *Al-Mufīd*, August 19th, 1922; summary: *Baghdad Times*, August 23rd, 1922.

Colonial Office that, in the event of a rising, which was confidentially to be expected, His Majesty disclaimed all responsibility. He begged the High Commissioner either to assume the conduct of administration or to give himself a free hand to direct affairs on such lines as he saw fit.

The High Commissioner immediately drafted a strong reply, pointing out the responsibility of the King in the situation. The letter was withheld, however, in order that it might not mar the approaching anniversary of King Faisal's accession.

The two Nationalist political parties, *Hizb al-Watanī*,¹ (National Party), and *Hizb an-Nahdha*² (Renaissance Party), which, with the *Hizb al-Hurr*³ (Independent Party), had been formed in early August to take part in the prospective elections,⁴ thought the moment opportune to add their weight to the protests against the Mandate. At a joint meeting, on November 20th and 21st, under the presidency of Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr, the parties drew up an address which they presented to the King.⁵ The address culminated in three demands:

1. Immediate termination of the present policy and of British influence.
2. Selection of a Cabinet, members of which were to be sincere patriots, possessing the confidence of the people.
3. Suspension of treaty negotiations until the meeting of the constituent Assembly, its members having been freely elected.⁶

Arrangements were also made by the parties for a joint public protest on August 23rd at the anniversary celebration.⁷

On the morning of the 23rd, when the High Commissioner

¹ Programme: *Al-Mufid*, August 8th, 1922.

² *Al-Iraq*, August 10th, 1922; Programme: *Al-Mufid*, August 21st, 1922.

³ *Baghdad Times*, August 11th, 1922.

⁴ The Law of Associations, under which the parties were strictly regulated had been approved, after much delay, by the Council on June 29th, and promulgated on July 2nd, 1922. *Compilation*, 1920-1923, pp. 56-8.

⁵ *Al-Mufid*, August 22nd, 1922.

⁶ *Al-Rāfidān* and *Al-Mufid*, June 23rd, 1922.

⁷ *Al-Iraq* and *Al-Mufid*, August 25th, 1922.

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and his staff arrived at the Palace, they found the courtyard packed and an address being delivered from a balcony. As the High Commissioner passed up the stairs, shouts from the crowd were heard, followed by loud applause. After the audience at which the King appeared to be somewhat nervous,¹ the High Commissioner, on inquiry, learned that the demonstration as arranged by the *Hizb al-Watanī* and *Hizb an-Nahdha* had been directed against the Mandate. The next day, he sent a strong protest, demanding an apology and the arrest of those responsible for the affair. The apology was immediate and ample.² Unfortunately the King, about noon on the same day, was stricken with appendicitis, an operation being performed early the following day. The necessary papers, however, had not been signed by him. The High Commissioner approached His Majesty shortly before the operation, but the King refused to sign, protesting that he would not put his signature to the condemnation of any of his subjects as an act which might well be his last.

The High Commissioner at once issued a proclamation, taking over the reins of government into his own hands and stating that the absence of a Cabinet, the King's illness and the seditious disturbances in the country left him no other alternative.³ Hamdī Pāchahjī, Saiyid Mahdī al-Basīr, Amīn al-Chārchafī and 'Abdul Rasūl al-Kubba were deported to Henjam. Saiyid Muhammad as-Sadr and Shaikh Muhammad Māhdī al-Khālīsī were advised by the High Commissioner that 'if they did not go, he would be forced to take measures which, out of respect to the *'Ulamā*, he did not want to take'. They crossed the Persian frontier, August 29th. Notice was served that any further attempts at sedition would be promptly and severely dealt with.⁴

From the provinces disquieting news had been reported. In

¹ Cf. Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 649.

² *Baghdad Times*, August 26th, 1922. No Arabic papers printed these letters.

³ *Ibid.*, Special Edition, August 26th, 1922.

⁴ *Ibid.*

Shamīya, the chiefs were defiant; in Dīwāniya, tribal lawlessness had broken out, while in Nāsiriya and Sūq ash-Shuyūkh, public order trembled in the balance. In Diyālā, unrest had increased to such an extent that had any rising taken place elsewhere, the tribes of Diltāwa, Shahrābān and Delli ‘Abbās would unquestionably have risen. Prompt and strong measures restored administrative authority on non-party lines, however, the Nationalist officials being summoned to Baghdad where the outstanding offender, the *Mutassarif* of Hilla, was tried and adjudged to be unworthy of future employment. Revenue was collected, land cases settled and incipient revolt checked, aerial action being necessary in four cases to re-establish the authority of the Government.

Whether or not the actual incident on August 23rd required the stern and, in the case of the deportations, even harsh measures employed, there can be no question that the High Commissioner, as responsible for peace and order, considered his measures, vigorously and promptly taken, to be essential for the well-being of the country as well as for the eventual success of British policy. His actions restored prestige to the Government, the country as a whole settling down to ‘an era of reconstruction’.¹

In order that the measures taken by the High Commissioner should appear to be constitutional, it was essential that they should be ratified by the King. Both British and ‘Iraqī officials were aware of the grave situation which might result if the King should refuse to give the required ratification. On September 10th, the High Commissioner approached King Faisal. His Majesty was told plainly that the British Government would not tolerate his connection with future Nationalist agitation nor any further delay in ratifying the Treaty. The King agreed to invite the Naqīb to form a new Cabinet, after the receipt of a declaration from the Secretary of State for the Colonies which would form the basis of an announcement of his

¹ *Admin. Report, 1922-1923, p. 21.*

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own policy. In reply to the demand that he regulate his conduct more closely on constitutional lines and refrain from undue interference in matters of detailed appointments and administration, the King argued that there was no Constitution, the Cabinet was heterogeneous, and it was difficult for him not to do so, but that as soon as he had a Treaty and a Constitution, he would willingly do as required.

A letter, previously drafted, approving of the High Commissioner's measures was then submitted to him for his signature. This letter, dispatched by King Faisal on the following day, was as follows:¹

September 11, 1922.

My dear Sir Percy,

Now that by the will of Providence I am restored to health and permitted by my medical advisers to deal with affairs of state, I feel it is my duty before taking up the reins of affairs to tender to Your Excellency my cordial thanks and to express to you my appreciation for the prompt policy and necessary measures adopted by you as representative of His Majesty's Government in order to maintain public interests and preserve order and peace in that sudden coincidence of my sudden illness with the interval between the resignation of one Cabinet and the formation of another. In conclusion, I repeat my sincere thanks to Your Excellency for your valuable co-operation.

Your sincere friend,

Faisal.

In the new Cabinet formed by the Naqīb, on October 2nd, with the sole purpose of ratifying the Treaty, only the Minister of Education, Hājī Muhsin ash-Shālāsh of Najaf, was new. The Minister of Interior, 'Abdul Muhsin Beg as-Sa'dūn, and the Minister of Justice, Taufiq Beg al-Khālidi, exchanged portfolios.²

¹ *Baghdad Times*, September 12th, 1922.

² *Admin. Report*, 1922-1923, p. 23.

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On October 10th, the Council ratified the Treaty, reaffirming, however, in spite of the continued efforts of the High Commissioner to the contrary, its resolution of June 25th, that the Treaty must be approved by the National Assembly. Three days later the Treaty was published, accompanied by a proclamation of future policy by His Majesty King Faisal.¹

The Treaty ratified, his purpose fulfilled, and feeling unable to deal forcefully with the rising strength of the Turkish demands for Mōsul, the Naqib resigned, ‘Abdul Muhsin Beg as-Sa’dūn succeeding him as Prime Minister. His retirement was made the occasion of messages from the British Government and from King Faisal thanking him for his loyal support and services to the ‘Iraq State since its inception.²

Definition of the Position and Duties of British Officials

The attention of both the as-Sa’dūn Cabinet³ and the High Commissioner, following the ratification of the Treaty, turned again to the development of administration, to the final drafting of the Organic Law and to preparations for holding the elections. No question, among those which faced them, loomed larger than the practical definition of the position and duties of the British officials in ‘Iraq. The principles were, as already indicated, laid down in the Treaty, in the subsidiary agreements and in the letter of appointment from the High Com-

¹ Text: *Baghdad Times*, October 14th, 1922, also *Admin. Report*, 1922-1923, pp. 24-5. It was accompanied by an announcement by the S/S for Colonies, October 12th, 1922. Text: *Baghdad Times*, same date; *Admin. Report*, 1922-1923, App. 3.

² *Baghdad Times*, November 26th, 1922.

³ Members of his Cabinet, which took office November 20th, were: President of the Council: ‘Abdul Muhsin Beg as-Sa’dūn; Minister of Interior: Nāji Pasha as-Sūwaidi; Minister of Finance: Sasūn Eff. Haskari; Minister of Communications and Works: Yāsīn Pasha al-Hāshimī; Minister of Education: ‘Abdul Husain Chālābi; Minister of ‘Auqāf: ‘Abdul Latīf Pasha Mandil; Minister of Defence: Nūri Pasha as-Sa’id. Nāji Pasha became Minister of Justice in January, 1923, ‘Abdul Muhsin Beg taking the portfolio of Minister of Interior. *Baghdad Times*, November 22nd, 1922. For programme of his Ministry: *ibid.*, November 25th, 1922.

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missioner.¹ The High Commissioner was to stand as an Adviser to the King, while the British officials in the employ of 'Iraq were to be responsible to it, but were to stand in a special relationship to the Residency. Although precedents had been created under the provisional Government, the practical application of the principles to the new regime was more complicated than the mere evolution of a theory and required painstaking care if British control were to be made effective without perpetual friction and deadlock between the British and 'Iraqī officials.

Under the provisional Government, resolutions of the Council of State had required the confirmation of the High Commissioner.² Under the monarchy, resolutions of the Council, if approved by the King, were issued as Royal *'Irādas* signed by the King, the Prime Minister and by the Minister concerned. In order that the High Commissioner might exercise his supervision, it had been arranged that all resolutions of the Council should be submitted in original to the King, with a copy to the High Commissioner. The King would not normally accord his assent until the High Commissioner had the opportunity of stating whether there was any point on which he desired to tender advice.

The procedure on the whole worked smoothly, although the King on several occasions interfered directly in administrative matters,³ particularly in appointments, or exercised his veto on resolutions of the Council of State without waiting for the opinion or advice of the High Commissioner.⁴

The High Commissioner and his successors, on their side, normally refrained from interfering in interdepartmental affairs except through the King. Vigilant at all times, however, on

¹ *Supra*, pp. 348-50.

² *Instructions for the Council of State*, Article X.

³ His failure to act through the Cabinet as a whole had caused the fall of the Naqib's first Cabinet, March 30th, 1922, as well as of his second, August 14th, 1922.

⁴ As in June, 1923, when he vetoed the Council's resolution to increase burial fees on corpses for interment in the Holy Cities.

all matters affecting the Treaty and British interests, they kept their fingers on the pulse of official life. On vital questions, such as the ratification of the Treaty, they considered it expedient that the Ministers, singly and in groups, should be interviewed and favourable decisions secured.¹

In the administrative services of the Government, the position of the advisory officials was similar to that of the High Commissioner. Every order and every measure within a Ministry, whether initiated in the Minister's or in the Adviser's office, had to pass through the hands of the Adviser before it received the final requirement, the Minister's signature. When a measure or action was proposed which seemed to the Adviser to be contrary to the Treaty or to good administration, he informed the Minister accordingly after providing alternative suggestions. He also forwarded to the High Commissioner, with the knowledge of the Minister concerned, full information regarding his protest. Unless the matter particularly affected Great Britain's position or was especially important, the High Commissioner took no immediate action until efforts to come to an understanding with the Ministry concerned had failed and the matter had been referred to the Council. The High Commissioner then either advised the King that the proposed measure would not be acceptable, thus leaving it to him to bring the Minister to book, or requested the King not to sign the resolution if it were passed by the Council.

In other cases, where British officers held posts complementary to those held by 'Iraqis, such as Inspector-General of Police or Adviser to the Postal Department, the position of the official was fundamentally the same although the tendency was for the British officer to assume more executive authority. In other posts, where British officials occupied executive positions, as Director of Health Services, Director of Customs and Excise, or definitely technical posts, as Directors of Agriculture, of

¹ In 1922: Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 643. In 1924, by Sir Henry Dobbs, on May 30th and other occasions.

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Public Works, of Irrigation and of Telegraphs, the officials were usually in complete charge of their departments, subject to the authority of their Minister and, through him, to the supervision of the Adviser. Nevertheless, as recipients of the letter of appointment from the High Commissioner, they were required to keep the Adviser of their Ministry informed directly of matters particularly affecting Great Britain's special interests.

In *Liwā* administration, where, on the advent of Arab Government, the British Political Officers had become Advisers to the Arab officials, the system of dual responsibility had worked with varying success. During 1921 and 1922, when agitation against the Mandate was at its height, the Arab officials had often disregarded British advice and, owing to the temporary loss of central administrative authority, discipline was not immediately effected. In other *Liwās*, as in the Muntafiq, Arab officials endeavoured to demonstrate their capacity for independent action, often with disastrous results on tribal peace, general order and revenue payments.

Although the High Commissioner issued a confidential circular in early 1922 for the guidance of British officials and the Ministry of Interior gradually evolved a schedule of working arrangements between British and Arab officials, it was not until the formulation of the Administrative Inspectors Law,¹ approved by the Council of Ministers, January 23rd, 1923, that the functions of the provincial Advisers, now termed Administrative Inspectors, were defined. Drafted by the Ministry of Interior with the co-operation of the Ministries of Justice and Finance, the Law placed the Inspectors in a stronger position than the former Advisers had been, the widest powers of inspection being given them in all details of internal administration, Revenue collection, municipalities, police and public order. Although the Law was not immediately and universally applied, the clearer definition of their respective duties was welcomed both by the *Mutasarrifs* and the British Inspectors.

¹ *Compilation*, 1920-1923, pp. 95-7.

The working of the system of dual responsibility thus evolved depended largely on the patience and tact of the British Advisers, on their own personality and that of the ‘Iraqī officials and on the mutual goodwill and confidence between them. In the case of the Ministries, if the Minister was energetic and anxious to show his ability, the pace might be forced faster than the Adviser thought expedient and restraint had to be applied. If the Minister showed a proclivity to appoint friends and relations without due consideration of their ability, the Adviser was obliged to curb his actions. On the other hand, the Adviser, part of whose duty was to initiate measures to facilitate administrative progress, sometimes found it necessary to employ means of stimulating his Minister in order to ensure the carrying out of the administration. The position of the Advisers was strengthened by their experience, prestige, and by the fact that, after the fashion of Permanent Under-Secretaries of State, they remained in office while Ministers came and went.

Although the system permitted the Government of ‘Iraq to function without visible control by British officials, it was not without serious defects, of which the great expense of maintaining the two cadres of officials was not least. Side by side with the ‘Iraqī officials, well paid in comparison to Turkish standards, were the corresponding British officials who, in every case, drew even higher salaries. Thus, in 1923, the average pay of the Ministers was Rs.2,112 (£141) per month,¹ that of the Advisers being Rs.2,575 (£172) per month,² plus special allowances up to 12 per cent of their salaries.³ In the *Liwās*, the eleven *Mutasarriffs* received an average of Rs.1,100 (£74) per month,⁴ while the twelve Administrative Inspectors received an average of Rs.1,610 (£108) per month,⁵ plus the usual allowances prescribed in the British Officials’ Agreement. In no case was the salary of any British officer employed under

¹ ‘Iraq Budget, 1923-1924 (Baghdad, 1923).

² Ibid.

³ Cmd. 2120, British Officials’ Agreement, Schedules II and III.

⁴ ‘Iraq Budget, 1923-1924, p. 61.

⁵ Ibid., p. 59.

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that Agreement less than Rs. 800 (£54) per month, plus allowances.¹ The larger pay was undoubtedly due to the British officials in consideration of their experience and of their foreign standard of living. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that British officials employed by the 'Iraq Government, numbering 569 in 1923,² while contributing invaluable aid to the Administration, drew heavily upon the resources of the Government which was forced at the same time to maintain a staff of its own nationals.

The greatest defect of the system, however, was the duality of responsibility, even after time and experience had created precedents and had defined spheres of duties. Friction and deadlock when officials did not see eye to eye often occurred, extending in some cases over a period of several months, impeding administration, checking initiative and providing confirmation for the belief held by 'Iraqīs that Great Britain was primarily interested in her own imperial policy rather than in the welfare of 'Iraq.³ In time, the dualism became one of the most vexing questions in 'Iraq's political circles, a special term, *al-Wādhā' al-Shādh* (perplexing predicament), being invented. It became the explanation of all the difficulties in administration. If innovations incurred the displeasure of 'Iraqīs, if revenue assessments rose, if revenue fell, if financial or judicial favours could not be obtained according to time-honoured practices or if there was not employment for 'Iraqīs, the 'Iraqī officials often put the blame on the British officials who, they

¹ Cmd. 2120, British Officials' Agreement, Schedules II and III.

² *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 292, gives the following table of British and Indian officials in 'Iraq Government Service

	1920	1923	1926	1929	1931
British Gazetted Officers	364	181	148	130	118
British Nursing Sisters	23	27	23	17	14
British Non-Gazetted Officers	484	361	53	34	28
Indian Officials	2,035	1,270	250	53	36
Total	2,906	1,839	474	234	196

³ For an account of the friction between British and 'Iraqī officers, see *J.C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. XI (1924), p. 73.

declared, served England rather than ‘Iraq. On the other hand, when unsatisfactory appointments were made, when poor work was done and when progress was slow, British officials attributed it to the fact that their position was only advisory. Too often, however, the dual responsibility became the whipping-boy for lack of initiative, for indolence and for, in some cases, even the lowering of standards.

To ‘Iraqīs, dual responsibility represented even more than administrative dependence. Taken in conjunction with treaty obligations and the subsidiary Agreements, it became the reason why ‘Iraq’s efforts to win independence were thwarted at every turn. It covered the anomalous position of ‘Iraq as an independent Kingdom under the Mandate of Great Britain. It explained the predicament of the Ministers, nominally responsible to the people of ‘Iraq, but actually subject to the control of their British Advisers. It was the reason why the ‘Iraq Government administered and paid the deficits of the railways and of Basra Port, but did not own them; why it could declare martial law, but under the Military Agreement, could not administer it; why it had an army, but could not move it without the consent of the High Commissioner. Officers of the ‘Iraq Government, both British and ‘Iraqī, were King Faisal’s officials but they were selected for him with the High Commissioner’s concurrence. Foreign Governments (members of the League) could discriminate in tariff and other matters against ‘Iraqī subjects, but the ‘Iraq Government had no power to retaliate; foreign subjects had special judicial privileges in ‘Iraq while ‘Iraqī subjects had no reciprocal advantages abroad. The ‘Iraq Government was obliged to pay half the cost of the expenses of the British High Commissioner and his staff in ‘Iraq, but had no control over the expenditure incurred on this account. Finally, although under the Military Agreement the ‘Iraq Government should, not later than four years from the date of the conclusion of the Agreement, accept full responsibility for the maintenance of internal order and for the

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defence of 'Iraq from external aggression, she had not up to the end of 1928 in practice assumed this responsibility.¹

Out of the desire to rid themselves of the 'perplexing predicament' which 'Iraqis saw on every side, developed one of the strongest sources of national indignation and of opposition which, as time passed, Great Britain had to face in 'Iraq.

¹ Cf. *Report on Administration of 'Iraq for the Year 1928*, Colonial No. 44 (1929), pp. 26-7. The report professes to see the 'perplexing predicament' as existing only in the imagination of the fervid patriots of 'Iraq.

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THE formulation of the Treaty, the subsidiary Agreements and other means of ensuring to Great Britain the successful maintenance of her dominant position in 'Iraq was accompanied at the same time by measures to set up an Organic Law for the constitutional regulation of the political institutions already established, such as the King and the Council of Ministers, and of those which had yet to be created: an electoral system and a representative Parliament.

The need for the Organic Law or Constitution¹ and the establishment of these additional instruments of Government arose partly from the exigencies of the situation. King Faisal had steadfastly maintained, when confronted with the request to act in a more constitutional manner and to refrain from interference in administrative matters, that he could not do so until there was a Constitution.²

Even more compelling were the obligations laid on both Faisal and the British Government under the stimulus of the belief, both of 'Iraqis and of the Western world, in the efficacy of 'consent of the governed', in democratic institutions and in written constitutions.³ Faisal had been declared King of 'Iraq

¹ The term Organic Law was employed in the mandatory documents (Cmds. 1176, 1500) and in the Treaties of 1922 and of 1927 (Cmd. 2998) for what was, in reality, the Constitution of 'Iraq. In the English translation, 1925 (*Compilation*, 1925, pp. 14-27), and in that forwarded to the League of Nations in 1928 (League of Nations publication C. 49. 1929. vi), the word Constitution is used.

² *Supra*, p. 360

³ In this connection a delightful story is told concerning the Naqib (Bell, *Letters* (August 21st, 1921), p. 618).

'It was the Naqib, to his huge delight - he's by every instinct an aristocrat, - and an autocrat, if ever there was one - who gave currency to the word, by announcing in the Council that Faisal should be King of a constitutional democratic state . . . The other day a Shammari Sheikh up from Hail, drops in to call. "Are you a Damaski?" says the Naqib. "Wallahi, no!" says the Shammari, slightly offended.

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by the Council of State, July 11th, 1921, 'provided that His Highness's Government should be a constitutional, representative and democratic Government, limited by law'.¹ The confidence of the Western world in democracy had been similarly voiced in Article One of the mandatory document for 'Iraq, and in Article III of the Treaty, when the principles of the mandatory document had been reproduced in the Treaty.²

Thus, once the drafting of the Treaty had been successfully initiated, the formulation of the Organic Law was taken in hand, although in accordance with the wishes of H.M. Government and of King Faisal, it was not promulgated until March 21st, 1925, after the oil concession had been concluded.³

As the mandatory document had provided many of the provisions of the Treaty, so Article III of the Treaty outlined certain basic principles around which the Organic Law was to be framed. Throughout the entire period of drafting, which passed through six distinct stages before the draft Law came before the Constituent Assembly, June 14th, 1924,⁴ those engaged in the task had to bear in mind, therefore, not only that the document was to regulate 'Iraq's political institutions and to prescribe 'the constitutional procedure, whether legislative or executive, by which decisions shall be taken on all matters of importance' but also that it should:

¹ Extract from Minutes of Council of State, July 11th, 1921.

² *Supra*, Ch. xviii.

³ Dispatch S/S for Colonies to High Commissioner, Baghdad, April 19th, 1923 (hereafter S/S to H.C., April 19th, 1923), Colonial Office File No. 19114/23.

⁴ (1) Project of 1921; (2) Baghdad Draft, March 16th, 1922; (3) First Colonial Office Revise, April 16th, 1922; (4) Baghdad Redraft, February 15th, 1923; (5) Final Colonial Office Revise, April 19th, 1923 and (6) The Draft Law, September 20th, 1923.

"I'm not a Magrati What is it?" "Well," says the Naqib enjoying himself thoroughly, "I'm Sheikh of the Damakratiyah" (the Democrats). "I take refuge in God!" replied the Sheikh, feeling he had gone wrong somewhere. "If you are the sheikh of the Magratiyah, then I must be one of them, for I'm altogether in your service. But what is it?" "Damakratiyah," says the Naqib, "is equality. There's no big man and no little, all are alike and equal." With which the bewildered Shammari plumped on to solid ground. "God is my witness," said he, seeing his tribal authority slipping from him, "if that's it I'm not a Magrati."

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- (i) contain nothing contrary to the provisions of the present Treaty;
- (ii) take account of the rights, wishes and interests of all populations inhabiting ‘Iraq;
- (iii) ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals;
- (iv) provide that no discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of ‘Iraq on the ground of race, religion or language;
- (v) secure that the right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Government of ‘Iraq shall impose, shall not be denied or impaired.¹

On the British drafters, however, lay more than the obligation to secure the inclusion of these conditions and of other Articles which would ensure the successful working of the machinery of State. It was incumbent on them, in accordance with the wishes of H.M. Government,² to secure by means of the Law additional support for the British position in ‘Iraq. Thus, the Constitution tended to become not only an instrument of government but also an instrument of policy, safeguarding the Treaty and facilitating administration in accordance with the obligations assumed by Great Britain as mandatory Power.

Their aims seemed most easily achieved by reserving as much power as possible, including that of legislation, to the King and indirectly to the High Commissioner in his advisory capacity,³ and by removing, as far as possible, opportunities for obstructive tactics from the elective Chamber, concerning

¹ Cmd. 1757, Article III.

² Dispatch, Legal Secretary, Baghdad, to Middle East Department, August 17th, 1922, C.O. 43338/22.

³ Letter, S/S for Colonies to Ormsby-Gore, F.O., April 24th, 1923, C.O. 19114/23.

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which Mr. Dobbs, when High Commissioner,¹ was later to write:

In light of experience of other Oriental Assemblies, there is to my mind real danger that irresponsible extremist majority may in early stages of Self-Government seek to paralyse state activities by refusing supplies for essential services . . . It is therefore essential to have provision for enabling the Executive to carry on.²

In addition, it was held necessary to embody within the Law all matters which the Ministers of the Chamber might be tempted to alter³ and to make any amendment of the Law extremely difficult. In articles dealing with the administrative system, however, it seemed, as the Legal Secretary suggested:

preferable to leave the whole administrative system to be dealt with by special law which, unlike the Organic Law, can be modified from time to time in the light of experience or of fresh circumstances, rather than adhere rigidly to the Turkish system and nomenclature.⁴

Along these lines a draft Project was drawn up in Baghdad in the late autumn of 1921 by Major H. W. Young of the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office and by Mr. M. E. Drower, Adviser to the Ministry of Justice.⁵ This first draft, for which some provisions were taken from the constitutions of Australia, New Zealand and other countries⁶ was later

¹ H. R. C. Dobbs became Acting High Commissioner, January 19th, 1923, in the absence of Sir Percy Cox, and High Commissioner on the latter's retirement, May 3rd, 1923.

² Telegram, High Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for Colonies, February 21st, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

³ Such as minority safeguards and salaries for Senators and Deputies.

⁴ Memorandum on Position of Draft Organic Law, by Legal Secretary to High Commissioner, Baghdad, February 15th, 1923 (hereafter Position of Draft O. Law, February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23).

⁵ Cf. Report on Draft O. Law, March 16th, 1922, C.O. 15296/23; Dispatch, Legal Adviser, Baghdad, to Middle East Dept., August 17th, 1922, C.O. 43338/22.

⁶ Letter, S/S for Colonies to Ormsby-Gore, Foreign Office, April 24th, 1923, C.O. No. 19114/23.

amplified in consultation with Mr. Nigel Davidson, Legal Secretary to the High Commissioner, with the High Commissioner himself and with the Colonial Office.¹ After it had been accepted in principle by King Faisal, it was taken to London by Major Young on his return in early 1922.

The Project provided that all legislation had to obtain the King's preliminary approval and that legislation concerning treaty matters should rest with the King-in-Council (Article 30). The latter was to consist of thirty nominated members including the Ministers. The King-in-Council was also to have the power of modifying all legislation, except in the face of a two-thirds majority from a newly elected Chamber (Article 33).

These Articles met with the protests of the Committee in Baghdad, composed of Nājī Pasha as-Sūwaidī, Minister of Justice, Sasūn Effendi Haskail, Minister of Finance and Rustum Beg Haidar, Secretary to His Majesty, to which King Faisal had referred the Project.² The Committee maintained that while it recognized the necessity for some of the Articles despite their admittedly undemocratic nature³ the Constituent Assembly would never accept them. It accordingly prepared a draft of its own. Constitutions of a number of countries, including Japan, were studied but the main provisions of the draft were admittedly drawn from the Ottoman Constitution with which the Committee members were most familiar. After consultations with the Judicial Adviser and the Legal Secretary to the High Commissioner, who suggested amendments to bring it into line with the wishes of H.M. Government, including those forwarded from the Colonial Office on February 23rd,⁴ the draft, hereafter referred to as the Baghdad Draft, was forwarded to the Colonial Office, March 16th, 1922.⁵

¹ Letter, S/S for Colonies to Ormsby-Gore, Position of Draft O. Law, February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23; also Nājī Pasha to writer, March 7th, 1934.

² Report on Draft Organic Law, by Legal Secretary, Baghdad, March 16th, 1922, C.O. 15296/22.

³ According to Nājī Pasha, March 7th, 1934.

⁴ Report on Draft O. Law, March 16th, 1922, C.O. 15296/22.

⁵ Ibid.

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The Committee in its draft, which became the foundation of all subsequent drafts, put forward a bicameral legislature on the Ottoman plan. The Council of the Project became a Senate of twenty Members.¹ Legislation, which with the exception of money bills could be initiated by any deputy supported by ten of his fellows, had to be accepted by both Houses (Article 62c). At the request of its British advisers, the Committee agreed to the inclusion of an Article (62), referring all disputes between the Senate and Deputies to a joint committee of forty, one half of which was to be deputies selected by lot, and the other half, the twenty Senators holding office at the King's pleasure — a feature essential to the scheme.²

In addition, the Baghdad Draft omitted the Article, included in the Project, validating the actions of the High Commissioner and of the King and Ministers prior to the promulgation of the Law. The Legal Secretary, however, stated that he proposed to reinsert the clause in the final draft. It was essential that Acts of previous regimes should not be called into question and that such measures as the forthcoming oil concessions should not be submitted to Parliament.³

In order that no alterations should be made to the Law, either to Articles contributing to good government⁴ or to those affecting the Treaty, it was stipulated in the Baghdad Draft that no amendments should be made 'until 8 years from its date of coming into force' and then only after the amendments had been passed by two successive Parliaments.

Although the attention of official circles in 'Iraq during 1922 and early in 1923 was directed principally to the Treaty and to election difficulties, the Baghdad Draft and the First Colonial Office Revise which embodied the Colonial Office amendments to the unsatisfactory sections, mainly those which vitiated the power of the King to control legislation, had been referred by

¹ Report on Draft O. Law, March 16th, 1922, C.O. 15296/22.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., also Dispatch, August 17th, 1922, C.O. 43338/22.

⁴ Ibid.

the Council of State to a Committee of Nāji Pasha and the Judicial Adviser, with power to co-opt local lawyers for assistance.¹ The Committee's work which gradually assumed the form of a Redraft, was submitted to the Colonial Office, February 15th, 1923, with an explanatory note by the Legal Secretary.²

In this Baghdad Redraft, the drafters further reduced the powers which previous drafts had given to the King.³ Ministers were to be made responsible to Parliament and not to the King (Article 24c).⁴ The King had to obtain the approval of Parliament to declare war.⁵ His right of approval of legislation, including financial measures, was withdrawn (Article 44). In other minor ways, his hands were tied more than in the original drafts.⁶ Furthermore, it was proposed that the Senate, being a purely legislative body, should not be dismissed at the discretion of the King. Some diminution of the power given to the King by the early drafts had not been unexpected.⁷ The last proposal, however, vitiated Article 62 which, in conjunction with Articles 24c and 24f, had become the most important sections in the Law,⁸ since they had been designed to 'enable the King to control the Senate and to force through legislation in face of a hostile majority in the Chamber of Deputies.'⁹

To meet these difficulties, the Judicial Adviser proposed that in cases of necessity, as of obstruction, the King should legislate

¹ Telegram, High Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for Colonies, November 14th, 1922, C.O. 5647/22; Letter, Judicial Adviser, 'Iraq Government, to Legal Secretary, Baghdad, cited C.O. 6927/23.

² Position of O. Draft Law, February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

³ Note by Judicial Adviser, 'Iraq Government, to Legal Secretary, Baghdad, in Position of Draft O. Law, February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid. Later amended to 'Cabinet' at King Faisal's suggestion. Cf. C.O. 48656/23, 49583/23.

⁶ Note by Judicial Adviser, 'Iraq Government, to Legal Secretary, Baghdad, C.O. 10606/23.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Report on Draft O. Law, February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23. Cf. Telegram H.C. to S/S for C., February 21st, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

⁹ Memo. on Organic Law by Legal Secretary, Baghdad, January 19th, 1923, C.O. 6927/23.

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by ordinance, Parliament having been prorogued or dissolved. Such ordinances if dealing with supplies or treaty obligations were to be exempted from subsequent validation by Parliament. The Acting High Commissioner, Mr. Dobbs, preferred,¹ however, to make use of Section 26 of the Government of India Act of 1919.²

Neither of these proposals found favour with the Baghdad Ministers, the Acting High Commissioner's suggestion being regarded as undemocratic. It rested, therefore, according to the Legal Secretary, on H.M. Government:

- (i) To insist on the original draft of 16 March, 1922 (Baghdad Draft); or
- (ii) To insist on the amendments proposed by the Judicial Adviser; or
- (iii) To act along Indian lines.³

In the interval, however, between the signing of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty, October 10th, 1922, and the submission of the Baghdad Redraft, February 15th, 1923, H.M. Government had been obliged to reconsider its entire position in the Middle East, a step which had a profound effect on the Organic Law.

The evacuation of 'Iraq, 'bag and baggage', had been insistently demanded by a section of the British Press, particularly the *Daily Mail* and the *Daily Express*. Parliament had continued to press for the reduction of British expenditure.⁴ At the General Election, following the fall of the Lloyd George Cabinet on October 23rd, 1922, withdrawal from 'Iraq became a prominent issue, a number of candidates, supported by a violent newspaper campaign, pledging themselves to work for that end. On coming into power, Mr. Bonar Law felt impelled to appoint in December, 1922, a special Cabinet Committee to

¹ Memo. on Organic Law by Legal Secretary, Baghdad, January 19th, 1923, C.O. 6927/23. He apparently changed his mind, for in his telegram, February 21st, 1923, C.O. 10606/23, he declared his preference for the second alternative given in Report on Draft O. Law, February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

² 8 and 9 Geo. V, cap. 101.

³ Report on Draft O. Law, February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

⁴ *Supra*, pp. 311, 355.

study the British position in ‘Iraq. In the meantime, the Treaty, for which the Residency had so strenuously worked, hung in the air without the ratification of the British Government, while at the first Lausanne Conference and on the Mōsul frontier the Turks gave every indication that they would never agree to cede Mōsul Wilayet to ‘Iraq.¹

It became apparent in the Cabinet Committee deliberations, which Sir Percy Cox attended,² that, while Great Britain could not abandon ‘Iraq until the Turco-‘Iraq frontier dispute had been settled, an immediate reduction might be made in the period over which British commitments were to extend. Accordingly, when the High Commissioner returned to Baghdad, March 31st, he brought a draft Protocol reducing the duration of the Treaty of 1922 from twenty years to four,³ from the date of the ratification of peace with Turkey. The door was left open, however, for future negotiations.⁴ The Protocol was subsequently signed, April 30th, 1923, but its publication met with less approval in ‘Iraq than had been expected.⁵

Under the new policy adopted by H.M. Government, it is not surprising that the entire question of the degree to which

it was necessary or desirable for the Organic Law to be so framed as to enable us to control the ‘Iraq Parliament through the King in order to secure fulfilment of treaty relations,⁶

should be discussed from a new view-point at the Colonial Office, as well as the provisos dealing with other powers of the King, finance and amendments to the Constitution. This

¹ For an admirable treatment of the Turco-‘Iraq Frontier dispute, see Toynbee, A. J., *Islamic World*, pp. 471-531.

² *Baghdad Times*, February 13th, 1923; Bell, op. cit., p. 662.

³ Text: Appendix ix. The available evidence gives no support to the view taken in the Memorandum on *The Termination of the Mandatory Régime in ‘Iraq* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1932), p. 8, that the Protocol was made ‘in order to put an end to the boycotting of the elections to the Constituent Assembly.’ See *infra*, pp. 391-3

⁴ Last sentence of the Protocol: Appendix ix. Cf. *Progress of ‘Iraq*, p. 15.

⁵ *Al-‘Iraq*, May 5th; *Al-‘Asima*, May 7th, 1923.

⁶ Middle East Department, Minute, March 31st, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

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change of attitude, influenced by the High Commissioner's view that the Constituent Assembly could not meet until after the Mōsul frontier had been settled,¹ was expressed by the Secretary of State for Colonies as follows:

It therefore appears unlikely that the Organic Law will come into effect until a year or more has elapsed from the date of the ratification of peace with Turkey. There may thus be not more than three years during which His Majesty as Mandatory will be responsible for the administration of 'Iraq under the Organic Law.²

In forwarding, therefore, to Baghdad the results of the deliberations of the Colonial Office in the form of a revised draft, April 19th, 1923 (hereafter called the April Revise), the Secretary of State pointed out that, in the question reserving legislative power to the King, neither the earlier stipulation of March 16th, 1922, nor the India Act nor the Judicial Adviser's proposals need be insisted upon. He declared:

I have arrived at the conclusion that, in all the circumstances it will be sufficient if power is given to the King to legislate where necessary, by Ordinance, for the purpose of securing the fulfilment of treaty obligations of the 'Iraq Government, and if provision is made that Ordinances passed with that object shall not require subsequent validation by the 'Iraq Parliament.³

The earlier insistence that supply for essential services should be guaranteed was thus dropped, the Secretary of State for Colonies declaring:

I see no reason from the viewpoint of H.M. Government why Ordinances (by the King to ensure supply of essential services) should be specifically exempted from validation by 'Iraq. If for fulfilment of treaty obligations, exemption will be secured by the provisions referred to in the foregoing paragraph.⁴

¹ Dispatch S/S to H.C., April 19th, 1923, para. 3, C.O. 19114/23.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid, para. 4.

⁴ Ibid., para. 5.

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The principle that finance Bills were to be initiated only by a Minister was, however, held to be still vital (Articles 44 and 104).¹

It was agreed, moreover, that it was no longer necessary to stipulate, in accordance with earlier provisions and with the desires of the King himself, that Ministers should be responsible to the King. Article 65 now made them responsible to Parliament.² In addition, it was provided, again contrary to King Faisal's wish that he be allowed latitude in choosing his Ministers,³ that they should be members of one of the two Houses (Article 63).⁴

On the question of protecting the Constitution from early amendments, as had been provided for in each previous draft, the Secretary of State now declared:

In view of the policy outlined in paragraphs 2 to 6 of this dispatch,⁵ H.M. Government have no special interest in recommending that provision should be made for no amendment to the Organic Law to conflict with treaty obligations since the existing treaty may be expected to have terminated before the end of the eight years mentioned in this article. At the same time it would greatly assist H.M. Government to secure the admission of 'Iraq to membership to the League of Nations if some provision were made in general terms for the sanctity of international engagements entered into by the Government of 'Iraq, not to be endangered by subsequent amendments to the Organic Law.⁶

Although the Colonial Office had thus dropped its original

¹ Dispatch S/S to H.C., April 19th, 1923, note on Article 44.

² Ibid., note on Article 65.

³ Letter, Middle East Department to Legal Secretary, Baghdad, April 4th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

⁴ Dispatch, S/S to H. C., April 19th, 1923, note on Article 63, C.O. 19114/23. It was eventually provided in the draft law that Ministers could hold office for six months without belonging to Parliament: Minute on C.O. File 2324/23.

⁵ Ibid., cited in part, *supra*.

⁶ Ibid., note on Article 119. The Council of Ministers changed 8 years to 5 years in the Draft Law. In view of the Protocol, no objection was made to the change: Letter, Judicial Adviser, 'Iraq Government, to Counsellor to High Commissioner, September 19th, 1923, C.O. 48110/23.

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insistence on these important aspects of the Law, once the new proposals had been evolved and had received the concurrence of the Foreign Office,¹ April 16th, 1923, it declared that its revised draft must be accepted as final by the Council of Ministers in Baghdad.² The latter insisted, however, that it was impossible to adhere rigidly to this injunction. Throughout the summer of 1923, the April Revise was the subject of discussion in the Council of Ministers and between the Minister of Justice and his Adviser.³ The Ministers accepted the first twenty-five Articles by September 5th,⁴ and by September 20th, the whole of the Revise, with numerous amendments,⁵ which, since they did not radically alter the force of the law, were agreed to for the most part by the Colonial Office.⁶ The approved Draft Law, published in the Arabic newspapers of Baghdad in early November, 1923, was that presented for ratification to the Constituent Assembly, June 14th, 1924.

The fact that it had been necessary for most of the British drafters to work in English⁷ and for the 'Iraqis to work in Arabic, requiring numerous translations and retranslations,

¹ Letter, S/S for Foreign Affairs to S/S for Colonies, April 16th, 1923, C.O. 19114/23.

² Concerning the necessity for determined action, the Legal Secretary wrote on February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23: 'Only one way of getting the draft finally settled for submission to the Constituent Assembly and that is: for H.M. Government to say definitely what alterations in the new draft they consider to be essential and for your Excellency to inform the Prime Minister that unless these are accepted, H.M. Government refuses to go further in the matter.'

³ Telegram, Acting High Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for Colonies, September 3rd, 1923, C.O. 44042/23.

⁴ Letter, Bourdillon, Baghdad, to S/S for Colonies, September 5th 1923, C.O. 46074/23.

⁵ The 'Iraqi Ministers in making their last-minute changes, were greatly influenced by the Egyptian Constitution of 1923 which had just come to their notice. From it were taken Article 2 and portions of Articles 12, 20, 24g, 28, 38, 43, 50, 51, 53, 55, 61, 63, 64 and 123.

⁶ Letter No. C. 67/126, Judicial Adviser to Counsellor, Baghdad, September 19th, 1923; Minutes of M.E.D. Conference, September 20th and October 4th, 1923, C.O. 48110/23; Telegram, High Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for Colonies, October 4th, 1923, C.O. 48656/23; S/S for Colonies to High Commissioner, Baghdad, October 16th, 1923, C.O. 49583/23.

⁷ The Judicial Adviser was a notable exception. He worked with equal facility in both Arabic and English.

provided constant opportunity for misunderstandings and errors to arise through a mutual lack of comprehension of each other's language. Moreover, in spite of the counsel given by the Judicial Adviser to the ‘Iraq drafters that precision of meaning was of primary consideration, the attraction of polished Arabic phraseology often triumphed over exact terminology,¹ a difficult attainment in Arabic, even under the most favourable circumstances.

*The Organic Law in its Final Form*²

The Organic Law as presented and ratified by the Constituent Assembly consisted of 123 Articles, divided into ten Parts with an Introduction.

The *Introduction*, in the form passed by the Assembly, declared ‘Iraq to be a

sovereign State, independent and free. Her territories are indivisible and no portion thereof may be given up. ‘Iraq is a constitutional hereditary monarchy with a representative Government.³

It designated Baghdad as the capital (Article 3) and prescribed the form and design of the national flag (Article 4).

Part I, dealing with the Rights of the People, specified:

1. General rights, such as are inherent in almost every constitutional document influenced by French political thought. These included absolute rights, that is, those not subject to the terms of any law, and conditional rights, limited by law.
2. Specific rights, peculiar to ‘Iraq as an Islamic State, both absolute and conditional.⁴

¹ Position of Draft O. Law, February 15th, 1923, C.O. 10606/23.

² All quotations are from the English translation transmitted to the League of Nations, November 28th, 1923. League of Nations Publication C. 49. 1929. (vi).

³ The Colonial Office originally objected to this Article (adopted by the ‘Iraqi Ministers from the Egyptian Constitution) as being inconsistent with the actual status of ‘Iraq. It was finally accepted, however, as being harmless.

⁴ Cf. analysis in Hooper, C. A.: *The Constitutional Law of ‘Iraq* (Baghdad, 1928), pp. 33-7.

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The absolute general rights guaranteed to 'Iraqis, whose nationality was to be defined by special law (Article 5), ensured equality 'before the law, whatever differences may exist in language, race or creed' (Article 6), forbade torture and deportation from the Kingdom of 'Iraq (Article 7),¹ guaranteed freedom of conscience (Article 13) and stipulated equality of status to all 'Iraqis 'as regards the enjoyment of their rights and discharge of their obligations' (Article 18).

Rights of 'Iraqis, conditional upon limitations imposed by law or by the Constitution itself included personal liberty (Article 7); the inviolability of all places of residence (Article 8); access to law courts (Article 9); freedom from forced loans and expropriation of property (Article 10); equality of taxation imposed only by law (Article 11); liberty of expression of opinion, of the press and of association (Article 12); freedom of worship (Article 13); freedom from postal, telegraphic and telephone censorship and detention (Article 15); and the right of the various communities 'of establishing and maintaining schools for the instruction of their members in their own tongues' (Article 16).

Absolute rights, peculiar to 'Iraq as an Islamic State, established Islam as the official religion of 'Iraq and the freedom to practise the rites of the different sects of that religion as observed in 'Iraq (Article 13). Conditional rights made Arabic the official language (Article 11) and gave to all 'Iraqis, subject to law,

the right of presenting petitions and memorials to the King, Parliament and the public authorities, setting forth complaints, whether relating to matters where they are personally concerned, or to matters of public interest. (Article 14).

Only 'Iraqis were to be employed by the Government, except in accordance with law, treaties or special agreements (Article 18).

¹ The Article forbidding deportation of 'Iraqis had its origin in the repeated deportations under the British regime. In 1933, when it was desired to deport Assyrians, the difficulty was evaded by a special law declaring them not to be 'Iraqis.

Part II, concerned with the Crown and its rights, stated in Article 19:

The sovereignty of the constitutional Kingdom of ‘Iraq resides in the people. It is a trust confided by them to King Faisal, son of Husain, and to his heirs after him.

The King, for whom the succession, his majority and a Regency were set forth in Articles 20 to 23, was to be the supreme head of the State (Article 25), safeguarded and not responsible. He was to confirm laws, order their promulgation and supervise their execution (Article 26, 1).¹ He was to order the convocation of Parliament, open it, adjourn it, prorogue or dissolve it. It was further stipulated:

Should necessity arise, when Parliament is not sitting, for taking urgent measures for the maintenance of order and public security, or to ward off a public danger, or for the fulfilment of treaty obligations, the King shall have the right of issuing ordinances, with the concurrence of the Council of Ministers, having the force of law, directing that the necessary steps shall be taken according to circumstances, provided that they are not contrary to the provisions of this Constitution. Such ordinances must all be laid before Parliament at its first session, with the exception of those issued for the purpose of fulfilling treaty obligations approved by Parliament or the Constituent Assembly. Should Parliament not approve these ordinances, the Government must declare them to be no longer operative and they shall be considered to be abrogated as from the date of such declaration. Such ordinances shall be signed by all Ministers. (Article 26, 3).

The King was to conclude treaties subject to the approval of Parliament (*Ibid.*, 4 and 8); choose the Prime Minister; appoint Ministers and accept their resignation (*Ibid.*, 5); name Senators (*Ibid.*, 6); and, on the recommendation of the

¹ The sections of articles which had been designated by letters in all drafts and in the Law as passed, are designated by numbers in the 1928 translation.

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Ministers, appoint and dismiss all officials, except where he had, by special regulation, delegated this authority to another. The King was also Commander-in-Chief, declaring war with the consent of the Ministers and proclaiming martial law. Death sentences were to be confirmed by the King, who also had power to reduce or remit other sentences.

Part III, concerning the Legislature, stated: 'Legislative power is vested in Parliament and the King. Parliament is composed of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies' (Article 28).¹ The King was to 'exercise his powers by means of Royal *'Irādas'*, signed by the Prime Minister and the responsible Minister or Ministers (Article 27). It established the conditions for membership and for compensation of the members of the two Chambers, the number of Senators being set at twenty (Articles 30-6, 41-2, 47-51). Deputies, to be elected in proportion of one to every 20,000 males, were to be elected in accordance with 'a special law based on the principle of the secret ballot and the necessity for the representation of non-Islamic minorities' (Article 36).

Other Articles regulated the sessions (Articles 32-3, 38-40, 44, 52-3, 56-8), and the conduct of the Deputies (Articles 46, 49, 51). Still other Articles governed the internal procedure of the two Houses and the initiation of legislation (Articles 43, 45, 54-5, 59, 62-3). Free speech and immunity were guaranteed (Article 60). Rules to prevail in cases of conflict between the two Houses were laid down in Article 63.

Part IV defined the numbers and duties of the Ministers (Articles 64-5), who collectively, as the Cabinet, and individually were responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, which could force their resignation by a majority vote of no confidence (Article 66).²

¹ The Constituent Assembly had great difficulty in conceiving of legislative power resting in a Parliament composed of 'King, Senate and Chamber of Deputies', as this article had read in the draft law, and had so modified the draft as above.

² No Cabinet has yet fallen in 'Iraq through the application of this Article.

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Part V concerned the Judicature. Courts, whose freedom from all influence was guaranteed (Article 71), were divided into three classes (Article 69): Civil Courts, Religious Courts and Special Courts. It was provided that

The manner of instituting the Courts, the places where they are to be established, the grades, divisions, jurisdiction and supervision thereof, and the execution of judgments, shall be determined by special laws (Article 70).

Civil Courts were to deal with civil, commercial and criminal matters (Article 74). Religious Courts included *Shara'* Courts of both sects (Article 77), which alone could deal with the personal status of Muslims and actions relating to *Waqf* foundations (Article 76) and Spiritual Councils of the Communities, Christian and Jewish, which were to be set up in accordance with special laws (Articles 78, 80).

Among the Special Courts were the High Court for trying Ministers, Members of Parliament and Judges, and for settling the validity of laws in relation to the Organic Law and the Treaty (Articles 81-3), and a *Dīwān Khāss*, a special Bench for the interpretation of other laws (Article 84).

Part VI was entitled *Financial Matters*. It laid down that taxes, which were to be collected from all classes, without distinction (Article 92), were to be imposed only in accordance with law. Monopolies, concessions and forms of taxes were to be regulated by law (Articles 93-4). Expenditure was to be sanctioned only in accordance with an annual Budget Law (Articles 98-101). Initiation of money bills in the Chamber was reserved exclusively to Ministers (Article 105). It was also stipulated that

the Chamber of Deputies may not take any decision, nor propose any amendment to a draft law, involving the reduction of expenditure arising out of treaties approved by Parliament, or the Constituent Assembly, unless approved by the King (Article 106).

Part VII dealt with Administration of the Provinces. In

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accordance with the policy of the drafters,¹ it was provided 'that the administrative districts of 'Iraq, their classes, names, manner of institution, powers of officials and their titles' should be prescribed by a special law (Article 109), which was to

provide that steps shall be taken in certain of the administrative divisions to ensure the performance of any obligations relating thereto, arising out of treaties concluded by the King and approved by Parliament or the Constituent Assembly. (Article 110).

Municipal affairs were to be administered by Municipal Councils, also in accordance with a special law (Article 111).

Part VIII provided, in Article 113, that

Ottoman Laws published before November 5th, 1914, and laws published on or after that date and which have remained in force in 'Iraq so far as circumstances permit, subject to any modification or repeal in conformity with the proclamations, regulations and laws referred to in the following article, and until they are altered or repealed by the legislative power, or the High Court issues a decision rendering them null and void in accordance with the provisions of Article 86.

Article 114 also provided that

All proclamations, regulations and laws issued by the Commander-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's Forces in 'Iraq, the Civil Commissioner, and the High Commissioner, and those issued by the Government of His Majesty King Faisal, during the period between November 5th, 1914, and the date of the coming into force of this Constitution, shall be considered to be valid as from the date on which they came into force. Any portion thereof still unrepealed by that date shall remain in force until changed or repealed by the legislative power, or until the High Court issues a decision rendering them null and void, in accordance with the provisions of Article 86.

In addition, it was stipulated that judgments in civil and criminal matters given by the Ottoman Courts before the

¹ *Supra*, p. 373.

British Occupation and by all Courts including Courts-Martial and Military Courts and by all officials, constituted by authority as Judges, from the time of the Occupation until the coming into force of the Constitution were to ‘be considered to have been given by the regularly constituted Courts of ‘Iraq’ (Articles 116 and 117). Indemnification for all persons for acts done under authority and in good faith, between November 5th, 1914, and the date of promulgation of the Constitution was also given in Article 115.

Part IX made provision for Constitutional Amendments. It stipulated that Parliament might amend by a two-thirds majority vote, within one year from the coming into force of the Law, any of the subsidiary matters, in order that the objects of the law might be given effect (Article 118).¹ Otherwise, no amendment might be made to the Constitution for a period of five years. After the expiration of that period, every amendment had to be approved by a two-thirds majority of both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. When the amendment had been so approved, the Chamber of Deputies was to be dissolved and the amendment submitted to the newly elected Chamber which, with the Senate, had to approve again by a two-thirds majority. The amendment was then to be submitted to the King for his confirmation.

Part X, entitled *General Provisions*, dealt mainly with martial law, the King being given power, subject to the approval of the Council, to proclaim martial law and to suspend existing laws and regulations, subject to the important proviso that ‘those charged with the execution of the proclamation shall be subject to any legal consequences of the acts, until a special law has been passed by Parliament exempting therefrom’.²

¹ Articles 22, 23, 35, 39, 40, 50, 82 and 83 were slightly modified by the first Parliament, July 29th, 1925, in accordance with this proviso.

² The drafts prior to the April Revision had contained no such proviso, but the Colonial Office insisted on its inclusion, maintaining that martial law could not be legalized in advance: Minute, March 31st, 1923, C.O. 10606/23; Dispatch S/S to N. C., April 19th, 1923, C.O. 19114/23.

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The Electoral Law by which the Parliament (the powers of which had given the drafters of the Organic Law great concern) was to be brought into being, had early occupied the attention of British and 'Iraqī officials.

The draft law, as presented and passed by the Constituent Assembly,¹ provided for an indirect system of election in accordance with the Turkish model on which both it and the Constituent Assembly Election Regulations² had been based. Deputies, in accordance with Article 36 of the Constitution, were to be elected in the proportion of one to every 20,000 primary voters who, among other qualifications (Article 33), were to be every male 'Iraqī, 21 years of age, paying taxes to the Government. Additional deputies, representing the Christians and the Jews, were also to be elected in the *Liwās* of Mōsul, Baghdad and Basra, in the following numbers:

Mōsul <i>Liwā</i>	2 Christians, 1 Jew.
Baghdad <i>Liwā</i>	1 Christian, 2 Jews.
Basra <i>Liwā</i>	1 Christian, 1 Jew. ³

Primary electors, inscribed in registers by the electoral authorities of their electoral districts, into which the country had been divided, were to elect by secret ballot (Chapter I) the secondary electors in proportion of one to every 250 primary voters (Article 7). The secondary electors, assembling at the headquarters of their district, were to elect the deputies who, in addition to the qualifications enumerated in Articles 30 and 42 of the Constitution, had to reside within the electoral circle for which they were elected (Article 8).⁴ To provide for by-elections, the secondary electors were to retain their office from one election until the next, and were to reconvene whenever called upon to elect a new deputy (Article 42).

¹ *Infra*, Ch XXI Text: *Compilation*, 1924, pp. 45-51.

² *Compilation*, 1923, pp. 34-42, 47, 83, 157.

³ Article 6.

⁴ First circle: *Liwās* of Mōsul, Kirkūk, Sulaimāniya and 'Arbil. Second circle: *Liwās* of Baghdad, Diyālā, Dulaim, Hilla, Karbalā, Kūt and Diwāniyā. Third circle: *Liwās* of Muntafiq, 'Amarā and Basra.

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Each step in the preparation of the registers, in the election procedure, and in the certifying of deputies was minutely prescribed by the law, penalties being laid down in accordance with modern practice for every possible contravention of the regulations.

The actual setting up of Parliament and the institution of the constitutional system were to await the ratification and the promulgation of the Organic Law and the Electoral Law. Nevertheless, in the two laws, through the efforts of their drafters, ample provision had been made along liberal lines, with the exception perhaps of the articles imposed in the interests of British policy, for the machinery and paraphernalia of a modern democratic State: a Sovereign, limited by law, a Council of Ministers responsible to Parliament, a Parliament consisting of a Senate and a representative Chamber of Deputies, and Judicial, Financial and Administrative systems. Provision had been made for the regulation of each institution. An outline had been provided into which further developments could be fitted in conformity with law as new circumstances made them essential. Comprehensive safeguards had been imposed for the rights of all sections of the population. Whether the machinery, the outlines and the safeguards so provided, however, were to be equal to the task of regenerating the country, to the progressive development of the new Kingdom and to the assurance of justice and equity to each member of the State, regardless of ‘language, race or creed’,¹ or whether they were to remain, as their Turkish prototypes had often remained, paper principles, depended on future circumstances, on the spirit and on the efficient zeal with which they were to be applied.

¹ Constitution, Article 6.

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ASSEMBLY*Convocation of the Constituent Assembly*

No subject, other than the employment of foreigners in government posts and the general anti-Mandate propaganda occupied more attention in the Arabic Press from 1920 onwards than the demand for the convocation of the promised Constituent Assembly in order that it might express the wishes of the country concerning its future Government. When, however, the 'Irāda ordering the elections to the Constituent Assembly to begin on October 24th was issued, October 19th, 1922,¹ after a delay of nearly two years, it met with a far different response than had been anticipated. The Nationalists and the Shī'a 'Ulamā united in opposition to its application. The 'Ulamā of Najaf and of Kādhimain, including Shaikh Madhī al-Khālīsī who had been among the Nationalists calling most loudly for the Constituent Assembly, were induced to issue *fatwās* in early November, forbidding any participation in the election.²

The immediate effect of the *fatwās* was to bring the elections to a standstill in Shi'a centres. In Najaf, Karbalā, Hilla and Kūfa, the Electoral Committees resigned. In Kādhimain, the officials declared themselves unable to form Election committees.³ In Dulaim *Liwā*, however, the *fatwās* had no effect,

¹ *Compilation*, 1920-1923, p. 82.

² The *fatwās* issued collectively by the 'Ulamā of Najaf and Kādhimain, November 8th, were followed by others by individual 'Ulamā. A translation of one of the latter is as follows:

'Yes, we have issued the order to prohibit the elections by the whole 'Iraqi nation.

'That whoever participates or gives assistance in them will disobey God and His Prophet. God has said in His glorious book that whoever disobeys God and His Prophet, fire shall be his lot. (*sd.*) Muhammad Mahdī al-Khālīsī.'

³ *Baghdad Times*, November 25th, 1922.

but there, as in other tribal districts, little interest was taken in the elections until wider tribal representation was provided¹ at the insistence of the Residency which relied on its long-standing influence among the paramount Shaikhs to obtain their support in the Assembly. In addition, a large section of the public was reluctant to register, fearing that the election rolls would be used for conscription.²

Every effort was made to conciliate the ‘*Ulamā* but without success, the *fatwās* being reissued in June, 1923. It was maintained in British official circles that the only remedy lay in vigorous action against the leaders themselves. Only by their suppression would the opportunity be afforded of intimidating the rank and file to the extent that the elections could be continued without further active opposition. The Prime Minister favoured this policy, but King Faisal continued to hope for conciliation by other methods. When, however, collisions occurred on June 21st, between the police and the inhabitants of Kādhimain over the posting of *fatwās* at the door of the mosque and when demonstrations were subsequently organized against the Government in which Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālīsī and his family took a prominent part, the Ministers, urged by their Advisers, felt it necessary to take strong action to vindicate the authority of the Government. Armed with an Ordinance, passed on June 9th, giving power to the Government to deport non-‘Iraqīs for political offences, the Council ordered with the reluctant concurrence of H.M. the King, then visiting Basra,³ the arrest and deportation of Shaikh Mahdī al-Khālīsī, his sons Hasan and ‘Alī, and his nephew, all Persian subjects. A demonstration of protest was immediately organized by the religious leaders of Najaf, a group of nine important ‘*Ulamā*, also Persian

¹ By means of a liberal interpretation of Article III (a) of the Election Regulations by the Ministers, in late August, 1923.

² *Al-‘Iraq*, December 2nd, 4th, 1922.

³ Official *Communiqué*, *Al-Istiqlāl* and *Al-‘Iraq*, June 25th, 1923, *Al-‘Asima*, June 27th, 1923. The Arabic Press generally approved of the deportations: *Al-‘Iraq*, June 27th, 30th; *Al-‘Asima*, June 27th; July 2nd, 4th; *Al-Istiqlāl*, June 25th, 1923.

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subjects, with twenty-five followers leaving for Persia as a gesture of their disapproval. The 'Iraq Government, although deprecating the action of these 'Ulamā, gave them every facility to expedite their departure.¹

The elections were renewed on July 12th.² Difficulties and delays, however, still remained, due to the refusal of the Shi'is to form Electoral Committees, to the undiminished fear of conscription and to the resignation of the Sa'dun Cabinet and the formation of Ja'far Pasha's Ministry. The change of Ministries, although disturbing at this juncture, provided an opportunity for conciliating the Shi'is, which the King had been anxious to facilitate.³ In spite of these difficulties, the registration of primary voters was concluded on December 16th; the secondary elections were completed on February 25th; and the elected representatives were summoned to Baghdad and given a great banquet by the King on March 4th.⁴

Ratification of the Treaty

In the presence of the High Commissioner and his staff, the Air Officer Commanding and a large audience, the King, in an eloquent speech from the Throne, opened the Assembly, March 27th, eighty-four representatives being present.⁵ He rendered thanks to God for the successful conduct of affairs of State and for the opportunity he now had of opening the *Majlis* which was to lay the foundations of the State. He then urged the

¹ *Admn Report*, 1923-1924, pp. 11-13.

² *Al-Istiqāl*, July 13th, 1923.

³ The new Cabinet was as follows: Prime Minister (without portfolio): Ja'far Pasha al-'Askarī; Interior: 'Alī Jaudat Beg; Defence. Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'id; Finance: Hājī Muhsin Chālābī ash-Shalash; Communications and Works: Sabih Beg; Justice: Shaikh Ahmad Effendi Fakhri; Auqāf: Shaikh Salih Bash'ayan; Education: Muhammad Hasan abū Mūhaisin. For its programme, see *Al-'Iraq*, December 3rd, 1923.

⁴ *Al-'Iraq*, March 5th, 1924.

⁵ *Maymū'a madhākūrātu' l-majlisu't-t'asīsi'l-'Irāqī* (Complete Proceedings of the 'Iraq Constituent Assembly, 2 vols., Baghdad, 1924), (hereafter *Madhākūrāt*, Proceedings), 1st Session, p. 5; Bell, op. cit., p. 692; *Baghdad Times*, March 28th, 1924.

members of the Assembly to have courage and wisdom in carrying out the tasks confided to them by the nation:

1. To give their verdict on the Treaty.
2. To pass upon the Constitution of ‘Iraq.
3. To pass upon the Electoral Law for the Parliament which was to represent the nation and guard its independence.

Reminding them of the injunction of the *Qur‘ān*, ‘it is for them to take counsel together’, he asked for God’s aid in all their deliberations.’¹

‘Abdul Muhsin Beg as-Sa‘dūn was elected president, receiving fifty votes and Yāsīn Pasha al-Hāshimī, twenty-three votes.² At the second sitting, Dā‘ūd Beg al-Haidarī and Yāsīn Pasha were elected vice-presidents.³

Consideration of the Treaty and its connected documents, which were presented to the Assembly at its third session, March 31st,⁴ and referred at the fifth session, April 7th, to a committee,⁵ of which Yāsīn Pasha became Chairman, began under very favourable circumstances. Notwithstanding the reluctance of the ‘Iraq Government to adopt the High Commissioner’s suggestion that it openly support in the elections to the Assembly those candidates pledging themselves to vote for the Treaty, and in spite of the failure of many candidates for election to declare their views regarding the issues to be settled in the Assembly,⁶ most of the 100 representatives who had been elected were believed to favour ratification of the Treaty. Only about fifteen were known to be definitely opposed to it. The forty tribal representatives, on whom the Residency counted as the backbone of the pro-Treaty group (they and the Kurdish representatives formed a majority of the Assembly), had drawn

¹ *Madhākūrāt*, pp. 5-7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³ *Ibid.*, 2nd session, p. 15.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 3rd session, pp. 27 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 5th session, pp. 90-3.

⁶ *Al-‘Iraq*, September 12th, 1923, in an inspired article, and *Al-‘Istiqlāl*, January 12th, 1924, had urged the candidates to present their programmes to the electors.

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together and on March 24th had pledged themselves to support the Treaty and to take no other action without common consent.

Discordant elements, however, both inside and outside the Assembly, soon began to make themselves felt. In the Assembly, a group, of which Yāsīn Pasha, Nājī Pasha as-Sūwaidī and Muzāhim Pāchahjī were leaders, opposed the Treaty and the Agreements on the grounds that they limited independence, that the Agreements, particularly the British Official and Financial Agreements, were more than the country could bear, and that they did not in return assure adequate support for 'Iraq, especially in the Mōsul frontier dispute. The party's vigorous advocacy of these arguments, particularly the last two, with which even supporters of the Treaty were in sympathy, drew many of the wavering deputies to their side.

Another group was formed, theoretically in opposition to the Treaty but in reality, it was maintained in official circles, in opposition to the Cabinet, whose fall it hoped to bring about. Still another group, led by Ra'ūf Beg Chādarchī, opposed the Treaty on technical grounds, alleging that in form it was not a treaty which could be honourably signed by two nations. It was merely the Mandate re-written.¹

In addition, a large section of the tribal representatives, led by Shaikh Salīm al-Khaiyūn of the Muntafiq, broke away from the tribal group, declaring that it would not agree to ratification unless the Organic Law guaranteed the shaikhs special privileges: increased use of the Tribal Disputes Regulations, the perpetual lease of government lands then held by the shaikhs and consultation with a tribal *majlis* of twelve shaikhs of any *Liwā* where martial law was about to be declared.

Outside the Assembly, where the sole subject of conversation was the Treaty, the religious leaders, the lawyers and law students, school teachers and Nationalists generally, including the young leaders of the *Ma'hadū'l 'Ilmī* and the *Nadī'l 'Islah*,

¹ Such was the tenor of Ra'ūf Beg's speech, June 2nd: *Madkāhurāt*, 19th session, pp. 300 ff.

with the support of several vernacular papers, united in incessant war against the Treaty. The principal attempt to bring the deputies under Nationalist influences, at a dinner organized by the Baghdad lawyers for April 11th, failed, the permission for the dinner having been revoked by the Minister of Interior. The incident, however, provided capital for the Nationalists and widened the breach already existing between the Assembly and the Cabinet.¹ The agitation was capped by the attempt on April 20th, following numerous threats, to assassinate in a Baghdad thoroughfare two tribal deputies from Hilla.²

Although the Government immediately made twenty-three arrests, suppressed *Al-Istiqlāl*, *Ash-Sha‘b*³ and *An-Nāshi’a*⁴ and took other steps against the agitators in order to reassure the deputies, it was clear that many representatives, even those favouring the Treaty, had been adversely affected by these Nationalist demonstrations. Only fifty-three members attended the eleventh session, May 10th,⁵ at which a number of resignations were recorded. These were due, it was openly declared by Mulla Muhammad of ‘Arbīl, to constant threats from anonymous letters and notices in the bazaars.⁶

The High Commissioner and his staff, on their side, spent themselves in strengthening the hands of the Government and in inducing the Assembly to hasten its decision. The High Commissioner had been obliged to declare in a letter to the King, April 24th, in answer to persistent requests that the Treaty and subsidiary Agreements be amended before their ratification, that

the British Government is unable to consent to any modifications either in the Treaty or Protocol or in the Agreements, and it remains for the Constituent Assembly either to accept

¹ *Madkhāhurāt*, 6th session, pp. 123-37. Also *Al-‘Iraq*, April 11th, 1924.

² *Ibid.*, 8th session, p. 147.

³ A Baghdad newspaper, founded April 10th, 1924.

⁴ A Baghdad comic weekly, founded December 2nd, 1921.

⁵ *Madkhāhurāt*, 11th session, p. 165. ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

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or reject them as a whole, as they may consider best in the interests of 'Iraq.¹

Nevertheless, he endeavoured in the same letter, in one of April 28th² and in other ways, to present the Treaty in its most favourable aspect. Questions from the Assembly for information were freely answered. Full publicity was given in the friendly newspapers to all possible reasons why the Treaty should be ratified, including the arguments that it was necessary in order to check pro-Turkish activities in Mōsul, to ensure successful frontier negotiations and to secure loans from English financiers.

In spite of these efforts, the dread of assuming the responsibility for ratification was apparent even among the Ministers who, in the face of agitated public opinion, hesitated to make any statement or to take any action which would subject them to personal criticism or to unpopularity from their own people. Influenced by the opprobrium heaped on the Cabinet, and believing that part of the opposition to the Treaty in the Assembly was due to the desire to dislodge his Cabinet, Ja'far Pasha offered his resignation in early May. Following consultation with the High Commissioner, the King requested Yāsīn Pasha to form a Cabinet, but after twenty-four hours' consideration the latter refused. At the same time, he gave a solemn assurance that the Treaty Committee, of which he was Chairman, would make a favourable report to the Assembly. Ja'far Pasha was induced to carry on until the Treaty had been ratified.³

Under these circumstances, H.M. Government, in concurrence with the High Commissioner, came to the conclusion, by the middle of May and before the Treaty Committee had made its report to the Assembly, that the situation, which they felt to be fraught with danger, must be terminated.⁴ The

¹ *Baghdad Times*, May 3rd, 1924.

² *Ibid.*

³ Nevertheless, the President of the Assembly, Yāsīn Pasha, and Nāji Pasha, in an interview with the High Commissioner on May 23rd, reiterated their contention that the al-'Askari Ministry had no hold over the Assembly.

⁴ *Admn. Report*, 1923-1924, p. 22; Dobbs, H. R. C., in Bell, *Letters*, p. 547.

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Council of the League of Nations, therefore, was asked by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a letter dated May 21st, to place the question of ‘Iraq on the agenda for its first meeting, June 11th.¹

In a second letter of the same date from the Foreign Secretary, communicating the Treaty and its related documents, the Council was informed:

The Treaty, Protocol, and the subsidiary Agreements are now under consideration in Baghdad by the Constituent Assembly referred to in Article 18 of the Treaty; and it is hoped that these documents, in which H.M. Government has announced they can accept no modification, will have been accepted by the Assembly before the next meeting of the Council of the League. The Treaty and the Agreements are the outcome of prolonged discussions and negotiations with the King of ‘Iraq and his Government, and the Council will understand that they represent the conditions on which alone H.M. Government see their way to give effect to the policy set forth in Mr. Fisher’s announcement of November, 1921. . . .

There is, however, the possibility that the Treaty, Protocol and subsidiary Agreements will not have been accepted by the ‘Iraq Constituent Assembly before the next meeting of the Assembly. In that event a new situation will arise, and H.M. Government may have no option but to obtain the authority of the Council for some alternative arrangement to ensure the carrying out of the provisions of Article XXII of the Covenant in so far as ‘Iraq is concerned.²

A copy of this letter, together with an explanatory note, was sent by the High Commissioner to King Faisal, on May 26th, a fortnight before the date by which the Treaty, if it were not ratified, would be considered rejected. The letter read as follows:

¹ *Official Journal, League of Nations*, No. 7 (1924), p. 1013. The date by which the Treaty should be ratified thus became June 10th.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 1013-4; also *Baghdad Times*, May 29th, 1924.

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Your Majesty,

I have the honour to forward for Your Majesty's information a copy of a letter which has been addressed by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald to the Secretary of the League of Nations regarding the relations between Great Britain and 'Iraq, together with a copy of the draft instrument which formed an enclosure to that letter.

I understand that the date of the next meeting of the Council of the League of Nations is to be 11 June, and Your Majesty will see from paragraph 8 of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's letter that, if the 'Iraq Constituent Assembly have not accepted the Treaty, Protocol and Subsidiary Agreements before that date, H.B.M. Government contemplate placing an alternative arrangement for the treatment of 'Iraq before the Council of the League. It is important that this decision of the British Government shall be widely known in 'Iraq without delay, and I trust Your Majesty will give orders for its early publication.

(Sgd.) H. Dobbs.¹

On May 20th,² eight days before the dispatch of the above letter, the Report of the Treaty Committee, a lengthy document of seventy-five pages, was submitted to the Assembly. In spite of Yāsīn Pasha's assurance to the King, the Report recommended continued insistence on amendments both to the Treaty and the Agreements: the definite abolition of capitulations, the declaration of complete independence, the non-interference of the High Commissioner in the Budget, the immediate transference to 'Iraq of all works of public utility not yet transferred, and the cancellation of the last sentence of Article VIII in the Military Agreement. Nothing was said as to whether the amendments should be made before or after the Treaty was ratified.³

¹ *Baghdad Times*, May 29th, 1924.

² *Mādhakurāt*, 14th session, pp. 429 ff. *Admn. Report*, 1923-1924, p. 21, erroneously gives the date as April 20th, thereby creating the impression that the Assembly considered the Report for seven weeks instead of twenty days.

³ *Baghdad Times*, June 3rd, 1924.

The Report did nothing to lessen agitation against the Treaty or to facilitate the decision of the deputies, in whose debates the amendments put forward by the Committee became the issue. Little attention was paid to the High Commissioner's statement that no amendments could be made prior to ratification and that H.M. Government could give no positive assurance that it would agree to specific amendments following ratification.¹

Outside the Assembly, the Nationalist agitation increased in intensity, culminating in demonstrations on May 29th and 31st. On the morning of May 29th, shops were closed in Baghdad. Huge crowds gathered in front of the Assembly building, vociferously demanding rejection of the Treaty. After several hours, the crowd grew threatening and attempted to force its way into the Assembly. Armed followers of Shaikh Salīm al-Khaiyūn and other shaikhs actually invaded the building. Deputies coming from the Assembly were assaulted. The situation rapidly grew alarming, the cavalry, which had re-enforced the police, being unable to clear the streets with their lances. Not until the police, after firing over the heads of the demonstrators, were forced to fire into the crowd, was order restored.²

Little progress towards ratification was made in the Assembly in the next four sessions,³ although the High Commissioner and the King exhausted every means of inducing it to give a favourable verdict. The deputies were appealed to, individually and collectively; the Ministers were interviewed by the High Commissioner who, on the occasion of a visit to the Assembly, May 31st, made an informal address to the deputies;⁴ Yāsīn Pasha, who had interests in agricultural concessions, was

¹ This declaration was made by the High Commissioner in response to repeated requests from H.M. the King, the Prime Minister, Yāsīn Pasha and others for such assurances.

² Although a huge crowd of demonstrators gathered on May 31st, it was soon brought under control by the police.

³ *Madhākūrāt*, 19th to 22nd sessions, June 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 9th, pp. 277-416.

⁴ *Baghdād Times*, June 2nd, 1924.

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repeatedly warned by Sir John Norton Griffiths that the concessions would be dropped if the Treaty were not ratified. The *Baghdad Times* was encouraged to publish articles urging ratification.¹

On the morning of June 10th, the final day set for ratification by H.M. Government, the session was attended by so much confusion, in spite of the previous determination of the 'Iraq Cabinet to force the Treaty through the Assembly, that the Prime Minister despaired of any clear decision.² With the concurrence of the King, whom he had consulted by telephone, he proposed an adjournment until the following day, 'on account of certain foreign political matters'.³

The subsequent request of the King to the High Commissioner that he arrange for an extension of time was refused. The High Commissioner recalled to His Majesty that the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations was taking place on the next day, and that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald had already informed the League that if the 'Iraq Assembly had not accepted the Treaty before the meeting of the Council, the British Government might be forced to propose an alternative method for dealing with 'Iraq. The High Commissioner insisted that the Assembly be resummoned that afternoon and informed the King that he would himself come at four o'clock to communicate his views to His Majesty.

The visit of the Prime Minister and Yāsīn Pasha to the High Commissioner that afternoon, just before his departure to see the King, found him obdurate. The High Commissioner

¹ Although the *Baghdad Times* declared that Great Britain neither wanted the Treaty (May 19th) nor wished to stay in 'Iraq (May 20th and 21st) and had nothing to gain (May 22nd), it continued to urge ratification of the Treaty in every issue, from May 19th to June 10th. It went to extreme lengths to prove that Turkey had colonizing designs on 'Iraq (June 10th), alleging that only fear of the pro-Turkish agents in Baghdad kept the deputies from voting (June 9th). See also issues of May 26th, June 2nd, 6th, 7th.

² So fearful were the deputies of making a decision that the Karbalā deputy actually proposed that a resolution be drafted and passed, neither accepting nor rejecting the Treaty. *Madhākūrāt*, 19th to 22nd session, p. 423.

³ *Madhākūrāt*, 23rd session, p. 430.

informed them that he saw no hope for a decision and that he was about to advise the King to dissolve the *Majlis* if it had not reached a decision by midnight. The visitors put forward another form of resolution which neither accepted nor rejected the Treaty. The High Commissioner abruptly refused the proposal.

At the Palace, the High Commissioner delivered to King Faisal in the presence of his Personal Adviser an unsigned memorandum. The memorandum reviewed the decision of the British Government to limit the period of discussion of the Treaty and Agreements. After summarizing the events leading up to the existing situation which was described as dangerous, it continued as follows:

In these circumstances, H.B.M. Government cannot allow the present situation, so dangerous both to the internal and the external security of ‘Iraq to continue. To-day’s last proceedings of the Assembly have shown no approach to an agreement and no prospect of a clear and early decision. I have, therefore, been empowered to call upon Your Majesty, as a condition of further support by H.B.M. Government, to promulgate immediately, by and with the advice of Your Council of Ministers, an amendment to the law of the Constituent Assembly by which Your Majesty will take power to dissolve the Assembly at any time within four months of the commencement of its sessions and also an order under the said amendment, dissolving the Assembly with effect from 12 o’clock on the night between 10th and 11th June. This order I must ask Your Majesty to communicate officially through the Prime Minister to the President of the Constituent Assembly before seven o’clock on the morning of 11th June, and I must ask Your Majesty to give instructions through the Minister of Interior for the immediate closing of the Assembly building and for the occupation of its approaches by a number of police sufficient to enforce order for its closing.

King Faisal had no choice but to accede to the High Commissioner’s wishes. Arrangements were made for the Judicial

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Adviser to bring a draft law of dissolution to the Palace that evening for promulgation if the Treaty were not passed by midnight.

At eight o'clock that night the Prime Minister telephoned the Palace that he had found it impossible to convene a quorum. He begged for a day's grace. The High Commissioner was adamant. The draft law for dissolving the Assembly was placed in the hands of the King.

At 10.30, however, the Prime Minister, by dint of great effort, had persuaded sixty-eight deputies to assemble.¹ The President, after explaining the circumstances of the special session, put to the Assembly the resolution, standing in the name of Yāsīn Pasha and his group, that ratification should be delayed until the amendments had been secured.² Forty-three voted against the resolution, twenty-four for it, one deputy refusing to vote.³ The Prime Minister's resolution, which attempted to incorporate the fears, hopes and desires of both the anti-Treaty and the pro-Treaty groups, was then put to the vote. His formula read as follows:

This Assembly considers that many of the Articles of the Treaty and Agreements are so severe that 'Iraq would be unable to discharge the responsibilities of the alliance desired by the people of 'Iraq. But 'Iraq relies upon and has full trust in the honour of the British Government and

¹ *Madhākūrāt*, 24th session, pp. 431-2.

² *Ibid.*, p. 435. The translation is as follows:

The Constituent Assembly have seen the Treaty, Protocol and Agreements, and in spite of their strong desire for co-operation with the British Government and for the maintenance of friendship between the two peoples, they found that they (the documents) contain such severe articles as to render 'Iraq incapable of discharging the responsibilities of alliance . . . Therefore, out of a desire to establish the alliance on strong foundations, the Assembly do not agree to the ratification of the Treaty by the Government, unless the amendments and reservations contained in the Committee's Report are accepted. Further, negotiations for securing the said amendments should be entered into forthwith, as pointed out in the Committee's Report and should be submitted to the Constitutional Assembly in the form of a Protocol. Also an assurance should be obtained for the defence of the rights of 'Iraq in the Mōsul Wilayet in its entirety.

³ Full lists of the deputies according to their votes are given, *ibid.*, pp. 436-9.

the nobility of the British people and is confident that they will not permit ‘Iraq to be overburdened nor its aspirations to be prejudiced. It is only this confidence and reliance on the part of ‘Iraq which has induced the Assembly to accept the statements which have been received from His Excellency the High Commissioner on behalf of the British Government, to the effect that the British Government, after the passing of the Treaty, will endeavour to adjust the Financial Agreement, in the generous spirit characteristic of the noble British people. In view of this, the Assembly recommends that His Majesty the King should ratify the Treaty, Protocol and Agreements, provided that immediately after such ratification, His Majesty shall confer with the British Government for securing the amendments suggested by the Committee of the Assembly. This Treaty and its subsidiary Agreements shall become null and void if the British Government fails to preserve the rights of ‘Iraq in the whole Mōsul Wilayet.¹

Thirty-seven deputies voted for the resolution, while twenty-four (the identical group which had voted for Yāsīn Pasha’s resolution) declared against it. Eight deputies abstained, including one who had arrived late and six of those who had voted against Yāsīn Pasha’s resolution.² The Assembly adjourned shortly before midnight.³

The ratification of the Treaty was received throughout ‘Iraq, according to the *Baghdad Times*,

in the most stoical fashion. There were none of the rejoicings nor lamentations we had expected: we heard no loud huzzas, nor did we notice any of the gangs of roughs, armed with sticks, knives and revolvers, apparent much earlier.⁴

¹ *Madhākūrāt*, 24th session, pp. 440-1.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 442-5. The fact that only 69 Deputies acted upon the Treaty has been the source of much adverse comment by Arab Nationalists. It must be remembered that the average attendance up to June 10th was 72, and that of the 23 scheduled sessions, less than 69 were present at 12 of them, less than a quorum appearing for the session of May 31st.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 446.

⁴ *Baghdad Times*, June 13th, 1924.

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Al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī stated:

Now that the great question is settled it is the task of the ‘Iraq Government to strive to gain the results foreshadowed by the statements and promises of Great Britain.¹

Al-‘Iraq wrote:

The Assembly has by a majority resolved to ratify the Treaty. ‘Iraq has passed from the old era into the new. In this new era her responsibilities will be greater, and her efforts to secure independence must be greater too.

The Treaty does not secure the success which we desired, nor will the alliance with Great Britain place us in the position to which we aspire, unless we work to create in the Treaty period adequate forces to help us to complete independence and make steady steps towards progress and development.²

Apathy and indifference attended the remainder of the Assembly’s labours. Discussion of the Organic Law occupied its attention from June 14th³ to July 10th, when the Law was unanimously approved.⁴ The Electoral Law was passed on August 2nd,⁵ the Assembly being dissolved on the same day.⁶

¹ *Al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī*, June 13th, 1924.

² *Al-‘Iraq*, June 12th, 1924.

³ *Madhākūrāt*, 25th session, pp. 446 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 41st session, pp. 1079 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 49th session, pp. 1300 ff.

⁶ For ‘*Irāda* of Dissolution, see *Compilation*, 1924, p. 37.

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THE Protocol of April 30th, 1923, had provided that the Treaty of 1922 should 'terminate upon 'Iraq becoming a member of the League of Nations and in any case not later than four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey'.¹ A new situation arose, however, in the settlement of the Turco-'Iraq frontier dispute as the final step in establishing peace with Turkey. Under the terms of the Peace Treaty signed at Lausanne, July 24th, 1923, when Turkey had persisted in her refusal to abandon her claims to Mōsul Wilayet, the dispute had been referred to the Council of the League of Nations.² That body on December 16th, 1925, in agreement with the Report of its special Commission which it had sent to Mōsul, January to March, 1925, to investigate the rival claims³ and in accordance with the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, November 21st, 1925,⁴ decided, subject to three conditions, that Mōsul Wilayet south of the 'Brussels Line'⁵ should be awarded to 'Iraq.

The two most important conditions were:

The British Government is invited to submit to the Council a new Treaty with 'Iraq, ensuring the continuance for twenty-five years of the mandatory regime defined by the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and 'Iraq and by

¹ *Infra*, Appendix ix.

² For proceedings of the Lausanne Conference, 1922-23: *Accts. and Papers*, 1923 (Cmd. 1814), xxvi, 1. Text of Treaty: *ibid.*, 1923 (Cmd. 1947), xxv, 533.

³ See *Report submitted to the Council by the Commission instituted by the Council Resolution of September 30th, 1924* (League of Nations Document, C. 400, M. 147, 1925, vii) (hereafter *Commission Report*).

⁴ Text in *Accts. and Papers*, 1924 (Cmd. 2565), xxxi, 563.

⁵ So-called because formulated by the Council at Brussels, October 29th, 1924.

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the British Government's undertaking, approved by the Council on the 27th September, 1924, unless 'Iraq is, in conformity with Article I of the Covenant, admitted as a Member of the League before the expiration of this period.

As soon as, within a period of six months from the present date, the execution of this stipulation has been brought to the knowledge of the Council, the Council shall declare that the present decision has become definitive and shall indicate the measures required to ensure the delimitation on the ground of the frontier line.

The British Government, as mandatory Power, is invited to lay before the Council the administrative measures which will be taken with a view to securing for the Kurdish populations mentioned in the report of the Commission of Inquiry the guarantees regarding local administration recommended by the Commission in its final conclusions.¹

Mr. Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies,² had already, on September 3rd, expressed to the League the willingness of the British Government to abide by the conditions put forward in the Frontier Commission's Report of July 16th if the League considered them necessary.³ Mr. Amery and Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Foreign Secretary, immediately following the League's decision of December 16th, accepted the conditions on behalf of the British Government.⁴

'Iraqi public opinion had not been unprepared for the League's decision. The possibility of the extension of the Treaty of 1922 as the only means of retaining Mōsul had been in the air from the time of the Frontier Commission's visit to 'Iraq. In a speech, August 4th, to the Ministers, Senators and Deputies, King Faisal had definitely put forward such a prospect.⁵

Such fear of the consequences attending the return of the

¹ Complete text: op. cit., loc. cit.

² Responsible for Anglo-'Iraq affairs.

³ *Official Journal, League of Nations*, October, 1925, pp. 1313-14.

⁴ *Ibid.*, February, 1926, pp. 192-3.

⁵ *Baghdad Times*, August 6th, 1925.

Turks to Mōsul and of the loss of the Wilayet had been aroused that the protests of sections of the British Press and Parliament against further British commitments in ‘Iraq, reproduced in Baghdad newspapers, came as a shock to many ‘Iraqīs who realized that without Great Britain, ‘Iraq would be helpless in the existing dispute.¹ Under the circumstances, the decision of the League, published in Baghdad, December 17th and 18th, was generally received with relief although the vernacular Press was guarded in comments on the conditions attached to it. *Al-Istiqlāl* and *Al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī* went so far as to omit from the text the words ‘over a period of twenty-five years’.

Although the prolongation of treaty relations was not entirely unpopular,² save among a group of Nationalists who held that the new Treaty must be accompanied by concessions to Nationalism, the unqualified prolongation of the Financial and Military Agreements met with general disfavour. It was held that the Report of Sir Hilton Young regarding financial conditions in ‘Iraq³ had confirmed the criticisms of the Constituent Assembly. When, therefore, the Council of Ministers, to whom the draft Treaty was presented on December 28th, manifested a strong desire for clauses stipulating the early amendment of the Financial and Military Agreements and the periodic review both of ‘Iraq’s readiness for the League of Nations and of the possibility of further amendment of the subsidiary Agreements, the Colonial Office gave its assent. The final text of the Treaty approved by the Council, January

¹ Secret Police Report, Baghdad. In early September, after the Commission Report was received in Baghdad, the Prime Minister, ‘Abdul Muhsin Beg, telegraphed Mr. Amery: ‘The ‘Iraq nation, represented by its Chamber of Deputies, declares its strong friendship for Great Britain after the expiry of the present treaty’. *Official Journal*, October, 1925, p. 1314.

² *Al-Mufīd*, however, declared, January 14th, 1926: ‘H.M. Government is bent on frightening the ‘Iraq Government into signing the Treaty with its eyes shut. Strange phantoms, colonization, Kurdistan, Goyan, decentralization, the loss of oil, etc., have arisen out of the welter of politics.’ The paper was immediately suppressed.

³ *Report of the Financial Mission Appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to enquire into the Financial Position and Prospects of the Government of ‘Iraq* (Confidential). (Baghdad, 1925.)

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11th, 1926, and signed by the King, January 13th, thus contained in addition to Articles fulfilling the conditions laid down by the League, the following Article:

At the time when the Treaty of October 10th, 1922, would have expired under the Protocol of April 30th, 1923, and at subsequent successive intervals of four years until the expiry of the period of twenty-five years, or until the admission of 'Iraq into the League of Nations, His Britannic Majesty undertakes that he will take into active consideration the following two questions, namely:

- (1) The question whether it is possible for him to press for the admission of 'Iraq into the League of Nations;
- (2) If it is not possible, the question of the amendment, on account of the progress made by the Kingdom of 'Iraq or for any other reason, of the agreements referred to in Article XVIII of the Treaty of October 10th, 1922 (Article III).¹

The Chamber of Deputies ratified the Treaty, January 18th, 1926, but not without protest from the Opposition who, numbering nineteen and headed by Yāsīn Pasha, not only refused to vote but withdrew in a body from the Chamber.²

The Treaty of 1927

In the spring of 1927, examination of the two questions contained in Article III, cited above, was begun by H.B.M. Government. In a dispatch in the early summer of 1927, minutely covering in its thirty-five pages the arguments for and against the admission of 'Iraq to the League of Nations, the High Commissioner seemed to favour the view that 'Iraq, provided it gave certain guarantees, could be proposed for membership in 1928. H.B.M. Government, however, con-

¹ Treaty Series No. 10 (1926), Cmd. 2662.

² Of the 88 deputies, 58 voted for the Treaty, 9, including 3 of the Opposition, were absent, while 19 walked out. One seat was vacant and one was held by the President who did not vote.

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cluded in July that they could not recommend ‘Iraq for membership in 1928, giving as their reason that the necessary formalities could not be arranged in time. The High Commissioner was authorized, nevertheless, to announce that the question of ‘Iraq’s admission would be taken up again in 1932 ‘provided that all went well in the interval and that the present rate of progress in ‘Iraq was maintained’.¹ In the meantime, negotiations would be continued for a new Treaty, incorporating the promised amendments to the Financial and Military Agreements.

Disappointment in ‘Iraq at the declaration took the form of agitation for sweeping concessions in the new Treaty. *Al-‘Iraq*, in its list of concessions, demanded:

1. The Announcement of absolute and complete independence.
2. Immediate negotiations for the entry of ‘Iraq into the League of Nations.
3. Complete control by ‘Iraq over every aspect of its Government, especially Finance. British help should be restricted to technical matters.
4. All capital works to be turned over to ‘Iraq, at a valuation fixed by the Council of Ministers, with interest at three per cent.
5. ‘Iraq should not pay for the expenses of the High Commissioner.
6. No exemption from custom dues on materials for the British forces in ‘Iraq.²

In the negotiations in London, which King Faisal with Ja‘far Pasha as Prime Minister had undertaken to conduct personally, His Majesty found himself opposed in every demand by the High Commissioner. The latter, in an *Aide Mémoire*, presented to King Faisal before the negotiations began,

¹ The High Commissioner protested against the inclusion of these words as likely to give offence and cause exasperation.

² *Al-‘Iraq*, July 28th, 1927: also *Al-Istiqlāl*, July 27th and 28th, and by *As-Zamān*, July 29th, 1927.

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pointed to official deficiencies and to the King's own shortcomings as indicative that further concessions to 'Iraq's independence were not justified. He also convinced H.B.M. Government that King Faisal and his Ministers alone desired treaty revision, citing in support of his statement the quiescence of the very newspapers which at one time had been foremost in demanding independence.¹

As a result, the Treaty, signed in London, December 14th,² made little practical advance on the previous treaties. It did, however, formally recognize in the preamble the need for the revision of the Military and Financial Agreements 'no longer appropriate in view of the altered circumstances and of the progress made by the Kingdom of 'Iraq.'³ It reiterated in Article VIII the promise already given in July:

Provided the present rate of progress in 'Iraq is maintained and all goes well in the interval, His Britannic Majesty will support the candidature of 'Iraq for admission to the League of Nations in 1932.

The new Treaty found little favour in 'Iraq. The resignation of two ministers, Yāsīn Pasha and Rashīd 'Alī al-Gailānī, soon after its publication, December 20th,⁴ was followed by that of the Prime Minister, January 7th. On the condition that the Chamber be dissolved, 'Abdul Muhsin Beg as-Sa'dūn undertook on January 19th, to form a new Ministry pledged to pass the Treaty and the revised Agreements. When, however, negotiations on the Agreements were resumed, a deadlock was reached. The High Commissioner would not accept the 'Iraq

¹ The sudden and abrupt change in tone of the vernacular Press about this time is inexplicable, particularly in view of the enthusiastic welcome to King Faisal, unprecedented in the history of Baghdad, on his return from negotiating the Treaty. In 'Iraqī circles the change has been attributed to the distribution of sterling subsidies.

² *Acts. and Papers*, 1927 (Cmd. 2998), xxvi, 229.

³ The Treaty had been signed with the understanding that it would not be ratified until these Agreements had been revised.

⁴ *Al-'Iraq*, December 20th, 1927.

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proposals,¹ put forward on October 15th by the Cabinet Committee composed of the Ministers of Finance, Defence and Education. The British counter-proposals made in early December did not satisfy the ‘Iraqis. When the High Commissioner indicated that H.B.M. Government had said its last word, ‘Abdul Muhsin Beg sent his resignation to the King, January 20th, 1929, stating that he considered his honour pledged to that course. On the same day the *Taqaddam* Party met and, approving of their president’s action, agreed to support no Prime Minister pledged to accept the Treaty. Although King Faisal approached the High Commissioner the following day, January 21st, pointing out that unless concessions could be made no Government could be found to take office, the High Commissioner was unperturbed. He declared that the British proposals were final.

So violently opposed was public opinion to the Treaty and the Agreements, that no Prime Minister could be persuaded to take office until more than three months had elapsed. On April 28th, Taufiq Beg as-Sūwaidi undertook to form a Ministry, on the understanding that his programme would not include the Treaty or Agreements.² In the meantime, Sir Gilbert Clayton had arrived as High Commissioner in Baghdad, March 3rd, Sir Henry Dobbs having left Baghdad, February 3rd, on his retirement from service.

The Declaration of September 14th, 1929

The advent of the second Labour Government facilitated a change in British policy towards ‘Iraq no less than towards Egypt, exemplified in the announcement of a new Anglo-

¹ Among these were: 1. Immediate assumption by ‘Iraq of internal and external defence; 2. British control of the army to be relinquished; 3. Amendments to the Articles concerning the command of mixed British and ‘Iraq forces; 4. Immunities and freedom from customs dues now enjoyed by the forces of H.M. Government in ‘Iraq to be abolished.

² Cf. *Report . . . on Administration of ‘Iraq, 1929* (Colonial No. 55, 1930), p. 11.

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Egyptian Treaty, August 3rd, 1929.¹ King Faisal, hopeful of a change in policy, indicated in early June his wish for a more aggressively National Cabinet in order to take advantage of the situation. 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, when asked to take office, demurred. He declared that he had resigned in January because of the British attitude; in the meantime the country had given every indication that it would be satisfied with nothing less than complete independence. 'Only on condition that the unyielding attitude with which Great Britain had confronted him during his last term of office be softened',² would he consent to form a Ministry.

The new High Commissioner, whose sympathy with and understanding of Arab Nationalism had won Arab esteem and friendship during the war and afterwards in Damascus, had already urged, in presenting the 'Iraqi point of view, that H.B.M. Government make a declaration which would at least partially satisfy 'Iraqi aspirations.³ His sudden death on September 11th in Baghdad, where he was sincerely mourned, had dashed 'Iraqi hopes.⁴ On September 14th, however, the Acting High Commissioner, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham,⁵ was instructed by H.B.M. Government to inform King Faisal:

- (a) That the British Government were prepared to support 'Iraq's candidature for admission to the League of Nations in 1932.
- (b) That the British Government would at the next Session of the League of Nations inform the Council that they had decided not to proceed with the Treaty of 1927.

¹ *Accts. and Papers, 1929-30* (Cmd. 3376), 85.

² *Cited Termination of Mandatory Regime in 'Iraq*, p. 13.

³ *Memorandum on Policy in 'Iraq*, by Secretary of State for Colonies: *Accts. and Papers, 1929-30* (Cmd. 3440), xxiii, 199.

⁴ *Al-'Alam al-'Arabi*, September 19th, 1929.

⁵ Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the Air Officer Commanding in 'Iraq, acted as High Commissioner until the arrival of Major H. W. Young, September 30th. Major Young served temporarily as High Commissioner until the arrival, December 10th, of Sir Francis H. Humphrys, who had been appointed High Commissioner on October 7th, following his outstanding services as H.M. representative in Kabûl.

- (c) That the British Government would also at the same time inform the Council of the League of Nations that they proposed in 1932 to recommend ‘Iraq for admission to the League of Nations.¹

The King was also informed that the British Government hoped before 1932 to conclude with the ‘Iraq Government a treaty based generally on the recent proposals for an Anglo-Egyptian settlement. This treaty would regulate ‘the relations of Great Britain with ‘Iraq after the admission of ‘Iraq into the League.

Published on September 19th, the declaration evoked comments from the Baghdad Press, varying from a warm welcome to incredulity.² The Arabic Press united, however, in demanding that the treaty which was to govern Anglo-‘Iraq relations should not be left until 1932 but should be put into operation immediately.³ In a speech, September 19th, when he became Prime Minister, ‘Abdul Muhsin Beg expressed the general viewpoint when he said, in part:

My colleagues and I have carefully considered the offer embodied in the recent reply received from the British Government. We are now convinced that their new offer satisfies part of the aspirations of the ‘Iraqi nation, which will accept in the long run nothing short of complete independence. In view of this conviction, we have responded to the call of the King, and have accepted, with complete satisfaction, His Majesty’s invitation to us to take over the reins of government. We have also undertaken to do all that lies within our power to guide the ship of the State to the sublime goal aimed at by our national aspirations under the auspices of His Majesty’s Throne, for the preservation of which we would all be willing to sacrifice our lives.⁴

¹ *Al-‘Iraq*, September 19th, 1929.

² Cf. *Al-‘Alam al-‘Arabi*; *Al-‘Iraq*; *Nidd’ ash-Sha’b*; *As-Saut al-‘Iraq*; *Baghdad Times*, September 19th, 1929.

³ *Al-‘Alam al-‘Arabi*; *Nidd’ ash-Sha’b*; *Al-‘Iraq*; *As-Saut-ul-‘Iraq*, on December 19th and in subsequent issues.

⁴ Cited *Admin. Report*, 1929, p. 15.

TERMINATION OF THE MANDATE

The Treaty, for which negotiations began on April 1st,¹ was approved by the Council of Ministers on June 28th and signed on June 30th by the High Commissioner and Nūrī Pasha as-Sa'īd, Minister of Foreign Affairs.² Previously they had initialled a new Judicial Agreement³ and an Annexure to the Treaty.

The new Treaty provided for 'a full and frank consultation in all matters of foreign policy' which might affect their common interests, each undertaking not to adopt a policy inconsistent with the alliance or which might create difficulties for the other party (Article 1).

In disputes between 'Iraq and a third State, the Contracting Parties were to concert together for a peaceful settlement (Article 3), but in the event of war,⁴ each of them was to come to the other's assistance. The aid of H.M. the King of 'Iraq would 'consist in furnishing to His Britannic Majesty on 'Iraq territory all facilities and assistance . . . including the use of railways, rivers, ports, aerodromes and means of communication' (Article 4). Air bases were to be leased to His Britannic Majesty on the terms set forth in the Annexure (Article 5). All responsibilities previously assumed by his Britannic Majesty in respect of 'Iraq were to devolve upon His Majesty the King of 'Iraq (Article 8). The Treaty was to come into force only when 'Iraq entered the League of Nations and was to continue for a period of twenty-five years from the date of her admission to membership.

The substance of the new relationship was, as in the previous treaties, contained in the subsidiary documents.⁵ The Annexure regulated the leasing of the air bases and continued the 'immu-

¹ *Communiqué, Al-'Iraq and Baghdad Times*, April 5th and 8th, 1920.

² *Acts. and Papers*, 1929-30 (Cmd 3627) xxxi, 649.

³ Signed, Baghdad, March 4th, 1929.

⁴ Subject to the provisions of Article 9: 'Nothing in the present Treaty is intended to or shall in any way prejudice the rights and obligations which devolve, or may devolve, upon either of the High Contracting Parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris on the twenty-seventh day of August, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-eight'.

⁵ Cmd. 3627.

nities and privileges in jurisdictional and fiscal matters, including freedom from taxation, enjoyed by the British forces in ‘Iraq’. It provided for the continuance of military assistance to ‘Iraq¹ and gave His Britannic Majesty the right to move troops and supplies by all possible means across ‘Iraq.

The first of the Notes signed and exchanged on the same day, June 30th, assured to the representatives of His Britannic Majesty precedence over representatives of other Powers at the Court of His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq. Great Britain’s privileged diplomatic position in ‘Iraq was thereby maintained. The second Note provided for a separate Financial Agreement,² while the third stipulated that ‘Iraq should normally engage British subjects for posts requiring foreign officials. The fourth Note stated the intention of the ‘Iraq Government to ask for a ‘British Advisory Military Mission . . . the conditions of service of which shall be similar to those of the existing Military Mission’.

The Judicial Agreement abolished the special judicial regime established in favour of certain foreigners under the Judicial Agreement of 1924, but guaranteed the employment of British legal experts in important specified posts.

Widespread opposition greeted the publication of the terms of the Treaty. *Al-‘Iraq* alone had a good word for it.³ *Al-Bilād* declared:

The new Treaty is only fresh proof that the British Government has no sympathy with the struggling ‘Iraqīs. It is a black spot in the history of the national struggle of this dominated country. The clauses of the Treaty are fetters mercilessly placed around the neck of the ‘Iraqīs, to condemn them to servitude for a quarter of a century longer.⁴

Al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī maintained: ‘This is not the time to rejoice when there are still several ‘Iraqī claims in collision with the British rock of obduracy and parsimony.’⁵ *As-Saut al-‘Iraq*

¹ The text is practically identical with Article II of the Military Agreement of 1924, cf. Cmd. 2120.

² Signed August 19th, 1930.

³ *Al-‘Iraq*, July 22nd, 1930.

⁴ *Al-Bilād*, July 22nd, 1930.

⁵ *Al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī*, cited *Baghdad Times*, July 3rd, 1930.

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declared that the Treaty made no advance over the former treaties.¹ Objection was also taken to the fact that the Treaty became operative only on the entrance of 'Iraq into the League.²

The Press continued to fulminate against the Treaty³ but little difficulty attended its ratification and that of the new Agreements by Parliament. The Chamber of Deputies, newly elected with the special purpose in view, ratified the documents on November 16th by a vote of 69 to 12. The Senate, less compliant, passed them by a vote of 11 to 5.

In preparation for the anticipated termination of the Mandate in 1932, the progressive transfer of administration into the hands of 'Iraqis was initiated in late 1929 and early 1930, a period which in reality marked the actual transition of power from British to 'Iraqī officials rather than that following the legal termination of the Mandate in October, 1932. The transfer continued from 1920 to 1932, although the necessity frequently arose for the High Commissioner to apply a restraining hand on the inclination of 'Iraqī officials to disregard British advice, which the 'Iraq Government was still under obligation to accept, and to cancel the contracts of British officials without adequate warning or explanation.

The League of Nations, following the receipt, on November 4th, of the British Government's communication stating its intention to recommend unconditionally the admission of 'Iraq as a member of the League in 1932, had begun consideration of the conditions under which the Mandate might be terminated.⁴ The League evinced considerable doubt as to

¹ *As-Saut al-'Iraq*, July 2nd, 1930.

² *An-Nahdha* and *Al-'Ālam al-'Arabī*, cited *Baghdad Times*, July 3rd, 1930.

³ *Az-Zamān* was suppressed, October 27th, 1930, for suggesting that the Treaty might lead to the independence of 'Iraq in the same manner as the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 and the Treaty of Sèvres had led to the independence of Persia and Turkey respectively. See also *Al-'Akhbār*, November 11th, 16th, 1931; *Al-Istiqlāl*, November 16th, December 15th, 1931; *Al-Ikhā' al-Watani*, December 7th, 1931.

⁴ *Official Journal*, February, 1930, pp. 74 ff; February, 1921, pp. 453 ff; November, 1931; March, 1932; July, 1932. *Permanent Mandates Commission Minutes*: Twentieth and Twenty-first Sessions.

‘Iraq’s administrative, political and social progress, as well as concern for the future of minorities in ‘Iraq.¹ H.B.M. Government, however, steadfastly championed the cause of ‘Iraq, foreseeing that if the League for any reason whatever refused to terminate the Mandate, Great Britain would be faced with a rebellious ‘Iraq, alleging duplicity and bad faith. At the twentieth session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, the High Commissioner, Sir Francis Humphrys, was authorized to declare:

His Majesty’s Government fully realizes its responsibility in recommending that ‘Iraq should be admitted to the League, which is, in its view, the only legal way of terminating the Mandate. Should ‘Iraq prove herself unworthy of the confidence which has been placed in her, the moral responsibility must rest with His Majesty’s Government. . . .²

This statement had a profound effect on the conclusion reached by the Commission. In its Report it stated:

Had it not been for this declaration the Commission would, for its part, have been unable to contemplate the termination of a regime which appeared some years ago to be necessary in the interests of all sections of the community.³

The Council, on January 28th, 1932, agreed to the admission of ‘Iraq provided that she gave a Declaration guaranteeing minority rights, administration of justice, international law and other safeguards.⁴ On May 30th, 1932, ‘Iraq signed the desired Declaration.⁵ On October 3rd, by admission to membership of the League,⁶ ‘Iraq took her place among the community of nations.

¹ *P.M.C. Minutes*, xx, pp. 115-16, 123, 130, 133-5, 140, 202.

² *Ibid.*, June 19th, 1931, p. 134.

³ *Official Journal*, March, 1932: Special Report of the Commission to the Council on the Proposal of the British Government with regard to the emancipation of ‘Iraq.

⁴ For text of draft Declaration: *Official Journal*, July, 1932, pp. 1342 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, September, 1932, p. 1552.

⁶ *Ibid.*, November, 1932, p. 1923.

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WITHIN the period between the ratification by the Constituent Assembly of the Treaty of 1922, the subsidiary Agreements, the Constitution and the Electoral Law and the entrance of 'Iraq into the League of Nations, October 3rd, 1932, two major problems faced 'Iraq. On the one hand lay the application of the documents implying the progressive development of the political and social institutions outlined in them. On the other, was the termination of the Mandate which, in spite of its partial dependence on the successful solution of the first problem, continued to be demanded by the majority of 'Iraqis on the basis of right rather than of capacity.

The process by which the Instruments of Policy and of Government for 'Iraq were formalized through the Treaties and other documents have been traced in some detail. It is not necessary here to indicate in such minuteness the various steps by which 'Iraq developed under these measures to the stage which satisfied the League of Nations that the Mandate could be successfully terminated. The evidence of 'Iraq's readiness for admission to the League as presented by the Mandatary to the Permanent Mandates Commission, and accepted by it, not altogether willingly,¹ is available in various official Reports.² It is pertinent here rather to summarize the developments in the light of their relation to the principles laid down in the Constitution and to indicate, in addition, the social conditions

¹ *Permanent Mandates Commission Minutes*, xx, pp. 113 ff.

² *Report by His Majesty's Government . . . to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of 'Iraq*, October, 1920, to March, 1922; April, 1922, to March, 1923 (Colonial No. 4); April, 1923, to December, 1924 (C. No. 13); 1925 (C. No. 21); 1926 (C. No. 29); 1927 (C. No. 35); 1928 (C. No. 44); 1929 (C. No. 55); 1930 (C. No. 62); 1931 (C. No. 74); 1932 (Foreign Office); and particularly *Progress of 'Iraq* (C. No. 58).

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and the civic spirit in which the political institutions and the departments of State have evolved from 1925 to 1932. The Permanent Mandates Commission itself had been inclined to consider that these considerations were in reality far more indicative of ‘Iraq’s fitness for emancipation than the mere possession of the machinery of a modern State.’

The Crown

On the promulgation of the Constitution, King Faisal, in accordance with his declaration to the High Commissioner, September 10th,² privately announced his withdrawal from direct participation in the affairs of State. Although this self-denying ordinance was received with some scepticism in ministerial circles, the King did refrain for a period of time from his former active intervention in administrative affairs. As time passed, however, and acting on the advice of the British authorities, including that given by the Secretary of State for the Colonies,³ King Faisal not only resumed his place as the actual executive of the State but even exceeded the powers explicitly assigned him by the Constitution. His natural tendency was not uninfluenced by the fact that, as the point of balance between Great Britain and his own people, he had every encouragement to concentrate power within himself. To him the High Commissioner looked for the assurance that the Treaty would be observed. Through him British control was to be exercised over the Council of Ministers, over Parliament and the conduct of administration. The necessity of strengthening the King’s hands to enable the High Commissioner to achieve these ends had been recognized from the first by the British drafters of the Constitution.⁴ Wide powers had been assured to the King by the provisions in the Constitution, in spite of the

¹ *Official Journal*, League of Nations, November, 1931, pp. 2056 ff.

² *Supra*, p. 361.

³ Dobbs, H. R. C., in Bell, *Letters*, p. 554.

⁴ *Supra*, Ch. xix.

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insistence of the 'Iraqī ministers that the original proposals be altered. In addition, in the practical application of the powers so assured him, it seems clear that the responsible British officials in 'Iraq, in their privileged position as guardians of the Constitution, not only acquiesced in but also encouraged the King to exercise his personal influence and prerogative beyond a strict interpretation of the Constitution in order that their own control might be made more complete. No clearer example of such action exists than the resignation of Nāji Pasha as-Sūwaidī in March, 1930, at the instigation of the Residency, due to the fact that his policy aimed at achieving 'complete independence' before 1932.

On the other hand, King Faisal himself, under the sustained stimulus of his own desire and that of the Nationalists for complete independence, made every effort to concentrate as much personal power as possible in his own hands. It need not be imputed that he sought power for its own sake. He desired it both because it would enable him to meet the responsibilities and obligations thrust upon him by the Treaties and also because it would place him in a stronger position to win concessions from Great Britain, thus bringing 'Iraq nearer to the goal of independence. By the concentration of power in his own hands he believed that he could command the support of the various sections and groups in 'Iraq which, by their quarrels and animosities, would otherwise mar 'Iraq's prospects for national development and ultimate independence. He was only too well aware of the slight foundation of public support on which his early authority had rested. It seems to have been his plan to identify himself with the nation's needs as far as his British Advisers would permit; to be sovereign in fact as well as in name; and to lead the country to prosperity and to independent Statehood. In the fulfilment of these objectives there can be no doubt that King Faisal made many mistakes, particularly in placing his confidence in Nationalist groups whose ambitions for 'Iraq were possibly less impersonal than

his own. Nevertheless, it is also true that had he not so identified himself with their programmes, he would not have won the esteem and regard of his subjects so markedly shown on his death.

In no field was King Faisal's assumption of power more evident than in the circumstances attending the formation and the fall of the Ministries. In spite of Article 66 of the Constitution which, contrary to the wishes of the King at the time of drafting, had made the Ministers collectively and individually responsible to the Chamber,¹ not one of the fifteen Ministries during his reign, 1921-33, owed its downfall to a direct vote of no confidence by the Chamber.² In almost every instance, the resignation of the Cabinet was due either to the direct wish of the King or to the belief that it no longer possessed His Majesty's confidence. Thus, in early April, 1922, the reorganization of the Naqib's Cabinet was occasioned by the King's dislike of four Ministers and his determination to remove them from office. The fall of the Naqib's second Cabinet, August 14th, 1922, was due to resentment on the part of the Ministers at the King's interference and his obvious desire for its resignation.³ The retirement from office of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg as-Sa'dūn, November 16th, 1923, was in large measure the result of His Majesty's objection to the strong line adopted by the Council, particularly against the 'Ulamā in June of that year.⁴ The King's desire for a more aggressive Cabinet was known to be directly responsible for the resignation of Taufiq Beg as-Sūwaidī, August 25th, 1929.⁵ Nūrī Pasha's resignation, October 24th, 1932, although attributed to a number of causes, was in reality due to the King's wish for a change of Ministers, if not to more personal reasons.

¹ It may be argued with reason that this article did not make the ministers exclusively responsible to the Chamber.

² 'Abdul Muhsin Beg resigned, however, November 1st, 1926, when the Chamber elected its President from the Opposition, as the result of a temporary defection of the Kurdish section of the *Taqāddam* or Government Party. Yāsīn Pasha has given as the reason for his resignation, June 26th, 1925, that he felt he could not command the confidence of Parliament.

³ *Supra*, p. 357

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 392-3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 412

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Every Prime Minister in forming a Cabinet was faced with the necessity of choosing Ministers compliant not only with the High Commissioner's requirement that they 'deal sensibly with relations between Great Britain and 'Iraq' but also with His Majesty's personal wishes, likes and dislikes. It was generally recognized that Ja'far Pasha's first Cabinet, November 3rd, 1923, was composed of members in sympathy with the King's ideas and pledged to pass the Treaty of 1922. In January, 1928, 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, who had been suggested by the High Commissioner as the only available Minister capable of bringing about the ratification of the Treaty of 1927, formed his Cabinet with great difficulty owing to the King's secret opposition to a strong Ministry for reasons connected with the Treaty.

In the Parliamentary elections, the King, not uninfluenced by lessons learned from the intractability of the Constituent Assembly, likewise exerted his influence. He insisted in some cases, as in the elections of 1925, on the addition to the list of official candidates the names of men he particularly desired to see in the Chamber, and on the deletion of others which were not acceptable to him personally.

In the second elections, during the spring of 1928, his interference took a curious form. 'Abdul Muhsin Beg had come to office, pledged to secure ratification of the Treaty of 1927, on the condition that the Chamber be dissolved, a step approved by the High Commissioner, as the Opposition in the Chamber had been steadily growing. The Prime Minister's suggestion that the usual confidential letters be sent to the *Mutasarrifs* to ensure the return of deputies favourable to the Treaty, was opposed by the King. By permitting free elections, His Majesty hoped to bring an anti-Treaty Chamber into opposition with the Cabinet to prove to H.B.M. Government that, contrary to the High Commissioner's contention in late 1927,¹ the Treaty and the new Agreements were unacceptable to the people of 'Iraq.

In the parliamentary elections of 1930, the King, seeking a

¹ *Supra*, pp. 410-411.

new Chamber which would not only ratify the new Treaty of 1930 without raising difficulties, but which would also contain Cabinet material on which he could ring Ministerial changes as he thought necessary, made his personal approval obligatory before candidates received government support.

In the conduct of general administration, however, the intervention of the King was as a rule well directed and in the interests of the country as a whole. To him has been ascribed the initiation of the Capital Development Works scheme,¹ whereby revenue from oil-concessions was earmarked for definite projects to facilitate the development of the country.² To him has been given the credit for the plans to settle the tribes on the land, and the development of residential amenities about Baghdad. In administrative appointments, his early inclination to find employment for those who had served him in western Arabia was never entirely overcome, but in general, as a result of his influence, more suitable appointments were made and without regard for religious distinctions. His broad outlook and his consideration for each community in proportion to its contribution to the welfare of ‘Iraq enabled him to take a wider view of affairs than many of his Ministers and the majority of his subjects. It is a fact that although ‘Iraqis universally proclaimed their familiarity with democratic institutions from the time of the Ottoman regime, and boldly asserted their competence to run them, conditions in ‘Iraq were far from ideal for the introduction of such institutions. No adequate class existed from which responsible and public-spirited officials could be drawn, nor was there a substantial body of literate and informed citizens with which to work the democratic institutions as provided in the Constitution.

An even greater obstacle was the lack of social consciousness

¹ By the Prime Minister, Nūrī Pasha, in a speech to the Chamber, May 31st, 1931.

² Cf. publication by the Department of Public Works, ‘Iraq: *Budget Estimates for the Years 1930 and 1931 and Capital Development Works Budget for 5 Years 1931-35.*

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embracing the State. Not yet had a sense of loyalty and duty to the nation arisen to surmount the differences between tribesmen and townsmen, between Sunnī and Shī'ī, and between Muslims and minority communities or to replace personal opportunism. Patriotism still denoted independence without obligations to the State.

In his impatience with these materials at hand for the creation of the new State, King Faisal may have gone farther than he was justified in attempting to mould the political institutions to his own will. On the other hand, it seems possible that had he not assumed the role of a benevolent despot, the political system of 'Iraq might have faltered and even collapsed entirely and the stable government insisted upon by the League of Nations as one of its criteria of 'Iraq's readiness for independence¹ would have been absent in 1932. It is equally probable that without King Faisal's guiding influence, supported by Great Britain, the 'Iraqī people in their impatience would have refused to agree to the obligations imposed by Great Britain as the price of her assistance. In the latter circumstance, Great Britain would have been forced to resume direct control or to withdraw from 'Iraq. Either course would undoubtedly have retarded for many years the entrance of 'Iraq into the League of Nations and her acceptance as a member of the international community.

Upon the accession of King Ghāzī I, September 9th, 1933, the young King, barely turned twenty-one and not less of a Nationalist nor less mindful of his position than his father, attempted to use the immense popularity he had acquired as the result of his openly displayed approval of the campaign against the Assyrians,² to exert the power of the crown and to take the reins of control into his own hands, after the example of his late father. The Prime Minister, Rashīd 'Alī al Gailānī, although

¹ *Official Journal*, November, 1931, pp. 2057 ff.

² *The Times*, September 1st, 11th, 1933. 'Iraqī-Assyrian relations are held to be outside the scope of this study. See *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934 (1935), pp. 135 ff.

requested to remain in office at the death of King Faisal, was speedily convinced by conversations with King Ghāzī that he did not enjoy His Majesty's confidence.¹ His resignation, tendered October 28th, was immediately accepted to the great surprise of political circles. It was apparent that the young monarch desired not only a Cabinet amenable to his wishes but also a Parliament of his own creation. He was persuaded, however, by his British and 'Iraqī advisers against this course. Parliament was not dissolved and the new ministry, although headed by Jamil Beg Midfai, was less Nationalist in tinge than he had desired.

On the whole, during the reign of King Ghāzī the personal power and influence of the Crown has tended to be less than under the former regime. His Majesty's youth, his inexperience and lack of training in statecraft have made it natural that he should be forced to give more scope than his father to the men about him, in his Palace and in the Cabinet, and to rely upon their advice and that of His Britannic Majesty's representatives at his Court. Thus few if any of the seven ministerial crises of the reign seem directly traceable to His Majesty's influence but have been due rather to discord within the Cabinets, as when Jamil Beg Midfai resigned, February 13th, 1934, to lack of confidence to meet emergencies, as at the time of the tribal revolts in March, 1935,² or to military intervention as in the *coup d'état* of October 29th, 1936.

On this last occasion, General Baqir Sidqī,³ in charge of army manœuvres to the north-east of Baghdad, suddenly moved the troops with the Air Force on the capital. In manifestoes dropped from the air, he demanded in the name of the army the dismissal of the Yāsīn Pasha ministry, with which 'the army had lost patience' and the appointment of one 'composed of

¹ See translation of Rashīd 'Alī's letter of resignation, *The Times*, October 30th, 1933.

² *The Times*, March 17th, 1935.

³ Baqir Sidqī led the 'Iraqi forces against the Assyrians in 1933, when he won great popularity and promotion. His campaigns in 1935 against the tribes added to his reputation for military ability and ruthlessness.

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sincere citizens' under Hikmat Sulaimān.¹ Warning was given that the army might have to take action against those who did not conform to the manifestoes.² After the bombardment of Baghdad by the 'Iraqī Air Force and an attempt to negotiate during which Ja'far Pasha al-'Askarī, Minister of Defence, was treacherously murdered, Yāsīn Pasha resigned. Hikmat Sulaimān took office with friends and nominees of Baqir Sidqī, few of them outstanding personalities.³

The various reasons put forward by the new government for the *coup d'état*, which seems to have come without warning to British and 'Iraqis alike, are not altogether convincing.⁴ It is true that Yāsīn Pasha had suppressed newspapers, had heavily bribed the tribal leaders to keep the peace, had curbed opposition, had appointed friends to office and that his personal attitude as Prime Minister had offended many 'Iraqis. It is also true that a general feeling existed that 'Iraq had made little progress under his Government. These unsatisfactory conditions could have been ameliorated, however, by constitutional means. As justifications for military intervention they assume the appearance of pretexts rather than explanations. Facts not mentioned in the official statements, as that army appropriations had been reduced, that the organization of the army was not proceeding according to the ideas of General Sidqī and that many aspiring politicians were out of office, seem to come closer to the causes behind the *coup d'état*⁵ and would make it appear

¹ Formerly Minister of Interior in 1933 at the time of the campaign against the Assyrians. Educated in Turkey, he possesses great admiration for Turkey. His brother, Māhmūd Shefket Pasha, was Grand Vizier of Turkey in 1913.

² *The Times*, October 31st, 1936. Also *Al-Ahrām* (Cairo), same date.

³ *Waḡayī al-'Iraqiyya* (Government Gazette), No. 1542, October 29th, 1936. In addition to Hikmat Sulaimān as Prime Minister and Minister of Interior were: Nāji al-'Asīl, Foreign Affairs; Ja'far abū Timman, Finance; Kāmil al Chādarchī, Economics; Abdul Latīf Nūrī, Defence; Sālih Jābbur, Justice; Yūsuf 'Izz-ad-Dīn Ibrāhīm, Education.

⁴ *The Times*, October 31st, November 2nd, 5th and 7th, 1936; *Al-Balāgh* (Cairo), November 2nd, 6th, 1936; *Al-Ahrām*, November 1st, 1936.

⁵ The *coup d'état* has also been ascribed to the influence of Germany and Italy, of extreme 'Iraqī Nationalists, of Shī'is, of the Jews, and of Socialists by the *Daily Herald*, *Al-Balāgh*, *Palestine Post*, *Al-Liwa*, *Alif-Bā* (Damascus), and the *Daily Mail*, respectively, November 1st to 6th, 1936.

that personal ambition of the leaders had no small part in the events of October 29th and afterwards.

At one time it was suspected that King Ghāzī might have been cognizant of the plot, his impatience at the limitations placed on his power being well-known.¹ His assurances to the contrary appeared to be sincere, particularly in the light of subsequent events. Indeed, Baqir Sidqī and Hikmat Sulaimān, supported by the armed forces, may be regarded as possessing sole power in ‘Iraq to-day despite published statements that General Sidqī would concern himself solely with the re-organization of the army, that the Government would work with a freely elected Parliament and that the rights of all section of the people would be respected.

Council of Ministers

Among the principal factors which have adversely affected the position and the functioning of the Council of State may be listed its susceptibility to outside influence, its instability, not altogether unrelated as has already been indicated, and the lack of a sufficiently large class of ‘Iraqis of Cabinet rank.

In the period from August, 1921, to October, 1932, the average life of the fourteen Cabinets was less than ten months each. Four Ministries, the second of the Naqīb, that of Taufiq Beg, the fourth of ‘Abdul Muhsin Beg and that of Nāji Pasha, lasted less than four months each. Nūrī Pasha’s first Cabinet, by remaining in office from March 23rd, 1930,² to October 19th 1931, had the longest existence although its tenure was not undisturbed by internal dissensions. Such instability, due largely to the King’s influence, to the conflict of British and

¹ *Al-Ayyām* (Damascus), November 3rd, 1936, cites Baqir Sidqī, however, as saying: ‘In no way have I proceeded in any action against the will of H.M. the King and of the Supreme Power.’

² *Waḡayyī’ al-‘Iraqiyya* (Government Gazette), No. 844, March 27th, 1930.

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'Iraqī viewpoints¹ and, in two cases, to alleged lack of confidence by Parliament² had unfortunate consequences. On the one hand, the smooth course of administration was interrupted by the change of administrative officials which usually accompanied the change of Ministry, and by the dislike of subordinate officials of assuming responsibility and initiative, never more evident than in the absence of a Minister. The fact that the dislocation was not greater may be attributed to the presence of British Advisers in the Ministries and in the key positions. On the other hand, public regard for the Council of Ministers was undoubtedly weakened and opportunities for a strong man to achieve dictatorial power were increased.

The twenty-one Cabinets between 1921 and October, 1936, have been repeatedly formed from a group of some two score men. The inability, or reluctance as 'Iraqī critics of the Council maintain, to find a wider selection of men of Cabinet standard has been accentuated by the necessity of incorporating within the Council representatives of the Shī'a sect which, although forming a majority of 'Iraq's population, has been unable even to the present day, to provide experienced officials to the same extent as the Sunnī sect, due to the reluctance of the sect to acquire secular education. Furthermore, the harmony of the Cabinets has not been enhanced by the inclusion of members of the mutually antagonistic sects.

It has been no secret that public opinion, its confidence shaken in the Council and in Parliament, has leaned increasingly towards Turkey and Kemal Atatürk as suitable models for 'Iraq. Many leading 'Iraqīs have expressed admiration openly for Atatürk, several politicians, including Yāsīn Pasha, being credited with personal desires to emulate his role.

The seizure of power by General Baqir Sidqī and Hikmat

¹ Three Ministries resigned rather than abandon the 'Iraqī viewpoint when it came into collision with that of the British Government: the second of Ja'far Pasha, January 7th, 1928; the third of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, January 20th, 1929; and that of Nāji Pasha, March 9th, 1930.

² *Supra*, p. 422, note.

Sulaimān, both ardent Turcophiles,¹ caused less resentment than might have been supposed, in spite of the bombardment of Baghdad, the murder of Ja‘far Pasha and of Dhia Yūnis,² Secretary of the former Council of Ministers, and the expulsions of many ‘Iraqīs held to be capable of raising opposition.

Much favourable sentiment was won by the new Government by its promises issued through the press,³ and for the first time in the history of ‘Iraq, by means of the radio⁴: distribution of land to the tribes and the *jallāhīn* individually, amnesties,⁵ freedom of the press⁶ and of election, and by an all-inclusive programme of administrative reforms ranging from prisons to revenue collection. The promises, however, even if not cast into a twenty-five point programme, have the familiar ring of similar programmes advanced by other Governments to win popular support and to justify the means by which they have come to power.

The goodwill of H.B.M. Government has apparently been won also by assurances of friendship to Great Britain and of loyalty to treaty relations as well as toleration for minorities,⁷ although individual members of the new ‘Iraq government have long been noted for their anti-British and anti-minority views. The new regime seems to have realized as have other ‘Iraqī Governments in the past and as all others must in the future that, whatever the internal political changes, order must be maintained and that commerce, oil-production, and air-routes must not be disturbed.

¹ One of Hikmat Sulaimān’s first official acts was to announce that he would visit Ankara to cement Turco-‘Iraqī friendship and to observe Turkish reforms for possible introduction into ‘Iraq.

² On the same day, January 21st, 1937, that Yāsīn Pasha al-Ḥāshimī died suddenly of heart-failure in Beirūt.

³ *The Times*, November 7th, 1936; *Al-Balāgh*, December 14th, 1936.

⁴ November 5th, 1936, by Hikmat Sulaimān and Ja‘far abū ‘Imman.

⁵ According to the *Palestine Post*, November 11th, 1936, 200 prisoners concerned in the tribal rebellions of 1935 were released.

⁶ *Al-Ayyām*, November 10th, 1936, reported the appearance of six new journals in Baghdad. Four others, however, *At-Tariq*, *Al-Uqāb*, *Al-Istiqlāl*, of Baghdad and *An-Nās*, of Basrah, were suspended later for periods ranging from 12 days to one year for articles in opposition to the new regime.

⁷ See *The Times*, November 3rd, 5th, and 7th, 1936.

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Complete support, however, of the country has yet to be won by the new Government. It must count on the opposition of the exiled 'Iraqis and of the adherents of the late Ja'far Pasha. It must count also on the potential opposition of all 'Iraqis who for motives of self-interest have kept a foot in both camps.¹ Its real test will come, therefore, in its inability to carry out its promises and to meet other problems which face the country: placating the shaikhs at the same time that the land is divided, applying conscription to the tribal areas, bringing Shi'is and Sunnis into harmony and of meeting the rising cost of living.

The Chamber of Deputies

The Chamber of Deputies, although a dignified body meeting regularly since its establishment in 1925 and conducting its deliberations as a rule with sobriety and moderation, has failed to take its full and rightful place in the political life of 'Iraq, as foreshadowed by the provisions of the Constitution. The failure seems directly due to its inability to command public confidence. The wave of scepticism as to the value of parliamentary institutions which recently swept over 'Iraq, in common with other countries with a more substantial democratic tradition, prepared the way for the present military dictatorship. The slow progress of 'Iraq as compared with that of Turkey and Persia under dictatorial regimes was conveniently explained away as being due to the democratic institutions. The critics pointed out that the parliamentary system of 'Iraq was adopted from foreign models and was unsuited to conditions and needs of 'Iraq. They indicated and with more reason that the elections to the Chamber, without exception, have been rigidly controlled by the Government, often under pressure from the Residency as in 1928 and 1930.² In all districts except Baghdad

¹ See Macdonald, A. D., *Euphrates Exile* (1936), pp. 53 ff. for a discussion of this characteristic in 'Iraqis.

² Principally because the Treaties of 1927 and of 1930 were to be ratified by the newly elected Chambers.

where the electoral body is not so amenable to control as elsewhere, the confidential orders of the Government to the provincial officials proved sufficient to secure the election of its candidates whether they were residents of the district or even known there. Thus in 1925, all but four of the government candidates were returned, two of these being from Baghdad *Liwā*.¹ In 1928 the deputies returned from Basra, ‘Amāra, Diyālā, Dulaim, Hilla and ‘Arbil *Liwās* were government nominees.² Of the thirteen Baghdad deputies, all but five were Government candidates. In these two elections, as well as in that of 1930, a number of Opposition candidates were conscientiously included by the Government on the principle advocated by the King that talented members of the Opposition would raise more difficulties outside Parliament from feelings of personal dissatisfaction than if they were actually members. Thus in 1928, half of the twenty-two Opposition members returned to the Chamber had been previously given the government coupon.

The deputies, on the other hand, by their proneness to consider parliamentary office as a means to personal aggrandisement, persistently refused the opportunity to win the respect and confidence of the nation. In 1925, it had been somewhat difficult to secure candidates to come forward. It soon became apparent, however, that deputyship meant an assured income and, even more attractive, the exercise of influence. In ‘Iraq, as in other countries, the principal value attached to official position has been its effectiveness in securing official favours and financial gain.

Examination of the statute books of ‘Iraq, not only from 1925 to 1932 but also to the present date, seems to suggest that the deputies have not failed to make free use of their position. Many of the financial measures granting remission of arrears in

¹ *Baghdad Times*, June 10th, 1925. These four, with five others, were, according to a confidential report of the time, accounted to be ‘unsatisfactory from the British standpoint’.

² Cf. *Baghdad Times*, May 10th, 1928.

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revenue¹ and of other financial legislation,² while passed by the Chamber for the benefit of 'Iraq as a whole, particularly after the agricultural crisis of 1931, have especially favoured the land-owning class which has been predominant in Parliament. Other evidence seems to point to the exercise by the deputies of their influence outside of Parliament, either to secure preferential treatment from revenue officials or to obtain appointments for their protégés.

In spite of these deficiencies, Parliament, judged by its complete record before 1932 as well as afterwards, has filled an important function in the political life of 'Iraq. It has attracted the most agile brains in the country; it has reflected although imperfectly, public opinion; and it has served as a brake on legislation which might otherwise have been forced on the country more quickly than it could be assimilated. It has served to curb the attempts of individual Ministers to assume a dictatorial attitude. Its right of interrogation, while sometimes checking the initiative of Ministers, has also served to reveal irregularities in administration. It has, moreover, furnished an outlet for Shi'a aspirations for participation in the Government and has given tribal opinion a limited means of expression through the tribal representatives, although discontent with the number of tribal representatives and the manner of their election was given by the leaders of the tribal revolt of 1935 as one of the primary reasons for that rising.³

The Chamber, together with the conservative Senate of twenty appointed notables, has, notwithstanding its many deficiencies, laid the foundations upon which democratic government, if it is to come to 'Iraq, must be built. If Parliament were to be given a broader base of an enlightened electorate, a reasonable degree of freedom of election, leadership and new

¹ Particularly Laws: No. 38 of 1927; No. 55 of 1929; Nos. 38, 43, 69 of 1931; Nos. 1, 5, 10, 34, 35 of 1932; Nos. 8, 10, 13, 14 of 1933.

² Particularly Pump Law of February 13th, 1926; No. 72 of 1926; No. 38 of 1929; No. 37 of 1930, No. 66 of 1931, etc.

³ *Near East and India*, June 27th, 1935; also *The Times*, August 5th, 1936.

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blood from the ranks of those who have absorbed with their education a modicum of civil spirit and a sense of duty to the State, it might yet prove to be the vital political institution of ‘Iraq.

Whether these conditions will be attained or whether parliamentary institutions themselves will be retained under the present Government, it is too soon to determine.¹ It is not too much to believe, however, bearing in mind the historical pattern of other dictatorships based on military force, that should the Chamber attempt to take an independent attitude, or should an opposition party arise, the Chamber will have a short life, and that the eventual overthrow of the constitution must follow, together with the loss of such rights and liberties as are now valued by the people of ‘Iraq and the destruction of all those conditions essential for the development and maintenance of democracy.

Administrative Services

A major difficulty which has faced ‘Iraq in the development of her administration has been the lack of a regularly organized Civil Service with regulations governing cadres, appointments, promotions and conditions of service.

Attempts to organize cadres for the various branches of administration, made as early as 1923 when a Cadre Commission was appointed² and renewed from time to time, as in 1926³ and 1928,⁴ have not been productive of a systematic

¹ Freedom of voting and introduction of new blood marked the elections to the new Chamber which convened on February 27th, 1937. It was apparent, however, even before the secondary elections had been held that the candidates, as in all past elections, had been selected so that there would be little or no opposition in the Chamber.

² By a decision of the Council of Ministers, March 5th, 1923: see also *Admin. Report*, 1923-1924, p. 124.

³ *Ibid.*, 1926, p. 70.

⁴ The Cadre Commission was reorganized by the Council, October 6th, 1928. See also *ibid.*, 1928, pp. 66-7.

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organization of the services. The Civil Service Law of 1931,¹ although it attempted to provide detailed regulations for the Civil Service, has not produced adequate and satisfactory results, not even being generally applied before October, 1932. Its comparative lack of success has been due in part to the constant reorganization of departments and in part to the tendency, restrained as far as possible while the British officials were in authority, to provide posts, either by turning out former occupants or by creating new positions, for applicants whose qualifications were too often those of relationship or personal influence rather than those of ability and capacity.

The result has been a general feeling of insecurity among practically all appointed officials, even those who might be expected to occupy permanent posts, a feeling not appreciably altered by the manner in which the State Official Discipline Law of 1929² has been applied. The sense of insecurity, accentuated by dismissals on a large order which have frequently followed Ministerial changes or which have been made in the name of economy as in 1931 or in February 1936, when over 300 officials, many of them highly placed, were dismissed³ has no doubt contributed to the aversion, amounting in individual cases to fear, which most officials have evinced towards the assumption of responsibility and initiative. All executive authority within departments of State tend to be centralized in the offices of the Ministers. This has been due partially to the system of dual control and responsibility between British and 'Iraqi officials and partially to practices inherited from the Ottoman regime. Every official, as a result, has looked to the official above him to assume the initiative and the responsibility for every action which he has performed, fearing to launch any new idea or plan or to risk any departure from routine for fear of censure and dismissal.

¹ *Compilation*, 1931, p. 191: Civil Service Law No. 103 of 1931.

² State Officials Discipline Law No. 41 of 1929 in *Compilation*, 1929, p. 24.

³ *Great Britain and the East*, March 5th, 26th, 1936.

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As a result, officials, even those nominally responsible, have tended to become mere head clerks in their own departments, while Ministers have found themselves overburdened with work. The British Advisers, especially before October, 1932, were able to assist in reducing the burden of the Ministers but elsewhere the administration was retarded in pace and was lowered in quality.

Among officials belonging to minority communities, as the Jews and Christians, the lack of security and the desire to avoid responsibility has been doubly apparent as the result of widespread opposition to the employment of any but ‘Iraqis professing Islam. This opposition was evinced as early as 1921, when Jews and Christians were included in the outcry against the employment of foreigners. Although members of these communities have been employed especially in posts attached to the Financial and Technical departments and have even occupied Ministerial positions,¹ the tendency seems to have been to retard their advancement, as evinced in June, 1936, when promotions of Jewish employees as made by the Director of the ‘Iraq Government Railway were cancelled by order of the Minister,² or to eliminate them as far as possible from Government service, a trend which has been more apparent in recent years.

Finance

In the development of ‘Iraq’s financial system from 1925, three major problems presented themselves: the reorganization of the land-revenue system including its purification from abuses and the development of land-settlement, the equalization of the

¹ Sasūn Effendi Haskail, a Jew, and Yūsuf Ghanīma, a Christian, served repeatedly as Ministers of Finance.

² So vehement was the outcry in the vernacular press over the promotion of the Jewish employees that not only were the promotions cancelled, but disciplinary action had to be taken by the Bureau of Press and Propaganda and an order issued that no promotions should be made without prior sanction of the Minister. See *Great Britain and the East*, July 2nd, 16th, 1936.

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incidence of taxation, and the provision of financial means, not only for the Government's essential services but also for the discharge of the obligations laid on it by the various treaties and by the Financial Agreements.

Judged by its ability to meet this last problem, the financial history of the 'Iraq Government may be regarded as comparatively successful. Budget deficits occurred as in 1921 and 1922 and in the years from 1929 to 1931,¹ but the financial crises, including that of 1930-1 were safely weathered without resort to foreign loans. The accumulated deficits were reduced by the conversion of oil revenue, of which the first instalment was received in August, 1931,² from the Capital Development Works Scheme to which they had been originally assigned. In addition, the 'Iraq Government's share of the Ottoman Public Debt,³ set at a nominal total of L.T.8,358,126,⁴ was practically extinguished by an agreement, October, 1928, by which Ottoman Debt securities to the value of £1,228,000 sterling were

¹ Summary of financial results, 1921-2 to 1931-2, in lacs of rupees:

	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Revenue</i>	<i>Deficit</i>	<i>Surplus</i>
1921-22	572'13	528'25	43'88	—
1922-23	485'82	474'67	11'15	—
1923-24	242'26	509'41	—	85'15
1924-25	464'85	527'33	—	62'48
1925-26	513'38	581'02	—	67'64
1926-27	536'72	567'00	—	30'28
1927-28	569'93	590'97	—	21'04
1928-29	599'93	594'44	4'57	—
1929-30	576'66	574'61	2'05	—
1930-31	464'57	511'58	47'01	—
1931-32	481'74	509'19	17'45	—
	<hr/> 63,88'47	<hr/> 60,68'47	<hr/> 126'11	<hr/> 266'59
		Net Surplus	<hr/> 140'48 <hr/>	

² The 'Iraq Petroleum Company's payments to the 'Iraq Government amounted to £866,814 in 1931-32, and to £524,397 in 1932-33. In 1932-33, the British Oil Development Company's payments amounted to £140,000. Cf. Empson, C: *Economic Conditions in 'Iraq* (Dept. of Overseas Trade, No. 559, 1933).

³ 'Iraq accepted the obligation by the Financial Agreement, Article XVII.

⁴ This sum was set by the Ottoman Public Debt Commission in 1926, under the authority of Article 49 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

handed over to the Debt Commission. The balance of £383,000 sterling was to be spread over a period of seven years.

Examination of the method of balancing the budgets and of meeting the demands of the Ottoman Debt bondholders indicates, however, that the results have been secured by the wholesale reduction of salaries and by the reduction of appropriations to government services which vitally concern the regeneration of ‘Iraq: Irrigation, Agriculture and Public Works. In 1923, salaries of ‘Iraqī officials were reduced by amounts varying from 2½ to 25 per cent on the recommendation of the Economies Committee of 1922.¹ In March, 1926, following recommendations by Mr. Hilton Young,² additional reductions were made, while in November, 1930, following the financial crises arising from the fall in agricultural prices, salaries were further reduced by amounts varying from 5 to 8 per cent.³ The result was that official salaries fell out of proportion to the cost of living; much dissatisfaction was produced, particularly since British officials under contract suffered no such reductions; and encouragement was given to the return to other methods of supplementing salaries which, prevalent under the Ottoman regime, had been severely discouraged by the British Advisers and Administrative Inspectors.

In the assessment and collection of land revenue, progress had been undoubtedly made by early Finance Ministers and their Advisers in removing some of the defects inherent in the Turkish system as adapted by Revenue Officers of the Civil Administration. Nevertheless, in 1925, the primary objectives before the ‘Iraq Government were still those which had faced the Civil Administration in 1919.⁴ These objectives were:

1. To organize the means of revenue collection, as, for example, the elimination of the tax-farmers, and to

¹ *Report of the Economies Committee, 1922* (Confidential), (Baghdad, 1922).

² *Report of Financial Commission, 1925.*

³ Young, Sir E. Hilton, *Reports on Economic Conditions and Loan Policy* (Baghdad, 1930).

⁴ *Supra*, Ch. vi.

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provide adequate methods of auditing and accounting in order to remove as far as possible opportunities for speculation either by officials or private individuals.

2. To set a definite and fixed rate of demand, payable in cash, applicable to each type of land according to whether it was privately or State-owned, and to the method of irrigation employed on it.
3. To devise methods whereby it would be possible to dispense with the actual annual estimates of agricultural yields, a costly and vexatious task, disturbing to the cultivator as well as affording latitude for bribery and corruption.

These objectives meant that eventually fixed demands would be based upon cadastral units of the land itself, in relation to their potential or assumed average rate of production.

Four obstacles stood between existing conditions and the achievement of these desired aims:

1. The lack of a cadastral survey, the prime essential to any system of land-revenue administration.
2. The lack of knowledge of the taxing authorities as to exact agricultural and marketing conditions, and of the potentialities and the actual yields of agricultural produce.
3. The presence of an agricultural class, from landowners to cultivators, unwilling from motives of self-interest to co-operate with the Government in agricultural assessments.
4. The existence of official personnel, which in many cases was insufficiently trained and was susceptible to outside influence.

If many of the problems remained unsolved to-day as they were in 1932, it has not been for the lack of conscientious effort on the part of both 'Iraqī officials and their British Advisers. The long delayed cadastral survey has been pushed forward. Sir Ernest Dowson, formerly Surveyor-General of Egypt, was

asked in 1929 to study land-tenure and, on the basis of his recommendations,¹ a Land Settlement Department was created in the Ministry of Finance. The deep-rooted conservatism of town and tribe, the lack of experienced staff and the undesirability of sudden changes involving possible serious political consequences made sweeping changes impracticable. Nevertheless, from 1926 onwards, legislation aiming at the simplification of existing methods both of assessment and collection found their way on to the statute books² until a radical change was made by the introduction of the *Istihlak* or Consumption Tax, June 2nd, 1931.³

The *Istihlak* Law, based on the principle of collecting a fixed proportion of the value of a commodity at the time of its sale, has aroused sharp differences of opinion as to its merits. It has been regarded as costly, complicated and difficult of application, affording opportunities of evasion. On the other hand, in spite of its imperfections, it seems to be a step in the right direction towards the simplification of taxation and the relief of a portion of the burden on the small landowners. Although no ostensible effort seems to have been spared to make the incidence of taxation more equitable, there seems to have been a tendency for returns from land-revenue to decrease while other forms of receipts, particularly customs and excise duties, increase. In 1921, land-revenue produced 21.1 per cent of the total receipts, and customs and excise 38 per cent. In 1928, customs and excise returns rose to 45.5 per cent and in 1931, to 48.2 per cent, while land-revenue fell to 22.3 per cent in 1928 and to 9.5 per cent in 1931.

‘Iraqi officials are apt to attribute this phenomenon, on the

¹ Dowson, Sir E. M., *An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions* (Letchworth, 1932).

² Law No. 40 of 1929: *Compilation*, 1929, p. 65; Amendment of Assessment of Land Tax Law, No. 44 of 1929: *ibid.*, p. 92; Law No. 25 of 1929: *ibid.*, p. 30; Law No. 18 of 1927, *ibid.*, 1927: p. 8.

³ *Istihlak* Law No. 83 of 1931, *ibid.*, 1931, p. 68. This Law after being repeatedly amended was repealed when a new Law, No. 59 of 1933, incorporating the amendments, was passed July 16th, 1933. *Ibid.*, 1933, p. 123.

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one hand, to recognition of the long existing necessity of lightening the burdens on agricultural produce, and, on the other, to the fall in world prices. The former argument might be more effective if the principal benefit of the reduction of land-revenue had been widespread and not restricted thus far to the comparatively few large landowners. The fall in world prices did no doubt cause a tremendous decrease in land-revenue but the decrease has been out of all proportion to the fall in prices. It must be observed also that no proportionate decrease occurred in the animal head-tax although the price of animals fell as sharply in 1930 as that of agricultural produce. Thus, while *koda* produced 5.2 per cent of the total receipts in 1921, it produced 7 per cent in 1928 and 6.2 per cent in 1931. The comparatively steady returns are hardly explained by increasing efficiency in collections and by increase in flocks but rather by the fact that most of the animals were owned by tribes whose voices counted for little in official circles.

Less tangible evidence seems to exist for the success of the attempts to eradicate corruption from revenue assessment and collection and from financial administration than for any other aspect of administrative activity, although every British official in the Ministry of Finance has striven for that end. The existence of dishonesty and of jobbery for financial favours, which seems to have increased from 1929-30 onwards, has been one of the most unsatisfactory features of administrative life, as most 'Iraqis admit. The tendency has been to lay the blame upon Turkish ex-officials and upon practices inherited from Turkish days, but the evil seems to be too prevalent to be thus accounted for. The true explanation seems to lie in the fact that public spirit has not yet been able to rise above the natural desire to avoid taxation, no less strong in 'Iraq than in other countries. The attitude of Parliament to personal aggrandisement at the expense of national interests has already been indicated. Even Ministers have been known to take advantage

of their position for their personal profit.¹ Lesser officials have too often followed the example of their superiors. Attempts have been made to impose checks, as by the auditing of government accounts by a British Comptroller and Auditor General responsible only to the Chamber of Deputies. This official has performed his task ably and efficiently,² but the results of his work have not been as extensive as might have been expected, due to the reluctance of Parliament to take action, particularly against highly placed or influential officials.

Justice

Two distinct tasks have fallen to the Minister of Justice in ‘Iraq: the organization and the administrative supervision of the courts and the drafting and codifying of legislation not only for the assurance of public justice but also for the regulation and development of other administrative services.

In the period 1925 to 1932, the number of Civil Courts was extended until they were in operation in varying degrees at forty-eight centres. Criminal Justice continued to be administered by the Civil Judges of these courts and also, in certain cases, by Administrative Inspectors and other senior officials. *Shara’* or Muslim Religious Law Courts continued to be established, not only in all centres where Civil Courts were provided but also in other places. Spiritual Courts to enable the Jewish and Christian communities to deal with their own religious law were set up in 1931,³ in accordance with Articles 78-80 and 112 of the Constitution.

In the creation and administration of the *Shara’* Courts, including those established for the Shi’a sect, a tendency has been noticed to assimilate them with the Civil Courts in order

¹ An outstanding instance has been the passage of legislation, remitting revenue on lands irrigated by pumps, by a Minister of Finance, who, as one of the largest owners of such lands, saved himself £3000 in taxes annually.

² *Audit Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General on Accounts of the Government of ‘Iraq: 1922 . . .* (Baghdad, 1924 . . .).

³ *Compilation, 1931, Armenian Orthodox Community Law, No. 70 of 1931: Jewish Community Law, No. 77 of 1931.*

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that eventually all cases involving Religious Law will be heard in the Civil Courts, along the lines of the Judicial system in force in present-day Turkey. Steps towards that end have been the appointment wherever possible of Civil Judges to act also as *Qādhīs* of the *Shara'* Courts,¹ and the passing of a law legalizing the transfer of law cases from *Shara'* Courts to Civil Courts. These steps have been facilitated both by the ability of the 'Iraqī Civil Judges to administer the *Shara'* Law and by the evident approval of a substantial portion of the public who have found in Turkey, both past and present, the model for 'Iraqī statecraft.

In the administration of justice in tribal areas, the application of the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulations² has continued but with much controversy. On the one hand, it has been held that the tribes represent a class unfamiliar with the laws and conventions applicable in a more highly civilized society, but possessing a code which, although harsh and even repellent, is definite and is recognized among themselves. The code, according to this view, should be applied to the tribes through the Tribal Disputes Regulations until such time as the normal system of justice can be brought into force among them. This has been the viewpoint of the Ministry of Interior charged with administering the Regulations. On the other hand, it is contended that two systems of justice should not exist side by side in 'Iraq; that much evasion of justice has already occurred through non-tribesmen claiming the right to be tried under the Regulations; and that tribesmen must be assimilated by the body politic. This opinion, although it may not be put forward officially by the Ministry of Justice, has nevertheless influenced the policy of responsible 'Iraqī officials in the Ministry. It has also been repeatedly presented in the Chamber, principally by urban deputies who in their speeches have voiced the prejudices of the greater part of the townsmen of 'Iraq.

¹ In 1931, Civil Court Judges were also *Shara' Qādhīs* in 24 places.

² As amended, December 28th, 1924. See *Compilation*, 1924, p. 63.

There can be no escape from the fact that the Regulations have been open to abuse and that revolting crimes have been committed by men who, in spite of their long familiarity with the legal codes, have taken advantage of almost untracable tribal connections to escape punishment strictly due them.

It would seem, however, that now as in 1932 the Regulations represent the only equitable way of dealing with tribesmen. Reforms are no doubt needed, particularly in the definitions between tribesmen and townsmen, but it would also seem that the tribal viewpoint cannot be changed by the mere application of laws to the tribal areas. Until education, land settlement and a liberal-minded official class have brought greater knowledge and familiarity with the customs and conventions prevailing in the rest of ‘Iraq, the extension of the legal system in its entirety will be fraught with injustice and with the gravest political and social dangers.

A great portion of the work of drafting and formulating the legislation which fell to the Ministry of Justice arose from the necessity both of filling in the outline set forth in the Constitution and of bringing into existence the special laws which by the express stipulations of that document were to govern the application of the principles contained in it.

Legislation of the first category which, after being drafted in the Ministry, was passed by Parliament, included the *Liwā* and Municipal Administration Laws;¹ the Jewish and Christian Communal Court Laws, cited above; the Currency Law;² and a series of Regulations for the various Ministries, as well as a number of other laws which put form and substance on the skeleton of the Constitution. Legislation implementing provisions of the Constitution included the Judges and *Qādīs* Law;³ Employment of Foreigners Law;⁴ a Law for determining

¹ *Compilation*, 1927, *Liwā* Administration Law, No. 58 of 1927; *ibid.*, 1931 Municipalities Administration Law, No. 84 of 1931.

² *Ibid.*, 1931, ‘Iraq Currency Law, No. 44 of 1931.

³ *Ibid.*, 1929, No. 31 of 1929.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1927, No. 36 of 1927.

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Conflicts of Jurisdiction between Courts;¹ and other laws interpreting Part V, The Judicature, of the Constitution; the Law of Associations² and the Press Law.³

A further heavy burden on the Ministry of Justice has been the constant necessity of reviewing and of preparing legislative amendments in accordance with the changing needs of the country, to the three forms of law in force in 'Iraq:

- (1) the Ottoman Laws in force in 'Iraq before the British Military Occupation, in so far as they have not been amended or repealed by the enactments of the Army Commander during the Occupation or by the enactments of the successive Governments after the Occupation;
- (2) the proclamations, regulations, or laws issued by the Army Commander, the Civil Commissioner, the High Commissioner, and the 'Iraqi Government, respectively, between the 5th November, 1914, and the 21st March, 1925;
- (3) Laws enacted by the 'Iraqi Parliament since the 21st March, 1925.⁴

Such amending legislation has been of necessity slow and laborious, but it has resulted in the partial redrafting of the Penal Code, the Civil Procedure Code and other legislation inherited from previous regimes.

In the work of the Ministry, both in the Courts and in the supervision of judicial administration and of legislation, the British officials, never more than six in number from 1926 to late 1932, have played decisive parts. These officials in their various positions guaranteed under the Judicial Agreement of 1924, as Adviser to the Minister, as President of the Court of Appeal and as the four Judges of Courts of First Instance, have ensured speedy justice to 'Iraqis as well as to foreigners in so far as has lain within their power. They have also assisted their colleagues in the interpretation of the provisions of the Con-

¹ *Compilation*, 1929, No. 8 of 1929.

² *Ibid.*, 1931, No. 82 of 1931.

³ *Ibid.*, 1926, p. 3.

⁴ *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 83.

stitution. Their principal contribution, however, has been their aid in creating a standard for the administration of justice and the conduct of the courts. Their insistence on justice without regard to distinctions of class or religion and their unfaltering rectitude in conformity with the best British traditions have left what may be hoped is an indelible imprint on the Judicial system of ‘Iraq. To them is due in a great degree the high standard of justice which prevailed in ‘Iraq before 1932. Their task has never been an easy one. The traditions inherited from Ottoman days that justice could be bought and that a Judgeship was a means of amassing a fortune, were too deeply ingrained to be eradicated easily and at once. As great an obstacle to equity in the courts was the unfortunate susceptibility of the Judges to outside influences, personal, official and religious. Thus the decisions of Judges of otherwise impeccable integrity have been known to be swayed by fear of public criticism, of the threatened displeasure of high officials or by political and religious motives.

Education

The British educational policy for ‘Iraq from the time of the Civil Administration largely centred around the provision of primary schools supplemented by denominational schools. The policy of the ‘Iraq Government, in brief, has been the extension of a system of national schools, primary and secondary, accompanied by the gradual elimination of denominational schools with their connotations of foreign and consequently undesirable influences.

Between these two policies has been waged incessant war, in which British officials employed by the Ministry usually gave way, particularly as they were rarely supported by the Residency to the same degree as were their colleagues in other Ministries. Moreover, control passed to ‘Iraqī officials throughout the Ministry earlier than in any other Ministry or

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department, no administrative order in the Ministry being given by a British official after 1923.¹ The responsibility for the educational system thus has been largely 'Iraqī, in spite of the inclination both of 'Iraqī officials and of American education-ists to lay the blame for its deficiencies at the feet of the British officials. Indeed, more influence of foreign origin has been exerted on the educational system by 'Iraqī students returning from American and English schools and Universities than by the British officials of the Ministry.

No government department has been a greater source of optimism for the continued development of 'Iraq, both to 'Iraqī and to foreign observers, than has Education. No other department can point to budget appropriations which have steadily increased from 1921, the amount assigned in 1932 to Education being more than double the sum in 1921.² No other Ministry can show such concrete and progressively achieved results. The number of primary schools for boys has increased from 124 in 1921 to 247 in 1930, the enrolment increasing from 12,226 to 24,885. In the same period, girls' schools have increased from 27 to 44, with an increase in enrolment from 3849 to 6003. During this period, secondary and intermediate schools have grown from four, with an estimated attendance of

¹ *Progress of 'Iraq*, p. 224.

² A summary of the expenditures of the Ministry of Education, 1921-32) in lacs of rupees) is as follows:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Percentage of Budget to total expenditure</i>
1921-22	19'36	3'3
1922-23	19'94	4'1
1923-24	18'15	4'0
1924-25	22'13	4'59
1925-26	23'48	4'43
1926-27	26'93*	5'2
1927-28	27'42	4'74
1928-29	32'01	5'33
1929-30	37'18	6'42
1930-31	38'41	7'5
1931-32	39'98	7'9

* The budget of the Antiquities Department and of the Engineering School was added to the Budget in this year and in subsequent years.

238 students, to fifteen with 1863 students. Nor has the increase in schools been attended by a decrease in the quantity or quality of the teachers, although they are admittedly still inadequate in numbers and in training. The return of ‘Iraqi students sent abroad at the expense of the Government in lieu of setting up its own Higher Educational Institutions has brought fresh blood, progressive ideas and new standards to Education to an extent not equalled by any other Ministry. Careful efforts have also been made, particularly in recent years, to adapt Western methods to ‘Iraq instead of blindly adopting them. In this respect, the educational system in vogue in present-day Turkey has been looked to as furnishing a model.

Notwithstanding these praiseworthy achievements, concern has been expressed both by ‘Iraqis and by others lest various tendencies, now observable in the educational system, mar the work of the Ministry. Such trends seem to be: the extension of the number of schools without maintaining their grade or the standard of work required by them; the failure of the Ministry to dissociate itself entirely from political struggles and controversies; and the acquisition by students of the view that education is vocational rather than cultural in aim and that government positions should be the reward of their school certificates. On the ability of the educational system to free itself from these handicaps, either by the wise direction of educational affairs on the part of those in authority or by the growth of a new attitude on the part of the people themselves, will depend much of the continued progress of ‘Iraq.

In other fields, a health service has been in existence since the British Occupation, a Medical School has been created at Baghdad, plague and cholera checked and sanitary regulations for the corpse traffic to the Holy Cities imposed. On the other hand, the Medical School has been unable to provide sufficient highly trained graduates with a willingness to take posts in outlying districts. Medical centres are unable to reach but a small portion of the total population. Malaria, tuberculosis and eye dis-

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eases are still rampant and infant mortality is distressingly high.

In agriculture the wave of optimism of the early 1920's has ebbed away. The Agricultural School at Rustam has been curtailed in funds, in purpose and in function. Improved machinery and agricultural methods foreshadowed during the British Occupation have not been introduced generally and are still regarded with disfavour in many quarters. Cotton, once believed to be the crop in which 'Iraq would rival the Sudan and India has been rendered unprofitable by boll-weevil, by hot winds, by the reluctance of the *fallahīn* to cultivate a strange crop which does not provide a living for themselves as it grows, and by the drastic fall in world prices. Wheat and barley remain of low quality, the foreign market being practically lost. Improvement in packing and marketing dates, 'Iraq's principal crop, has been apparent but effective co-operation among the growers is still lacking. Cheering features, however, have been the negotiations whereby Japan may take 'Iraqi wool and the signature of an agreement between 'Iraq and Palestine, December 14th, 1936, granting 'Iraq a free zone at Haifa and numerous commercial concessions.¹ The favourable trade balance of £217,000 for 1934-35, recently announced by the Ministry of Finance, is also encouraging.²

Large-scale industries are, for the present, practically not existent although a number of projects, such as cement making, have been under consideration for some time. The Department of Labour Affairs, necessitated by 'Iraq's entrance into the League of Nations has had few important matters to come into its hands, although a law protecting 'Iraqi labour against foreign competition has been recently passed.³

These brief summaries of tendencies apparent in the political, economic and social life of 'Iraq seem to indicate, on the basis of absolute standards, the development of 'Iraq along unsatisfactory lines. It is only fair, however, in judging a government

¹ *G.B. and E.*, March 11th, 1937.

² *Al-'Iraq*, September 7th, 1936.

³ *G.B. and E.*, December 26th, 1935.

so recent in origin and a people so recently brought into contact with larger ideas than have motivated them for centuries past, that a relative standard of judgment should be applied. On such a standard the League of Nations itself was obliged to assess the readiness of ‘Iraq for independence, in response to the firm insistence on the part of the Mandatary, which declared in its special report presented to the League in 1931:

His Majesty’s Government have never regarded the attainment of an ideal standard of administrative efficiency and stability as a necessary condition either of the termination of the Mandatory Regime or of the admission of ‘Iraq to membership of the League of Nations. Nor has it been their conception that ‘Iraq should from the first be able to challenge comparison with the most highly developed and civilised nations in the modern world.¹

On the basis of a similar standard it can be confidently stated that ‘Iraq not only achieved unprecedented development in the period from 1914 to 1932, and particularly since 1921, but much of the development has been maintained since 1932. The development at the time of ‘Iraq’s entrance into the League may not have been so great as put forward in the Official Reports or in the statements made by British representatives to the League of Nations, nevertheless it has been very real. Less than a score of years previous to 1932, ‘Iraq was an isolated lethargic mal-administered portion of the Ottoman Empire. In 1932, as since that time, ‘Iraq has occupied a strategic position on the highway of air-communications. It possesses the machinery of a modern democratic state although the control is now centred in a Government backed by military force. It belongs by general acceptance to the international community, having assumed the obligations of a sovereign nation for international agreements.

In reaching this state of development, ‘Iraq has undergone a period of direct British control, first under military and then

¹ *Progress of ‘Iraq*, p. 11.

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under civil administration, followed by a period of tutelage. Under the first of these regimes, the administrative and economic development took place according to the dictates of an Anglo-Indian administration, apparently determined to make of 'Iraq an Indian province. Under the mandatory regime, extending from 1920 to 1932, 'Iraq was forced to accept the restricting hand of the mandatory Power but, at the same time, was able to count upon its support and assistance.

The British Government, as Mandatary, had assumed definite responsibilities from the League: the granting of assistance for the development of 'Iraq's political and social institutions, for its economic regeneration and for its protection from external enemies. These obligations it was not unprepared to honour but only on its own conditions, imposed in a manner which, as has been indicated, guaranteed its position in the country. These conditions do not seem to have been laid down because of any inherent lack of sympathy with 'Iraq's national aspirations. On the one hand, the British Government felt unable to relinquish the Mandate, for fear of losing prestige, until it had satisfied world opinion that as Mandatary its obligations had been fulfilled. On the other hand, the British Government was unwilling to give up its favoured position in 'Iraq until it had achieved the aims for which, in accordance with British policy in the Middle East for the past century and a half, it had occupied 'Iraq. These aims included the control of the land route to India, now vital to the British Empire as the result of the development of air-transport; the assurance of peace and order in the strategic centre of the Middle East; the extension and protection of British commerce; and the control of the existing and potential oil-producing districts of 'Iraq and Persia. Until these objectives were achieved, through the establishment of a stable government, 'friendly to and bound by gratitude and obligations to H.B.M. Government',¹ the 'Iraqi Nationalists seem to

¹ Instructions of H.M. Government to the High Commissioner of 'Iraq, cited *Admin. Report*, 1927, p. 11.

have had little effect on British policy. Although agreeing to the progressive restatement of its relations with ‘Iraq, the British Government diminished no whit of its insistence that its advice, through the High Commissioner and the British officials, be taken; that its assistance, as outlined in the Treaty and the Agreements, be employed; and that its will as the mandatory Power be the ultimate authority.

If the formal relinquishment, October, 1932, by Great Britain of her right to control the affairs of ‘Iraq except in accordance with the Treaty and Agreements still in force, marked another stage in ‘Iraq’s political existence, the work of development has not been completed. In the continued re-organization of finances, in the perfection of the Judicial system, in the raising of education standards, and in the extension of agriculture, irrigation and means of communication still lie much to be done. Hopeful signs of governmental action would seem to appear in the current version of the frequently altered Five Year Capital Works Plan with its provision for irrigation projects, roads, bridges, 130 schools and numerous health centres,¹ in the proposed Health Campaign,² and in the recently created Agricultural Bank,³ and in the many new proposals laid before the Chamber by the new Government.

‘Iraq’s recent treaty of friendship with Sa‘ūdī Arabia, April 2nd, 1936,⁴ and her amiable relations with Turkey seem to point to the removal of these two external dangers. Within the country still lie the problems of the creation of a social class of citizens, now beginning to appear, capable and willing to assume political duties from a sense of public duty and not of personal aggrandizement, the evolution of a free Press motivated by public spirit rather than by individual or party grievances, the assurance of free elections, and the elimination of sectarian and sectional animosities which will eradicate the antipathies between tribesmen and townsmen, will bring the Shi‘is into

¹ *G.B. and E.*, April 9th, 23rd, 1936.

² *N.E. and I.*, August 8th, 22nd, 1935.

³ *G.B. and E.*, March 26th, 1936.

⁴ Text: *ibid.*, April 23rd, 1936.

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the body politic, will create a real bond between Kurds and Arabs, and provide adequate protection to all minorities within the State.

If the past progress of 'Iraq has been a matter of concern to a wider group than merely the people of 'Iraq, so also is the problem of its future. The first of the mandated territories to achieve the right 'to stand alone' as contemplated by the drafter of the League of Nations Covenant, 'Iraq, the model Mandate, has been the object of special interest to believers in the mandate system, to whom its future will bring additional proof of the success or failure of the Mandate idea. 'Iraq's progress, followed in the past as providing confirmation or refutation of Great Britain's assurances that she had fulfilled the obligations laid on her as Mandatary, will furnish new evidence concerning Great Britain's trusteeship. To the Arab Nationalists in Syria and Lebanon, whose demands for independence have been both stimulated and assisted by 'Iraq's achievements, 'Iraq's future will either provide new arguments for treaty revision or supply France with reasons for resisting Nationalist demands. Of even greater importance will be the effect of the future on the welfare of the 'Iraqīs themselves: Kurds and Arabs; townsmen and tribesmen; *fallahīn* and landowners; and Muslims, Jews and Christians.

The future is not without its dark aspects, but if the new regime can provide stability with a much needed discipline, if it will be motivated by foresighted and courageous statesmanship, and if the people of 'Iraq can and will devote themselves to the tasks which lie before them with the same energy which they expended in achieving independence, the position of 'Iraq among the progressive states may yet be assured.

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GENERAL MAUDE'S PROCLAMATION¹

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE BAGHDAD VILAYET

In the name of my King and in the name of the peoples over whom he rules, I address you as follows:

Our military operations have as their object the defeat of the enemy and the driving of him from these territories. In order to complete this task I am charged with absolute and supreme control of all regions in which British Forces operate, but our Armies have not come into your Cities and Lands as Conquerors, or enemies, but as Liberators.

Since the days of Hulaku your Citizens have been subject to the tyranny of strangers, your palaces have fallen into ruins, your gardens have sunken in desolation and your forefathers and yourselves have groaned in bondage. Your sons have been carried off to wars not of your seeking, your wealth has been stripped from you by unjust men and squandered in distant places.

Since the days of Midhat Pasha the Turks have talked of reforms yet do not the ruins and wastes of to-day testify to the vanity of those promises?

It is the wish, not only of my King and his peoples, but is also the wish of the Great Nations with whom he is in alliance, that you should prosper, even as in the past, when your lands were fertile, when your ancestors gave to the world literature, science and art and Baghdad was one of the wonders of the world.

Between your people and the Dominions of my King there has been a close bond of interest and for 200 years have the Merchants of Baghdad and Great Britain traded together in mutual profit and friendship. On the other hand, the Germans and Turks, who have despoiled you and yours, have for twenty years made Baghdad a centre of power from which to assail the power of the British and the Allies of the British in Persia and Arabia. Therefore, the British Government cannot remain indifferent as to what takes place in your country, now or in the future, for, in duty to the interests of the British people and their Allies, the British Government cannot risk

¹ *Proclamations*, 1914-1919, Proclamation No. 9, pp. 5-6.

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that being done in Baghdad again which has been done by the Turks and Germans during the war.

But you, the people of Baghdad, whose commercial professions and whose safety from oppression and invasion must ever be a matter of the closest concern to the British Government, are not to understand that it is the wish of the British Government, to impose upon you alien institutions. It is the hope of the British Government that the aspirations of your philosophers and writers shall be realized once again. The people of Baghdad shall flourish and enjoy their wealth and substance under institutions which are in consonance with their sacred laws and their racial ideals. In the Hejaz the Arabs have expelled the Turks and Germans who oppressed them and have proclaimed Sharif Hussain as their King and His Lordship rules in independence and freedom and is the ally of the Nations who are fighting against the power of Turkey and Germany. So, indeed, are the noble Arabs, the Lords of Nejd, Koweit and Asir.

Many noble Arabs have perished in the cause of freedom at the hands of those alien rulers, the Turks, who oppressed them. It is the determination of the Government of Great Britain and the Great Powers allied to Great Britain that these noble Arabs shall not have suffered in vain. It is the desire and hope of the British people and Nations in alliance with them that the Arab race may rise once more to greatness and renown amongst the peoples of the Earth and that it shall bind itself to this and in unity and concord.

O! People of Baghdad. Remember that for twenty-six generations you have suffered under strange tyrants who have ever endeavoured to set one Arab house against another in order that they might profit by your dissensions. Therefore, I am commanded to invite you, through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives, to participate in the management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the Political Representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British Army so that you may unite with your kinsmen in the North, East, South and West in realizing the aspirations of your race.

Army Headquarters,
Baghdad

F. S. MAUDE, Lieut.-General,
Commanding British Forces
in 'Iraq

The 19th March, 1917
(24th Joma-al-Awal, 1335)

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APPENDIX II

BALFOUR DECLARATION¹

2 November, 1917

'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

APPENDIX III

PRESIDENT WILSON'S TWELFTH POINT²

8 January, 1918

POINT XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guaranties.

APPENDIX IV

THE ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION³

The end which France and Great Britain have in view in their prosecution in the East of the war let loose by German ambition is

¹ From facsimile of original letter, Stein, *op. cit.*

² *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, Vol. cxi (1918), p. 950 ff.

³ *Proclamation, 1914-1919*, Proclamation No. 32, November 8th, 1918, p. 21.

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the complete and definitive liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national Governments and Administrations drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of indigenous populations.

In order to give effect to these intentions France and Great Britain are agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of indigenous Governments and Administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, which have already in fact been liberated by the Allies, and in countries whose liberation they are endeavouring to effect, and to recognize the latter as soon as they shall be effectively established. Far from wishing to impose any particular institution on these lands, they have no other care but to assure by their support and effective aid the normal working of the Governments and Administrations, which they shall have adopted of their free will. To ensure impartial and equal justice, to facilitate economic development by evoking and encouraging indigenous initiative, to foster the spread of education and to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy — such is the rôle which the two allied Governments assume in the liberated territories.

APPENDIX V

TENTATIVE DRAFT OF ARAB INSTITUTIONS¹

Central Government

Arab Ministers with English Advisers.

Say: For Interior, Finance, Justice, Education, Public Works, Commerce or Agriculture(?), Waqf(?).

Council of Ministers

Consisting of Arab Ministers and Advisers.

To be the Supreme Legislative body for the whole country.

No elected legislative body at present.

Local Government

English Commissioners — Arab Deputy Commissioners or vice versa.

¹ Memorandum by Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, Baghdad, 1919.

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Provincial Council

General powers of legislation; exception of subjects reserved for Council of Ministers, e.g., cf. laws relating to India Local Councils.

All local laws to be submitted to this body, but Commissioners to have power not to accept their amendments or to issue law not withstanding their rejection.

I see no reason why this body should not be elected, special plans to be made for initial representation.

APPENDIX VI

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COUNCIL OF STATE ¹

I. The Council of State should realize that at any rate until the convening of a National Assembly for the purpose of deciding the future Constitution of 'Iraq, I, as High Commissioner, am personally and directly responsible to His Majesty's Government for the administration of the country. Accordingly, in the event of difference of opinion between myself and the Council of State in reference to matters under disposal, the final decision will rest with me.

II. In view of the fact that the elections for an Assembly and its convocation must necessarily take some time, I have decided upon taking preparatory measures for the conduct of the actual administration (with the exception of such questions as concern foreign policy and military considerations) under my supervision by the formation of a Council of State under the presidency of His Highness the Naqib as President. Such Council shall consist of Ministers, some of whom will preside over the various Departments of State, while the others will be Members of Council without portfolio.

III. The Head of each State Department will be the Minister in charge of it and the administration of such Department will vest in him subject —

(a) To the control of the Council over the action of the Ministers.

¹ *Note on the Establishment of a Council of State for 'Iraq*, India Office, B. 363, November 30th, 1920, pp. 4-5.

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(b) To the hearing of the views expressed by the British officers selected by me as Advisers to the several Departments.

As regards the functions of these Advisers, they are to be not executive but advisory, but I trust that the Council and the members in charge of Departments will realize that the officers whom I select for the post of Adviser, having been so selected owing to their long experience of the working of the administration and their knowledge of the conduct of the departments attached to the said Ministries, it is necessary both that attention should be paid to their views and that the latter should be taken into careful consideration.

(c) To the fact that in the last resort supreme control will vest in my own person.

iv. It seems to me that the best method of conducting the affairs of the Departments of State will be by the reference of all matters concerning a particular Ministry to its Minister through his Adviser, and it will be incumbent on the latter to refer communications and papers received to his Minister without delay, in order that the Minister may be able to take action for the disposal of the matter after consulting the Adviser. Similarly, if a Minister desires to initiate action in regard to any matter concerning his Ministry, it is necessary either that he should call his Adviser into consultation in the first instance or that he should send his orders to the Department concerned through the Adviser so that the latter may be able to put forward his views before the matter takes final shape.

v. Such being the position, it is necessary to make provision for the contingency of a difference of opinion on any matter between the Minister and his Adviser, thus:

(a) If in any case the Adviser tenders advice to his Minister and the latter feels unable to accept such advice, the Minister should call the Adviser into consultation. If they are unable to arrive at an agreement after discussion of the matter, and if the Adviser considers the matter of sufficient importance to be pursued further, he will have the right to ask the Minister to refer the matter to the Council of State for consideration. It will then be incumbent on the Minister to suspend action on the matter until the next meeting of the Council, when the subject will be brought before it.

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(b) In the interval which occurs while the matter is being referred to the Council the Minister and Adviser have full discretion to refer the matter to me as High Commissioner. I shall thus have an opportunity of conveying my views to the Council of State without the least prejudice to the procedure provided for in Article x of this programme.

vi. As regards the Council, it is necessary that it should hold regular meetings at least once a week or even more, as may be necessary.

vii. To facilitate the business of efficient administration the Council requires a competent Secretary and a clerical staff, for the appointment of whom steps should be taken without delay.

viii. All business to be brought before the Council meeting for discussion should be intimated by the Minister concerned to the Secretary of the Council, who will prepare a list of agenda for each meeting in time for circulation —

(a) To the High Commissioner,

(b) To all Ministers and Advisers,

at least twenty-four hours before the time fixed for the meeting. As a general rule no question not included on the agenda paper should be discussed at such meeting. At any rate, no formal resolution should be taken on it, except in the case of any matter of great urgency the prompt disposal of which is essential.

ix. The Secretary will attend all meetings of the Cabinet and will prepare a record of the proceedings of such meetings in the form of a list and statement of matters in respect of which resolutions have been passed. These lists will be circulated within twenty-four hours of such meeting under the Secretary's signature —

(a) To the High Commissioner.

(b) To all Ministers and Advisers.

Each Minister will be responsible to give effect to resolutions of the Council affecting it and to report such action to the Secretary for the information of the Council at subsequent meetings. In accordance with the usual practice the deliberations of the Council are to be considered confidential and it is not permitted to disclose them outside the Council.

x. All resolutions of the Council will be final, subject to their

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confirmation by myself as Head of the Government. I must also reserve for myself the right inherent in me as High Commissioner to veto or modify on grounds of expediency any resolution passed by the Council.

xI. In order that the Council may be kept informed of all matters appertaining to the subjects included in the agenda, the presence of the Adviser will be necessary at the meetings of the Council while any matter affecting the Ministry to which he belongs is under discussion. He will have the right in the course of the proceedings to tender his advice regarding the matter under consideration, but he will not take part in the recording of votes.

xII. It is my confident hope that the instructions above set forth in regard to the working of the Council of State and the several Ministries and their relations with myself on the one hand and with the Advisers on the other will conduce to the smooth progress of the administrative machinery at Headquarters.

As regards the central departments at present engaged in the work of administration, in view of the fact that for several years past they have been working smoothly, the attachment of them to the new scheme of Government, after the necessary adjustments, should offer no serious difficulty. As regards the administration of the provinces, it is probable that we shall be confronted with a good many difficulties — but In‘Shallah they will admit of solution.

xIII. As you all know, the administration of the various districts and sub-districts of ‘Iraq is still, as it has been for some time past, conducted by an organization of British Political Officers, with suitable local personnel in minor administrative posts as D.A.P.O.s and Mudirs, etc.; some districts are still in a disturbed state and British troops are still present therein; consequently in such places it is difficult to make the change from British to indigenous personnel in the immediate circumstances; on the other hand, there are districts in which it is possible to take the necessary steps in the desired direction as soon as competent personnel is forthcoming.

xIV. And whereas it is among the duties of the Council of State to devise administrative measures to promote the speedy pacification of the provinces, the said Council should give their early attention to the selection of experienced and suitable candidates from indigen-

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ous elements of the population for appointment by degrees to those posts where such appointment is expedient. Having done so, they should formulate their proposals with the names of candidates recommended in each case for my consideration and orders.

APPENDIX VII

SPEECHES MADE BY AMĪR FAISAL

(Excerpts from, after his arrival in Baghdad, 1921)¹

(i) *Speech of Amīr Faisal to the Mōsul Delegation*

‘I say to you that the British Government is taking a wise line and fully intends to fulfil the promises made to my father in order to make the Arab Nation a true ally in the Middle East. The painful events which took place between me and the French have forced me to persevere in my efforts in the cause for which we arose in some other Arab country. Whereas ‘Iraq is of importance to us as well as to the Arabs, my father delegated me in accordance with the wishes of ‘Iraqis to perform this duty. I assure you that ‘Iraq will remain independent with a constitutional government, free from all errors. Very shortly the national congress will be summoned and will introduce the constitutional law of this new Kingdom. I add, that in accordance with Mr. Churchill’s declaration, ‘Iraq will be an independent ally of Great Britain.’

(ii) *Speech at a Dinner given by Amīr Faisal to the Ministers and Notables of Baghdad, 16 July²*

‘I assure you that the British Government has determined to assist the inhabitants to establish an Independent Constitutional Government, thus fulfilling the promise made to my father.

‘Moreover, the British Government has declared its readiness to help you as a friend to a friend in accordance with its historical tradition. . . . I am certain that when the permanent government is established and the Congress held, that it will look on this matter as I do and that we will be able to establish friendship between Great

¹ *Al-‘Iraq*, July 7th, 1921.

² *Lisān al-‘Arab*, July 18th, 1921.

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Britain and the Arabs on such foundation as cannot be shaken and on promises which will preserve our honour and independence and safeguard our material interests.

‘Our duty is to maintain our independence on a strong basis that we may keep it forever.’

(iii) *Speech to the Jewish Community of Baghdad, 18 July¹*

‘There is no meaning in the words Jews, Muslims and Christians in the terminology of patriotism, there is simply a country called ‘Iraq, and all are ‘Iraqīs.

‘I ask my countrymen the ‘Iraqīs to be only ‘Iraqīs because we all belong to one stock, the stock of our ancestor Shem; we all belong to that noble race, and there is no distinction between Muslim, Christian and Jew. To-day we have but one means to our end: the race.’

(iv) *Speech to the Shaikhs, Ramadi, 25 July, 1921²*

‘Brothers! my word is yours and I deal with you as brother towards his brother, and as a friend towards his friend and not as a ruler towards his subjects. I am not a foreigner to you. You may accept my word in all confidence. I came to you knowing you to be Arabs and Beduin, and for the last four years I have not been in similar surroundings. All Muslims should be brothers. I have no doubt that you approach me with requests as subjects approach their ruler. I, in turn, ask you, tribesmen, to keep the peace. I must ask the tribesmen like Fahād Beg and ‘Alī as-Sulaimān each of whom is equal to a thousand, and those who are present to act on behalf of those who are absent. The past has passed away. In the future you and I will demand certain things from each other just as I now ask the Arabs to guard themselves and to be done with past evils and troubles. We have had enough of pillage and robbery. Now that God has granted us our wish, we should give our thoughts rest and devote ourselves to the promotion of our best interests and the building up of our country, which things are in the interests of both the ruler and the ruled. Such things are attainable only by peace and loyalty.

‘In the future, when the tribes gather together, we will look into any differences existing between them. I shall call the tribal chiefs

¹ *Al-‘Iraq*, July 19th, 1921.

² *Al-Dijla*, August 1st, 1921.

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and speak to them of the past. Muslims are brothers. They look up to no one but to me and the Government. Those present shall inform those who are absent. No one may raid another. This is what I want to tell you.'

At this point Fahād Beg rose and addressed the Shaikhs, saying: 'Do you want other than this?'

They all answered: 'No! No!'

Amīr Faisal then said: 'Will you be responsible to me for those who disobey?'

They replied: 'Your orders shall be obeyed and God shall bear witness to this.'

'What you order shall be done,' said 'Alī as-Sulaimān.

Fahād Beg added: 'We shall obey your orders because the British Government is your ally.'¹

Amīr Faisal replied: 'We are in agreement with them [the British] and we must settle our affairs among ourselves.'

To this Fahād Beg replied: 'As to the Arabs, we will be responsible to you that 'Anaiza and Dulaim will be under your orders.'

'Alī as-Sulaimān then said: 'I undertake the same responsibility.'

Amīr Faisal said: 'There is another matter. Under a proper settlement, Arab traditions and the word of Arab rulers will be respected. I will be present among them, and will call together tribal chiefs and settle their disputes.'

(v) *Speech to the Catholic Christians of Baghdad, 30 July*²

'I thank this noble community which has given this reception. I make no difference between one community and another, because we are all noble 'Iraqīs, and I, therefore, thank them for their confidence in my person, firstly, as an Arab and secondly, as an 'Iraqī. I desire to benefit from all the inhabitants of this country, whatever community or religion they belong to, and from every individual as well, so that we may regain our ancient glory. I also desire to make use of the qualifications and efficiency of each individual with-

¹ Amīr Faisal was clearly taken aback by this frank definition of the situation. See also Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 615.

² *Al-Fallah*, July 31st, 1921.

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out consideration of personality or religion. All present or absent, must know that this is my belief. All must know that there is neither majority nor minority in this country. The minority are the majority and vice versa. We must make use of any person whomsoever he may be and choose him to carry on the work which he can do; and I therefore desire the nation to help me by maintaining tranquillity and peace. All 'Iraq looks to independence and civilization, the Beduin and the villager alike. For I see the Beduin who never came before to the cities are now asking for a piece of ground to cultivate and a canal to irrigate it. This also makes me hope for success.

'We need two things: firstly, the maintenance of peace in all parts of 'Iraq and secondly, patience. Let me say that 'Iraq for eight hundred years has been governed by foreigners, passing from one tyranny to another till it reached its present stage. Give me one year for every hundred, or one for every two hundred — in four years time come and ask me for an account of what I have done. But you must not be in too great a hurry, you must not be rash: do not let the sentiments of race and patriotism boil in your blood. The nation is busy with the swearing of allegiance. There may be some difference of formulas but all aim at one goal — independence. We must work with tranquillity and not hurry, lest we fall before reaching fundamental needs.

'I, Faisal, say to you, that my desire is Arab independence. Who does not wish for independence? The very beasts of the field desire it. If I did not hope to attain it I would not be here. I am determined to overcome obstacles and I am certain the nation will support me.

'Let me say a word of a more general kind about the inter-relation of states. All are busy with their own affairs and every nation that desires to live must form a part of the community of people so that the interests of all may be realized. We are wanting in men of learning and experts, and money, materials and all that is necessary to civilization. These will not drop from heaven but we must ask for them from one of the nations of the world. The nearest nation to us, geographically and economically, is Great Britain, and our interests agree with theirs. So we stretch out our hand for mutual support as a free independent people and ask

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assistance as a younger brother demands from an elder, as a freeman from a freeman, not as a slave from a master, but as a friend from a friend.

‘I am the friend of the British, and I ask the nation to hold towards them the friendship of the free to the free.’

APPENDIX VIII

H. M. KING FAISAL'S ACCESSION

(Telegrams Exchanged on the Occasion of)

(i) *Telegram from H.M. King George V to H.M. King Faisal*¹

‘I offer Your Majesty my sincere congratulations on this historical and moving occasion when by the overwhelming vote of the people of Iraq the ancient city of Baghdad has once again become the seat of an Arab Kingdom. It is a source of deep gratification to myself and my people that combined military effort of British and Arab forces and those of their Allies has culminated in this memorable event. The treaty which will shortly be concluded between us to consecrate the alliance into which we entered during the dark days of the war, will, I am confident, enable me to fulfil my solemn obligations by inaugurating an era of peace and renewed prosperity for Iraq.’

(Signed) GEORGE, R.I.

(ii) *Telegram in reply from H.M. King Faisal*

‘I am profoundly touched and greatly rejoice at the Royal and gracious favour which you have extended towards me and towards my people in Your Majesty’s message.

‘On this auspicious day when Baghdad the city of the Khalifs has become for the second time the capital of an Arab Kingdom, I recall with pride how white has been the hand of Your Majesty and Your noble people in the achievement of Arab aspirations. I am confident that the Arab Nation will justify Your Majesty’s

¹ *Iraq Admin. Report, October, 1920, to March, 1922, pp. 9-10.*

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reliance on the success of their efforts to regain their pristine glory provided that they continue to enjoy the support and friendship of Great Britain. I doubt not that the treaty which will be concluded between us, will strengthen the bonds of alliance already cemented with the mingled blood of Briton and Arab on the battle-fields of the Great War and that it will be established on unshakable foundation.

‘Finally, I wish Your Majesty and your honoured Nation continued prosperity and enduring glory.’

(Signed) FAISAL

APPENDIX IX

PROTOCOL OF 30 APRIL, 1923

(To the Treaty with King Faisal, Signed 10 October, 1922)¹

We, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries of HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY and of HIS MAJESTY the KING of ‘IRAQ respectively, having been duly authorized, met together this 30th day of April, 1923, corresponding to the Ramazan, 1341, in order to sign the following Protocol to the Treaty of Alliance concluded between Their Majesties aforesaid on the 10th of October, 1922, corresponding to 19th Sa‘far, 1341, Hijrah, subject to ratification.

PROTOCOL

It is understood between the High Contracting Parties that, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 18, the present Treaty shall terminate upon ‘Iraq becoming a Member of the League of Nations and in any case not later than four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey. Nothing in this Protocol shall prevent a fresh agreement from being concluded with a view to regulating the subsequent relations between them before the expiration of the above period.

IN WITNESS OF WHICH the respective Plenipotentiaries have affixed their signatures thereto. Done at Baghdad in duplicate this

¹ Cmd. 2120.

A P P E N D I C E S

thirtieth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-three of the Christian Era, corresponding with the fourteenth day of Ramazan, one thousand three hundred and forty-one, Hijrah.

P. Z. Cox
His Britannic Majesty's High
Commissioner in 'Iraq

ABDUL MUHSIN AL SA'ADUN
Prime Minister of the 'Iraq
Government

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SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

THIS study has been based upon the source materials enumerated below.

1. UNPUBLISHED OFFICIAL TELEGRAMS, DISPATCHES, MEMORANDA AND MINUTES

Most of these unpublished documents have been made available for the first time for study through the kindness of the India Office, the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office. Citations from them have been noted in the text of this study.

2. PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS, TREATIES, REPORTS

A partial list of the published documents are given below. The writer believes that he has seen every report concerning 'Iraq. These include

- (a) Interdepartmental and other reports made by the British Administration and by the 'Iraq Government.
- (b) Reports of H.M. Government to the League of Nations.
- (c) Reports of special Commissions, as those sent by the League of Nations.
- (d) Minutes, in Arabic, of the Constituent Assembly, 1924.

Some of these Reports, especially those concerning the early days of the British Occupations, have been seen in manuscript form through the kindness of H.M. Ambassador at Baghdad. Where possible the writer has cited these and the Interdepartmental Reports, many of which were originally secret or confidential, rather than the reports prepared for general circulations, although many of the latter are extremely valuable for facts and statistics concerning 'Iraq, 1914-32.

3. NEWSPAPERS

During his residence in Baghdad, the writer was able to draw upon the files of the *Baghdad Times* (now the *'Iraq Times*) and of nearly all vernacular newspapers published in 'Iraq from 1921. Newspapers and periodicals of Great Britain, France, Italy and of other countries have also been used.

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4. BOOKS AND ARTICLES

In so far as possible this study is based on original sources but a large number of works in English, French, Arabic, etc., on 'Iraq and the Middle East have been used, principally to confirm or amplify those facts obtained at first hand or the writer's own judgments. A selected list of works is given below.

5. INTERVIEWS

These have included an audience with His Majesty King Ghazi, interviews with practically every 'Iraqi statesman and dignitary who has taken part in the creation of modern 'Iraq, with the former High Commissioners of His Britannic Majesty in 'Iraq and with many of the British Officials who from 1915 to the present have participated in the affairs of government and administration of 'Iraq.

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